UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

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UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
From Jawin, posted by Behemot: "Actually, the Chinese Communist Party is the UBC! McCarron's UBC has strong, longstanding, personal ties with Ron Tutor, who controls Tutor Perini Corporation with investor Richard Blum, husband of United States Senator from California Dianne Feinstein. Blum and Feinstein have a history of lobbying for, and profiting from, the normalization of trade relations with China. You have to dig, but the information is out there. For instance: http://articles.latimes.com/1997-03-28/news/mn-43046_1_china-connections"
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anonymous
http://unionplainfacts.tripod.com/documents/archivespage/bigthree.htm

THE BIG THREE Exclaim

McCARRON, BLUM, TUTOR

The Big Three Alliance within the Carpenters Union consists of Carpenters Union General President Douglas McCarron, Carpenters Union Pension Financial Advisor (and husband of California Senator Diane Feinstein) Richard Blum, and Los Angeles Red Line (subway) contractor and Carpenters Union Pension Trustee and President of the California Contractors Association Ronald Tutor.

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

 

These three individuals -McCarron, Tutor, and Blum- head the Carpenters Union and decide what is done, and when. These three individuals are also on the board of directors of the Massachusetts-based Perini Construction Company. They receive a salary from the Carpenters Pension Trust, as well as stock options from Perini Construction.
Ted
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

Ted
http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/08/video-inside-the-7-billion-bay-bridge-construction-project/#

are you saying Feinstein allowed Chinese Steel to go into in the new Bay Bridge under the most favored nations clause, over American firms bids? This is being being built by CALTRANS....FYI, CA, Bay Area has $29B in infastructure projects underway or on the table for being funded through 2012. Some of you may want to head that way & tap into some of that work. That's $29 Billion with a B & that kind of dough employs a lot of men.

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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
Thanks for the info.

Now the U.S.A new Bay Bridge is under constructing.
-Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. (ZPMC)
http://www.zpmc.com/view.php?tid=37&cid=2l

Highly praise for our company’s self-innovation and self- confidence
2009-4-29 14:19:50
The afternoon of March 24th Shanghai Political Consultative Conference Chairman Feng Guoqin and some members went to our Changxing Base. Chairman Feng and his followings inspected our independent innovation of marine engineering vessel dynamic positioning system, U.S.A new Bay Bridge and environment-friendly automatic terminal demonstration zone. They listened to the report from ZPMC President Guan Tongxian on “production, management and how to deal with the finance crisis”. Chairman Feng pointed out that ZPMC is still flourishing under this finance crisis, we can see the company’s confidence which comes from constant independent innovation, from the early adjustment of product structure and maintains the good combination of traditional advantage industry and new advantage industry. He stressed that keeping increasing must keep the market firstly. We shall study the worshipful spirit which is constantly strive to become stronger, revitalize the Chinese nation, brave to innovate and make providence from ZPMC.
http://www.zpmcspreader.com/english/news.asp?Action=Show&ID=57

President of ZPMC Guan Tongxian: The leading enterprise
2009-6-1 15:36:46
Not just innovation, the management personnel of President of ZPMC Guan Tongxian is also to be praised by people. When many enterprises think a lot of highly educated people, Zhenhua Port Machinery has been to "do not ask the source of the hero" as a criteria for employment. In the human resources strategy, President of ZPMC Guan with more ideas also has a "philosophical Zhenhua."Emphasis on academic qualifications is important but not only. In ZPMC’s team there are two types of useful people, one is white-collar with some foreign languages and computers basic skills; the other is the people who has useful experiences without academic qualifications. Guan thinks that those up to few tens of meters, weighing hundreds of tons of port machinery can only be controlled by the second people. Retirement is not according to age. In ZPMC, people with healthy body and work ability will not retire if work need. In the enterprise do one big thing needs 5-10 years, if the 60-year-old should retire, what can the 50-year-old do something?" President Guan believed that the reason which ZPMC didn’t waste too much effort is because of the old team of experienced staff which is closely related to quality. ZPMC turns a large contingent of migrant workers into industrial workers. ZPMC production line uses the 40,000 front-line workers which mostly are migrant workers. President Guan repeatedly said that although the education level of migrant workers is not high, they can work hard, Zhenhua can trains these migrant workers to skillful craftsman. At present, Zhenhua has thousands of people, the world''s largest welding workers.     Better wages and benefits reduce the smaller wage gap. Guan Tongxian said ZPMC has 4000 white-collar workers, and everyone’s monthly income is more than 10,000 Yuan. 40,000 migrant workers can also get a monthly average close to 2,500 Yuan, so that even if the income of enterprises in Shanghai is also relatively high. It is worth mentioning that, in ZPMC, the incomes of all employees are more balanced, even if the company''s executives, the highest annual income is up to 350,000 Yuan, however, President of Guan’s annual individual income can not even ranked in the company before the 5 . While employee don’t pursuit high annual income, the company adopts the form of self-help groups when the workers suffer from serious illness, or purchasing house, or children in university such as large expenditures, and gives them necessary assistance or free loans and so on. ZPMC has many ideas and policies to encourage and motivate employees, in ZPMC, as long as you have ability and performance highlights, you can get high wages.
http://www.zpmcspreader.com/english/news.asp?Action=Show&ClassID=14&ID=64
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
http://chinhdangvu.blogspot.com/2010/08/us-spends-china-benefits.html
Friday, August 20, 2010
U.S. Spends, China Benefits
By Gordon G. Chang

Need another argument why Washington should refrain from further stimulus spending?
Of course you don't--your list should already be too long--but let me tell you what Andy Xie says anyway.
The former chief Asia-Pacific economist for Morgan Stanley argues that American stimulus just ends up helping the Chinese economy--and hurting our own.
"Just as water flows down," he writes, "stimulus affects low-cost economies more, wherever it is initiated."
His argument starts off with a simple proposition: producers will take stimulus funds and source products in developing nations, where costs are cheaper.
Xie says America's General Electric and Germany's Siemens get to make the decisions as to where stimulus money is ultimately spent, not Washington or Berlin.
So, according to Xie, the West will pour money into the global economy and the funds will find their way into the emerging nations, which already have too much liquidity.
Inflation will then come back here through increasing commodity prices.
Workers in the developed economies will, naturally, demand higher wages to compensate themselves for price increases, both present and anticipated.
The Fed then has to raise interest rates to deal with the excess liquidity, and the tightening "will probably trigger a global crisis as asset bubbles burst."
The result is that Western nations will be wracked by inflation, burdened by debt and laid low by another downturn.
"That's the irony: The stimulus in the West can immediately bring harm to itself," writes Xie.
And apparently everyone else, if he is correct.
But is he?
We know the first step of Xie's analysis is right on the money.
Washington is restricted from using its purchasing power to favor domestic competitors.
For instance, the U.S. is a party to the World Trade Organization's Government Procurement Agreement, which seeks to treat domestic and foreign parties alike when governments acquire goods or services.
More important, the United States is committed to maintaining an open market.
When the Obama administration wanted to spur the production of clean energy, it was a Chinese enterprise that won the right to produce the turbines for a 36,000-acre wind farm in West Texas.
The United Steel workers were eventually able to get A-Power Energy Generation Systems and its affiliate, Shenyang Power Group, to buy steel made in the U.S., but this side arrangement was only the result of intense backdoor pressure.
Similarly, when Caltrans decided to replace much of the Bay Bridge in San Francisco--using Federal funds--the California transportation agency employed a Chinese steel fabricator, Zhenhua Port Machinery Co., now known as Zhenhua Heavy Industry.
Congress's border fence with Mexico is built with--you guessed it--Chinese steel.
Washington could shut out Chinese companies if it wanted.
Why?
China is not one of the 40 signatories to the "plurilateral" Government Procurement Agreement. We are free to discriminate against China, but we don't.
China is free to discriminate against us, and it does.
Beijing, not surprisingly, made sure almost all its November 2008 stimulus program went to state enterprises.
That's not to say foreign companies received no benefit from China's unprecedented spending spree.
How could they not get some of the cash from the plan, which disbursed a staggering $1.1 trillion last year according to my calculations?
Some American companies--notably Caterpillar, Alcoa, United Technologies and Cummins--cited China as a positive factor in last year's interim results, but they ultimately didn't do as well as expected.
At the moment, China is looking to use its purchasing power to extract technology from foreign companies that want to get the central government's business.
The "indigenous innovation product accreditation" rules show just how far the Chinese leaders will go to restrict their market to domestic competitors, especially their so-called "national champions."
Beijing is dedicated to building up Chinese companies, and it is using state cash to do so.
We won't know for some time whether all of Andy Xie's gloomy thesis is correct, but at this point we can tell that a far higher proportion of American stimulus money is going to China than Chinese money is coming back here.
So here's more evidence that our stimulus programs don't work for you -- unless, of course, you're a Chinese enterprise.
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
http://www.aisc.org/newsdetail.aspx?id=21398
Warnings Prove Prescient as Chinese Welding Issues Delay Bay Bridge

July 31, 2009 from the National Steel Bridge Alliance

Welding problems at the China-based steel fabricator for the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge have caused a two-month delay in shipping the pieces to the Bay Area, according to Steve Heminger, executive director of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and a member of the panel that oversees bridge construction.

"Bay Area transportation officials are concerned that the delayed steel delivery could push back the completion of the $6.3 billion eastern span, which is now scheduled to open in 2013," according reports in the San Francisco Chronicle.

Back in 2004, the National Steel Bridge Alliance cautioned about circumventing the Buy America bridge provisions and using a Chinese fabricator for this project. The issue developed when the single American bid for the project was higher than expected. But rather than using a value engineering process to optimize the design and decrease costs, it was decided to use a China-based fabricator and Chinese-produced steel. At the time, NSBA officials stated: "It could be redesigned more economically with a U.S.-based collaborative effort." It now appears the result of rejecting that option will be increased costs and substantial delays in project completion.

The welding issues on the steel were first discovered last year but Caltrans and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission thought the issue had been resolved; instead, it now appears the problems are even more serious than originally thought. As a result of finding these new problems, Heminger, incoming Caltrans Director Randell Iwasaki, and Bimla Rhinehart, executive director of the state Transportation Commission, plan to head to China to press their concerns with officials from the steel fabricator and project contractor. As commission spokesman Randy Rentschler explained: "There's nothing like intimate, on-the-ground management to solve problems." And of course, the process would be even simpler if the contractor wasn't located 6,165 miles from the job site.

The welding issues are not the only problems that have occurred with Chinese construction products in the recent past. Last year, rumors surfaced of issues with welds on Chinese hollow structural sections. The rumors were substantial enough that many warehouses stopped stocking Chinese tubes and fabricators with Chinese inventory increased their inspection procedures. Also, the residential construction industry has been hard hit with lawsuits over faulty Chinese drywall which may have been used in as many as 100,000 homes in the United States.
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-02/01/content_11953800.htm

Zhenhua Heavy may report loss
By Wang Ying (China Daily)
Updated: 2011-02-01 13:38


SHANGHAI - Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industry Co Ltd (ZPMC), the world's leading manufacturer of large steel cranes designed to unload shipping containers, is expected to report a financial loss in 2010, the first-ever loss in company's 18-year history.

The heavy-duty equipment manufacturer told China Daily on Sunday that it estimated the loss in 2010 could be between 650 million yuan ($98.6 million) and 750 million yuan.

The company's net profit was 840 million yuan in 2009, which means ZPMC's net profit might have slumped up to 189.3 percent year-on-year last year.

The company attributed the slump in business to weak demand globally in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

The global financial meltdown in late 2008 has led to a sharp cut in orders in 2009. "ZPMC only received $1.7 billion worth of orders in 2009, compared with $4 billion in 2008," said Kang Xuezeng, president of ZPMC.

On average, it takes between eight months and 18 months to complete an order, hence the worst performance in 2010.

In addition, ZPMC's high level of steel inventory, purchased at higher prices, together with the appreciation of the yuan, has led to the only loss since the Shanghai-based State-owned company was founded in 1992, according to Kang.

"We have tried every means to reduce losses, such as cutting the budget, restructuring product lines and strengthening internal management," said Kang. "The company is ready to operate more diversified product lines," he added.

Kang, however, remained upbeat this year. "The worst year for port equipment manufacturers has passed, and in the following year, global demand will recover for marine engineering products. As a result, ZPMC's performance will see major improvements in 2011 and 2012," he said.

"It is worth noting that even during the slowdown ZPMC maintained a 76 percent global port machinery market share," added Kang.

ZPMC set the goal of acquiring $4 billion in orders and 20 billion yuan in sales in 2011.

Global demand for port cranes revived in 2010. ZPMC received new orders worth $3.05 billion, up 78 percent over 2009.

The increase of new orders in 2010 showed ZPMC has come through its worst time, said Zhou Sili, an analyst from Northeast Securities. However, due to the long industrial cycle of port machinery manufacture, it should take a bit more time for ZPMC to regain its pre-crisis performance.

In addition, the company is striving to expand its marine engineering production line. ZPMC plans to generate up to 50 percent of revenue from marine engineering and steel structures in the future.

The company will also develop its own 91-meter jack-up drilling unit in 2011, according to Kang.

The optimization of its product line will play a significant role in its future development, said Zhou.

Despite the expected loss in 2010, shares of ZPMC edged up 1.67 percent to close at 7.29 yuan a share on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on Monday.
Ted
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

Ted
In reply to this post by anonymous
What do you know regarding the U.S. Glazing Industry?

The new WTC Freedom Tower's entirely new glazing spec was fast-tracked in design by American firms, whom I believe invested well opver $10M and subsequent to their time, effort, energy & cash laid out - the glazing Contract was awarded to another Chinese firm, again without reimbursement or any regard for American Industry.

I believe Harmon may have garnered a very small portion of the work...the money floors are say ground level to 20, from there up (in general) it was a seperate contract.

NAFTA & the most favored nation crapola has destroyed the American Manufacturing & Industrial base, in favor of 3rd world hellholes who pay workers $14/day, thus negating transportation costs. And the dopey UBC supported Slick Willie, cuz...wink-wink, I'll never sign that, I promise - 11 Months after having been sworn in & Elected largely on that promise by the UBC and our support, not only did slick Willie Bone Monica, he boned the rest of us too, all construction trades.

Since NAFTA was signed late 1993, do you realize how many billions of dollars of plants & factories, offices, support facilities etc could have been built right here in the USA....Freaking staggering amount of work down the shitter, and yet the UBC keeps supporting all the losers for office nationwide.....OBAMA included.

Slick Willie started the decline & Obama is hell bent on finishing the Financial Destruction of the USA, our economy, the military....NASA, Bean Bag Border Patrol??? Hello - anything wrong with this picture?  And he is well on his way
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/09/AR2009100903138_pf.html

New World Trade Center's Chinese Glass Is Adding to Trade Furor

By Peter Whoriskey
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, October 10, 2009

The new World Trade Center, now under construction, is often considered a symbol of American enterprise. But to some union members and U.S. businesses, it represents what's wrong with the nation's economy.

The contract to manufacture the blast-resistant glass wrapping the main tower's first 20 stories was awarded earlier this year to a Chinese firm that underbid U.S. competitors.

Now the trade tensions between the United States and China that have arisen recently over tires, steel and paper are spreading to glass.

"This new tower is going to be made out of subsidized Chinese glass, putting factory workers out of their jobs in America," said Scott Paul, director of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, a partnership of the United Steelworkers and some manufacturers.

On Thursday, the Alliance sent a letter to U.S. trade officials asking that they address what they see as unfair trade practices. Specifically, the group says that the Chinese government spends billions of dollars subsidizing the glass industry's energy costs.

"Our domestic glass industry is the most efficient in the world, but it cannot compete against production that is heavily subsidized by the Chinese government," according to the letter. "As a result, glass production in the U.S. has suffered in recent years, with plant closings and thousands of lost jobs throughout the country."

U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk and Commerce Secretary Gary Locke are slated for trade meetings in Hangzhou, China, later this month.

A Chinese spokesman on trade issues did not respond to requests for comment.

The U.S. glass industry has lost more than 40,000 jobs since 2000, according to Department of Labor figures, even as the Chinese glass industry has experienced explosive growth. Between 2000 and 2008, U.S. imports of Chinese glass have tripled.

Trade relations between the United States and China were frayed last month when President Obama approved tariffs of 35 percent on Chinese tires, after the United Steelworkers, which includes workers from a number of industries, filed a complaint. Other complaints regarding steel and paper products are pending.

Some economists have warned that such measures could inflame broader economic tensions between the two countries and ultimately hurt consumers by raising prices.

"If foreign governments are subsidizing products, for whatever reason, we are benefiting by lower prices," said Daniel J. Ikenson, a trade specialist at the Cato Institute.

When it was learned in March that a Chinese firm, Beijing Glass, would manufacture the special glass for the World Trade Center project, a small furor erupted.

A U.S. company, PPG Industries, said it had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars helping to design the glass, only to see the contract go overseas.

"I think that we have seen product after product from China be unreliable, and in this instance, we need the most reliable," Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) said at the time, according to media reports.

Steven Coleman, a spokesman for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which is rebuilding the World Trade Center site, defended the award.

"It was a competitive bidding process, which is how we award all our contracts," Coleman said.

Ikenson, the trade specialist, dismissed the One World Trade Center controversy, saying, "It's in our national interest to get the biggest bang for the buck."

A spokesman for the steelworkers union, which represents about 15,000 workers in the North American glass industry, said there are currently no plans to file a trade case on behalf of the industry. But union leaders said the U.S. government should address the Chinese practices in the glass industry.

"Trade cases are a last resort," union spokesman Gary Hubbard said. "As unemployment keeps rising we have a heightened concern that if we don't fight back smartly, we're going to lose our industries."

View all comments that have been posted about this article.
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/business/19glass.html

January 19, 2010
Glassmaking Thrives Offshore, but Is Declining in U.S.
By LOUIS UCHITELLE

The majestic steel beams of a soaring office tower beginning to rise from the ruins of the World Trade Center are a tribute to American resilience, but also a marker in the decline of yet another industry. Not an inch of imported glass went into the two lost towers, built 40 years ago. The lower floors of the new one will soon be sheathed in Chinese glass.

The decline of glassmaking in America started gradually in the 1990s and accelerated during the Great Recession. What’s more, the big companies, like Corning and Guardian Industries, say that even as the economy improves, they are unlikely to bring domestic employment and production back to prerecession levels. Imports, for one thing, inhibit sales. And bigger profits lie abroad, so they are channeling investment and expansion to their overseas factories.

“Those who are looking through the rearview mirror, waiting for the glass industry in this country to come back, should know it isn’t going to come back, not the way it was,” Russell J. Ebeid, Guardian’s chairman, said in an interview.

With the nation’s unemployment rate hovering at 10 percent, the possibility of stemming job losses holds considerable appeal. So, in an argument likely to be repeated if unemployment persists at record high levels, some are pressing the Obama administration to offer protection for the nation’s glassworkers by raising existing tariffs on imported glass, particularly from China, as is happening on steel and tires. That action or something similar is supported by the United Steelworkers and also by many of the small manufacturers that operate more than 300 factories in this country.

They say that Chinese glassmakers are competitive in the American marketplace only because they have received giant subsidies in recent years from the Chinese government. The subsidies offset, among other things, the high cost of shipping heavy glass — auto windshields, for example — across the Pacific.

“We definitely need to put tariffs on some of the glass coming from China,” said Tim Tuttle, chairman of the glass industry department of the United Steelworkers. Overall industry employment has declined 30 percent over the last nine years, to fewer than 95,000 workers, 15,000 of them unionized.

The Obama administration shies away from identifying specific industries, like tires, steel and now glass, for special protection from imports. “The president wants to help create the economic conditions such that broad new industries can evolve consistent with his priorities, particularly in the area of clean energy,” said Jared Bernstein, chief economist to the vice president.

That caution reflects the free trade thinking of many mainstream economists and trade experts. They contend that in a global economy that has minimized tariff barriers and subsidies, each country will concentrate — if not immediately, then over the long run — on the goods and services it is best at producing, and trade them for what other countries are best at producing, thus maximizing output across the globe.

The United Steelworkers endorses free trade, but insists that in the cases of tires, steel pipe and now glass, Chinese government subsidies have undercut the market forces on which free trade depends.

Senator Sherrod Brown, Democrat of Ohio, still a big glassmaking state, takes the argument a step further. Given the deep symbolism of the new World Trade Center tower, he considers awarding the glass contracts to the lowest bidders, as the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey did last year, a blow to national pride.

“Imagine China,” he said in an interview, “building a huge structure intended to be an important national symbol and importing glass from the United States to build it. There is no way the Chinese would do that.”

Beijing Glass won in the bidding to supply the opaque, blast-resistant glass for the first 20 floors of the new tower, which is now just seven stories of steel beams, a stub along the Lower Manhattan skyline, and still dwarfed by the huge cranes putting the framework in place.

While the Steelworkers and many smaller companies seek protection, the big glassmakers generally do not. Some, with factories in China, have benefited from the subsidies, and also from the economies of scale that operating in China make possible: access to a rapidly growing market there and competitively priced exports to the United States.

In the Trade Center bidding, Guardian won as the supplier of the intricately layered glass for the upper 85 floors. It will soon make that glass at a factory in Carleton, Mich. But even as company executives described this victory in interviews this month, they sent out a news release noting a greater one.

Guardian manufactured all the glass — more than two million square feet of it — for the newly opened 160-story Burj Khalifa in Dubai, the world’s tallest building. That glass came not from America, but from Guardian’s factories in Germany and Luxembourg. The company now has 36 plants abroad, employing 9,000 people, up from 6,500 workers in 2005 and, for the first time, surpassing the number of Guardian employees in this country.

“Nearly three-quarters of our sales are outside the United States,” Mr. Ebeid said. “That has been steadily increasing since 1981, when we were totally a domestic supplier.”

Like many glass factories in the United States — those that have survived the recession — the Guardian plant in Carleton is operating at less than 85 percent of capacity, producing long strips of coated “float” glass from which windows, glassware, fiber optics, auto windshields, solar panels and other glass products are fashioned. Employment has fallen to 410 people, from 520 as the recession was getting under way in January 2008.

The work force will not return to the old level, says Gerry Hool, the plant manager. That is partly because of new efficiencies, but also because imported glass now accounts for nearly 24 percent of domestic consumption, up from 21 percent just four years ago. What’s more, the industry’s biggest customers — automakers and home builders — are not likely to raise production to the levels reached during the housing bubble and before the credit crisis.

“Maybe in better times we’ll get back to 450 workers,” Mr. Hool said.

Some pockets of strength remain. Beer and wine bottles are made in this country, at automated plants. And from two factories in the Ohio Valley, operating 24/7, the Anchor Hocking Company churns out baking dishes, drinking glasses, glass canisters, glass candleholders and glass meter covers, counting on customer service, like just-in-time delivery to Wal-Mart, to stave off imports. Anchor Hocking has no factories abroad.

But elsewhere in the Ohio Valley, dozens of companies that once made glass for the furniture industry, concentrated just to the south in the Carolinas, are gone. As furniture-making moved offshore, so did the glass that went with it: glass tabletops, for example, and glass for framed mirrors.

Colored glass is another victim. A hundred companies in the valley once made “art” glass — figurines, flower vases, lamps, perfume bottles, bowls and woven glass baskets — employing hundreds of skilled glass blowers and pressers. They are mostly gone. Many were family-owned enterprises, like Fenton Art Glass in Williamstown, W.Va., a rare survivor run by George W. Fenton, a grandson of the founder.

“We make a product that no one needs; we are purely discretionary,” Mr. Fenton said, noting that the recession devastated discretionary spending.

Employment at the Fenton plant is down to 125 people from a peak of 700 in 2000. Imports are also a problem, but Mr. Fenton, rather than fight them, has become an importer himself, reselling what he purchases abroad — a sideline that now contributes 10 percent of revenue.

“I need some relief from government to stay in business,” Mr. Fenton said, referring to the tariff proposal, “but I’m not sure it is the government’s role to keep me in business.”
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

tommy
In reply to this post by anonymous
CAT  and CUMMINS are at all time highs. Cat was at $36 less than a year ago, today its at $104 and change. Stimulus has worked for only a few US companies, but to say the results for these two were under, you're mistaken. These 4 companies you mention have made unspeakable profits, but where is ours?
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
In reply to this post by anonymous
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/08/30/apples-glass-temple-made-in-china/

August 30, 2010, 12:31 PM HKT

Apple’s Glass Temple, Made in China

    The tubular glass entranceway to Shanghai’s new Apple Inc. shop may be its most high-tech feature, considering the iPad hasn’t officially arrived in China.

Twelve rounded glass panels stand over 12.5 meters (41 feet) to form the cylindrical dome. Inside, the computer maker’s distinctive bitten-apple logo is suspended above a glass stairway that corkscrews into the underground retail space

The atrium foyer is also a crystalline sign of the times: It was made entirely in China, establishing a fresh benchmark on workmanship for the world’s largest glass industry.

Glassmaking is a rare ancient craft with limited history in China. It got a boost in 1954 when Mao Zedong urged more production of building materials during a visit to a Hebei Province glass factory. In 1971, China’s building materials bureau proclaimed its development of a version of the established “float glass” manufacturing process.

By the early 1990s, China had overtaken the U.S. in flat glass production, and its 28.7 million-ton output last year was six times Ducker Worldwide managing partner Nick Limb’s estimate of 2009 U.S. shipments.

Now the Chinese industry is ascending the technology ladder.

Trends in glass underscore a broader shift for the world’s new No. 2 economy. Moving beyond cheap-for-export manufacturing and strengthened by domestic growth, Chinese companies increasingly compete in sophisticated, capital-intensive global businesses.

Foreign glassmakers are active in China, and on balance make superior products with more sophisticated technology. Yet increasingly, Chinese names in flat glass like CSG Holding Co.’s China Southern Glass, Fuyao Glass Industry Group Co. and Xinyi Glass Holdings Ltd. challenge global titans Nippon Sheet Glass Co.’s Pilkington, Asahi Glass Co., Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Guardian Industries Corp. and PPG Industries Inc.

This month, a crowded half-day Shanghai seminar (in Chinese) drew speakers from as far as Delaware to expound on China’s new glass milestone: the Apple store.

When it started planning for the Shanghai store 18 months ago, Apple’s London-based design firm Eckersley O’Callaghan was unsure fabricators in China could fulfill Steve Jobs’s signature standards, said co-founder James O’Callaghan. The Apple chief executive took a personal interest in the Shanghai project — his name appears on patents for glass stairways used in some shops.

As Apple embarks on a major China retail expansion, not least of the reasons for it to source locally is the nation’s tax of up to 30% on certain glass imports. And of course, China already has a role making its iPhone and iPad.

Fabricator Beijing North Glass Safety Glass Co. got the nod for Shanghai after cutting its teeth on less complex Apple store projects in New York and Beijing.

Even so, North Glass’s general manager Paul Gao told the seminar, “they doubted our ability.”

While North Glass’s mandate for Shanghai was only 62 pieces, it took a year to complete, including months spent testing new machinery.

The complexity: ultra-clear, tempered, scratch-, stain- and bubble-free glass panels, six layers thick, 12.563 meters tall and 2.578 meters wide.

“Actually North Glass has run risks to be the global partner of Apple,” Gao said, noting it once took 28 days of retries to get a panel approved by O’Callaghan’s two-hour inspection. “A lot of glass was rejected.”

“Pure determination,” said O’Callaghan. “The accuracy was excellent and beyond my imagination.”

A DuPont Co. division supplied glass-strengthening materials to the Apple project. Some shop glass came from Shandong Jin Jing Technology Co. (http://www.cnggg.cn/,) which has worked with PPG and is also producing blast-resistant windows for One World Trade Center, New York’s newest and tallest skyscraper.

Special cranes lifted the glass panels in place, and Apple’s store opened to overflow crowds on July 7.

At the end of Gao’s Aug. 13 presentation, his audience burst into applause — then accompanied him across the street to marvel at the Apple dome under a clear dusk sky. “Apple was inspecting art, not a manufactured product,” Gao said.

– James T. Areddy. Follow him on Twitter @jamestareddy

Ted
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

Ted
In reply to this post by anonymous
BAY BRIDGE - TEAM CHINA, $1.574M for a 91-page Qtr. 2-2010 Report (Priceless)....as US Unemployment remains staggeringly high & unacceptable, and BHO Bankrupts the Nation.

They can't outsource the Labor here, so CUFTA (Reagan), NAFTA (Clinton) & CAFTA (Bush II) outsourced the manufacturing.

Part & Parcel to the outsourcing comes the next piece of the puzzle, which is the AFL-CIO & NLRB's joint effort to expand Globally to "organize" workers of the World. What does that have to do with their mandated duties & responsibilities here at home in the ole, U.S.A. - absolutely nothing. What will spring forth from these efforts you ask??? Simple, the next part of the puzzle is Importing the Labor, via the use of Foreign Nationals....to replace all you fat, lazy, fried chicken, pizza eating, beer bellied U.S. slobs of workers who refuse to work like dog and to eat dog/rice on Company Construction Sites...

Nice Rig though....1873 Ton Capacity on the Barge Crane to be used in the 550-1660 Ton individual picks (lifts).

What started as a $1B Dollar Seismic Replacement of the Eastern Span of the Bay Bridge into the Oakland side (Afetr 1989's Loma Prieta Quake) will balloon to a $9 Billion Dollar Project when complete in 2014/15.

American Bridge joined forces with Flour-Daniels in a JV effort to build the project. Flour is notorious for their animosity toward all Unions in general..

You NY guys, this is worth a look - save for the next major Bridge Project there, just to keep in the back of your minds, as you'll have an idea of what to expect and can address these type issue's prior to the advertisement for bids, award of contracts & NTP's...

http://baybridgeinfo.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/TBPOC_2Q_2010.pdf

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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~epf/1999/choi.html

The Rhetoric of Inclusion: The I.W.W. and Asian Workers
By Jennifer Jung Hee Choi

In early 1903, two thousand Mexican and Japanese sugar beet workers in Oxnard, California, collectively organized a large biracial strike, and then asked Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, for a union charter. Upon receiving the request, Gompers replied, "Your union must guarantee that it will under no circumstances accept membership of any Chinese or Japanese."1 His response was typical of American trade unionism because of its anti-Asian sentiment and for its refusal to organize Asian workers even when they were willing to organize themselves.2 Consequently, in a great act of solidarity the Mexican workers repudiated any charter that excluded Japanese workers.

The American Socialist Party also endorsed Asian exclusion from American labor organizations while simultaneously proclaiming the slogan "Workers of the World, Unite." Much in the same vein as Gompers and the AFL, the party supported workers' struggles in Japan, but not those of Japanese workers in the United States.3 The party even opposed the position of the Second International, which appointed a special committee in 1908 to study the question of immigration.

    We therefore endorse every demand made and position taken by the International Congress...; except those passages which refer to specific restrictions or to the exclusion of definite races or nations...We advocate the unconditional exclusion of Chinese, Japanese, Coreans and Hindus, not as races, per se, not as peoples with definite physiological characteristics -- but for the evident reasons that these peoples occupy definite portions of the earth which are so far behind the general modern development of industry, psychologically as well as economically, that they constitute...an obstacle and menace to the progress. . . of our working class population.4

Organized labor's position suited a general atmosphere of hostility to Asian immigrants that American labor played only one part in creating. Labor advocacy of Asian exclusion encouraged the institutionalization of Asian exclusion in other social, economic, and political areas. The large majority of both the populations of California and of the Pacific Coast more generally, regardless of class, religion, party affiliation, or European immigrant status, seem to have agreed on the "necessity" for exclusion. California politicians Hiram Johnson, Chester Rowell, and James Phelan, and novelist Jack London were only a few examples of the similar attitudes held among Progressives, Democrats, Republicans, and Socialists on this issue.5 From the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act to the 1913 Alien Land Act to the 1924 Immigration Act, which barred all Asians from entry into the United States, exclusionary legislation blocked Asians from citizenship and from participating in most American organizations and institutions.

Among labor and leftist organizations, the Industrial Workers of the World, the anarcho-syndicalist group, were the sole exception to this pattern of hostility toward Asian immigrants. The I.W.W. was the only major national labor organization of the period to hold open their door to Asian workers and consequently to remain consistent in a rhetoric of including all workers regardless of race.6 In this, the I.W.W. stood in stark contrast to all other labor organizations from conservative craft unions like the AFL to radical political groups such as the Socialist Party. Furthermore, the I.W.W. developed their rhetoric of Asian inclusion during a period of intense hostility to Asians and, in so doing, they challenged dominant racial assumptions and hierarchies. This paper will examine the organizational discourse on this issue by first briefly surveying the historiography, then by providing a background on the I.W.W.'s philosophy and ideology, and finally by focusing on the organization's position on Asian workers.

The racism of the American labor movement against Asian workers and immigrants has been well documented, particularly with recent contributions from Asian-American studies which have examined Asian workers not as mere victims but also as active agents in shaping their own experiences.7 However, few studies have explored efforts like those of the I.W.W. to embrace all workers regardless of race. Within the historiography of the I.W.W., surprisingly few studies concentrate on the organization's relationship to workers of color. The record of the Wobblies on race and ethnicity has piqued the interest of historians only recently. Early organizational history endeavored instead to tell the Wobbly story.

Two major authoritative works, published fifty years apart, mark the evolution of the more than 70 years of I.W.W. historiography. For the first forty years, Paul Brissenden's The I.W.W.: The Study of American Syndicalism (1919) stood as the most authoritative and comprehensive examination of the organization. After 1932, John Gamb's The Decline of the I.W.W. picked up the history where Brissenden's ended, but then little new scholarship surfaced until the late 1960s, when interest in the I.W.W. reemerged. Philip Foner led the way in 1965 with his volume on the I.W.W. in his History of the Labor Movement in the United States. Soon after Foner's narrative history covering the victories and struggles of the organization during its most active years (1905-1917), several book-length studies followed: Patrick Renshaw's The Wobblies: The Story of Syndicalism in the United States (1967), Robert Tyler's The Rebels of the Woods: The I.W.W. in the Pacific Northwest (1967 focusing on timber workers), and Joseph Conlin’s analytical study Bread and Roses (1969). Also in 1969, Melvin Dubofsky published We Shall Be All: A History of the I.W.W., which remains the most comprehensive study of the organization.8 All the studies fundamentally agreed that the I.W.W. represented a radical alternative to the conservative craft unions of the time. With their commitment to industrial unionism and a revolutionary working-class movement, the I.W.W. organized those workers excluded from the larger American labor movement. As Dubofsky stated, these marginalized workers encompassed "those workers neglected by the mainstream labor movement: timber beasts, hobo harvesters, itinerant construction workers, exploited eastern and southern European immigrants, racially excluded Negroes, Mexicans and Asian Americans."9

Within the decade of the 1960s, historians began to give serious attention to those at the periphery of the labor movement, the so-called "submerged fifth" as Renshaw described them.10 Several recent historians have explored the I.W.W. in relationship to a particular racial or ethnic group that formed part of the larger marginalized section of the working class. Philip Dreyfus' 1997 study, "The I.W.W. and the Limits of Interethnic Organizing," scrutinized I.W.W. attempts to organize across white ethnic lines in Grays Harbor, Washington, in 1912. Dreyfus demonstrates, "that the I.W.W.'s international vision and profession was sorely tested by American racial realities."11 On the question of Asians, Daniel Rosenberg and Philip Foner contend in their introduction to the I.W.W. section of the Racism, Dissent and Asian Americans (1993) that the I.W.W. was the first working class organization to actively recruit Asians. Rosenberg elaborated on this claim in a separate journal article introducing a Wobbly speech, which supported organizing Asian workers. Rosenberg argued that the speech reflected consistency in the views of I.W.W. that "stress[ed] solidarity between Asian and non Asian labor."12

This paper follows in the vein of this recent scholarship on the I.W.W. by focusing on the organization’s relationship to a particular racial group. By analyzing the I.W.W.'s policy on a specific group of workers -- Asian immigrants -- within the context of and in combination with their overall revolutionary framework and vision, this paper strives to link this specific topic with earlier organizational historiography. This paper surveys the I.W.W. rhetoric on Asian immigrant workers by examining regional I.W.W. newspapers and government documents -- many not previously used by researchers of this topic. This paper concludes that the Industrial Workers of the World devised a rhetoric to include Asian workers within their organization and the labor movement more generally despite intense hostility and exclusionary sentiments against Asian immigrants. Ultimately, they began to challenge accepted racial hierarchies and the racism of the American labor movement by developing a rhetoric of inclusion stemming from their internationalist ideology and commitment to a working-class revolution. Although Wobblies continued to use racial labels and language, such as "Jap," from the exclusion movement, they nonetheless derived from their overall internationalist framework and analysis of immigration and foreign workers a unique set of arguments that called for solidarity with Asian workers. At the same time, they generated arguments relating more specifically to Asian workers.

"All who toil, be they young or old, male or female, skilled or unskilled, born here or abroad, are welcomed in the ranks of the One Big Union."13 "One Big Union," a major I.W.W. campaign slogan, captured the idea of one of the organization's essential goals -- to organize workers into industrial unions, regardless of craft or skill, in order to abolish the wage system through direct action and general strikes. Founded in 1905 during the struggles of the Western Federation of Miners in the West, the I.W.W. believed in the "cardinal" principle that labor produces all wealth and is entitled to all the wealth it produces. Rooted in Marxist labor theory of value, the organization claimed workers and capitalists were engaged in a class struggle over the wealth the labor produced. Therefore, as they stated in the preamble to their constitution, the two classes "have nothing in common."14 For the I.W.W., this meant all workers had to be organized against the employer at the point of production regardless of craft, skill, race, ethnicity, or gender.

    Organizing as we do at the point of where value is created, we must be at all times ready to admit to membership all members of the working class. The I.W.W. has no restrictions in this regard. Young and old, foreign born and native born, male and female, the black, the yellow, the red, and the white, the home-guard and the blanket stiff, the skilled and the unskilled are alike welcome to our ranks.15

This analysis logically derived from an internationalist conception of an industrial working class. The only "nation" to which workers belonged was to the "nation of those who work."16 The I.W.W. viewed workers as carrying the same interests of labor across national boundaries. They deemed nationality as an artificial category that only served to divide the solidarity of workers

    The Industrial Workers of the World is an INTERNATIONAL movement...We realize workers have no country...As long as we quarrel among ourselves over differences of nationality we weaken our cause, we defeat our own purposes...Differences of color and language are not obstacles to us. In our organization, the Caucasian, the Malay, the Mongolian and the Negro, are all on the same footing. All are workers and as such their interests are the same. An injury to them is an injury to us.17

Furthermore, the nation state existed only to protect the interests of the capitalist class -- the state was a part of a larger apparatus that oppressed workers. "The nations belong to his master, and therefore to protect any nation is to protect his master," wrote one Wobbly in 1912.18

Recognizing that workers possessed the same interest from nation to nation also entailed realizing that when workers moved from one nation to another their interests became inextricably bound with those of the host labor force into which they entered. The Wobblies' analysis of "foreign workers" understood the movement of labor across national boundaries as intrinsic to capitalism. Unlike some labor organizations of the time, the I.W.W. embraced foreign workers for two reasons. First, the organization recognized that foreign workers made up the majority of the pool they attempted to organize, particularly the unskilled migratory labor force. If they were to succeed in launching a unified labor movement, the I.W.W. had to embrace foreign workers.19 Secondly, though the I.W.W. agreed with trade unions that immigrant labor constituted "cheap bundles of labor power," as other conservative labor unions accused, they reasoned the only way to reduce competition between native and foreign workers was to organize the latter rather than exclude them from labor organizations.

    So long as labor is bought and sold upon the market, its price being regulated to a large extent by supply and demand, so long will the master class bring these people in to compete with us as sellers of labor power...We must educate and organize on class lines; we must do away with race prejudice and imaginary boundary lines; we must recognize that all workers belong to the international nation of wealth producers.20

The real test of the commitment to these sentiments for Wobblies in California was how they handled the question of Asian workers.

The "merciless" tactics of Japanese agricultural workers had become almost legendary within the industry. A U.S. Department of Labor report in 1945 on labor unionism in American agriculture dedicated a section to describing the organization of Japanese agricultural laborers in the early twentieth century.21 The I.W.W. were quite aware of Japanese labor tactics at the time and often relied upon this knowledge to support their position of including Asians in unions and their stance against Asian exclusion policies. The use of this type of argument may represent what Rosenberg claims made the I.W.W. much more "forceful" in their presentation of class solidarity across racial lines than were other organizations that used a similar rhetoric.22 While their analysis of Asian workers fit neatly into their overall internationalist/anti-nationalist conception of a working class, the I.W.W. also generated an analysis that spoke specifically to the conditions of Asian workers.23 Not only did the I.W.W. apply their generic argument about internationalism and foreign workers to the Asian issue but they also constructed new, more specific reasons for welcoming Asians into their ranks.

In general, when applying their analysis of foreign workers to Asians, the I.W.W. appealed to Euroamerican workers that unionizing foreign workers was to the benefit of "American" workers. "The Japanese are here, they will not starve to death, and they will work as long as the boss will hire them...[Would it not] be better to unite with them to fight the common enemy, the master...?" inquired one Wobbly organizer, Joseph Biscay, in 1911.24 As long as Asian workers, like all foreign workers, resided in the United States and sold their labor power, native workers always had a potential pool of cheap labor with whom they might be forced to compete. Of course we have to compete with the Orientals and we know that a glut in the labor market will lower the price of our commodity labor power,"25 wrote one Wobbly in 1912. Excluding Asian workers or other foreign laborers from moving to the U.S., entering the job market, or joining unions was not going to eliminate competition. The only way to end competition between workers was to own the means of production.26 Secondly the workers did not possess the power to control the flow of Asian immigrant labor into the United States. "Whenever the capitalists want the Asiatics they get them regardless of any exclusion leagues or laws and the whole purpose simply serves to keep up race prejudice," argued I.W.W. member Caroline Nelson.27 Although workers could not control immigration, they did have the power to unionize Asian workers and to unite all labor in order to prevent employers from forcing workers to compete with one another. To exclude certain segments of the working population because of race only served to defeat their cause, Wobblies argued. "Are we not correct when we say that trade unions foster a state of affairs which allows one set of workers to be pitted against another set of workers in the same industry; thereby helping to defeat one another?"28 Also, the organization viewed the exclusion of Asian workers as a form of nationalism that stood in opposition to its own internationalism. It meant being "race conscious" rather than "class conscious." "A worker who proclaims himself class conscious and then talks loftily about 'greasers', 'dagoes', 'coons', etc. is a fool. He is really nothing but race conscious....The worker has no nation to protect. The nations belong to the masters."29 Another argument offered was that exclusion served the interests not only of capitalists who tried to divide workers but also of the middle class of small merchants. The Wobbly J. Walsh, who was especially outspoken on the Asian issue, reasoned that much of the anti-Asian agitation originated within the American middle class who saw Japanese immigrants who launched small businesses as threats to their own economic interests. "These people," Walsh wrote in 1908, "are entering every business of the middle class, and our little American cock-roach merchants sees his finish, unless he can create some disturbances of some kind, and thereby drag the working class into a middle class fight."30

The I.W.W. also developed more specific reasons why Asians should be organized, explanations that went beyond the extension of their generic international and anti-nationalist framework. These types of explanations reflected attempts to fight stereotypes of Asian workers as unorganized, docile, and prone to scabbing. In fact, Wobblies claimed, Asian workers sometimes were better organized, less likely to scab, more likely to hold out longer for higher wages, and even more class conscious than whites.

The I.W.W. often cited the strike strategy of Japanese agricultural workers as their best quality as workers. With admiration, many Wobblies described the strategy of how Japanese eliminated labor competition and potential scabs before striking as a superior level of solidarity.

    The Japs having worked one season at a wage and hours satisfactory to the boss, were again contracted for the next season. When they came back, the boss met them with smiles, everything looked good for him for another season, but a great surprise was in store for him. Mr. Jap said $1.75 per day and ten hours work, but said the boss, you have contracted to work for less wages and longer hours. One dollar and seventy-five cents and ten hours work answered the Jap. The bosses refused to comply with their demand, so they refused to work...Not a sufficient number of whites could be procured to harvest the fruit, so the bosses had to fall back on the Japs, who later demanded and received $2.00 per day and eight hours work.31

The I.W.W. often attributed the reason that Asian workers sometimes received higher wages than white workers to this superior organizational strategy. "Don't holler about the yellow peril, as the Japanese worker receives $2.00 per day; the free born American citizen $1.25. Why the difference? The Japanese are organized; they are past masters in the art of bringing John Farmer to his knees."32 The Japanese use of their strike strategy "is the very qualification in the Japanese that will make [them] one of the best industrialists ever known. While there may be many Japanese working for less than Americans, there are thousands of Americans working for less than Japanese."33 Wobbly organizer George Speed testified at a 1912 hearing of the Industrial Relations Commission that the Japanese labor tactic pushed native workers to realize the necessity for a higher level of organizing and solidarity. "The native worker through the agitation that has been going on in the state during the last several years is commencing to wake up and realize the necessity of some form of organization in order to keep in touch and develop."34

Many Wobblies argued that other Asian workers also possessed a long history of militancy and solidarity that white workers did not have. "[T] he Chinaman is the most rebellious worker in the world and there are thousands of them here."35 Asian workers' sense of loyalty and obligation made them good union men because it made them "timely on their dues," and prevented them from scabbing. Speed testified before the Industrial Relations Commission:

    Now, the Jap does act true, has acted largely true. I have seen strikes on this coast when the Japs refused to take other men's place, while the white man would take them...[T] hey certainly have organization and they certainly have solidarity. They act more solid together than natives... the white is too individualistic as yet.36

However, this system of reasoning proved to have little effect in the long run on how white workers saw their Asian counterparts.

After more than 40 years of anti-Asian agitation, the 1924 Immigration Act institutionally reinforced the hostility toward Asian immigrants when it in effect stopped the flow of all Asian people from entering the United States, regardless of occupation or gender. The Immigration Act, like many exclusionary policies preceding it, carried more than just the impact of ending immigration. These legislative policies, often supported and led by American labor, prevented Asians from participating in most aspects of American society. Nearly all economic and political doors on which Asians knocked before W.W.I. were locked, apparently with the exception of that of the Industrial Workers of the World. In policy and rhetoric, the I.W.W. remained open to Asian workers and consequently stood consistent with their internationalist vision of building a worldwide labor movement. Placing Asians within in an overall international and anti-nationalist framework, the I.W.W. advocated organizing Asian workers, thus opposed conservative and radical labor organizations.

In the preface to his paperback edition of We Shall Be All, Dubofsky addressed a historiographical debate about the I.W.W.'s commitment to both industrial unionism and the building of a international movement of the proletariat. Some historians, like Renshaw, concluded at a certain point the I.W.W. ceased to be a revolutionary organization, and "became primarily a militant union."37 In controverting Conlin's depiction of the I.W.W. as reformers, Dubofsky asserted, "They fought long and hard for reforms in working conditions...but reform and revolution need not be mutually exclusive. At any given historical moment, to be sure, tangible reforms may vitiate the spirit of revolution...But that in no way lessened the dedication of the typical I.W.W. leader to ultimate revolutionary goals."38 The conclusions of this paper reinforce Dubofsky's assertion that though the I.W.W.'s commitment to industrial unionism lead them to work for reforms in working conditions, they retained their dedication at least in rhetoric to a working-class revolution. The I.W.W. challenged racial hierarchies and the racism of the American labor movement by developing a rhetoric of Asian inclusion. By arguing for solidarity with Asian workers, the I.W.W. kept in sight the larger goal of international working-class solidarity as essential to a revolutionary workers' movement. They refused to exchange their ideological commitments to revolutionary internationalism for short term advantages of trade union reform.

Much more study needs to occur before evaluating the depth of the I.W.W.'s commitment to including Asian workers. This paper only skims the rhetorical surface. Many questions need to be probed regarding the nature of the relationship between Asian workers and the I.W.W. Did Asian workers find the I.W.W. to be a welcoming home? Was the anti-racist and anti-exclusionary stance only a rhetoric, or did it carry into practice? What was the experience of everyday Asian workers in the I.W.W.? How did they see the organization and its members? A deeper investigation of these questions may unearth the rich diverse history of American radicalism and the stories of those participants who have been traditionally marginalized in the radical narrative.

Jennifer Jung Hee Choi completed her M.A. in history this spring. Her specific area of interest in U.S. history has been on race and class in the nineteenth and twentieth century, specifically on Asian Americans and labor. She will continue to do her research this fall as a doctoral student at the University of California-Berkeley.
Endnotes

1 Karl Yoneda, "The First 100 Years of Japanese Labor History in the USA," in Roots: An Asian American Reader, eds. Amy Tachiki, Eddie Wong, Franklin Odo, and Buck Wong (Los Angeles: Continental Graphics, 1971). Return to essay
2 An entire historiography exists on organized hostile response to Asian workers in California. Alexander Saxton's work stands as the most definitive study of white working-class racism against Asian workers. See, Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy; Labor and the Anti-Chinese Sentiment in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). Return to essay
3 For AFL support of Japanese workers abroad see Samuel Gompers, "The Rights of Japanese Working People and the Attitude of the Japanese Government Toward Them," a statement by Gompers to Rev. Doctor Sidney L. Gulick, Dec. 17, 1914, Samuel Gompers Letter-Books, Library of Congress, published in Racism, Dissent and Asian Americans from 1850 to the Present, eds. Philip S. Foner and Daniel Rosenberg (Westport, Cn: Greenwood Press, 1993). The International Socialist Review published articles about the labor movement in Japan written by a leading Japanese socialist, and later a founding member of the CPUSA, Sen Katayama, while simultaneously advocating Japanese exclusion from the United States. See articles in The International Socialist Review by Sen Katayama, "Capitalism in Japan" 10, (May 1910): 1003-1006; "A Japanese Victory," 12, (March 1912): 581-582; "The Uprising in Japan," 13, (April 1913): 742-744.Return to essay
4 "The Socialist Congress and the Immigration Question," The International Socialist Review 10, (June 1910): 1121-1126. Return to essay
5 Frank W. Van Nuys, "A Progressive Confronts the Race Question: Chester Rowell, the California Alien Land Act of 1913 and the Contradictions of Early Twentieth Century Racial Thought," California History 73 (1994): 2ff. Return to essay
6 The AFL, Knights of Labor, and other organizations sometimes allowed African-Americans and often enrolled Mexican workers, but still blocked the door for Asians. Return to essay
7 For studies on Asian-American radicalism, see Robert G. Lee "The Hidden World of Asian Immigrant Radicalism," in The Immigrant Left in the United States, ed. Paul Buhle and Dan Georgakas (Albany: State University of New York, 1996) and Yuji Ichioka, The Issei: The World of the First Generation of Japanese Immigrants, 1885-1924 (New York: Free Press, 1988). Return to essay
8 Paul Brissenden, The I.W.W.: The Study of American Syndicalism (New York: Columbia University, 1919); John Gamb, The Decline of the I.W.W. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932); and Philip Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol. IV: The Industrial Workers of the World, 1905-1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1965). Patrick Renshaw, The Wobblies: The Story of Syndicalism in the United States (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Company, Inc., 1967); Robert Tyler, The Rebels of the Woods: The I.W.W. in the Pacific Northwest (Eugene, OR: University of Oregon Books, 1967); Joseph Conlin, Bread and Roses (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1969) and Melvin Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the I.W.W., 2nd. ed., (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988). Return to essay
9 Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 148. Return to essay
10 Renshaw, The Wobblies, 26. Return to essay
11 Philip Dreyfus, The I.W.W. and the Limits of Interethnic Organizing: Reds, Whites and Greeks in Grays Harbor, Washington, 1912, Labor History (Fall 1997): 450-470. Return to essay
12 Foner and Rosenberg, Racism, Dissent, and Asian Americans from 1850 to Present and Daniel Rosenberg, "The I.W.W. and Organization of Asian Workers in Early Twentieth Century America," Labor History 36, no.1 (1995): 77. Return to essay
13 (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 1 May, 1913, 2.Return to essay
14 (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 24 October, 1912, 2.Return to essay
15 (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 24 October, 1912, 2.Return to essay
16 (New Castle, PA) Industrial Solidarity, 13 September, 1913, 3.Return to essay
17 ibid., p. 3. Return to essay
18 (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 10 October, 1912, 2. Return to essay
19 (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 6 June, 1912, 3. Return to essay
20 (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 31 November, 1912, 4. Return to essay
21 The report stated, "The Japanese soon lost their docility once they had come to dominate the labor market in various crop areas...[T]hey were prone to put pressure on the employer when he was most vulnerable and subject to maximum loss in case of a strike -- just when the crop was ripe and in highly perishable conditions. It was generally conceded the Japanese were merciless once they had their employer at a disadvantage." Department of Labor, Labor Unionism in American Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 1945, 52. Return to essay
22 Rosenberg, "The I.W.W. and Organization of Asian Workers," Labor History, 77. Return to essay
23 Perhaps the racial politics of the West in general and the region's overall obsession with the Asian question pushed or forced the I.W.W. to deal with the question more pointedly. It seems the I.W.W. papers in the West dealt more with the Asian question than the organization's East Coast branch publications. For example, Industrial Solidarity published in New Castle, Pennsylvania, carried more articles on African Americans, while the Industrial Worker published in Spokane, Washington, produced more articles on Asian Americans See (New Castle, Pa) Industrial Solidarity 4 June 1921, 1 and (New Castle, Pa) Industrial Solidarity, 11 June 1921, 1. Return to essay
24 Telegram, Joseph S. Biscay to Industrial Worker,in Industrial Worker, 5 June 1911 quoted in Racism, Dissent and Asian Americans, eds. Foner and Rosenberg, 195. Return to essay
25 (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 31 November 1912, 4. Return to essay
26 ibid. Return to essay
27 (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 10 October 1912, p. 3. Return to essay
28 J.H. Walsh, "Japanese and Chinese Exclusion of Industrial Organization, Which?" Industrial Union Bulletin, 11 April 1908, quoted in Racism, Dissent and Asian Americans, eds. Foner and Rosenberg, 192. Return to essay
29 Nelson, (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 10 October 1912, p. 3. Return to essay
30 Walsh, "Japanese and Chinese Exclusion," Industrial Union Bulletin, 11 April 1908, quoted in Racism, Dissent, and Asian Americans, eds. Foner and Rosenberg, 190. Return to essay
31 (Detroit) Industrial Union News, 14 February 1914, 3. Return to essay
32 (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 18 May 1911, 2.Return to essay
33 Walsh, "Japanese and Chinese Exclusion," quoted in Racism, Dissent and Asian Americans, eds. Foner and Rosenberg, 191. Return to essay
34 Industrial Relations Commission, Final Report and Testimony submitted to Congress by the Commission on Industrial Relations, Washington, D.C., 1916, Vol. 5, 4941. Return to essay
35 (Spokane) Industrial Worker, 10 October 1912, 3. Return to essay
36 Industrial Relations, Final Report, 4947. Return to essay
37 Renshaw, The Wobblies, 267. Return to essay
38 Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, vii. Return to essay

 

 
Ted
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

Ted
So McCarthy was right!

This is not about the IWW or bogus claims that marxism, socialism, communism should rule.

The United States is a 'Sovereign Nation' and we have a vested interest & direct right to control trade policies, immigration, taxation of foreign goods, tarrifs etc. National Sovereignty and solidarity amongst Americans....first & foremost. Accordingly, all your articles & reposts of others work product only support the fact that you are un-American.

This is not the turn turn of the century, and frankly, we do not need any more immigrants. We need to take care of business right now first...for our citizens and workers.

Save the open border lectures (via re-posts) of the same old, same old propaganda that your kind has always used. When that fails, any one who opposes your aims is thus attacked and/or branded a racist....keep smoking the hash & dropping the LSD.

Were the crap this article portends to be true, then the Chinese would be earning more than $14-$30 a day, per the theory (not fact) that Asians are better negotiators & their workers stick together in solidarity better than Americans...please. That is why theyt have been under Communist Rule all these years, why they can only have one baby?

Moreover, the labor costs & Chinese manipulation of their currency are policies which require attention. The fastest way to end the inequities impacting American workers would be for Congress to repeal NAFTA & impose strict Tarrifs on any/all goods entering US Ports. Fair trade is a laudible goal is it not? Addressing Corporate Tax structures & ending the insanity caused by the IRS & the Fed's manipulation of interest rates, (they are after all private-offshore bankers right?) deflation/inflation are worthy topics of discussion...what does the IWW say on this stuff? What does your hero Obama say on these topics?

Following your logic, if China owns most of our debt, they should be running the Country right? Maybe we should replace Congressman & Senators & tie it that equation to the percentage of the debt we owe them....free & open borders afterall....shit, while we're at it, shred the US Constitution too, disband the military & then we can all sing Kumbaya & We are the World.
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703514904575602731006315198.html

NOVEMBER 16, 2010

China's 'State Capitalism' Sparks a Global Backlash

By JASON DEAN, ANDREW BROWNE And SHAI OSTER

(Please see Corrections & Amplifications item below.)

BEIJING—Since the end of the Cold War, the world's powers have generally agreed on the wisdom of letting market competition—more than government planning—shape economic outcomes. China's national economic strategy is disrupting that consensus, and a look at the ascent of solar-energy magnate Zhu Gongshan explains why.

A shortage of polycrystalline silicon—the main raw material for solar panels—was threatening China's burgeoning solar-energy industry in 2007. Polysilicon prices soared, hitting $450 a kilogram in 2008, up tenfold in a year. Foreign companies dominated production and were passing those high costs onto China.

Beijing's response was swift: development of domestic polysilicon supplies was declared a national priority. Money poured in to manufacturers from state-owned companies and banks; local governments expedited approvals for new plants.

In the West, polysilicon plants take years to build, requiring lengthy approvals. Mr. Zhu, an entrepreneur who raised $1 billion for a plant, started production within 15 months. In just a few years, he created one of the world's biggest polysilicon makers, GCL-Poly Energy Holding Ltd. China's sovereign-wealth fund bought 20% of GCL-Poly for $710 million. Today, China makes about a quarter of the world's polysilicon and controls roughly half the global market for finished solar-power equipment.

Western anger with China has focused on Beijing's cheap-currency policy; President Obama blasted the practice at the G-20 summit in Seoul last weekend. Mr. Zhu's sprint to the top points to a deeper issue: China's national economic strategy is detailed and multifaceted, and it is challenging the U.S. and other powers on a number of fronts.

Central to China's approach are policies that champion state-owned firms and other so-called national champions, seek aggressively to obtain advanced technology, and manage its exchange rate to benefit exporters. It leverages state control of the financial system to channel low-cost capital to domestic industries—and to resource-rich foreign nations whose oil and minerals China needs to maintain rapid growth.

China's policies are partly a product of its unique status: a developing country that is also a rising superpower. Its leaders don't assume the market is preeminent. Rather, they see state power as essential to maintaining stability and growth, and thereby ensuring continued Communist Party rule.

It's a model with a track record of getting things done, especially at a time when public faith in the efficacy of markets and the competence of politicians is shaken in much of the West. Already the world's biggest exporter, China is on track to pass Japan this year as the second-biggest economy.

Charlene Barshefsky, who as U.S. trade representative under President Bill Clinton helped negotiate China's 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization, says the rise of powerful state-led economies like China and Russia is undermining the established post-World War II trading system. When these economies decide that "entire new industries should be created by the government," says Ms. Barshefsky, it tilts the playing field against the private sector.

Western critics say China's practices are a form of mercantilism aimed at piling up wealth by manipulating trade. They point to China's $2.6 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves. The U.S. and the European Union have lodged a series of WTO cases and other trade actions targeting Beijing's policies, and hammer China's refusal to let its currency appreciate more quickly, which they argue fuels global economic imbalances.

Top executives at foreign companies have started griping publicly. In July, Peter Löscher, Siemens AG chief executive, and Jürgen Hambrecht, chairman of chemical company BASF SE, in a public meeting between German industrialists and China's premier, raised concerns about efforts to compel foreign companies to transfer valuable intellectual property in order to gain market access.

Some observers think Beijing's vision is rooted in a desire to avenge China's "century of humiliation" that started with the 19th-century opium wars. Such critics believe that China's focus on "indigenous innovation"—nurturing home-grown technologies—entails appropriating others' technology. China's high-speed trains, for instance, are based on technology introduced to China by German, French and Japanese makers.

"The Chinese have shown that if they have the ability to kill your model and take your profits, they will," says Ian Bremmer, president of New York-based consultancy Eurasia Group. His book, "The End of the Free Market," argues that a rising tide of "state capitalism" led by China threatens to erode the competitive edge of the U.S.

So far, though, multinationals aren't staying away, because China remains a vital source of growth for companies whose domestic markets are saturated.

China's strategy echoes the policies Japan employed in its economic rise—policies that also rankled the U.S. But China's sheer scale—its population is 10 times Japan's—makes it a more formidable threat. Also, its willingness in recent decades to open some industries to foreign firms makes its market far more important for global business than Japan's ever was, giving Beijing much greater leverage.

Chinese leaders have begun to acknowledge the backlash. At the World Economic Forum in Tianjin in September, Premier Wen Jiabao said that the recent debate about China among foreign investors "is not all due to misunderstanding by foreign companies. It's also because our policies were not clear enough."

"China is committed to creating an open and fair environment for foreign-invested enterprises," Mr. Wen said.

The state has always played a big role in China's economy, but for most of the reform era that started in the late 1970s, it retreated as state-owned collective farms were dismantled and inefficient state industrial enterprises closed. Accession to the WTO in 2001 represented a big bet by the leadership on liberalizing markets further. The gamble paid off, with growth rocketing much of the past decade.

But the state is again ascendant. Many analysts say the pace of liberalization has slowed, and point to vast swaths of industry still controlled by state companies and tightly restricted for foreigners. The government owns almost all major banks in China, its three major oil companies, its three telecom carriers and its major media firms.

According to China's Ministry of Finance, assets of all state enterprises in 2008 totaled about $6 trillion, equal to 133% of annual economic output that year. By comparison, total assets of the agency that controls government enterprises in France, whose dirigiste policies give it one of the biggest state sectors among major Western economies, were €539 billion ($686 billion) in 2008, about 28% of the size of France's economy.

The government's increased involvement in sectors from coal mining to the Internet has spawned the phrase guojin mintui, or "the state advances, the private sector retreats," among market proponents in China. A January report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development said China's economy had the least competition of 29 surveyed, including Russia's. Prominent Chinese economist Qian Yingyi has said he worries over what appears to be "a reversal of market-oriented reforms in the last couple of years."

The state's huge role in the economy gives it enormous sway to pursue its policy goals, which are often laid out in voluminous five-year (sometimes 15-year) plans. These relics of the Mao-era command economy are central to the corporate fortunes of Western giants like Caterpillar Inc. and Boeing Co. that rely on the country's market. China is now one of the biggest sources of revenue growth for Caterpillar, and is the biggest buyer of commercial jets outside the U.S., according to Boeing.

One of Beijing's most important goals: wean China off expensive foreign technology. It is a process that began with the "open door" economic policies launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 that brought in waves of foreign technology firms. Companies such as Microsoft Corp. and Motorola Inc. set up R&D facilities and helped train a generation of Chinese scientists, engineers and managers.

That process is now in overdrive. In 2006, China's leadership unveiled the "National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology," a blueprint for turning China into a tech powerhouse by 2020. The plan calls for nearly doubling the share of gross domestic product devoted to research and development, to 2.5% from 1.3% in 2005.

One area of hot pursuit: green technology. China's "Torch" program fast-tracks industries, attracting entrepreneurs with offers of cheap land for factories, export tax breaks and even a free apartment for three years.

Take the case of Deng Xunming, a China-born U.S. citizen who is a pioneer of America's solar industry and whose innovations light up the first solar-powered billboard on New York's Times Square.

His company, Xunlight Corp., has been nurtured by U.S. financial aid and embraced by politicians eager for the U.S. to win the race to develop new energy technologies. Xunlight has pulled in more than $50 million in state and federal grants, loans and tax credits, partly aimed at bringing needed jobs to Toledo, Ohio, where the company is based.

But two years ago, Mr. Deng, who left China in 1985 to study at the University of Chicago, set up a Xunlight unit on a giant industrial estate near Shanghai. The company now also makes its thin-film solar panels there and employs 100 workers. The panels are exported back to the U.S.

Mr. Deng says he is trying to keep the Chinese operation "low key." It isn't mentioned on Xunlight's website, and Mr. Deng declined to comment on the China factory in an interview. "China will be a good market for the future," he said. "But right now, the bigger market is in Europe. We're putting our attention on the Europe and U.S. market. But meanwhile we're developing efforts for the China market," which could eventually be bigger, he said.

While the state seeks new technology, it also uses control of banking to feed cheap credit to industries it wants to foster. The government sets interest rates for China's bank depositors low relative to rates of growth and inflation. That means Chinese households, through the banks, effectively subsidize the state's industrial darlings.

Privately held telecommunications equipment maker Huawei Techologies Co. has long had its overseas expansion supported by China Development Bank, which in 2004 extended a five-year, $10 billion credit line and routinely lends money to foreign buyers to finance their purchases of Huawei products. Revenue has risen more than 200% in the past five years, and it has become one of the top three telecommunications companies, along with Nokia Siemens Networks and Telefon AB LM Ericsson.

Sprint Nextel Corp. recently excluded Huawei and fellow Chinese telecom company ZTE Corp. from a contract worth billions of dollars, prompted by U.S. fears that the companies have ties to China's military. The Sprint decision was a setback for Huawei in the one major market it has had difficulty penetrating, the U.S., and shows how mounting concerns over China's policies are starting to exact a cost.

Huawei has also faced complaints in Europe that Chinese government backing gives it an unfair advantage. Both Huawei and ZTE have said their equipment poses no threat to U.S. security, and deny benefiting unfairly from government support.

For China, the biggest risks may be internal. Some attempts to generate high-tech breakthroughs by fiat have fizzled. A drive to produce a home-grown microprocessor took years to replicate features of those from Intel Corp. and Advanced Micro Devices Inc., whose products had continued to evolve. A Chinese-developed mobile phone technology has yet to gather significant momentum abroad, despite the government forcing China's largest phone company to adopt it.

Longer term, China faces a host of challenges that threaten growth. They include a population that is aging quickly because the one-child policy limited births in recent decades, and environmental damage resulting from the country's breakneck pace of industrialization.

For now, that pace has the West on guard. "Our competition has gotten tougher during a period for the U.S. of profound economic weakness that magnifies any perceived threat," says Ms. Barshefsky, the former U.S. trade representative. There is a "significant and profound—almost theological—question about the rules as they exist."

Corrections & Amplifications: An earlier version of this article mistakenly said that Chinese economist Qian Yingyi is from Peking University.
—Andrew Batson contributed to this article.

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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

listman
Let's concentrate on the crime of the corporate raiding of a trade union in AMERICA.
Sorry guy your too far off the charts for the likes of me.

I'm all for stopping repression of various cultures but we've got our own situation to deal with.
If you can heal the world go right ahead, I need to heal my Union and that takes all my time.
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

tester
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
Thanks for the interesting link! Here's another:

http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/09/a-labor-unions-analysis-of-china/

August 9, 2010, 10:20 am
A Labor Union’s Analysis of China
By MATTHEW L. WALD
Green: Business

The United Steelworkers announced last week that it had signed a deal with two Chinese companies that are planning a $1.5 billion wind farm in Texas to assure that some of the high-value parts are made in this country.

China was probably inclined to negotiate because the labor organization has become an influential voice in trade policy, bringing successful suits against countries that it asserts are unfairly dumping subsidized imports here.

A few years ago, it might have seemed odd for an American industrial union to negotiate with companies owned by the People’s Republic of China on rights for workers. And it might seem odd that China wants to build in the United States. The plant will have Chinese financing yet a heavy component of American parts.

In a conference call to announce the deal on Friday, the union president, Leo W. Gerard, was asked why under those circumstances the Chinese were so interested in Texas.

For one thing, he said, China has more money than it can invest at home. And the United States has good wind and a good electricity market.

“They believe they can make some money in the U.S. market,” he said. “These are Communist capitalists.”

 
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Re: UBC/McCarron connections with Chinese Communist Party

anonymous
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1222
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
Ed Royce (R-CA)
China's Indigenous Innovation Trade and Investment Policies:
How Great a Threat?

Date Wednesday, March 09, 2011
Time 2:00 PM
Location Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building
witnesses Panel I
Ms. Karen Laney
Acting Director of Operations
U.S. International Trade Commission

Panel II
Mr. Philip I. Levy
Resident Scholar
The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

Mr. Peter Brookes
Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies
The Heritage Foundation

Ms. Thea M. Lee
Chief of Staff
AFL-CIO
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/hearings.asp
March 9, 2011
China's Indigenous Innovation Trade and Investment Policies: How Great a Threat?

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
Testimony:

    * The Honorable Edward R. Royce ,
    * Ms. Karen Laney,
    * Mr. Philip I. Levy,
    * Mr. Peter Brookes,
    * Ms. Thea M. Lee

www.internationalrelations.house.gov/112/lee030911.pdf
Testimony of Ms. Thea Mei Lee
Deputy Chief of Staff AFL-CIO