– Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion
In Reply To
PRIMARY JOB SITUS – PER THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, NLRA Sec. 14(b)
U.S. Supreme Court Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976) Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp. No. 74-1254 , Argued March 29, 1976 Decided June 14, 1976 426 U.S. 407
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act permits union- or agency shop agreements between employers and unions, but § 14(b) authorizes States to exempt themselves from § 8(a)(3) and to enact "right-to-work" laws prohibiting union or agency shops. About two years after petitioner unions and respondent employer had entered into an agency shop agreement covering seamen employed on respondent's oil tankers, respondent brought suit claiming that the agreement was invalid and unenforceable because it violated Texas' right-to-work laws. Since, inter alia, all final decisions for hiring the seamen are made in Texas, the majority of the then employed seamen reside in Texas, and respondent's personnel records are maintained and payroll checks are written there, the District Court held that Texas had an "intimate concern" with the agreement, notwithstanding that the seamen spend the vast majority of their working hours away from Texas on the high seas, and that therefore Texas' right-to-work laws were applicable under § 14(b) and rendered the agreement void and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stressing that Texas was the place of hiring.
1. lt is the employees' predominant job situs, rather than a generalized weighing of factors or the place of hiring, that triggers operation of § 14(b), and, under § 14(b), right-to-work laws cannot void agreements permitted by § 8(a)(3) when the situs at which all the employees covered by the agreement perform most of their work is located outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 412-419.
(a) Insofar as § 8(a)(3) deals with union and agency shop agreements, it focuses both in effect and purpose on post-hiring conditions, conditions that have a major impact on the job situs. Pp. 426 U. S. 414-416.
Page 426 U. S. 408
(b) Similarly, § 14(b)'s primary concern is with state regulation of the post-hiring employer employee-union relationship, the center of which is the job situs, i.e., the place where the work that is the very raison d'etre of the relationship is performed; and because of this close relationship between § 14(b) and job situs, § 14(b) does not allow enforcement of right-to-work laws with regard to an employment relationship whose principal job situs is outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 416-418.
(c) Under the job situs test, as opposed to a "place of hiring" test, the possibility of patently anomalous extraterritorial applications of any given State's right-to-work laws will be minimized, and parties entering a collective bargaining agreement will easily be able to determine in virtually all situations whether a union or agency shop provision is valid. Pp. 426 U. S. 418-419.
NEW YORK is not a RIGHT to WORK (RTW) State, yet that is what Doug and his Corporate Minions are seeking to push through via full mobility - that is to say, the enforcement of RTW Laws in a Non-Right to Work State such as NEW YORK.
The GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION of the NYCDCC is your source and element of wealth as defined by Tropiano and the 2nd Circuit. It is where you ply your craft, your trade, your skills, sweat and equity. The primary Job Situs is in NYCDCC's turf, not some right to work State. The UBC International's McCarron thinks that buying the services of a former Federal Judge somehow allows him to initiate a defacto reversal of the NLRA Section 14(b) as it directly applies to Federal pre-emtion, state sovereignty and New Yorks non-right to work status. Neither McCarron or Conboy have the power or the authority to usurp the role of the Congress to amend or alter Federal law, yet that is exactly what is going on here, why we have play-skool (pun intended) down at Courtroom 21B at the Federal Courthouse.
Geographical Jurisdiction, under the NLRA, LMRDA is an express Property Right which has directly both tangible and intangible apsects therein, all of which are protected by law and by the U.S. Supreme Court....if only we could get the USAO & the Court to enforce the laws already on the books and without their allowing McCarron, Conboy & the yet vetted and still very corrupt Contractor Associations (Wall & Ceiling etc.) to carve out an exception without submitting any formal motion to the Court or any follow on legal brief's.
The simple fact is, Judge Haight's 67/33% Ruling is in fact still on the Books and has not been over-ruled.
The SDNY and Judge Berman should not allow a corrupt Contractor Association and a corrupt International Union and it's General President and his hired Gun, the former IRO to directly threaten, coerce and intimidate the men, the USAO, the RO via a 5-page intro letter from a former 2nd Circuit Judge who also ruled upon Criminal RICO matters, and who now stains his own past record and legacy, and directly threaten the Court that should everyone not simply fall in line and acquiesce to the direct threats and demands for full mobility and 100% Contract Association Control over the New York City that no Contract will in fact be signed.
Mobility & Primary Job Situs: