UBCJA 2011 LM-2 Report

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UBCJA 2011 LM-2 Report

Daniel J. Franco
The 2011 UBCJA LM-2 Report is now available - http://danieljfranco1.blogspot.com/2012/03/ubcja-2011-lm-2-report.html
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Re: UBCJA 2011 LM-2 Report

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This post was updated on .
LATHAM & WATKINS
894256


LOS ANGEL[E]S, CA 90189-4256
Type or Classification (B) LAW FIRM Purpose
(C) Date
(D) Amount
(E)
Total Itemized Transactions $1,226,698
Total Non-Itemized Transactions $0
Total of All Transactions $1,226,698

Legal fees 01/13/2011 $39,471
Legal fees 02/17/2011 $76,717
Legal fees 03/24/2011 $105,471
Legal fees 04/21/2011 $92,740
Legal fees 05/26/2011 $86,836
Legal fees 06/16/2011 $117,832
Legal fees 07/21/2011 $174,657
Legal fees 08/25/2011 $288,605
Legal fees 09/29/2011 $100,472
Legal fees 11/03/2011 $83,710
Legal fees 12/01/2011 $60,187
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69. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUMMARY FILE NUMBER: 000-085. Statement A,

Cash Begin Total: THIS AMOUNT IN UNCHANGED FROM THE BALANCE REPORTED ON THE 2010 FORM LM-2

Question 10: UBC Pension Plan, EIN 52-6075035, Plan 002, 6801 Placid Street, Las Vegas, NV 89119. Purpose To provide pension benefits to eligible participants.

General Office and Staff Health and Welfare Plan, EIN 52-6679969, Plan 501, 6801 Placid Street, Las Vegas, NV 89119. Purpose To provide health and welfare benefits to employees and officers of the Brotherhood, certain councils affiliated with the Brotherhood and the Carpenters International Training Fund.....Carpenters Helping Hand, Inc., EIN 52-124116, 101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20001. Purpose To provide charitable aid to poor/distressed carpenters, joiners, and related occupations and their families. UBC Labor-Management Committee for the Floor and Wall Covering Industry, EIN 52-6799457, 101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20001. Purpose To eliminate problems that inhibit competitiveness / economic development, enhance involvement of workers in decision making, improve relations between labor and management. ....
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UBC Labor-Management Committee for the Floor and Wall Covering Industry, EIN 52-6799457, 101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20001.

Purpose To eliminate problems that inhibit competitiveness / economic development, enhance involvement of workers in decision making, improve relations between labor and management.


COST: Total of All Transactions $1,226,698, re: LATHAM & WATKINS
_______________________________________________

The above is a flat out lie. The purpose was to break the will of the members in New York City, by submitting the Restructuring Plan to the Court through a bought off former Judge...Kenneth Conboy and to ultimately break the Carpenters union in New York City to allow signatory GC's & sub's to come in with their double breasted non-union operations and the corresponding 40% - 60% reductions in wages and elimination of safety requirements and work rules.
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THE TRUE PURPOSE OF MCCARRON'S $1.23M dollar expenditure to Judge Conboy's firm:
McCarron is hell bent on creating a sub-class of inferior UBC rank & file Workers and Employees, which shall be doing all of your Traditional Craft work, albeit, at a substantially reduced sub-class Wage & Benefit Scale. They shall be known as:


 Senior Drywall Utility Worker scaled at 60% of the full rate

 Wall & Ceiling Utility Worker scaled at 40% of the full rate

 Interior Systems Local Technicians

 Scrappers

 Helpers

 Pre-Apprentices

 Cash Workers

 Illegal Aliens

 Foreign Nationals

 Full Mobility (for all above categories)

 8-Hour Days

 Skills Forms

 Revocation of Journeyman Status

 Mandatory Annual Training or no Pay Raise

 Camp or Board Lodging Paid at $3.00 per day @ McCarron's Company Store

 Elimination of Travel Time

 Graded Wages in Violation of the Standing Order of the UBC Constitution dated September 17, 1887

 Mandatory Union Participation & a $500 dollar per year Perpetual Fine

 PERMANENTLY REDUCED WAGES & BENEFITS

 JOURNEY-LEVEL APPRENTICES

An Elite White Collar Class of UBCJA & DC Union Officers who consistently raise their Wages & Benefits while simultaneously SCREWING & YOU and yours and telling you how wonderful that will be for your Family.

As an ADDITIONAL BONUS, if you SIGN UP today, you will also receive:

 - Taping Tools & a free Journeyman upgrade course at the LTC to hone your new Skill

 - Paint brushes & a Wall Papering Journeyman Upgrade course at the LTC and a Pink Skirt

 - No opt out on OBAMA-CARE, an ever Increasing Retirement Age, Reduced or Eliminated Health Coverage for current & future Retirees and their Dependents

 - Wall & Ceiling, pg. 22(e) "The Employer shall have the option of using One (1) Apprentice for every Two (2) Journeyman*

 - "Business & Property rights, Chattels, Indentured Servitude"...............

VOTE NO ON ALL PROPOSED FINAL CONTRACTS

*Journey-person is not the recognized Trade terminology.

VOTE NO TO "CONTRACTING IN" & "BUSTING YOUR OWN DAMN UNION" per McCarron's invidious little scheme above...you know, the one he claims the Contractor Associations invented. Get a clue.....they are in bed together and every so called Negotiation to date has been done in direct collusion with each other and is entirely in Bad Faith.

WINK-WINK, THESE CONTRACTS WILL CREATE MORE MAN-HOURS AND MORE WORK OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR MEMBERS....

Don't you just hate it when your plan back-fires Doug? Seems old Judge Conboy is not up to the task. Time to let him go and time to donate that yearly $1.23M Dollar legal fee to:

Carpenters Helping Hand, Inc., EIN 52-124116, 101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20001.

 Purpose To provide charitable aid to poor/distressed [UNION] carpenters, joiners, and related occupations and their families. [EMPHASIS ADDED, "UNION CARPENTERS & their FAMILIES only]
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Re: UBCJA 2011 LM-2 Report

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excerpt NLRB v. AMAX COAL 453 U.S. 322 (1981), Chief Justice Stewart at II

As explained by Senator Ball, one of the two sponsors of the provision, the "sole purpose" of 302 (c) (5) is to ensure that employee benefit trust funds "are legitimate trust funds, used actually for the specified benefits to the employees of the employers who contribute to them . . . ." 93 Cong. Rec. 4678 (1947).

Senator Ball stated that "all we seek to do by [ 302 (c) (5)] is to make sure that the employees whose labor builds this fund and are really entitled to benefits under it shall receive the benefits; that it is a trust fund, and that, if necessary, they can go into court and obtain the benefits to which they are entitled." Id., at 4753; see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 66-67 (1947), 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 570 (1948) (Leg. Hist. LMRA). The debates on 302 (c) (5) further reveal Congress' intent to cast employee benefit plans in traditional trust form precisely because fiduciary standards long established in equity would best protect employee beneficiaries.

For example, one opponent of the bill suggested that 305 (c) (5) was unnecessary because even without that provision, the "officials who administer [the fund] thereby become trustees, subject to all of the common law and State safeguards against misuse of funds by trustees." 93 Cong. Rec. 4751 (1947) (Sen. Morse). Senator Taft. the primary author of the entire Act, answered that many existing funds were not created expressly as trusts, and that 302 (c) (5)'s requirement that each fund be an express and enforceable trust would ensure that the future operations of all such funds would be subject to supervision by a court of chancery. 93 Cong. Rec. 4753 (1947). See also id., at 4678 (Sen. Ball); id., at 3564-3565 (Rep. Case, author of House bill on which 302 (c) (5) was patterned). In sum, the duty of the management-appointed trustee of an employee benefit fund under [453 U.S. 322, 332]   302 (c) (5) is directly antithetical to that of an agent of the appointing party. 14  
 
Whatever may have remained implicit in Congress' view of the employee benefit fund trustee under the Act became explicit when Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829. ERISA essentially codified the strict fiduciary standards that a 302 (c) (5) trustee must meet. See 29 U.S.C. 1002 (1) and (2); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, pp. 296, 307 (1974). Section 404 (a) (1) of ERISA requires a trustee to "discharge his duties . . . solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 1104 (a) (1). 15 Section [453 U.S. 322, 333]   406 (b)
(2) declares that a trustee may not "act in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C. 1106 (b) (2).

Section 405 (a) imposes on each trustee an affirmative duty to prevent every other trustee of the same fund from breaching fiduciary duties, including the duty to act solely on behalf of the beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. 1105 (a).

Moreover, the fiduciary requirements of ERISA specifically insulate the trust from the employer's interest. Except in circumstances involving excess contributions or termination of the trust, "the assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." 403 (c) (1), 29 U.S.C. 1103 (c) (1). Finally, 406 (a) (1) (E) prohibits any transaction between the trust and a "party in interest," including an employer, and 407 carefully limits the amount and types of employer-owned property and securities that the trustees may obtain for the trust. 29 U.S.C. 1106 (a) (1) (E), 1107. 16 In sum, ERISA vests the "exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan" in the trustees alone, and not the employer or the union. 29 U.S.C. 1103 (a).
 
The legislative history of ERISA confirms that Congress intended in particular to prevent trustees "from engaging in actions where there would be a conflict of interest with the [453 U.S. 322, 334]   fund, such as representing any party dealing with the fund." S. Rep. No. 93-383, pp. 31, 32 (1973). In short, the fiduciary provisions of ERISA were designed to prevent a trustee "from being put into a position where he has dual loyalties, and, therefore, he cannot act exclusively for the benefit of a plan's participants and beneficiaries." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, supra, at 309. 17   
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(2) declares that a trustee may not "act in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C. 1106 (b) (2).

McCarrons interests, given they are adverse to the interests of NYCDCC members, need not be considered by the Trustees. He has no right to appoint any Trustee for the NYCDCC benefit Funds; and, those so appointed need be removed - if necessary, by suit and an apppropriate order from the District Court.

Restoration of Democracy under Prong 2 of the Consent Decree requires that McCarrons last minute appointment of Trustees to oversee your funds, your monies are vetoed, given they expired with the expiration of the illegal extension of the LMRDA Trusteeship.

Repreresentatives of your choosing inures to the Trustees moreso than the Officers, as it is they who have unfettered fiduciary control to manage the benefit Trust funds for:

 
"the assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan."