Reply – Re: The locals have outlived their usefulness
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Re: The locals have outlived their usefulness
— by Ted Ted
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Board%20Decisions/279/VOL279-145.pdf

NEW LINK:

https://www.nlrb.gov/case/32-CA-005760

Carpenters Local 925 was the lead case used by the International UBCJA to consolidate power to a Council level. However, it did reveal other aspects of Labor Law relevant to Locals & their powers, as well as "affiliation" rationale.

 - Business Agents are Supervisors under the NLRA
 - Respondent Local is an integral part of a multi-state enterprise
 - Sup Ct. - Labor Unions should be treated like any other Employer with regard to their own Employees, 353 U.S. 313 (1957)
 - Respondent District Council does not remit any funds on its own behalf to the UBCJA, its 5 affiliated Locals, in the aggregate, during calender year 1983, remitted to the UBCJA per capita taxes in an amount in excess of of $100k, and the subject Local in excess of $28k
 - page 1059, std. 3-prong test for prima-facie case showing under Wright Line, also discusses "pre-textual" matters.

This case led directly to the new Council Structure which began in 1988 under Sig Lucassen. McCarron then jumped on it & abused it to his desires & push for all out Dictatorial Control of the International & the Councils under his direct Authority and he has systematically changed the UBCJA Constitution so that the majority of it falls so far outside the NLRA, LMRA, LMRDA & Appellate & Supreme Court landmark & precedent cases that McCarrons UBCJA Constitution has all but negated every law on the book relative to labor.

What should be gleaned form this case, is simply this - w/o Funding, the District Councils have no power. Without Funds and the per capita tax the District Council does not exist!

When Locals elect leaders with the brains and hire competent legal counsel to represent members interests; they shall with-hold said funding (per capita tax), dis-affiliate and/or conduct a decertification election if need be & watch the Councils drown in red ink. The Locals within a Council have to band together to fight this & simultaneously with-hold the funding.

Can the Councils survive for a while, get injunctions, play legal games - sure, but so too can the Locals.

The Key Test is simply this: 

Who is the Integral Part of a Multi-State Enterprise engaged in Commerce; the Local, or the Council?

Answer - the Local is. The Council does not exist "but for" the Local. The same can be said for Doug McCarron and the International UBCJA as well as each and every Benefit Trust Fund, all funds of which are generated by wage deductions with-held from employees pay.

Without the 'employee', none of the Benefit Trust Funds would exist; thus, their false claim that they are a 'separate entity' and/or legal 'corporation' fails. That's nothing more than a paper charade so they can get their hands on the billions of dollars in with-held employee wages.
_________________________________

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Carpenters Local 608, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (Various Employers) and John Harte and Franklin McMurray and Eugene Clarke. Cases 2-CB-9767, 2-CB-9811, and 2-CB-981230 April 1986

VOL 279 NLRB No. 99; pg's. 747-749 excerpts:
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS DENNIS AND JOHANSEN

On 26 March 1985 Administrative Law Judge Steven B. Fish issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three member panel.

The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.I....

ALJ - Stephen B. Fish
A hearing was held before me with respect to the allegations in the complaint in New York, New York, on December 12, 20, 21, and 22, 1983, and April 10 and 11, 1984. Briefs have been received from Respondent and the General Counsel and have been duly considered. On the entire record,4 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. JURISDICTION
Building Contractors Association Inc. (BCA) and the Cement League (the Associations) are associations of employers engaged in the construction and building trades, and which exist for the purposes of representing their employer-members in collective bargaining and negotiating and administering collective-bargaining agreements
with labor organizations, including the District Council of New York and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (District Council and Respondent).

Annually, the employer-members of each of the Associations, in the course of their business operations, collectively purchase goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from firms located outside the States wherein the employer-members are located. It is admitted and I find that each of the Associations and their respective employer-members are now, and have been at all times material herein, employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
It is also admitted and I so find that Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

II. FACTS
A. Respondent's Hiring Hall Procedures

At all times material herein, Respondent has been a constituent member of the District Council, which includes all Local Carpenter Unions within the city of New York. For a number of years Respondent, as a constituent member of the District Council, was a party to a series of collective-bargaining agreements with the various Associations covering employees falling within the jurisdiction of Respondent. A collective-bargaining agreement running from July 1, 1981, to June 30, 1984, was executed by the parties, and was binding on and enforced and maintained by Respondent during this period of time.

Article VI, section 2, of the agreement provides:

The first Carpenter on the jobsite shall be referred by the Union. The Second Carpenter shall be the Employer's selection. The balance shall be 50% from the Union and 50% from the Employer. The Union will cooperate, in order to meet all legal requirements, and furnish qualified Carpenters when requested. A working Job Steward shall be appointed by the Union.

When an Employer, in compliance with this Section, requests the District Council to send men to a job, the District Council shall cooperate by sending only such as are experienced in the specific type of carpentry work being done on the said job by that Employer. There shall be no discrimination of any kind against any person covered by this agreement, based on race, religion, age, sex, national orgin or Union affiliation with respect to hiring, firing, or any other conditions of employment.

Article VII, entitled "Job Referral System," provides that: In the referral of applicants by the Union for employment as provided for in Article VI, Section 2, by the following provisions shall govern:

Section 1. The Union shall establish and maintain an open employment list for the employment of competent workmen. This list shall be established and maintained on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be based on, or in any way affected by race, creed, color, nationality, age, sex, or Union membership, by-laws, rules, regulations, constitutional provisions of any other aspect or obligation of Union membership, policies or requirements.
________________

And what did the UBCJA International, Judge Conboy, R.O. Dennis Walsh and the U.S. Attorney and Judge Berman do with the last Contracts (CBA's) with the corrupt Contractor Associations; with the 150+ PLA's and $5 Billion dollars in Wage & Benefit consessions (kick-backs to developers & contractor association racketeers) but base the contracts (CBA's) and 100% Full Mobility on "Union Membership, UBCJA International, Dennis Walsh & Contractor Association authored By-Laws, rules, regulations and the UBCJA's facilally unlawful Constitution & Obligation" all of which were, are and remain illegal under NLRB Board precedent, federal law and U.S. Supreme Court precedent; and for the lawyers, their sworn obligation to uphold the laws & statutes as written not as they wished them to be, and to enforce all precedents of the courts. Instead of ending racketeering, they've all willfully or unwillfully furthered it by design or by stupidity and sheer ignorance of the the laws & precedent they were sworn to uphold; or both.
___________

All criminal suspects are innocent until proven guilty in a court of law; or are they?

- cont. -
page 754 NLRB Board Decision & Order dated April 30,1986
(remains good law and has never been over-turned)

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Exclusivity of the Hiring Hall

Respondent contends that its hiring hall herein is nonexclusive in nature, because in order for such an arrangement to be considered exclusive, "all" hiring authority must be reserved to the Union. I do not agree. {As the authors above falsely claim with respect to 100% FULL MOBILITY}

It is well settled that a hiring is deemed to be exclusive where the union retains exclusive authority for referrals for some specified period of time, such as 24 or 48 hours, before an employer can hire on its own. Mountain Pacific Chapter AGC, 119 NLRB 883 (1957); Boilermakers Local 587 (Stone & Webster), 233 NLRB 612, 614 (1977); Carpenters Local 78 (Murray Walter), 223 NLRB 733, 734-735 (1976). Thus to the extent that that union retains such exclusive authority during this period, it operates an exclusive hiring hall.

Similarly, an exclusive hiring hall can also exist where an employer has the contractual right to bring in a certain number or percentage of employees onto a job. Bricklayers Local 8 (California Mason Contractors), 235 NLRB 1001, 1003 (1978). Thus the employers herein have given up and delegated to Respondent the right to hire the first employee on the job and 50 percent of the remainder after the employer selects a second employee.

I conclude that to such an extent an exclusive hiring hall is contemplated by the agreement. Heavy Construction Laborers Local 663 (Robert A. Treuner), 205 NLRB 455, 456 (1973).26 Since the record is bereft of any evidence that the terms of the contract have not been adhered to, I conclude that to the extent specified, Respondent operates an exclusive hiring hall, and is subject to the obligations and requirements which flow from such a finding.27

B. The Obligation to Permit Inspection of and Supply
Information Regarding Respondent's Referral Records


It is well settled that a union which operates an exclusive hiring hall breaches its duty of fair representation in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it arbitrarily denies requests of its members for job referral information, where such requests are reasonably directed towards ascertaining whether such members have been properly treated in connection with the operation of the hiring hall. Operating Engineers Local 324 (AGC of Michigan),
226 NLRB 587 (1976); Bartenders Local 165 (Nevada Resort), 261 NLRB 420 (1982); Electrical Workers IBEW Local 575 (Coleman Electric), 270 NLRB 66, 69-70
(1984).
 The Board has found violations with respect to the denials of various types of requests in this connection, such

page 755
as inspecting the hiring hall lists,28 copying the lists,29 or even asking the union to compile and furnish hiring hall information.30

Even where a union operates a nonexclusive hiring hall, the Board has found that the union still owes a duty of fair representation towards those who seek to utilize its services. Bricklayers Local 8, supra at 1005-1008; Plumbers Local 13 (Mechanical Contractors of Rochester), 212 NLRB 477, 479 (1974); Crouse Nuclear Energy Services,
240 NLRB 390 (1979).

This duty has been held to have been violated where the union in a nonexclusive hiring hall discriminatorily refuses its members access to and services of the hiring hall because they have engaged in intraunion political activity. Operating Engineers Local 4 (Carlson Corp.), 189 NLRB 366 (1971); Teamsters Local 923 (Yellow Cab), 172 NLRB 2137 (1968); Crouse Nuclear, supra. The Board has also found the duty of fair representation to have been violated where the operator of a nonexclusive hiring hall refused to permit the utilization of the hiring hall, because of other arbitrary reasons, such as the fact that the applicant was not a union member or because he worked for a nonunion contractor, Plumbers Local 13, supra, or because of his nonunion status and because he refused to pay a fine to a sister local. Bricklayers Local 8, supra.

In the instant case the evidence is more than sufficient to support a finding that the various requests of the Charging Parties were denied because of activities in opposition to the policies of Respondent and its incumbent officials, including their reelection.

SECTION 38:   HIRING HALL OR JOB REFERRAL SYSTEM
 
The Executive Committee of the Council shall maintain, and all workers shall be governed by, uniform rules and/or procedures consistent with the Consent Decree, and any other Order entered in United States v. District Council, et al., 90 Civ. 5722, for the registration and/or referral to employment of unemployed workers. Workers shall have the right to seek work and be employed throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the Council. The referral of all workers to jobs shall be performed by the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Representatives, organizers and agents of the District Council may not otherwise refer members to jobs or in any way inform an employer that a member is available for employment. The Executive Secretary-Treasurer shall maintain records of all worker registration and referrals, which shall be reviewed regularly by the Executive Committee and which may be reviewed by any member upon reasonable request.

NYCDCC is not a Non-Exclusive Hiring Hall as feigned to the NLRA by D.C. counsel & the I.M. and the UBCJA International & Contractor Associations claiming 100% Full Mobility via their collective & phony declarations to the NLRA's ALJ Green or the NLRB Board.

NYCDCC by the terms and conditions of the contracts (CBA's) and the rules of the Hiring Hall as established by the Executive Committee, the R.O. and as reviewed & approved by the U.S.A.O. and the Court have revealed two things:

1)   The NYCDCC is the Local; therefore requiring Elections for all E-Board positions w/o limitations, and;

2)   The NYCDCC is an Exclusive Hiring Hall by its operative By-Law language as authored by the UBCJA International, its corporate counsel Latham & Watkins & the R.O. Dennis Walsh and consented to by the U.S.A.O. (government) and approved by Federal District Court Judge Richard M. Berman at their behest; and by the law & precedent established through the Board, Appellate & U.S. Sup. Ct. precedent - period.
__________________

Anon - where are you now? This is your baby!

States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government. The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most detailed organizational chart. The Constitution instead "leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 246 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment.

Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.

________________

Nor may the UBCJA compel Right to Work laws in states which have not approved them as McCarron has done by forcing his 100% Full Mobility Right to Work scam upon the Federal District Court or the NLRB via his fraudulent submission of the phony CEMENT LEAGUE case in NYC or the Board in Washington D.C..

McCarron says its so and the spineless US Attorneys Office & the I.M. Glen McGorty and his predecessor always second the motion due to sheer arrogance, incompetence or both - leaving the Federal court as frustrated with these buffoons as the rank & file.

Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1986). Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, "this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases "correction through legislative action is practically impossible." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved, see Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 405-411 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 458 (1852), the opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving procedural and evidentiary rules.

FULL TEXT OF CASE BELOW:

http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/553/639.html


United States Supreme Court

BRIDGE ET AL. v. PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY CO. ET AL., (2008)

No. 07-210

Argued: April 14, 2008    Decided: June 9, 2008


Each year the Cook County Treasurer's Office holds a public auction to sell its tax liens on delinquent taxpayers' property. To prevent any one buyer from obtaining a disproportionate share of the liens, the county adopted the "Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule" (Rule), which requires each buyer to submit bids in its own name, prohibits a buyer from using "apparent agents, employees, or related entities" to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel, and requires a registered bidder to submit a sworn affidavit affirming its compliance with the Rule. Petitioners and respondents regularly participate in the tax sales. Respondents filed suit, alleging that petitioners fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by filing false compliance attestations. As relevant here, they claim that petitioners violated and conspired to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through a pattern of racketeering activity involving mail fraud, which occurred when petitioners sent property owners various notices required by Illinois law. The District Court dismissed the RICO claims for lack of standing, finding that respondents were not protected by the mail fraud statute because they did not receive the alleged misrepresentations. Reversing, the Seventh Circuit based standing on the injury respondents suffered when they lost the chance to obtain more liens, and found that respondents had sufficiently alleged proximate cause because they were immediately injured by petitioners' scheme. The court also rejected petitioners' argument that respondents are not entitled to relief under RICO because they had not received, and therefore had not relied on, any false statements.
 
Held: A plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Pp. 6-21.
 
     (a) In 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation," as pertinent here, of §1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with" a qualifying enterprise "to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity," including "mail fraud," §1961(1)(B). Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mail "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice." §1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any " 'mailing ... incident to an essential part of the scheme' ... satisfies the mailing element," Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705, 712, even if the mailing "contain[s] no false information," id., at 715. Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents' theory of the case is straightforward. Petitioners nonetheless argue that because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity is predicated on mail fraud, respondents must show that they relied on petitioners' fraudulent misrepresentations, which they cannot do because the misrepresentations were made to the county. Nothing on the statute's face imposes such a requirement. Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate racketeering act under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation, see Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 24-25; and one can conduct the affairs of a qualifying enterprise through a pattern of such acts without anyone relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation. Thus, no reliance showing is required to establish that a person has violated §1962(c) by conducting an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity predicated on mail fraud. Nor can a first-party reliance requirement be derived from §1964(c), which, by providing a right of action to "[a]ny person" injured by a violation of §1962, suggests a breadth of coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit first-party reliance requirement. Moreover, a person can be injured "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud even if he has not relied on any misrepresentations. For example, accepting respondents' allegations as true, they were harmed by petitioners' scheme when they lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been awarded. Pp. 6-10.
 
     (b) None of petitioners' arguments--that under the "common-law meaning" rule, Congress should be presumed to have made reliance an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute; that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud must show reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations in order to establish proximate cause; and that RICO should be interpreted to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the "overfederalization" of traditional state-law claims--persuades this Court to read a first-party reliance requirement into a statute that by its terms suggests none. Pp. 10-21.
 
477 F. 3d 928, affirmed.
 
     Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

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Every member concerned about their current status or their future in the NYCDCC should read this case. The above portion is the syllabus only. See the link for the full case.

After absorbing it, please think about who the guilty parties are; and why they are guilty and what evidence you have in the form of written or electronic communications from them; whether the International, the D.C., your Local and/or from Officers or Delegates which would confer standing on you as an individual and/or as a certified class

There is so much damning evidence in this case it's sickening and the 'players' in this extortive game wherein racketeering has not ended but accelerated under their watch know exactly who they are and what I am speaking of.


MAIL and WIRE FRAUD; re:


The BLUE CARD:

**   The Blue Card Vacation Wage Hobbs Act extortion scheme, approximating $81.25 Million dollars.
 
BY-LAW SECTION 21 MISAPPROPRIATION/CONVERSION:

**   The Bilello, McGinnis & Cavanaugh and Walsh By-law Sec. 21 misappropriation, reallocation and illegal conversion of wages in multiple contracts to the Welfare Fund, approximating $38 Million dollars per year, prending total man-hours recorded under each contract; allegedly verifiable via the new electronic scanners.
 
The CONTINUATION OF PREDICATE RICO ACT VIOLATIONS

**   Continuation of NYCDCC racketeering occurred while allegedly under the watchful eyes of the United States Attorneys Office and the court appointed Review Officers notwithstanding their gross dereliction of duty and negligence as the parties with standing to allegedly (cough) represent member interests; while illegally denying rank & file member due process rights for their immediate and very direct interests in both issues above.

 
The CEMENT LEAGUE & 100% FULL MOBILITY RACKETEERING:

**   Continuation of the racketeering scheme via the intentional ignoring of the NLRA in its entirety, Board precedent and long known Appellate & U.S. Supreme Court precedent as directly related to the 100% Full Mobility scheme and the recent phony/false filing of the Cement League case by the UBCJA International, in concert with the NRCC - which misappropriated the entirety of the NYCDCC's jurisdictional territory and your man-hours for wages and benefits (deferred compensation) to those not entitled to it; and which is your primary source & element for creating wealth as a District Council member.


The NYCDCC's criminal racketeering case has gone on unabated for 25-1/2 years and that fact along with the near 22-year old private contract known as the Consent Decree are both an Abortion of Justice.

The United States Attorneys Office has openly & hostilely turned a blind eye to all of it, it refuses to press further charges against the UBCJA International for their direct role in not only continuing the racketeering, but accelerating it.

The U.S. Attorney has allowed the UBCJA International & the former R.O. Dennis Walsh to abuse the NLRA, LMRA, LMRDA, ERISA, SEC & IRS regualations to the point where these public laws are unrecognizeable and the Court and two judges have allowed it and they have allowed the former R.O. to pursue a clearly illegal agenda and directly couch participants in the misappropriation of rank & file member pay raises, in direct concert with Union & Employer Trustees and Fiduciaries and the D.C & Benefit Trust Funds legal counsel in an ongoing act of criminal racketeering and hand the raises over to the Welfare Fund.
     
**   The U.S. Attorney has refused to investigate, audit, seat a grand jury or indict any of the long list of those who can & should be so charged.
     
**   The U.S. Attorney has refused to file charges or to force the Welfare Fund to remiburse members whose wages were stolen one red cent.



The U.S. Attorneys malfeasance in their direction & handling of this case is a disgrace. Ben Torrance & Preet Bhararra by their very silence thus condonde this racketeering and Judge Berman and others should act to see to it that they are removed from the case.

**   Your 'standing' in the case can no longer be denied - courtesy of the U.S. Supreme Court.


Everyone knows the line "Show me the Money", "Show me the Quan" - well, where is it? Why haven't you got yours back? Why are all you boys in NYC allowing these clowns to shit all over your Federal rights?

EXCERPT, FULL ECASE:
 Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
 
     The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§1961-1968, provides a private right of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Act's criminal prohibitions. §1964(c). The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud must plead and prove that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that a showing of first-party reliance is not required, we affirm.

_________________

All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?

JOHN BRIDGE, et al., PETITIONERS v. PHOENIX
BOND & INDEMNITY CO. et al.
 
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
 
[June 9, 2008]
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.

     
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§1961-1968, provides a private right of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Act's criminal prohibitions. §1964(c). The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud must plead and prove that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that a showing of first-party reliance is not required, we affirm.
 

I
 
     Each year the Cook County, Illinois, Treasurer's Office holds a public auction at which it sells tax liens it has acquired on the property of delinquent taxpayers.1 Prospective buyers bid on the liens, but not in cash amounts. Instead, the bids are stated as percentage penalties the property owner must pay the winning bidder in order to clear the lien. The bidder willing to accept the lowest penalty wins the auction and obtains the right to purchase the lien in exchange for paying the outstanding taxes on the property. The property owner may then redeem the property by paying the lienholder the delinquent taxes, plus the penalty established at the auction and an additional 12% penalty on any taxes subsequently paid by the lienholder. If the property owner does not redeem the property within the statutory redemption period, the lienholder may obtain a tax deed for the property, thereby in effect purchasing the property for the value of the delinquent taxes.
 
     Because property acquired in this manner can often be sold at a significant profit over the amount paid for the lien, the auctions are marked by stiff competition. As a result, most parcels attract multiple bidders willing to accept the lowest penalty permissible--0%, that is to say, no penalty at all. (Perhaps to prevent the perverse incentive taxpayers would have if they could redeem their property from a winning bidder for less than the amount of their unpaid taxes, the county does not accept negative bids.) The lower limit of 0% creates a problem: Who wins when the bidding results in a tie? The county's solution is to allocate parcels "on a rotational basis" in order to ensure that liens are apportioned fairly among 0% bidders. App. 18.
 
     But this creates a perverse incentive of its own: Bidders who, in addition to bidding themselves, send agents to bid on their behalf will obtain a disproportionate share of liens. To prevent this kind of manipulation, the county adopted the "Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule," which requires each "tax buying entity" to submit bids in its own name and prohibits it from using "apparent agents, employees, or related entities" to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel.2 App. 67. Upon registering for an auction, each bidder must submit a sworn affidavit affirming that it complies with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule.
 
     Petitioners and respondents are regular participants in Cook County's tax sales. In July 2005, respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, contending that petitioners had fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by violating the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule at the auctions held from 2002 to 2005. According to respondents, petitioner Sabre Group, LLC, and its principal Barrett Rochman arranged for related firms to bid on Sabre Group's behalf and directed them to file false attestations that they complied with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule. Having thus fraudulently obtained the opportunity to participate in the auction, the related firms collusively bid on the same properties at a 0% rate. As a result, when the county allocated liens on a rotating basis,3 it treated the related firms as independent entities, allowing them collectively to acquire a greater number of liens than would have been granted to a single bidder acting alone. The related firms then purchased the liens and transferred the certificates of purchase to Sabre Group. In this way, respondents allege, petitioners deprived them and other bidders of their fair share of liens and the attendant financial benefits.
 
     Respondents' complaint contains five counts. Counts I-IV allege that petitioners violated and conspired to violate RICO by conducting their affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity involving numerous acts of mail fraud. In support of their allegations of mail fraud, respondents assert that petitioners "mailed or caused to be mailed hundreds of mailings in furtherance of the scheme," App. 49, when they sent property owners various notices required by Illinois law. Count V alleges a state-law claim of tortious interference with prospective business advantage.
 
     On petitioners' motion, the District Court dismissed respondents' RICO claims for lack of standing. It observed that "[o]nly [respondents] and other competing buyers, as opposed to the Treasurer or the property owners, would suffer a financial loss from a scheme to violate the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule." App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. But it concluded that respondents "are not in the class of individuals protected by the mail fraud statute, and therefore are not within the 'zone of interests' that the RICO statute protects," because they "were not recipients of the alleged misrepresentations and, at best were indirect victims of the alleged fraud." Id., at 18a. The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over respondents' tortious-interference claim and dismissed it without prejudice.

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SOUND FAMILIAR? What have the two Lawyers with "STANDING"; one being the Court Appointed Review Officer Dennis Walsh and the Governments lawyers Ben Torrance & Preet Bhararra, for the United States Attorneys Office, S.D.N.Y. and Federal District Court Judge Berman been telling you from day one - "standing denied". Well screw them, the United States Supreme Court says otherwise! You have standing via this precedent and you can sue and recover treble (TRIPLE) damages.

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     The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. It first concluded that "[s]tanding is not a problem in this suit" because plaintiffs suffered a "real injury" when they lost the valuable chance to acquire more liens, and because "that injury can be redressed by damages." 477 F. 3d 928, 930 (2007). The Court of Appeals next concluded that respondents had sufficiently alleged proximate cause under Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258 (1992), and Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451 (2006), because they (along with other losing bidders) were "immediately injured" by petitioners' scheme. 477 F. 3d, at 930-932. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' argument that respondents are not entitled to relief under RICO because they did not receive, and therefore did not rely on, any false statements: "A scheme that injures D by making false statements through the mail to E is mail fraud, and actionable by D through RICO if the injury is not derivative of someone else's." Id., at 932.

     With respect to this last holding, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that courts have taken conflicting views. By its count, "[t]hree other circuits that have considered this question agree ... that the direct victim may recover through RICO whether or not it is the direct recipient of the false statements," ibid. (citing Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Servs., Inc., 18 F. 3d 260, 263-264 (CA4 1994); Systems Management, Inc. v. Loiselle, 303 F. 3d 100, 103-104 (CA1 2002); Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F. 3d 251, 263 (CA2 2004)), whereas two Circuits hold that the plaintiff must show that it in fact relied on the defendant's misrepresentations, 477 F. 3d, at 932 (citing VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210 F. 3d 696, 701 (CA6 2000); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F. 3d 1350, 1360-1361 (CA11 2002)). Compare also Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indemnity Ins. Co., 319 F. 3d 205, 223 (CA5 2003) (recognizing "a narrow exception to the requirement that the plaintiff prove direct reliance on the defendant's fraudulent predicate act ... when the plaintiff can demonstrate injury as a direct and contemporaneous result of a fraud committed against a third party"), with Appletree Square I, L. P. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 29 F. 3d 1283, 1286-1287 (CA8 1994) (requiring the plaintiff to show that it detrimentally relied on the defendant's misrepresentations).
 
     We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. ___ (2008), to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals on "the substantial question," Anza, 547 U. S., at 461, whether first-party reliance is an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud.4


II
 
     We begin by setting forth the applicable statutory provisions. RICO's private right of action is contained in 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), which provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Section 1962 contains RICO's criminal prohibitions. Pertinent here is §1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with" an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." The term "racketeering activity" is defined to include a host of so-called predicate acts, including "any act which is indictable under ... section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)." §1961(1)(B).

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Given this is a June 8, 2008 D & O by the U.S. Sup Ct - every party, (the D.C., The UBCJA International & all of their in-house and hired out legal counsel; the R.O., the USAO-SDNY, & the Federal District Court) were put on notice that this was an available remedy for members obtaining standing; thus - by continually denying "standing"; whether indivdually or as a class to appear in Federal District Court, the practice was both discriminatory on its face and a violation of your Federal Due Process rights under the Constitutional guarantees and provides a seperate cause of action under the ongoing criminal RICO enterprise established by McCrarron, Spencer and others wherein direct & willing participants appeared to have included the RO & USAO, D.C. & Benefit Trust Fund employees as well as multiple Contractor Associations and private contractors & developers.

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     The upshot is that RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to any person injured in his business or property by reason of the conduct of a qualifying enterprise's affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud. Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mail "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do." §1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any "mailing that is incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element," Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705, 712 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), even if the mailing itself "contain[s] no false information," id., at 715.
 
     Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents' theory of the case is straightforward. They allege that petitioners devised a scheme to defraud when they agreed to submit false attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule to the county. In furtherance of this scheme, petitioners used the mail on numerous occasions to send the requisite notices to property owners. Each of these mailings was an "act which is indictable" as mail fraud, and together they constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity." By conducting the affairs of their enterprise through this pattern of racketeering activity, petitioners violated §1962(c). As a result, respondents lost the opportunity to acquire valuable liens. Accordingly, respondents were injured in their business or property by reason of petitioners' violation of §1962(c), and RICO's plain terms give them a private right of action for treble damages.

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Straightforward - 

AS IS the case against the aforementioned parties for screwing you on the BLUE CARD and failing to litigate or your behalf against Insurers & re-Insurers; or to refund any ill gotten (stolen) monies to every member so burned, plus interest; trebled, plus attorneys fees & expenses;

AS IS the case against the aforementioned parties for screwing you on the Hod Hoist, BCA & other CBA's Wage Increase which was illegally converted/misappropriated to the Welfare Fund in yet another demonstrable case of ongoing criminal racketeering - wherein the USAO & RO were direct/willing participants in the cover-up for the theft of funds, the failure to prosecute EST Bilello, President McGinnis, Vice President Cavanaugh; every Trustee & Fiduciary, the in house D.C. legal counsel or the Welfare Fund legal counsel for their role in continuing Crimnal RICO Racketeering in the NYCDCC & for violating the very core of the 1994 Consent Decree to which they were all legally bound. The fact is, both the R.O. & the U.S.A.O were both grossly negligent in their core/sworn duties and so to should be prosecuted for conspiring to cover it up & bury it;

AS IS the current  NLRB Board case being financed & run by the UBCJA International, Doug McCarron & his handlers & the NRCC against the NYCDCC via the CEMENT LEAGUE  - to forever force 100% FULL MOBILITY down your throats and albeit, illegally into NLRB Board precedent wherein the NYCDCC legal counsel James Murphy and the court appointed Independent Monitor McGorty and another retired federal Judge, Judge Jones intentionally hid the facts of this case or its filing from the members; right through the 2-12-16 Board Decision & Order (D & O).
     
Other than ixnaying Lebo & Bilello on our written demands, Walsh, Torrance & Bhararra or Walsh's legal counsel did little else other than cover their own ass.

To date, there has not been one Audit conducted by the former RO Walsh or the current I.M. McGorty for the BLUE CARD or for the SECTION 21 BY-LAW illegal  theft of member Vacation Wages or for the illegal misappropriation/conversion of member Pay Raises to the Welfare Trust Fund and there has not been one Motion filed in Judge Bermans Court to force the D.C. to Refund any member and no criminal or civil charges filed by anyone. The Court however, upon its own motion/action can intiate the process to move this along; less it too lose any & all apparent authority or credibility which it might still hold.


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     Petitioners argue, however, that because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity consisted of acts of mail fraud, respondents must show that they relied on petitioners' fraudulent misrepresentations. This they cannot do, because the alleged misrepresentations--petitioners' attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule--were made to the county, not respondents. The county may well have relied on petitioners' misrepresentations when it permitted them to participate in the auction, but respondents, never having received the misrepresentations, could not have done so. Indeed, respondents do not even allege that they relied on petitioners' false attestations. Thus, petitioners submit, they fail to state a claim under RICO.

     If petitioners' proposed requirement of first-party reliance seems to come out of nowhere, there is a reason: Nothing on the face of the relevant statutory provisions imposes such a requirement. Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate act of racketeering under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation. See Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1999) ("The common-law requiremen[t] of 'justifiable reliance' ... plainly ha[s] no place in the [mail, wire, or bank] fraud statutes"). And one can conduct the affairs of a qualifying enterprise through a pattern of such acts without anyone relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation.
 
     It thus seems plain--and indeed petitioners do not dispute--that no showing of reliance is required to establish that a person has violated §1962(c) by conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of acts of mail fraud. See Anza, 547 U. S., at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Because an individual can commit an indictable act of mail or wire fraud even if no one relies on his fraud, he can engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of §1962, without proof of reliance").If reliance is required, then, it must be by virtue of §1964(c), which provides the right of action. But it is difficult to derive a first-party reliance requirement from §1964(c), which states simply that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" may sue for treble damages. The statute provides a right of action to "[a]ny person" injured by the violation, suggesting a breadth of coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit requirement that the plaintiff show reliance in addition to injury in his business or property.
 
     Moreover, a person can be injured "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud even if he has not relied on any misrepresentations. This is a case in point. Accepting their allegations as true, respondents clearly were injured by petitioners' scheme: As a result of petitioners' fraud, respondents lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been awarded. And this is true even though they did not rely on petitioners' false attestations of compliance with the county's rules. Or, to take another example, suppose an enterprise that wants to get rid of rival businesses mails misrepresentations about them to their customers and suppliers, but not to the rivals themselves. If the rival businesses lose money as a result of the misrepresentations, it would certainly seem that they were injured in their business "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud, even though they never received, and therefore never relied on, the fraudulent mailings. Yet petitioners concede that, on their reading of §1964(c), the rival businesses would have no cause of action under RICO, Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, even though they were the primary and intended victims of the scheme to defraud.

     Lacking textual support for this counterintuitive position, petitioners rely instead on a combination of common-law rules and policy arguments in an effort to show that Congress should be presumed to have made first-party reliance an element of a civil RICO claim based on mail fraud. None of petitioners' arguments persuades us to read a first-party reliance requirement into a statute that by its terms suggests none. 

III
 

A
 
     Petitioners first argue that RICO should be read to incorporate a first-party reliance requirement in fraud cases "under the rule that Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses." Neder, supra, at 23. It has long been settled, they contend, that only the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may recover for common-law fraud, and that he may do so "if, but only if ... he relies on the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action." Restatement (Second) of Torts §537 (1977). Given this background rule of common law, petitioners maintain, Congress should be presumed to have adopted a first-party reliance requirement when it created a civil cause of action under RICO for victims of mail fraud.
 
     In support of this argument, petitioners point to our decision in Beck v. Prupis, 529 U. S. 494 (2000). There, we considered the scope of RICO's private right of action for violations of §1962(d), which makes it "unlawful for any person to conspire to violate" RICO's criminal prohibitions. The question presented was "whether a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy may assert a civil RICO conspiracy claim under §1964(c) for a violation of §1962(d) even if the overt act does not constitute 'racketeering activity.' " Id., at 500. Answering this question in the negative, we held that "injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under RICO is not sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under §1964(c) for a violation of §1962(d)." Id., at 505 (citation omitted). In so doing, we "turn[ed] to the well-established common law of civil conspiracy." Id., at 500. Because it was "widely accepted" by the time of RICO's enactment "that a plaintiff could bring suit for civil conspiracy only if he had been injured by an act that was itself tortious," id., at 501, we presumed "that when Congress established in RICO a civil cause of action for a person 'injured ... by reason of' a 'conspir[acy],' it meant to adopt these well-established common-law civil conspiracy principles." Id., at 504 (quoting §§1964(c), 1962(d); alterations in original). We specifically declined to rely on the law of criminal conspiracy, relying instead on the law of civil conspiracy:
 

"We have turned to the common law of criminal conspiracy to define what constitutes a violation of §1962(d), see Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52, 63-65 (1997), a mere violation being all that is necessary for criminal liability. This case, however, does not present simply the question of what constitutes a violation of §1962(d), but rather the meaning of a civil cause of action for private injury by reason of such a violation. In other words, our task is to interpret §§1964(c) and 1962(d) in conjunction, rather than §1962(d) standing alone. The obvious source in the common law for the combined meaning of these provisions is the law of civil conspiracy." Id., at 501, n. 6.
 
     Petitioners argue that, as in Beck, we should look to the common-law meaning of civil fraud in order to give content to the civil cause of action §1964(c) provides for private injury by reason of a violation of §1962(c) based on a pattern of mail fraud. The analogy to Beck, however, is misplaced. The critical difference between Beck and this case is that in §1962(d) Congress used a term--"conspir[acy]"--that had a settled common-law meaning, whereas Congress included no such term in §1962(c). Section 1962(c) does not use the term "fraud"; nor does the operative language of §1961(1)(B), which defines "racketeering activity" to include "any act which is indictable under ... section 1341." And the indictable act under §1341 is not the fraudulent misrepresentation, but rather the use of the mails with the purpose of executing or attempting to execute a scheme to defraud. In short, the key term in §1962(c)--"racketeering activity"--is a defined term, and Congress defined the predicate act not as fraud simpliciter, but mail fraud--a statutory offense unknown to the common law. In these circumstances, the presumption that Congress intends to adopt the settled meaning of common-law terms has little pull. Cf. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 11) (rejecting the argument that §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78j(b), incorporates common-law fraud). There is simply no "reason to believe that Congress would have defined 'racketeering activity' to include acts indictable under the mail and wire fraud statutes, if it intended fraud-related acts to be predicate acts under RICO only when those acts would have been actionable under the common law." Anza, 547 U. S., at 477-478 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 
     Nor does it help petitioners' cause that here, as in Beck, the question is not simply "what constitutes a violation of §1962[(c)], but rather the meaning of a civil cause of action for private injury by reason of such a violation." 529 U. S., at 501, n. 6. To be sure, Beck held that a plaintiff cannot state a civil claim for conspiracy under §1964(c) merely by showing a violation of §1962(d) and a resulting injury. But in so doing, Beck relied not only on the fact that the term "conspiracy" had a settled common-law meaning, but also on the well-established common-law understanding of what it means to be injured by a conspiracy for purposes of bringing a civil claim for damages. See id., at 501-504. No comparable understanding exists with respect to injury caused by an enterprise conducting its affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud. And even the common-law understanding of injury caused by fraud does not support petitioners' argument. As discussed infra, at 16-17, the common law has long recognized that plaintiffs can recover in a variety of circumstances where, as here, their injuries result directly from the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations to a third party.

     For these reasons, we reject petitioners' contention that the "common-law meaning" rule dictates that reliance by the plaintiff is an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute. Congress chose to make mail fraud, not common-law fraud, the predicate act for a RICO violation. And "the mere fact that the predicate acts underlying a particular RICO violation happen to be fraud offenses does not mean that reliance, an element of common-law fraud, is also incorporated as an element of a civil RICO claim." Anza, supra, at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 

B
 
     Petitioners next argue that even if Congress did not make first-party reliance an element of a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud, a plaintiff who brings such a claim must show that it relied on the defendant's misrepresentations in order to establish the requisite element of causation. In Holmes, we recognized that §1964(c)'s "language can, of course, be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured 'by reason of' a RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that the defendant violated §1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant's violation was a 'but for' cause of plaintiff's injury." 503 U. S., at 265-266 (footnote omitted). We nonetheless held that not "all factually injured plaintiffs" may recover under §1964(c). Id., at 266. Because Congress modeled §1964(c) on other provisions that had been interpreted to "requir[e] a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a 'but for' cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well," we concluded that §1964(c) likewise requires the plaintiff to establish proximate cause in order to show injury "by reason of" a RICO violation. Id., at 268.
 
     Proximate cause, we explained, is a flexible concept that does not lend itself to " 'a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.' " Id., at 272, n. 20 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 536 (1983)). Instead, we "use[d] 'proximate cause' to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts," Holmes, 503 U. S., at 268, with a particular emphasis on the "demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged," ibid.; see also Anza, supra, at 461 ("When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries"). The direct-relation requirement avoids the difficulties associated with attempting "to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors," Holmes, 503 U. S., at 269; prevents courts from having "to adopt complicated rules of apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries," ibid.; and recognizes the fact that "directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely," id., at 269-270.5
 
     Pointing to our reliance on common-law proximate-causation principles in Holmes and Anza, petitioners argue that "[u]nder well-settled common-law principles, proximate cause is established for fraud claims only where the plaintiff can demonstrate that he relied on the misrepresentation." Brief for Petitioners 28. In support of this argument, petitioners cite Restatement (Second) of Torts §548A, which provides that "[a] fraudulent misrepresentation is a legal cause of a pecuniary loss resulting from action or inaction in reliance upon it if, but only if, the loss might reasonably be expected to result from the reliance." Thus, petitioners conclude, "a plaintiff asserting a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud cannot satisfy the proximate cause requirement unless he can establish that his injuries resulted from his reliance on the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation." Brief for Petitioners 28.
 
     Petitioners' argument is twice flawed. First, as explained above, the predicate act here is not common-law fraud, but mail fraud. Having rejected petitioners' argument that reliance is an element of a civil RICO claim based on mail fraud, we see no reason to let that argument in through the back door by holding that the proximate-cause analysis under RICO must precisely track the proximate-cause analysis of a common-law fraud claim. "Reliance is not a general limitation on civil recovery in tort; it 'is a specialized condition that happens to have grown up with common law fraud.' " Anza, 547 U. S., at 477 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Systems Management, 303 F. 3d, at 104). That "specialized condition," whether characterized as an element of the claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, simply has no place in a remedial scheme keyed to the commission of mail fraud, a statutory offense that is distinct from common-law fraud and that does not require proof of reliance.

     Second, while it may be that first-party reliance is an element of a common-law fraud claim, there is no general common-law principle holding that a fraudulent misrepresentation can cause legal injury only to those who rely on it. The Restatement provision cited by petitioners certainly does not support that proposition. It provides only that the plaintiff's loss must be a foreseeable result of someone's reliance on the misrepresentation.6 It does not say that only those who rely on the misrepresentation can suffer a legally cognizable injury. And any such notion would be contradicted by the long line of cases in which courts have permitted a plaintiff directly injured by a fraudulent misrepresentation to recover even though it was a third party, and not the plaintiff, who relied on the defendant's misrepresentation.7 Indeed, so well established is the defendant's liability in such circumstances that the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth as a "[g]eneral [p]rinciple" that "[o]ne who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances." §870. As an illustration, the Restatement provides the example of a defendant who "seeks to promote his own interests by telling a known falsehood to or about the plaintiff or his product." Id., Comment h (emphasis added). And the Restatement specifically recognizes "a cause of action" in favor of the injured party where the defendant "defrauds another for the purpose of causing pecuniary harm to a third person." Id., §435A, Comment a. Petitioners' contention that proximate cause has traditionally incorporated a first-party reliance requirement for claims based on fraud cannot be reconciled with these authorities.

     Nor is first-party reliance necessary to ensure that there is a sufficiently direct relationship between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's injury to satisfy the proximate-cause principles articulated in Holmes and Anza. Again, this is a case in point. Respondents' alleged injury--the loss of valuable liens--is the direct result of petitioners' fraud. It was a foreseeable and natural consequence of petitioners' scheme to obtain more liens for themselves that other bidders would obtain fewer liens. And here, unlike in Holmes and Anza, there are no independent factors that account for respondents' injury, there is no risk of duplicative recoveries by plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violation, and no more immediate victim is better situated to sue. Indeed, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents and other losing bidders were the only parties injured by petitioners' misrepresentations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a; 477 F. 3d, at 931. Petitioners quibble with that conclusion, asserting that the county would be injured too if the taint of fraud deterred potential bidders from participating in the auction. But that eventuality, in contrast to respondents' direct financial injury, seems speculative and remote.

     Of course, none of this is to say that a RICO plaintiff who alleges injury "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud can prevail without showing that someone relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Cf. Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59, 66 (1995) ("No one, of course, doubts that some degree of reliance is required to satisfy the element of causation inherent in the phrase 'obtained by' " in 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A), which prohibits the discharge of debts for money or property "obtained by" fraud). In most cases, the plaintiff will not be able to establish even but-for causation if no one relied on the misrepresentation. If, for example, the county had not accepted petitioners' false attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule, and as a result had not permitted petitioners to participate in the auction, respondents' injury would never have materialized. In addition, the complete absence of reliance may prevent the plaintiff from establishing proximate cause. Thus, for example, if the county knew petitioners' attestations were false but nonetheless permitted them to participate in the auction, then arguably the county's actions would constitute an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation between petitioners' misrepresentations and respondents' injury.
 
     Accordingly, it may well be that a RICO plaintiff alleging injury by reason of a pattern of mail fraud must establish at least third-party reliance in order to prove causation. "But the fact that proof of reliance is often used to prove an element of the plaintiff's cause of action, such as the element of causation, does not transform reliance itself into an element of the cause of action." Anza, 547 U. S., at 478 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nor does it transform first-party reliance into an indispensable requisite of proximate causation. Proof that the plaintiff relied on the defendant's misrepresentations may in some cases be sufficient to establish proximate cause, but there is no sound reason to conclude that such proof is always necessary. By the same token, the absence of first-party reliance may in some cases tend to show that an injury was not sufficiently direct to satisfy §1964(c)'s proximate-cause requirement, but it is not in and of itself dispositive. A contrary holding would ignore Holmes' instruction that proximate cause is generally not amenable to bright-line rules.
 

C
 
     As a last resort, petitioners contend that we should interpret RICO to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the "over-federalization" of traditional state-law claims. In petitioners' view, respondents' claim is essentially one for tortious interference with prospective business advantage, as evidenced by Count V of their complaint. Such claims have traditionally been handled under state law, and petitioners see no reason why Congress would have wanted to supplement traditional state-law remedies with a federal cause of action, complete with treble damages and attorney's fees, in a statute designed primarily to combat organized crime. See Anza, supra, at 471-475 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Beck, 529 U. S., at 496-497. A first-party reliance requirement, they say, is necessary "to prevent garden-variety disputes between local competitors (such as this case) from being converted into federal racketeering actions." Reply Brief for Petitioners 3.

     Whatever the merits of petitioners' arguments as a policy matter, we are not at liberty to rewrite RICO to reflect their--or our--views of good policy. We have repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe. See, e.g., National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 252 (1994) (rejecting the argument that "RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose"); H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 244 (1989) (rejecting "the argument for reading an organized crime limitation into RICO's pattern concept"); Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 481 (1985) (rejecting the view that RICO provides a private right of action "only against defendants who had been convicted on criminal charges, and only where there had occurred a 'racketeering injury' ").      
 
     We see no reason to change course here. RICO's text provides no basis for imposing a first-party reliance requirement. If the absence of such a requirement leads to the undue proliferation of RICO suits, the "correction must lie with Congress." Id., at 499. "It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it." Id., at 499-500.
 

IV
 
     For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations.
 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
 
It is so ordered.

All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?




re: "Standing", Federal Courts, Judge Berman

excerpt at II A, par. 4:

United States Supreme Court

ALLEN v. WRIGHT, (1984)

No. 81-757

Argued: February 29, 1984    Decided: July 3, 1984


Like the prudential component, the constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition. The injury alleged must be, for example, "` distinct and palpable,'" Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 501), and not "abstract" or "conjectural" or "hypothetical," Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 -102 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). The injury must be "fairly" traceable to the challenged action, and relief from the injury must be "likely" to follow from a favorable decision. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 38 , 41. These terms cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise.

THE CEMENT LEAGUE

and

NORTHEAST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS

and

NEW YORK CITY AND VICINITY
DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS,
PARTY IN INTEREST

Case 03-CA-126938

Administrative Law Judges decision 5-21-15

_________________________________________

Docket Activity page 4

Date,                Document,                       Issued/Filed By

02/10/2015, RD Order*,                               NLRB - GC

02/02/2015, Answer to Complaint*, Charged Party / Respondent

01/13/2015, RD Order*,                               NLRB - GC

12/31/2014, Complaint and Notice of Hearing*, NLRB - GC

04/21/2014, Initial Letter to Charging Party*, NLRB - GC

04/21/2014, Initial Letter to Charging Party*, NLRB - GC

04/21/2014, Initial Letter to Charged Party*, NLRB - GC

04/21/2014, Signed Charge Against Employer*, Charging Party

02/24/2014, Signed Charge Against Employer*, Charging Party

The Docket Activity list does not reflect all actions in this case.

* This document may require redactions before it can be viewed. To obtain a copy, please file a request through our FOIA Branch. 

Allegations


8(a)(1) Coercive Rules


8(a)(3) Union Security Related Actions

https://www.nlrb.gov/case/03-CA-12693

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The UBCJA International has again fabricated a test case which does not comport with Federal law. What it is seeking here is for the Government to approve the UBCJA & their Corporate handlers back-door Amending/Altering of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); a power reserved wholly to the U.S. Congress, via the Legislative branch - and one which the corrupt UBCJA International & their Corporate handlers (the true plaintiffs in the case) do not possess.

Quite obviously they are redacting documents in order to bury the true identities of the parties controlling the case. The CEMENT LEAGUE is agnositic (ALJ Greens quote) as they never had a direct interest in pursuing any charges in the first instance - as there were none to pursue predicated upon the charges as proffered by the the NLRB. The current charges were made up to fit the facts as the UBCJA International, their Corporate handlers and their attorneys wanted them to read; and all of them controlled the outcome of this case through to the bogus Board D & O issuing February 12, 2016. The real facts would have produced an entirely different set of charges - criminal racketeering under multiple causes of action.

Anyone who has read ALJ Greens many, many D & O's over the years can see right through this particular Decision & Order and realize immediately that he was told what to write and how to write it and what the outcome was to be in advance and over/above his objections to his superiors. I have read a ton of his work product and this case is certainly not in his own words.
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Decision - Statement of the Case
RAYMOND P. GREEN, Administrative Law Judge.


I heard this case on March 25, 2015, in New York City. The charge in this proceeding was filed on April 21, 2014, and the complaint was issued on December 31, 2014. It essentially alleges that a collective-bargaining agreement between The Cement League, an employer association, and the New York City and Vicinity District Council of Carpenters contained provisions granting preference in hiring based on union membership.

On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed, 1 I make the following -
Findings of Fact
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This case as ALJ was forced to write it can be broken down to 4 basic components, as follows, the rest being superfulous:


1)   pg. 1, Line 42
   
"In the past, the contract between the NYC Council and The Cement League has permitted employers to select up to one half of their work force for any given project, but required them, after the hiring of a foreman and (line 45) a shop steward, to obtain the other half from the NYC Council out-of-work list; this being a nonexclusive referral system which was not limited to members of the affiliated local unions of the NYC
Council."

2)   pg. 3, Line 45

"Among other things, Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right to join a labor organization and the right to refrain from doing so. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Similarly, Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act prohibits a union from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7."

3)   pg. 4, Line 45-51; pg. 5 Lines 1-4

"Strictly speaking, the contract provisions in the present case do not require any employer to hire all or a part of its work force for any project in New York City because such individuals are already members of the NYC Council. {FALSE}

What they do require is that if an employer chooses to hire persons who are nonmembers, then the employer would be required 50 to hire 50 percent of its work force from the NYC Council’s job referral list that is also called, “the out of work list.” And although it may be fairly assumed that there is strong probability that the people on that list would be members of the NYC Council, there is no showing that the Union prevents or precludes nonmembers from registering for the list. (The record doesn’t disclose the mechanics of how the list is created, maintained or utilized.) In this sense, the use by a union of a job referral list is the equivalent of a hiring hall, whether exclusive or nonexclusive."

4)   pg. 7, Line 10 -18

In light of the above, I am inclined to agree with the theory proposed by the General Counsel and the Charging Party and to conclude that the provisions of The Cement League’s collective-bargaining agreement unduly encourage membership in local unions affiliated with the NYC Council and tend to unduly discourage membership in the locals affiliated with the Northeast Council. (Line 15) I am also going to reject the defense that the Board should defer to the fact that a contract, in the context of the RICO settlement, was approved by Judge Berman. I am doing so despite the fact that that lawsuit was not between private parties and involved a branch of the government other than the NLRB.
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All legal commentary shall be reserved for formal submissions, leaving McCarron and his minions guessing. Good morning Doug!.


Judge Greens decision is not based on any direct evidence, fact or most importantly, NLRB, Appellate Court or U.S. Supreme Court precedent. In short, its garbage and w/o a doubt not ALJ Greens choice.

www.nlrb.gov/case/12–CB–109654 ORDER

The Union, United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, Local 1192, AFL–CIO, CLC and United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Energy, Manufacturing, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC


III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards

Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act prohibits an exclusive bargaining representative from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, which includes the right to refrain from joining a union. The Board has long held that a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it makes union membership a condition to processing a grievance. See, e.g., Auto Workers Local 1303 (Jervis Corp. Bolivar), 192 NLRB 966
(1971). In Machinists Local 697 (H.O. Canfield Rubber Co.), 223 NLRB 832 (1976), the Board extended that holding to a case in which the union had made payment of fees by nonmembers a condition of grievance processing. The Board held doing so discriminated against nonmembers and that to “discriminate against nonmembers by charging them for what is due them by right restrains them in the exercise of their statutory rights.” Id. at 835, relying on Hughs Tool Co., 104 NLRB 318 (1953) (in which the Board held that demanding nonmembers pay a fee for grievance and arbitration processing violated the union’s obligations under Section 9(a) of the Act warranting revocation of the union’s certification). Thereafter, the Board has consistently held, absent a valid union-security clause, or in a “right to work” state, a union may not charge nonmembers for processing of grievances or other related services because doing so coerces employees in the exercise of their Section 7 right to refrain from joining a union. Furniture Workers Local 282 (Davis Co.), 291 NLRB 182 (1988); and American Postal Workers (Postal Service), 277 NLRB 541 (1985)

ERISA § 1108(c)(2) excerpt 2nd Cir. 8-20-02

Before: MINER and SACK, Circuit Judges, and BERMAN, District Judge.*
The clear intent of § 1108(c)(2) is to allow a fiduciary, which is otherwise prohibited from engaging in self-dealing transactions by § 1106, to receive reasonable compensation for the administration of a retirement fund. As we stated in Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1216 n. 4 (2d Cir.1987), "the services exempted under ERISA Section [1108(c)(2)] are services rendered to a plan and paid for by a plan for the performance of plan duties." Lobbying, and litigation against plan beneficiaries or their trustees cannot be construed "plan duties."
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Excerpt December 21, 2011:

July 18, 2003 VACATION PLAN FUND
PRUDENT ACTIONS BY PLAN FIDUCIAIRIES


If it should happen that Vacation Plan fiduciaries misuse the Plan’s money, {seriously, they wrote this...had to have been Forde...Guilty Conscience, advance admissions...you can't make this stuff up} or if you are discriminated against for asserting your rights,you may seek assistance from the U.S. Department of Labor, or you may file suit in a federal court. The court will decide who should pay court costs and legal fees.
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re: In response to the original Question posed by Pete Corrigan....your new By-Laws have seen the BLUE CARD VACATION WAGE EXTORTION SCHEME (half billion dollar fraud/extortion/Criminal RICO violations by McCarron) morph right back to the OLD PERMIT SYSTEM as evidenced below. NYCDCC is an EXCLUSIVE HIRING HALL as defined by the NLRB and the SECOND CIRCUIT, via the Gene Clarke cases, which remain "good law".
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AUGUST 2011 NYCDCC BY-LAWS APPROVED BY JUDGE BERMAN:

SECTION 14:  
WORKING DUES (DUES CHECK-OFF); SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND PER CAPITA TAX  


(A) The Council shall receive working dues in the amount of 1% of the members total package rate as reflected in the current collective bargaining agreement covering members for each hour worked. The Council shall also receive working dues from each member of $.60 per hour for each hour worked, subject to review and modification by the Council Delegate Body after review and report by the Audit Committee. This $.60 will be allocated to Organizing in the amount of $.50 an hour, $.05 for Communications and $.05 for Civic Action. The apportionment of working dues amongst Organizing, Communications, and Civic Action shall be maintained in the same proportions as outlined in the prior sentence, subject to review and modification by the Council Delegate Body after review and report by the Audit Committee. The working dues to this Council shall be due on the first day of the month and must be paid not later than the 15th day of the following month. The Council shall also receive working dues of $500 per year from every carpenter who has performed carpentry work for a signatory contractor in our jurisdiction during the calendar year. This $500 working dues to this Council shall be due on the first day of the month following the first day of work performed in our jurisdiction each year and must be paid not later than April 15th of the following year, provided however, that any member who shall have satisfied his or her Union Participation requirement for the applicable year, pursuant to Section 14(F) of the Bylaws, will receive credit for this $500 working dues requirement. The sums stated in this paragraph shall be reviewed periodically to determine if prudence requires that they be reduced or increased.
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The NYCDCC, USAO, RO and the Court have collectively failed to remove the illegal provisions mandating forced compliance against your Section 7 Federal Right to "refrain from any & all activities", per LMRDA 1959 amendments. Instead of expunging the extortionate exaction in violation of NLRA Section 7 and the LMRDA, they have simply altered the language slightly and re-worded it to something they believe will allow them to continue the Master Plan for McCarron to implement the program nationally, raise it to $1,000 per head, per year and ultimately allow him to extort half a billion plus each and every year.

$512 Million dollars per year based on UBCJA International reports filed with OLMS, thus mooting the false claims of eliminating racketeering and restoring democracy. This scam is better than running drugs it seems, and far more profitable. That kind of money buys a lot of injustice.

The current By-Laws below have additional illegalities built in, which also must be severed & expunged, short of filing additional charges at the NLRB. This is labor law 101, and the coerced/mandated compliance to a facially unlawful rule does not survive scrutiny within Board, Appellate or Supreme Court precedents, notwithstanding application of the All Writs Act yet applied, but doomed to failure as well.

The NYC District Council of Carpenters paid top dollar for the Fiduciary Liability Covergae and policies, each of which has a 6-year statute of limitations. It is time for the newly elected EST, President & Vice President to call in these policies, all of them from 2006-2011 and it is time that the Insurer made the members who were defrauded whole, with punitive damages, attorney fees & expenses and interest and it is time for the Welfare Fund to forego any & all illegal gotten gains now held in their control, to which Paul Tyzner admittedly stated totaled $58 Million dollars during the November 16, 2011 Javit's debate.

No time like the present to act decisively, denial and silence not being options on the table.


7th Circuit Court of Appeals
     Sweeney v. Pence
         No.13-1264
     Decided 9-12-14


..."the First Amendment “protects the right to be free from government abridgement of speech,” but it does not “require[ ]” the government “to assist others in funding the expression of particular ideas, including political ones.” Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009). ."
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The UBCJA International sponsored/funded Blue Card and its morphed cousin named the White Card as well as every other District Council mandatory Union Participation Program (UPP) mandate coercing & forcing all Union members to perform mandatory Leaflet, Banner or Picket Duty via fine; however disguised or re-worded; OR any other mandated participation requirement whether or not political violates the NLRA Section 7 'right' to refrain from any & all duty which the Union proscribes and forces upon its members and per all past posts remain illegal, facially unlawful under all federal statute, law, Appellate Court & United States Supreme court precedents. And, it also vioates your Free Speech and First Amendment rights as well.

The UBCJA International knows this as fact as does its corporate counsel; as does the former Review Officer & current Independent Monitor Glen McGorty as does the government/United States Attorney for the S.D.N.Y. and Federal District Court Judge Richard M. Berman.

The UBCJA International flaunts the laws & precedent at will and w/o application at any time to the Federal District Court to subvert Federal law via any All Writs Act application and/or approval by the Court; nor could it.; thus, via the fines, penalties collected, whether or not disguised as refunds, work assessments, dues or any other name they conjure up - the clear facts prove that the UBCJA International & its affilated District Councils and Local Unions are running an inter-state Hobbs Act criminal Racketeering operation through all 50-States, the District of Columbia etc.

The UBCJA has raked in hundreds of millions of dollars & are pushing close/exceeding to a billion dollars in illegal collections & racketeering since the illegal programs inception; yet, the hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil or catch no evil and very inept and complicit U.S. Attorneys Office in Manhattan does absolutely nothing to stop the criminal racketeering of the UBCJA International. Instead of preventing it, it willingly participates in the continued raping & extortion of the members in NYC and nationally.

Benjamin Torrance and Preet Bhararra are unfit to practice law in the State of New York and should be removed from the Consent Decree and replaced with competent legal counsel who would pursue this very simple & straight-forward prima-facie racketeering case and one who would seat a grand jury and indict the parties previously named throughout every post in this thread.

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All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?  

April 10, 2013

Honorable Richard M. Berman
U.S. District Judge,
U.S. District Court (SDNY)                                                                                                
Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse
500 Pearl Street, Courtroom 12                                                                                                        
New York, NY 10007                

Subject: U.S. v. District Council of New York and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood                          of Carpenters & Joiners of America, et al; (Index No. 90 Civ. 5722) (RMB)
Reference: February 13, 2013 Order, Doc. No. 1255
Responsive Filings, Status of Union approval and ratification of the District Council/Wall-Ceiling CBA dated March 12, 2013

Dear Judge Berman,

We are in receipt of the Wall-Ceiling and Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc collective bargaining agreement (CBA) dated/executed on March 12, 2012.

As you are aware, the contracts are complex legal documents effecting members rights. The executed contract (CBA) was not properly or timely submitted to the Council Delegate Body (CDB) or Executive Committee or rank and file member, for proper dissemination, review, debate or contract ratification, per the past practice under the new by-laws as established by the Council Delegate Body (CDB) and the follow-through March 27, 2012 vote by the rank & file, on 5-CBA’s which were supervised & counted by the American Arbitration Association (AAA).

N.L.R.A. Section 8(f) verses 9(a):
The District Council and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York have presented to you and untenable & false claim within the proposed contract, where on the one hand The Contractor Association and the Union offer a Non-Exclusive Hiring/Referral Hall; and, on the other the Union waives its responsibilities to represent all of its members equally upon collection and receipt of dues and working assessment monies – yet, refuses to perform said duty and awards the Contractor Association 100% control of all hiring under their joint and false claim of exclusive and majority status.

WALL-CEILING CBA at ARTICLE II, SECTION 2. Page 2 & 3 states:

“Section 2. The Association and any employer that may hereafter become a signatory to this Collective Bargaining Agreement hereby acknowledge that the Union has claimed and demonstrated, and the Association of signatory employers is satisfied and acknowledges, that the Union represents a majority of the Association members Carpenters or said signatory employer’s Carpenters in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The Association and its members, as well as said signatory employer, accordingly recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent under Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act for all employees within the contractual bargaining unit (Carpenters) with respect to wages, hours and working conditions. The Association and any employer that may hereafter become a signatory to this Collective Bargaining Agreement by becoming a member of the Association further agree that any dispute concerning its obligation to recognize the Union as sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the Carpenters will be resolved solely under Article herein. The employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative for all its Carpenter employees who are performing covered work as herein defined.”

There are multiple issues with respect to this Section.

1) None of the language was presented to the Council Delegate Body (CDB) prior to the alleged contract ratification & vote of August 22, 2012, thus, by with-holding critical information, any & all alleged agreements and/or alleged votes taken upon an incomplete Memorandum of Understanding (M.O.U.) are void ab-initio.

2) The UBCJA International and the NYCDCC via the first Restructuring Plan in 1999 under Judge Haight or in the 2011 Restructuring Plan within your tenure have never proven majority status, nor held the required representation election required by Federal Law(s). Through the never ending barrage of McCarron lawsuits throughout the country, they have evaded this simple requirement, albeit illegally while simultaneously destroying the Local Unions autonomy, seizing assets and tangible & intangible property which does not belong to them and eliminating and shredding every Federal law on the book relative to rank & file member voting and property rights.

In Ladies’ Garment Workers v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann), 366 U.S. 731 (1961) the Supreme Court stated.:
In the bona fide but mistaken belief that a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit had authorized petitioner union to represent their interests, the union and the employer entered into an agreement under which the employer recognized the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of certain of its employees, although in fact only a minority of those employees had authorized the union to represent their interests. The National Labor Relations Board found that, by extending such recognition, the employer interfered with the organizational rights of its employees in violation of 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act and gave unlawful support to a labor organization in violation of 8 (a) (2), and that the union violated 8 (b) (1) (A) by its acceptance of exclusive bargaining authority. The Board ordered the unfair labor practices discontinued and directed the holding of a representation election. The Court of Appeals granted enforcement of the Board's order.
Held: The Board and the Court of Appeals correctly held that such extension and acceptance of recognition constituted unfair labor practices; the remedy provided was appropriate; and the judgment is affirmed. Pp. 732-740.
(a) A different conclusion is not required by the fact that the union subsequently obtained authorization from a majority of the employees to represent their interests, since the earlier recognition of the minority union was a fait accompli depriving the majority of the employees of their guaranteed right to choose their own representative. P. 736.
(b) The agreement was void in its entirety, and it cannot be held valid and enforceable as to those employees who consented to it. Pp. 736-737.
(c) By granting exclusive bargaining status to a union selected by a minority of its employees, thereby impressing that union upon [366 U.S. 731, 732] the non-consenting majority, the employer violated both 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (2). Pp. 737-738.
(d) The employer's bona fide belief in the majority status of the union is no defense. Pp. 738-739.
(e) The remedy provided by the Board's order was proper. Pp. 739-740. 108 U.S. App. D.C. 68, 280 F.2d 616, affirmed.
The NYCDCC and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc. have violated NLRA Sec. 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) via the unlawful support and acceptance of exclusive bargaining authority and via NLRA Sec. 9(a) by:
o Failing to prove majority support
o Failing to hold the required Representation Election as mandated by the NLRA and long settled law
Items (a) through (e) in Justice Clark’s majority opinion are fully applicable to the Wall-Ceiling and BCA proposed CBA’s, and, any/all remaining contracts yet negotiated with the NYCDCC.
Said parties have colluded directly, by and through and with the assistance of the UBCJA International’s legal counsel Latham & Watkins, through a former Federal Judge, Kenneth Conboy via direct coercion, intimidation, fraud and by violating the two primary prongs of the Civil RCIO Consent Decree to end racketeering and to restore democracy, and have engaged in a lengthy extortionate Hobbs Act scheme to defraud members of tangible and intangible property, and the rights according thereto, all in a continued pattern of racketeering in violation of U.S.C. Section 1861. NYCDCC in house counsel Murphy’s recent letter [ cite doc. No. here, the one rec’d via PACER today] evinces noting more than a campaign of distraction, diversion and deception.
Voluntary recognition based on support that was induced by either union or employer coercion is unlawful, as is the coercion. See, e.g., Windsor Castle Health Care Facilities, 310 NLRB 579, 580 (1993), enfd. 13 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 1994)
In 358 NLRB No. 15 (2012), International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 25 and Denise Avallon at pg. 12 The Supreme Court has upheld the legality of hiring hall referral systems, acknowledging that “the very existence of a hiring hall encourages union membership,” but holding that “the only encouragement or discouragement of union membership banned by the Act is that which is “accomplished by discrimination.”45 Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 674–676 (1961) (quoting Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954)).
But, since a union has such comprehensive authority vested in it when it acts as the exclusive agent of users of a hiring hall and because the users must place such dependence on the union, there necessarily arises a fiduciary duty on the part of the union not to conduct itself in an arbitrary, invidious, or discriminatory manner when representing those who seek to be referred out for employment by it. Iron Workers Local 111 (Steel Builders), 274 NLRB 742,746 (1985). No specific intent to discriminate need be shown to support a finding of an unfair labor practice in the improper operation of a hiring hall. Carpenters Local 25 v. NLRB, 769 F.2d 574, 580 (9th Cir. 1985). Such fiduciary duty requires a union to employ objective standards for the referral of employees. Operating an exclusive hiring hall without reference to such is violative of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Laborers Local 394 (Building Contractors Assn. of New Jersey), 247 NLRB 97 fn. 2 (1980).

Granting 100% exclusive control (FULL MOBILITY) of all hiring/referrals to the Wall-Ceiling Contractor Association violates the NYCDCC’s Fiduciary duties, is arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory as the case law above requires “the union” to employ objective standards and nowhere within the body, text or legislative history of the NLRA do the laws discuss Contractor Associations running the unions referral or hiring halls and dominating/interfering with this relationship, while  the Union does nothing more than hold its hand out and collect money for doing absolutely nothing for the rank& file member. This is reminiscent of what street gangs, drug dealers and the mob do via typical shakedowns and racketeering schemes via fear, intimidation, coercion & fraud.

Immediately prior to the alleged negotiation of the MOU with the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc. (“Wall-Ceiling”) in July 2012, the Review Officer, rather than veto the new Benefit Funds Director Mr. Epstein, whom he championed prior, instead directed the Trustees to terminate his employment for “inappropriate & unauthorized expenditures” on credit cards, business transactions with a vendor whom he reported to law enforcement authorities and for acquisition of furniture purchased through a printing company as well as mis-allocation of funds totaling $450k dollars for 1 quarter of printing work without issuing a request for proposal (RFP) or without affording the Council Delegate Body (CDB) the opportunity to review same and decline the expenditure in whole or in part as required by its inherent plenary power & authority vested to it by the by-laws. Reference the 5th Interim Report of the R.O. at pg. 2, Item 2; and, pg. 26, items 28 & 29.

During July and August of 2012 both before and after the August 22, 2012 MOU, the Review Officer had been investigating the District Council President William Lebo for incidents occurring on July 25, 2012 Delegate Meetings for harassment of Delegates which facilitated Executive control of the agenda in continuance of racketeering, which subsequently led to the Notice Of Possible Action on September 19, 2012 and the resignation of the D.C. President shortly thereafter. Reference 5th Interim Report of the Review Officer at pg. 1, Item 1 and pg. 3 – Democracy and District Council Delegate Meetings.

At page 7, the Review Officer stated:

 “ I have always felt the great scope of authority granted to the EST as conceived by the UBC Constitution presents a risk in the New York District Council. That is one of the reasons that the office is different here, for instance, arguably fettered by the unique hiring process for business representatives required by the District Council Bylaws. The Bylaws endeavored to strike a proper balance between the authority of the EST, the Delegate Body and mandatory process – all with oversight of an Inspector General and a compliance overlay4. I would not presently recommend that any offices be eliminated or created. In my view, the governance is still a fledgling. Despite some growing pains, I think the system will not only work, but serve the District Council well. Much will depend on the commitment of all to take it seriously, master the Bylaws, study issues and engage in collegial debate.”

The obvious should not escape this honorable Court – that being, The District Councils EST usurped his proper balance and authority by facilitating Executive control of the Agenda in continuance of racketeering throughout the course of the alleged contract negotiations, presentation of the MOU and the alleged vote on what was, is and remain nothing more than notes kept relative to basic discussions during a period where the racketeering continued unabated in direct violation of Prong 1 of the Consent Decree (Elimination of Racketeering).

The D.C. & Contractor Associations now wish to insult the rank& file member and the Courts intelligence via the ‘nunc pro tunc’ diversionary argument to dissuade the Court that EST Bilello’s schoolboy type notes now constitute a formal contract which had yet been developed or voted upon; and which contract was first presented to the Court on March 12, 2013 and first received by members and Council Delegate Body members via PACER on March 13, 2013.

EST Bilello and President Lebo were engaged in “Executive control of the agenda in continuance of Racketeering” during the entire period when the MOU was operative. In direct contravention to subsequent/recent submissions of NYCDCC in house counsel Murphy false statements and the Review Officers charges against the NYCDCC EST for a;

NOTICE OF POSSIBLE ACTION: (source, 157blogspot.com)
Breaking News...The New York City District Council of Carpenters  is once again rocked by scandal as Executive Secretary-Treasurer Michael Bilello faces a possible veto for among other things, failing to abide by Section 21 of the District Council Bylaws and caused or attempted to cause employer compensation for members to be directed to the New York City District Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund, according to a notice of possible action letter signed by Review Officer Dennis Walsh (see letter below).

Pursuant to Paragraph 5.b.iii of the Stipulation and Order entered on June 3, 2010, in the matter of United States v. District Council, 90 Civil 5722 (SDNY) (RMB) (the “Stipulation and Order”), please be advised that the Review Officer is considering issuing a veto of your service as Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the New York District Council of Carpenters.

The facts and circumstances under review involve suspected violations of (1) Paragraph 5.b.iii (c), (d) and (e) of the Stipulation and Order entered in this matter on June 3, 2010, and (2) violation of Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation and Order; to wit:

(a) from on or about July 1, 2012, through March 12, 2013, you failed to abide by Section 21 of the District Council Bylaws and caused or attempted to cause employer compensation for members to be directed to the New York City District Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund;

(b) on March 22, 2013, you directed a business representative of the District Council attempting to properly enforce the collective bargaining agreement at the Javits Center to let a suspended member work at the Javits Center knowing that the person had been suspended as a member;

(c) on March 13, 2013, you refused to answer questions about your report to the Delegates properly posed to you by a delegate at a meeting of the Delegate Body of the District Council;

(d) on July 25, 2012, you engaged in indecorous and undemocratic behavior in a debate with a delegate at a meeting of the District Council Delegate Body;

(e) from on or about September 2012, to the present, you failed to continue the development of the business representative cross-training program recommended by the Review Officer and begun by the former District Council President and Assistant to the EST;

(f) from on or about August 22, 2012, through October 2012, you failed to take reasonable and prudent measures to implement the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement between the District Council and the Association of Wall-Ceiling and Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc.;

(g) from on or about January 11, 2012, to the present, you failed to review minutes of the meetings of the Board of Trustees of the Benefit Funds with the District Council Executive Committee;

(h) on March 22, 2013, you failed to cooperate with an investigation of the Review Officer by falsely stating, in sum and substance, that a certain business representative “suggested to me that I give [a suspended member] to the end of the week [working at Javits Center], like we are doing for others.”

Pursuant to procedures promulgated by the Review Officer to supplement the record in such matters (enclosed ), and as provided for herein, you may deliver a written submission to this office via email stating any facts, law or arguments (and appending any exhibits) which might be, in your view, relevant to consideration of this matter. Said submission must be delivered by noon on April 9, 2013. A pre-action conference will be scheduled to occur at a later date. Please email any submission or other communications relevant to this notice to dmwfw@verizon.net, with copies to jacknmitchell@gmail.com and Bill O’Flaherty at oflah267@optonline.net.

Dated: March 26, 2013

Dennis M. Walsh
Review Officer  
Charge (f) by the Review Officer Dennis Walsh states: (f) from on or about August 22, 2012, through October 2012, you failed to take reasonable and prudent measures to implement the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement between the District Council and the Association of Wall-Ceiling and Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc.;
The failure to implement the MOU between those dates and through to the present day is significant. The MOU was not a contract rather it was a mere update to the Council Delegate Body of 4-pages of EST Bilello’s personal notes culled from ongoing collective bargaining negotiations.
As recognized by the All Writs Act—which permits “courts established by Act of Congress” to issue “all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,” 28 U. S. C. §1651(a)—a court’s power to issue any form of relief, extraordinary or otherwise, is contingent on its subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or controversy. Such jurisdiction is determined by Congress. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 212.

The New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters and the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc. contractor association have converted the former illegal Blue Card (reference attachment in Doc. No. 1-7) to the White Card and are now attempting to coerce the same illegalities by forcing members to sign said cards as a vehicle or means to demonstrate majority support for the District Council,, but without offering one scintilla of proof. As it stands now, the contract proposal being foisted upon this honorable Court are by a minority Union which purports to act for the majority of its members. Said practices have long settled and held to be illegal under Federal Labor laws.

Accordingly, the only way to remediate this would require;

o An Order from the Court directing the District Council to furnish proof of Majority Support, or;
o An Order from the Court directing the District Council to hold the mandatory NLRA Sec. 9(a) Election via secret ballot
o Sustaining the R.O.’s veto of the EST,
o Voiding the Wall-Ceiling Contract in its entirety
 
In the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 10–179, Stern v. Marshall (2011) at page 1 the court stated: “This “suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, that . . . no two . . . lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause: innumerable young people have married into it;” and, sadly, the original parties “have died out of it.” A “long procession of [judges] has come in and gone out” during that time, and still the suit “drags its weary length before the Court.” Those words were not written about this case, see C. Dickens, Bleak House, in 1 Works of Charles Dickens 4–5 (1891), but they could have been.

At page 15 - We have recognized “the value of waiver and forfeiture rules” in “complex” cases, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471, 487–488, n. 6 (2008), and this case is no exception. In such cases, as here, the consequences of “a litigant . . . ‘sandbagging’ the court—remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor,”

In accordance with the above case, the NYCDCC & the WC & C are trying to sandbag the Court via their intentional with-holding of the required proof of majority status and their willful failure to hold the required 9(a) Representation Election to remedy their failure to furnish the Court with proof of Majority status, notwithstanding the fact that both the International & the District Council and Contractor Associations(s) have executed waivers under the Consent Decree.

At pg’s 16-18, Stern v. Marshall, the court stated “Article III, §1, of the Constitution mandates that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The same section provides that the judges of those constitutional courts “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and “receive for their Services[] a Compensation[] [that] shall not be diminished” during their tenure. As its text and our precedent confirm, Article III is “an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances” that “both defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch.” Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 58 (plurality opinion). Under “the basic concept of separation of powers . . . that flow[s] from the 17 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) scheme of a tripartite government” adopted in the Constitution, “the ‘judicial Power of the United States’ . . . can no more be shared” with another branch than “the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 704 (1974) (quoting U. S. Const., Art. III, §1).

In establishing the system of divided power in the Constitution, the Framers considered it essential that “the judiciary remain[] truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 466 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). As Hamilton put it, quoting Montesquieu, “‘there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’” Ibid. (quoting 1 Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws 181).

We have recognized that the three branches are not hermetically sealed from one another, see Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977), but it remains true that Article III imposes some basic limitations that the other branches may not transgress. Those limitations serve two related purposes. “Separation-of powers principles are intended, in part, to protect each branch of government from incursion by the others. Yet the dynamic between and among the branches is not the only object of the Constitution’s concern. The structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.” Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 10)….At 37 - If our decision today does not change all that much, then why the fuss? Is there really a threat to the separation of powers where Congress has conferred the judicial power outside Article III only over certain counterclaims in bankruptcy? The short but emphatic answer is yes. A statute may no more lawfully chip away at the authority of the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it entirely….At 38 -  “Slight encroachments create new boundaries from which legions of power can seek new territory to capture.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 39 (1957) (plurality opinion). Although “[i]t may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form,” we cannot overlook the intrusion: “illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635 (1886).

EST Bilello’s purported execution of this contract which the Council Delegate Body, the legislative branch of the D.C. never reviewed or voted upon cannot be sustained.

 

We have recognized that the three branches are not hermetically sealed from one another, see Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977), but it remains true that Article III imposes some basic limitations that the other branches may not transgress. Those limitations serve two related purposes. “Separation-of powers principles are intended, in part, to protect each branch of government from incursion by the others. Yet the dynamic between and among the branches is not the only object of the Constitution’s concern. The structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.” Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 10). Article III protects liberty not only through its role in implementing the separation of powers, but also by specifying the defining characteristics of Article III judges….If our decision today does not change all that much, then why the fuss? Is there really a threat to the separation of powers where Congress has conferred the judicial power outside Article III only over certain counterclaims in bankruptcy? The short but emphatic answer is yes. A statute may no more lawfully chip away at the authority of the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it entirely….At pg. 38 “Slight encroachments create new boundaries from which legions of power can seek new territory to capture.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 39 (1957) (plurality opinion). Although “[i]t may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form,” we cannot overlook the intrusion: “illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635 (1886).
EST Bilello’s purported execution of this contract which the Council Delegate Body, the legislative branch of the D.C. never reviewed or voted upon cannot be sustained.
In the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 06–856 JAMES L ARUE, PETITIONER v. DEWOLFF, BOBERG & ASSOCIATES, INC., ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [February 20, 2008], JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-856.pdf
The second question--whether Varity's deception violated ERISA imposed fiduciary obligations--calls for a brief, affirmative answer. ERISA requires a "fiduciary" to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." ERISA §404(a). To participate knowingly and significantly in deceiving a plan's beneficiaries in order to save the employer money at the beneficiaries' expense, is not to act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." As other courts have held, "[l]ying is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in section 404(a)(1) of ERISA," Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F. 2d 320, 326 (CA7 1983). See also Central States, 472 U. S., at 570-571 (ERISA fiduciary duty includes common law duty of loyalty); Bogert & Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees §543, at 218-219 (duty of loyalty requires trustee to deal fairly and honestly with beneficiaries); 2A Scott & Fratcher, Law of Trusts §170, pp. 311-312 (same); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §170 (same). Because the breach of this duty is sufficient to uphold the decision below, we need not reach the question of whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to employee inquiries.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/94-1471.ZO.html 

EST Bilello cannot usurp the Council Delegate Body’s (CDB) plenary power and authority granted via Section 5, 12 and 20 of the bylaws and violate his fiduciary obligations and duties by lying to the R.O., the Court and the rank & file members of this Organization, the NYCDCC.

The R.O. and/or the Court should veto his employment, issue an order to hold an interim election for a new EST via the hybrid procedures and past practice of the court appointed Review Officer Dennis Walsh and hold this and all other contracts in abeyance until such election is complete and this honorable court can set a Conference date for all matters presented for review from February 27, 2013 through April 4th, notwithstanding the EST’s belated response to the charges duly filed and served upon him.

Sincerely,


William T. Doherty



April 27, 2012

BY HAND
The Honorable Richard M. Berman
United States District Judge
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse
500 Pearl Street
New York, NY 10007-1312    
Subject: United States of America v. New York City District Council of Carpenters
                et al.; Case 1:90-cv-05722-RMB-THK

Reference:      August 5, 2011 NYCDCC By-Laws, Section 20, 35, 37 & 38

Dear Judge Berman:

We write to you noting our opposition to the following items:

Court Order and Aggrandizement of Power:

The Office of the NYCDCC EST’s intentional mis-statement of the Order of the Court dated April 11, 2013 wherein the D.C.’s EST stated:

“As per the order and direction today of Judge Berman, the fully executed Wall & Ceiling agreement will be brought before the Delegate Body for ratification at the next Delegate meeting.  The next meeting will take place on April 25th at 5:00 p.m.”

Your Court Order dated April 11, 2013 stated:

“The District Council is directed, as a matter of "best practices," to seek ratification of the completed Collective Bargaining Agreement, dated March 12, 2013 ("CBA"). Among other reasons, some of the material terms included in the CBA appear not to have been included in the Memorandum of Understanding ratified by the Delegate Body on August 22, 2012. Following ratification, the Court will consider the District Council's application to modify the Final Order and Judgment of Contempt and Remedy, dated May 26, 2009, of United States District Judge Charles S. Haight Jr.
 

The April 11, 2013 letter to the delegates is wholly misleading, and contrary to established law. Under the Bilello administration's stated plan of action, the due process rights of Local Union Members of the NYCDCC are violated under TITLE I (29 U.S.C. 411), SEC. 101. (a)(1) EQUAL RIGHTS which states: Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws.

In an e-mail directive to District Council corporate counsel James Murphy dated Monday April 15, 2013, the Review Officer stated:
Jim: Please convey to the relevant persons at the District Council the following formal recommendations made pursuant to Paragraph 5.h of the Stipulation and Order:
1. The District Council Delegate Body should immediately and fully comply with Section 20 of the District Council Bylaws by formally adopting written rules and procedures governing the method of collective bargaining ratification and should do so before any further collective bargaining matter is taken up by the Delegate Body.
2. All votes relating to collective bargaining ratification should be by roll call of the delegates.
Members have a right to know how their representatives in the delegate body vote on collective bargaining matters. Such transparency is a rudimentary tenet of a democratic system. The fostering of democracy is a fundamental goal of the Consent Decree, which recognizes that a vital democratic system is a strong deterrent to corruption.
In my view, these recommendations are necessary and appropriate, and I stand ready to petition the court to require their implementation if necessary.
Dennis M. Walsh
Review Officer
90 Civ. 5722 (SDNY)
District Council attorney James Murphy, responded to the directive of the R.O. on April 15, 2013, as follows:

I forwarded to the District Council’s three Officers and the Director of Operations your e-mail regarding these recommendations for adoption.  Your recommendations can certainly be adopted as standing rules of order and I anticipate the Officers putting before the Delegates for adoption such standing rules of order at the next Delegate Body meeting on April 25.

{SENTENCE ELIMINATED HERE DAMIAN}
It is clear here, that by falsely re-classifying specific duties held by the CDB’s full plenary power & authority as “standing orders” of the Executive branch dictated to the CDB where the EST & Executive Delegates are limited to an appointed sub-committee role and a limited power to recommend, that; EST Bilello through his corporate counsel is attempting to usurp or seize control of powers and duties which are not specifically reserved to him or the Executive Committee or Executive Board, District Council Officers or counselor Murphy via the court approved by-laws; and as such are an affront to restoration of democratic control, transparency and constitute an aggrandizement of power  held to be illegal by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976) & Nixon v. Adm’r. of Gen. Servs. 433 US 425 (1977).

The New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenter By-laws approved by this court on August 5, 2011  violate Federal Law, TITLE I (29 U.S.C. 411), SEC. 101. (a)(1) EQUAL RIGHTS  express requirement that “every member”…. “shall have equal rights and privileges”….”to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings”…

No where within Federal Labor law, statute, policy, House or Senate reports or the NLRA preamble & Section 7 rights is there an express or implied right which limits or qualifies the phrase “every member” to preclude a one man, one vote requirement in elections, referendums, deliberations and voting upon the business of the meetings or of the labor organization as a whole.

Accordingly, the NYCDCC By-laws denying this most fundamental and basic equal right to one man, one vote for “every member” of the labor organization with respect to a contract ratification vote which is a referendum under federal law, cannot be negated in whole or part by  the By-laws which are not reasonable nor in accordance with the plain meaning, text and legislative intent of the words & phrases used, either individually, or in context of the whole of 29 U.S.C. 411, Sec. 101.(a)(1) and/or NLRA Preamble/Section 7 U.S.C. Sec. 157 with respect to the defined individuals (worker, employee, employee member) individual and collective rights.

The NYC District Council of Carpenters is a labor organization as defined under the NLRA (Wagner Act-1935). The UBCJA International and the District Council and Contractor Association (WC & C) via contract require a Maintenance of Membership obligation for every member carpenter irrespective of which contract (CBA) the individual is employed under for a signatory General Contractor or Subcontractor. Therefore, under Title I (29 U.S.C 411), SEC. 101.(a)(1) Equal Rights, neither the International nor the District Council can refuse to acknowledge or deny the “every member” mandate within the Federal Equal Rights clause “to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization”, to attend membership meetings and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings”…


Blacks Law, 8th Ed. at pg. 1307 defines referendum:
referendum. 1.  The process of referring a state legislative act, a state constitutional amendment, or an important public issue to the people for final approval by popular vote… 2. A vote taken by this method.

Amending of the NYCDCC by-laws under Title 1, (29 U.S.C. 411), Sec. 101. (a)(1) equal rights express requirements; and, under New York State Labor Code, § 704 3(a)(2) for conspiring to and dominating, supervising & controlling the meetings, management, operation, elections and formulation or amendment of constitution, rules or policies in violation of N.Y. State law/statute must be viewed in light of the specific construction requiring that “every member”…. “shall have equal rights and privileges” ….”to vote in elections or referendums” of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings”.

Referendum votes of the labor Organization to be taken by the people which in the instant matter herein discussed under normal construction and the plain meaning and black-letter law clearly require the amendments proposed require a mandatory By-law Sec. 37(D) 30-day advance written notice be furnished to all 100-Council Delegates as a condition precedent to By-law Sec. 35A-C becoming operative, which subsequently require any all proposed amendments first be initiated by & through the 1/3 of the Local Unions, under their Seal, subsequently presented to the District Councils Executive Committee and when viewed as proper, transferred to an elected By-laws Committee for drafting of the express language of said amendment(s) proposed per NYCDCC By-law Sec. 35(A)(B) & (C) and Sec. 37; subject to a binding referendum vote of the people for final approval, which in the instant matter of the District Council is “every member” as clearly defined under Title 1, (29 U.S.C. 411), Sec. 101. (a)(1).

Property Rights:

In Tropiano, the Court stated: “3. Did the defendant induce or attempt to induce the victim to give up property or property rights?”

"Property" has been held to be "any valuable right considered as a source of wealth." United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969) (the right to solicit garbage collection customers). "Property" includes the right of commercial victims to conduct their businesses. See United States v. Zemek, 634 F.3d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980) (the right to make business decisions and to solicit business free from wrongful coercion) and cited cases). It also includes the statutory right of union members to democratically participate in union affairs. See United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1991) (the right to support candidates for union office); United States v. Teamsters Local 560, 550 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1985) (rights guaranteed union members by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411).”

Again, per the above, District Council corporate counsel Murphy has attempted to coerce & intimidate members to give up the intangible property rights conferred by the Court approved by-laws and he has willfully, wantonly and intentionally persisted in this untenable “position” which does not comport to the Federal or State Labor law or binding court precedent, the Consent Decree and the waiver of rights attached thereto; thus, the Court must view his continued efforts to ignore Court Orders, to extort rank & file member due process and known property rights and hold them unto himself or transfer or convert said rights to the District Council Officers, the Executive Committee or Executive Board and/or the non-union Benefit Trust Fund fiduciary’s and Trustees the Council Delegate Body’s vested Legislative rights to “initiate & pass” legislation in the first instance, to “make business decisions” and to thus hold unto himself and the parties thus mentioned as an offending act warranting contempt of court charges, sanctions and the appropriate fine to compel him to obey the law(s).

The Court approved Stipulation & Order at 5(b)(i)(2) stated:

The Review Officer must be given prior notice of, and is granted the authority to review, all contracts or proposed contracts on behalf of the District Council (except for Collective Bargaining Agreements)

District Council corporate counsel Murphy’s continued attempts to induce the Court appointed Review Officer to approve his illegal efforts to unilaterally change the by-laws by fraudulently re-labeling them as “standing orders” are an express violation of the protocol established by NYCDCC By-law Sections 35 A-C, 37  & 38.

5TH Interim Report of Review Officer:

During July and August of 2012 both before and after the August 22, 2012 MOU, the Review Officer had been investigating the District Council President William Lebo for incidents occurring on July 25, 2012 Delegate Meetings for harassment of Delegates which facilitated Executive control of the agenda in continuance of racketeering, which subsequently led to the Notice Of Possible Action on September 19, 2012 and the resignation of the D.C. President shortly thereafter. Reference 5th Interim Report of the Review Officer at pg. 1, Item 1 and pg. 3 – Democracy and District Council Delegate Meetings.

Enabling Legislation, Self Executing requirements:

As this court is aware, the District Council and the government negotiated a treaty/contract to end the criminal aspects of the racketeering case against it resulting in the March 3, 1994 Consent Decree. With respect to our prior submission to this Court (Doc. No. 1,231 dated February 27, 2013) regarding NYCDCC By-law Section 5, 12 & 20, the Sec. 20 requirement is not self executing until the 100-member Council Delegate Body (CDB) initiates and passes enabling legislation as is its right under its full plenary power and authority per Sec. 4(B) via 37(D) and Sec. 35(A) (B) & (C) and Sec. 37 as noted herein.

In Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) at 194 supra, the Court stated: “When the stipulations are not self-executing, they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect”…
In 552 U. S. 491 (2008) Medellin v. Texas Opinion of the Court at B, page 18 – the Supreme Court stated:
“The interpretive approach employed by the Court today—resorting to the text—is hardly novel. In two early cases involving an 1819 land-grant treaty between Spain and the United States, Chief Justice Marshall found the language of the treaty dispositive. In Foster, after distinguishing between self-executing treaties (those “equivalent to an act of the legislature”) and non-self-executing treaties (those “the legislature must execute”), Chief Justice Marshall held that the 1819 treaty was non-self executing.”

And at page 19 the Supreme Court stated: “Our Framers established a careful set of procedures that must be followed before federal law can be created under the Constitution—vesting that decision in the political branches, subject to checks and balances. U. S. Const., Art. I, §7.”

We note in the instant matter, when the parties creating the By-laws provided the forum for rank & file member commentary, it was the members who pointed out to this Court that the UBCJA International & the D.C. had attempted to subsume the powers of each of the three co-equal tripartite branches and hold them unto itself; and, that by our objections, the U.S.A.O. & R.O. thus revised the proposed first draft of the by-laws to comport with the “subject to checks and balances” language which the Review Officer and United States Attorney fully endorsed.

In 552 U. S. 491(2008) MEDELLIN v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court at B, page 20 – the Supreme Court stated: The point of a non-self executing treaty is that it “addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.” Foster, supra, at 314 (emphasis added); Whitney, 124 U. S., at 195. See also Foster, supra, at 307

We note here that the until the 100-member CDB is the Legislature within the District Council structure mandated by the August 5, 2011 By-laws approved by this honorable Court; and, until it formally legislates written rules for contract ratification procedures per the specific, binding and controlling D.C. By-laws, the August 22, 2012 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the subsequent 60-26 vote for the MOU by Council Delegates fails to execute any contract.

To date, the 100-member CDB has failed to legislate the written rules (enabling legislation) which would then provide the legal authority for it to execute a legitimate, final and binding contract, as opposed to the District Council EST’s illegal execution of the contract(s) (CBA’s) which first were made available to the 100-member Council Delegate Body on March 13, 2013 before enabling legislation has passed. In any event, under the August 5, 2011 NYCDCC By-laws, Section 20, 37, 35(A)(B) & (C), the EST and/or in house counsel Murphy have no binding legal authority to usurp the legislative powers of the 100-District Council Delegates and execute any contract as the R.O., the DOJ-U.S.A.O.  and  your Court provided the exclusive power to “ratify and execute” to the 100-member CDB, thus, the purported March 12, 2013 rush by EST Bilello & in-house legal counsel Murphy to usurp or aggrandize the power to “execute” the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc. contract (CBA) when said powers of ratification and execution are held and reserved specifically to the 100-member Council Delegate Body (CDB), subject to the “every member” express requirements clearly defined by TITLE I (29 U.S.C. 411), SEC. 101. (a)(1) and the NLRA Preamble & Section 7 cannot be sustained as a matter of law.

Blacks Law, 8th Ed. at pg. 89 defines amendment as:
Amendment. 1. A formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specif., a change made by addition, deletion, or correction; esp., an alteration in wording….2. The process of making such a revision.

Subsequent to the February 27, 2012 Court Conference the District Council’s Executive Secretary-Treasurer Michael Bilello and in house legal counsel James Murphy presented the court with a March 12, 2013 Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc. and New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters “executed contract” containing the signatures of EST Bilello & of one John DeLollis, the authorized agent of the Contractor Association which purports to bind the District Council and its rank & file members to a contract term beginning March 3, 2013 and ending on June 30, 2016, which translates to a remaining term approximating 4.33 years.

It is our stated position of fact, reason and law – per the terms and conditions of the March 3, 1994 Consent Decree, the August 5, 2011 By-laws that EST Bilello does not have the authority to “bind” or “execute” this contract (CBA) or any other and that said rights are retained by the 100-member CDB subject to the enabling legislation which they failed to pass on or about March 12, 2013 at the time of the false submission to the Court; and, subject to the express requirement within 29 U.S.C. 411, Sec. 101.(a)(1) and/or NLRA Preamble/Section 7 U.S.C. Sec. 157 which together provide for one man, one vote and “every member”  and “referendum “language which is controlling. Section 20 Collective Bargaining language is controlling, and states:

SECTION 20:   COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  
“Following recommendation by the Executive Committee, the Council Delegate Body shall have the exclusive power and authority to ratify and execute Collective Bargaining Agreements for and on behalf of its affiliated Local Unions, except to the extent the International Union exercises its jurisdiction or authority. The District Council Delegate Body shall adopt rules and procedures governing the method of collective bargaining ratification.”…

The District Council Delegate Body’s adoption of “rules and procedures” governing the method of collective bargaining ratification is controlled by NYCDCC By-law Section(s) 37(D), which is the conditions precedent to NYCDCC By-law Section 35(A)(B) & (C); and, Section 37 & 38; and, subject to both New York State Labor Law and Federal law(s) as previously noted herein. The fact that the D.C. EST Bilello and corporate counsel Murphy and the Contractor Association representative DeLollis and their legal counsel ignored these requirements does not save it from the inherent illegality or the contractual requirements to sever any & all illegal provisions contained therein which violate state & federal laws, thus, the contract as proposed must be declared facially unlawful and void ab-initio.

Moreover, the Review Officers direction via e-mail to D.C. corporate counsel Murphy directing him to use the word “should” in place of “shall” with respect to the qualified sentence in section 20 Collective Bargaining stating “The District Council Delegate Body shall adopt rules and procedures governing the method of collective bargaining ratification”…is an untenable change of the NYCDCC By-laws requiring formal amendment requirements be followed, to black letter law as the R.O. has stated in past submissions to this Court. Changing the rules or legal qualifiers mid-stream obviates the need here for judicial intervention. The difference between “shall” and “should” cannot be overlooked as to the direct impact to rank & file member collective rights, and that qualification amounts to a free pass to the EST Bilello and the D.C.’s corporate counsel to violate the NYCDCC mandatory By-law procedures at will without following black letter law and can therefore not be sustained.

In 552 U. S. 491(2008) MEDELLIN v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court at B, page, at page 32, the Supreme Court stated:

“As Madison explained in The Federalist No. 47, under our constitutional system of checks and balances, “[t]he magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law.” J. Cooke ed., p. 326 (1961).”

Here, EST Bilello and corporate counsel Murphy, in concert with the Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Contractor Association seek to avoid compliance with the specific terms, conditions and waivers of the UBCJA International and the District Council as agreed to in the Consent Decree in direct contempt and in violation of both Prong 1 (elimination of racketeering) and Prong 2 (restoration of democracy) via an illegal power grab or usurpation of powers which they jointly & severally fail to hold or possess.

The Review Officer intentionally removed the power to execute the contract from the Executive branch’s EST as part of a comprehensive plan within the ‘checks and balances’  requirement of a representative democracy to avoid the autocratic and dictatorial control of an all consuming and corrupt EST as was present under the Forde administration.

Now in direct contravention to his previous mandate and direct statements to the Court via his Interim Reporting, the Review Officer is violating the tenets of the Stipulation & Order which prevent him from interfering and dominating in any & all contract (collective bargaining agreement) negotiations and the R.O. himself is directly advising the NYCDCC corporate counsel and its Executive Secretary-Treasurer on ways they can collectively manipulate and attempt to end run the By-laws he ostensibly authored in tandem with UBCJA International counselors of record Kenneth Conboy & Brian Quinn. The Review Officer is supposed to report corruption to the Court, not participate in it.

April 25, 2013 District Council Delegate Meeting and Illegal Delegate Voting:

In the instant matter of the April 25, 2013 Delegate meeting, the executive (Bilello) in concert with the Executive Board made the law and then forced an illegal vote on the law, per the direction of R.O. Walsh and D.C. corporate counsel Murphy. Their actions warrant a direct veto of their services by this Court.

Given the fact that the Executive branch consisting of EST Bilello, the Executive Board and D.C. Officers failed to abide by or follow NYCDCC By-laws dated August 5, 2011 as approved by this honorable Court in September of 2011 per the condition precedent established by By-law Sec. 37(D) for constructive notice and subsequently failed to follow and apply NYCDCC By-law Sec. 35(A), (B) & (C) and that they fraudulently and collectively on the advice of corporate counsel Murphy ignored the strict mandate of NYCDCC By-law Sec. 20 providing the 100-member Council Delegate Body (the Delegates) with “the exclusive power and authority to ratify and execute Collective Bargaining Agreements for and on behalf of its affiliated Local Unions”, all actions conducted at the April 25, 2013 Delegate Meeting must be declared facially unlawful and a direct violation of the by-law sections cited and thus be declared a willful violation of the Consent Decree.

The controlling language in NYCDCC By-laws Sec. 20 is to “ratify and execute” and that of course is ‘subject to’ strict compliance with the Court approved By-laws. That authority is vested exclusively in the 100-member CDB, the Legislative branch as opposed to the Executive branch.

UBCJA Constitution, Roberts Rules:

Because the NYCDCC Sec. 20 mandate stating “The District Council Delegate Body shall adopt rules and procedures governing the method of collective bargaining ratification.” was not adhered to, per the UBCJA Constitution Rule 5. - All questions of a parliamentary nature not provided for in these Rules shall be decided by Roberts’ Manual

Motions Requiring a Two-thirds Vote

1    Amend (Annul, Repeal, or Rescind) any part of the Constitution, By-laws, or Rules of Order, previously adopted; it also requires previous notice

68   Amend or Rescind a Standing Rule, a Program or Order of Business, or a Resolution, previously adopted, without notice being given at a previous meeting or in the call for the meeting

37   Take up a Question out of its Proper Order

22   Suspend the Rules, Make a Special Order

20   Discharge an Order of the Day before it is pending, Refuse to Proceed to the Orders of the Day

Irrespective of the fraudulent claims for roll call votes made on April 25, 2013, the District Council, were their actions legally binding and in compliance with the By-laws as previously noted herein; said actions and the subsequent voting wherein under black letter law “every member” is afforded Equal Rights per Federal law to vote, a fraudulent vote conducted by the  100-member NYCDCC  Council Delegate Body (CDB) would require a 2/3’rd’s vote which they failed to achieve with respect to the fraudulent vote on the WC & C contract (CBA); noting that 82 Total Delegates voted on the Illegal Motion; and, that those in favor were 46, while those opposed were 34.

EST Bilello, corporate counsel Murphy and R.O. Walsh failed to achieve the minimum 2/3 rd’s vote required to sustain their collective illegal actions. Two Thirds Voting by basic math requires 55-Votes in favor, thus, the Illegal Voting were it deemed legal by this Court would fall 9-votes shy of passing and thus fail to establish the tenet mandated by the Unites States Supreme Court in 552 U. S. 491 (2008) MEDELLIN v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court at B, page 20 – the Supreme Court stated: The point of a non-self executing treaty is that it “addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.” Foster, supra, at 314 (emphasis added); Whitney, 124 U. S., at 195. See also Foster, supra, at 307

Conclusion:

The usurpation of and aggrandizement of power not possessed by EST Bilello, the Executive Board or the Review Officer and District Council attorney Murphy and the WC & C Contractor Association or UBCJA International and their respective legal counsel cannot be allowed to stand. Each and all of them have individually and jointly conspired to violate the prohibitions in U.S.C. Sec. 157 and U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(1) & (2) and U.S.C. Sec. 158-8(b)(1)(A) for Employer and Labor organization domination and interference and Title I (29 U.S.C. 411), Sec. 101. (a)(1) Equal Rights

 As such, the continued racketeering efforts warrant EST Bilello’s immediate veto notwithstanding By-law Section 21 violations to extort $165-$200 million dollars in member’s  pay raises (wages) in an illegal quid-pro-quo exchange wherein the Contractor Associations and the District Council Benefit Trust Funds, Fiduciaries/Trustees and their separate entity, at will employees and respective corporate counsel illegally conspire to mis-appropriate and convert, exact and extort to its own use/benefit, the guaranteed member wage increases for approximately 18-million man-hours of labor over the 4.33 year remaining life of the contracts; and, wherein the Contractor Association in consummation of the deal with said parties is awarded 100% control of all hiring; or, reversion of all control of the  New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters (the Union) in exchange for the $165-$200 million reallocation of wages to the Welfare Fund.

This illegal quid-pro-quo exchange is the very core and essence of criminal racketeering the 1994 Civil RICO Consent Decree was designed to cure and it cannot be sustained under any rationale or legal basis.

Prayer for Relief:

We pray this honorable Court:
 
1) Direct the Court appointed Review Officer to veto NYCDCC EST Bilello & counselor Murphy’s employment; and; further instruct the R.O. to seek indictments with the DOJ’s-United States Attorney’s Office Preet Bashara and Benjamin Torrance against Bilello & Murphy for criminal racketeering under guidelines established by the FBI & United States DOJ and U.S. Attorney’s Office.

2) Direct the Review Officer to file charges with the State Bar Association of New York following indictment and to seek revocation of counselor Murphy’s license to practice law.

3) Direct the Review Officer & U.S.A.O. to file charges against EST Bilello, attorney Murphy and WC & C Contractor Association executive John DeLollis for willful and wanton violations of New York State Labor Code, § 704 3(a)(2) for conspiring to and with each other in dominating, supervising & controlling the meetings, management, operation, elections and formulation or amendment of constitution, rules or policies of the duly organized 100-member Council Delegate Body of the NYCDCC in direct contravention to the Court approved NYCDCC By-laws dated August 5, 2011; in direct violation of N.Y. State law/statute.

4) Direct the Executive Board of the District Council to abide by NYCDCC By-law Sec. 37 (D), which states: “(D) The Executive Committee of the Council shall have the authority to call a Special Convention. Written notice describing the purpose of a Special Convention must be given to all Delegates and the principal office of each Local Union at least thirty (30) days prior to such Convention. The delegates of any Special Convention of this Council shall consist exclusively of the Delegates to this Council” noting that said Executive Committee failed to provide for the required 30-day Written Notice for a called/desired “Special Convention” to amend the by-law member ratification rules and procedures prescribed by NYCDCC By-law Sec. 20.

5) The Court issue an Order which voids, ab-initio the;
 
 August 22, 2012 MOU and illegal vote of the 100-member CDB;
 March 12, 2013 WC & C contract (CBA);
 April 25, 2013 – all Delegate Meeting Roll Call Votes wherein said delegate by and through their illegal votes violated NYCDDC By-laws Sections 35(A)(B) & (C) and Sec. 37 through votes denying “every member” the right to ratify the contract as required by Federal law under the normal construction, clear & plain meaning of the by-laws and the words and phrases used therein ; or, in the alternative;
 Issue an Order directing the District Council that any and all By-Law Amendments and Referendums to adopt Rule & Procedures for Contract (CBA) ratification must follow Roberts Rules of Order which demand a 2/3rd’s Majority Vote of the quorum present, after compliance is had by following the mandated requirements of By-law Section 37 (D) and 35(A), the condition precedent to application of By-laws Sections 35A-C which follow with respect to and prior to Section 20 application

We respectfully pray this honorable court take these and other actions deemed appropriate in light of the serious nature of the continued criminal activity.

Sincerely,


Demian Schroeder
Rich Dorrough
John Musumeci
William T. Doherty

Reference Material:

NYCDCC By-laws dated August 5, 2011

SECTION 35:   AMENDMENTS

(A) Any amendments and changes to these Bylaws may be put into effect by the action of the Delegates at a Special Convention of the Council.

(B) A proposed change must be submitted in writing by at least one third of the Local Unions affiliated with the District Council, with the seal affixed provided that the Resolutions Committee consisting of three (3) or more members has reviewed and approved the resolution as to its legality in accordance with the Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood and the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement, and State and Federal laws.

(C) All changes or proposed changes to the Bylaws or Trade Rules of this Council or any of the Local Unions shall be first referred to the Executive Committee for consideration and recommendation, and then referred to a Bylaws committee for consideration and, if warranted, recommendation to the Delegate Body that a proposed change or changes be adopted. If approved by the Council and in accordance with Section 11B of the Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood (the “UBC Constitution”), the proposed change or changes must be submitted to the General Vice President for approval after review of, among other things, whether such change or changes are in conformity with the UBC Constitution, are in the best interests of the District Council, and will further the objectives of the Consent Decree or Stipulation and Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing herein shall change or limit the authority of the General Vice President pursuant to the UBC Constitution to approve or disapprove changes to these Bylaws. All proposed changes to the Bylaws shall be subject to the approval of the United States Attorney and, during the term of the Review Officer, the Review Officer.

SECTION 36:   SEVERABILITY
If any Section or part of these Bylaws shall be held invalid by operation of law or by any tribunal of competent jurisdiction, the remaining Sections of these Bylaws shall not be affected thereby and shall remain in full force and effect.

SECTION 37:   MISCELLANEOUS
(A)The Council Delegate Body, by majority vote of the Delegates present, either in regular or special session, shall have the authority to adopt policies and procedures consistent with these Bylaws to govern the Council and all Local Unions, and to enact all measures, resolutions, trade rules, instruction to members and Local Unions and all other actions that may be necessary to further the objectives and purposes of the Council. Provided further that the foregoing shall be in conformity with the Consent Decree, Stipulation and Order of June 3, 2010, and any other Order entered, in United States v. District Council, 90 Civ. 5722 (CSH), and subject to the approval of the United States Attorney and, during the term of the Review Officer, the Review Officer.

(B)These Bylaws, Trade Rules and any other rules, resolutions and directives adopted by the Council shall govern and be binding on each Local Union.

(C)Any subject not covered by these Bylaws and Trade Rules shall be governed by the Constitution of the United Brotherhood and nothing in these Bylaws shall in any way be construed to conflict with the Constitution of the United Brotherhood.

(D) The Executive Committee of the Council shall have the authority to call a Special Convention. Written notice describing the purpose of a Special Convention must be given to all Delegates and the principal office of each Local Union at least thirty (30) days prior to such Convention. The delegates of any Special Convention of this Council shall consist exclusively of the Delegates to this Council.

(E) All current Bylaws of Local Unions must be submitted to the Council for approval. All Bylaws of Local Unions that are inconsistent with these Bylaws are superseded.

SECTION 38:   HIRING HALL OR JOB REFERRAL SYSTEM
The Executive Committee of the Council shall maintain, and all workers shall be governed by, uniform rules and/or procedures consistent with the Consent Decree, and any other Order entered in United States v. District Council, et al., 90 Civ. 5722, for the registration and/or referral to employment of unemployed workers. Workers shall have the right to seek work and be employed throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the Council. The referral of all workers to jobs shall be performed by the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Representatives, organizers and agents of the District Council may not otherwise refer members to jobs or in any way inform an employer that a member is available for employment. The Executive Secretary-Treasurer shall maintain records of all worker registration and referrals, which shall be reviewed regularly by the Executive Committee and which may be reviewed by any member upon reasonable request.


New York State Labor Code:

§  704.  Unfair  labor practices. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer:
3.  To  dominate  or  interfere  with  the  formation,  existence,  or administration  of  any  employee organization or association, agency or plan which exists in whole or in part for the purpose  of  dealing  with employers  concerning  terms or conditions of employment, labor disputes or grievances, or to contribute financial or other support to  any  such organization,  by any means, including but not limited to the following:
(a) by  participating  or  assisting  in,  supervising,  controlling  or dominating (2)  the meetings, management,   operation,   elections,   formulation   or   amendment  of constitution, rules or policies, of any such  employee  organization  or association