Reply – Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion
— by Ted Ted

The UBCJA urges that the national crisis in 1999 demanded a broad and intensive co-operative effort by the Contractor Associations, and that this necessary co-operation was carried out by the adoption and implementation of Mobility Rules on a National level. But the statutory plan is not simply one for voluntary effort. It does not seek merely to endow voluntary trade or industrial associations or groups with privileges or immunities. It involves the UBCJA’s coercive exercise and the exaction of Congressional valid lawmaking and legislative power passed off as a simple “internal rules change” governed by the UBC Constitution and its subordinate Regional & District Council By-Laws.

The UBC International and its subordinate Regional & District Councils seek to abolish the Congressional power to legislate, substitute their internal union by-laws and constitution for that of the United States and the Congress.

The UBCJA International & Regional/District Councils are exercising a veto power over the 22-Right to Work States inherent sovereignty to control & legislate their own Employment laws and in the instance of the 28-Non Right to Work States, the UBC INTERNATIONAL & LATHAM & WATKINS seek to pre-empt Federal laws by application of a Right to Work State law and apply those laws to all 50-States nationwide.

The UBC International simply does not have such powers, nor can they violate the property right of the Geographical Jurisdiction of the NYCDCC, and its inherent source of wealth for its members, the workers & employees which the NLRA, LMRDA, the USAO and the Federal Court and its decisions protect and which the Federal Constitution of the United States and Supreme Court precedents demand.

In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the United States Supreme Court at second wrote:

“Second. The Question of the Delegation of Legislative Power. - We recently had occasion to review the pertinent decisions and the general principles which govern the determination of this question. Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 , 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed . 446. The Constitution provides that 'All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.' Article 1, 1. And the Congress is authorized 'To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' its general powers. Article 1, 8, par. 18.

The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. We have repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting [295 U.S. 495, 530]   legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national Legislature cannot deal directly. We pointed out in the Panama Refining Company Case that the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. But we said that the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained. Id., 293 U.S. 388 , page 421, 55 S.Ct. 241”.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), at 15:

“But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to Trade or Industrial Associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section 1 of title 1? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress…”.