Reply – Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion
— by Ted Ted
Chief Justice Roberts got this one right & did so in direct contravention to Justice Stevens abortive ruling in Kelo v. the City of New London Connecticut, which ironically issued 10-years ago on June 23, 2005.

Now Kelo must be overturned by stare decisis as it ignores the basic tenets of the U.S. Constitution relative to private property rights; albeit, not some of them, but all of them. In Kelo, big-Pharma/Corporate America greased & lined everyone's pockets (as evinced by the intense participation in the case & the many amici-curie or friend of the court briefs submitted) to effect the illegal taking of private property (beach-front homes) & turned it over to privately held corporations via a false claim that private corporations held the same Police Power as the state or the federal government. They do not. Neither does a privately held non-profit corporation such as the UBCJA, greasing politicans, federal attorneys & judges aside.

The UBCJA International cannot claim a Police Power as a sovereign specifically reserved to the state or federal government to effect a regulatory taking of personal property rights via a private contract bewteen the UBCJA International and the United States Attorneys Office via a court imposed Consent Decree and private contract as it, and its ultimate end - elimination of the right of exclusion by the locals & district council as that action effects a per se taking.

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Oral Argument Audio & Transcript:

http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2014/14-275



(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
HORNE ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 14–275. Argued April 22, 2015—Decided June 22, 2015


The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate “marketing orders” to help maintain stable markets for particular agricultural products. The marketing order for raisins established a Raisin Administrative Committeethat imposes a reserve requirement—a requirement that growers setaside a certain percentage of their crop for the account of the Government, free of charge. The Government makes use of those raisins by selling them in noncompetitive markets, donating them, or disposing of them by any means consistent with the purposes of the program. If any profits are left over after subtracting the Government’s expenses from administering the program, the net proceeds are distributed back to the raisin growers. In 2002–2003, raisin growerswere required to set aside 47 percent of their raisin crop under the reserve requirement. In 2003–2004, 30 percent. Marvin Horne, Laura Horne, and their family are raisin growers who refused to set aside any raisins for the Government on the ground that the reserverequirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property for public use without just compensation. The Government fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins as well as additional civil penalties for their failure to obey the raisin marketing order. The Hornes sought relief in federal court, arguing that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property underthe Fifth Amendment. On remand from this Court over the issue of jurisdiction, Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 569 U. S. ___, the Ninth Circuit held that the reserve requirement was not a FifthAmendment taking. The court determined that the requirement was not a per se taking because personal property is afforded less protection under the Takings Clause than real property and because the


2 HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Syllabus

Hornes, who retained an interest in any net proceeds, were not completely divested of their property. The Ninth Circuit held that, as in cases allowing the government to set conditions on land use and development, the Government imposed a condition (the reserve requirement) in exchange for a Government benefit (an orderly raisin market). It held that the Hornes could avoid relinquishing large percentages of their crop by “planting different crops.” 730 F. 3d 1128, 1143.

Held: The Fifth Amendment requires that the Government pay justcompensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real property. Any net proceeds the raisin growers receive from thesale of the reserve raisins goes to the amount of compensation theyhave received for that taking—it does not mean the raisins have notbeen appropriated for Government use. Nor can the Government make raisin growers relinquish their property without just compensation as a condition of selling their raisins in interstate commerce.Pp. 4–18.

(a)
The Fifth Amendment applies to personal property as well as real property. The Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes yourhome. Pp. 4–9.

(1)
This principle, dating back as far as Magna Carta, was codified in the Takings Clause in part because of property appropriations by both sides during the Revolutionary War. This Court has noted that an owner of personal property may expect that new regulation of the use of property could “render his property economically worthless.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1027–1028. But there is still a “longstanding distinction” betweenregulations concerning the use of property and government acquisition of property. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 323. When it comes to physical appropriations, people do not expect their property, real or personal, to be actually occupied or taken away. Pp. 4–8.

(2)
The reserve requirement imposed by the Raisin Committee isa clear physical taking. Actual raisins are transferred from the growers to the Government. Title to the raisins passes to the Raisin Committee. The Committee disposes of those raisins as it wishes, topromote the purposes of the raisin marketing order. The Government’s formal demand that the Hornes turn over a percentage oftheir raisin crop without charge, for the Government’s control anduse, is “of such a unique character that it is a taking without regardto other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 432. Pp. 8–9.

(b) The fact that the growers are entitled to the net proceeds of the
Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

Syllabus

raisin sales does not mean that there has been no taking at all.When there has been a physical appropriation, “we do not ask . . . whether it deprives the owner of all economically valuable use” of theitem taken. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U. S., at 323. The fact that the growers retain a contingent interest of indeterminate value does not mean there has been no taking, particularly when that interest depends on the discretion of the taker, and may beworthless, as it was for one of the two years at issue here. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, distinguished. Once there is a taking, as in the case of a physical appropriation, any payment from the Government in connection with that action goes, at most, to the question of just compensation. Pp. 9–12.

(c)
The taking in this case also cannot be characterized as part of avoluntary exchange for a valuable government benefit. In one of the years at issue, the Government insisted that the Hornes part with 47 percent of their crop for the privilege of selling the rest. But the ability to sell produce in interstate commerce, although certainly subjectto reasonable government regulation, is not a “benefit” that the Government may withhold unless growers waive constitutional protections. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, distinguished. Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 279 U. S. 392, distinguished. Pp. 12–14.

(d)
The Hornes are not required to first pay the fine and then seekcompensation under the Tucker Act. See Horne, 569 U. S., at ___. Because they have the full economic interest in the raisins the Government alleges should have been set aside for its account—i.e., theyown the raisins they grew as well as the raisins they handled, havingpaid the growers for all of their raisins, not just their free-tonnageraisins—they may raise a takings-based defense to the fine leviedagainst them. There is no need for the Ninth Circuit to calculate the just compensation due on remand. The clear and administrable rule is that “just compensation normally is to be measured by ‘the market value of the property at the time of the taking.’ ” United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U. S. 24, 29. Here, the Government already calculated that amount when it fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins. Pp. 14–18.
750 F. 3d 1128, reversed.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.