Working on that also brother!!!!
The Union has told the Dept of Labor that there were no requirements prior to their amendment. However, that is not true. There was always a requirement, it used to be 5 vested credits. They have said they have to do this as we are costing the union too much money. The Labor Dept has been in touch with the union. Everything was explained to them by the union. They have the SDP read and the union has the "Fiduciary" right to amend the collective bargaining agreements to keep the union alive. The only way this can be sorted is if our union reps negotiate for us? They are not !! Who voted on this amendment? Where are the minutes to this meeting? Will their next measure be anyone less than 15 vested credits are going to lose 20% of their pension? Where does it stop. Is anybody picketing this? The working "Brothers & Sisters" don't even know it's happening.
Hi Anything I can do to help please let me know! I am also disabled and retired! Jerry
In reply to this post by RDK
I'm just hearing about this blog.I am also a retired disabled carpenter losing my benefits.I spoke to a lawyer a few weeks ago and he told me this was a union matter and there's nothing he could do.I also heard from a friend that he knows someone who has less than 15 credits and received a letter from the benefit fund saying his wife will no longer have coverage but his will remain the same.
In reply to this post by Braciole
Rules when changed, go infect occur at time of making,and start new at that time. Whoever is before that change stays with what they got,and start new for whoever is after. So how does the Union get of dumping new rules on members from past rules,at time qualified for benefits and then take away. Have been in touch with Harvey Mars office as of 3.5wks ago. They say looking into,but I do not believe what they are saying. As time passes, we need a attorney we can trust. Has anyone spoken with the NLRB Representive appointed to watch over the NYCDCC? please call 631-578-3928 to discuss futher, I am also disable , my name is Ray Miller. Thank you
In reply to this post by RDK
Hi My name is Jerry and I am a retired disabled carpenter! Any news yet as to any lawyers that might be interested in this injustice?
In reply to this post by Braciole
Fght back - sue him, seize the UBCJA International assets. File lawsuits inmultiple states & play the game the exact same way he & his corporate whore legal counsel does.
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2015
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
LUIS v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 14–419. Argued November 10, 2015—Decided March 30, 2016
A federal statute provides that a court may freeze before trial certain assets belonging to a defendant accused of violations of federal healthcare or banking laws. Those assets include (1) property “obtained as a result of ” the crime, (2) property “traceable” to the crime, and (3),as relevant here, other “property of equivalent value.” 18 U. S. C. §1345(a)(2). The Government has charged petitioner Luis with fraudulently obtaining nearly $45 million through crimes related tohealth care. In order to preserve the $2 million remaining in Luis’ possession for payment of restitution and other criminal penalties,ﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭpating her assets, including assets unrelated to her alleged crimes.Though the District Court recognized that the order might prevent Luis from obtaining counsel of her choice, it held that the SixthAmendment did not give her the right to use her own untainted funds for that purpose. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded.
564 Fed. Appx. 493, vacated and remanded. JUSTICE BREYER, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYORﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭgitimate, untainted assets needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. ﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭtional right taken together with the nature of the assets lead to thisconclusion. Pp. 3–16.
(a) The Sixth Amendment right to counsel grants a defendant “afair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice,” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53, that he “can afford to hire,” Caplin & Drys-dale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U. S. 617, 624. This Court has
2 LUIS v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus consistently referred to the right to counsel of choice as “fundamental.”
(b) While the Government does not deny Luis’ fundamental right to
be represented by a qualified attorney whom she chooses and can afford
to hire, it would nonetheless undermine the value of that right
by taking from Luis the ability to use funds she needs to pay for her
chosen attorney. The Government attempts to justify this consequence
by pointing out that there are important interests on the other
side of the legal equation. It wishes to guarantee that funds will
be available later to help pay for statutory penalties and restitution,
for example. The Government further argues that two previous cases
from this Court, Caplin & Drysdale, supra, at 619, and United States
v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 615, support the issuance of a restraining
order in this case. However, the nature of the assets at issue here
differs from the assets at issue in those earlier cases. And that distinction
makes a difference. Pp. 5–16.
(1) Here, the property is untainted, i.e., it belongs to Luis. As described
in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto, the Government may
well be able to freeze before trial “tainted” assets—e.g., loot, contraband,
or property otherwise associated with the planning, implementing,
or concealing of a crime. As a matter of property law, the
defendant’s ownership interest in such property is imperfect. For example,
a different federal statute provides that title to property used
to commit a crime (or otherwise “traceable” to a crime) passes to the
Government at the instant the crime is planned or committed. See
21 U. S. C. §853(c). But here, the Government seeks to impose restrictions
upon Luis’ untainted property without any showing of any
equivalent governmental interest in that property. Pp. 5–10.
(2) This distinction does not by itself answer the constitutional
question because the law of property may allow a person without a
present interest in a piece of property to impose restrictions upon a
current owner, say, to prevent waste. However, insofar as innocent
funds are needed to obtain counsel of choice, the Sixth Amendment
prohibits the court order sought here.
Three basic considerations lead to this conclusion. First, the nature
of the competing interests argues against this kind of court order.
On the one side is a fundamental Sixth Amendment right to assistance
of counsel. On the other side is the Government’s interest in
securing its punishment of choice, as well as the victim’s interest in
securing restitution. These latter interests are important, but—
compared to the right to counsel—they seem to lie somewhat further
from the heart of a fair, effective criminal justice system. Second,
relevant, common-law legal tradition offers virtually no significant
support for the Government’s position and in fact argues to the conCite
as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3
ﾭ ﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭing unfettered, pretrial forfeiture of the defendant’s own “innocent” property. Third, as a practical matter, accepting the Government’sposition could erode the right to counsel considerably. It would, in ﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭstraints in other cases involving illegal behavior that come with steep financial consequences. These defendants, often rendered indigent, would fall back upon publicly paid counsel, including overworked and underpaid public defenders. The upshot is a substantial risk that accepting the Government’s views would render less effective the basicright the Sixth Amendment seeks to protect. Pp. 11–15.
The constitutional line between a criminal defendant’s tainted funds and innocent funds needed to pay for counsel should prove workable. Money may be fungible, but courts, which use tracingrules in cases of, e.g.ﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭence determining how much money is needed to cover the costs of a lawyer. Pp. 15–16.
JUSTICE THOMAS concluded that the rule that a pretrial freeze of untainted assets violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice rests strictly on the Sixth Amendment’s text andcommon-law backdrop. Pp. 1–12.
The Sixth Amendment abolished the common-law rule thatgenerally prohibited representation in felony cases. “The right to select counsel of one’s choice” is thus “the root meaning” of the SixthAmendment right to counsel. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
S. 140, 147–148. ﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭrequisites for their exercise. ﾭﾭnies the Government unchecked power to freeze a defendant’s assets before trial simply to secure potential forfeiture upon conviction. Unless the right to counsel protects the right to use lawfully owned ﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭderstood to protect only the right to hire counsel of choice—would be meaningless. Without pretrial protection for at least some ﾭﾭfendant’s assets, the Government could nullify the right to counsel of choice, eviscerating the Sixth Amendment’s original meaning and purpose. The modern, judicially created right to government-appointed counsel does not obviate these concerns. Pp. 1–5.
History confirms this textual understanding. The common-law forfeiture tradition provides an administrable rule for the Sixth Amendment’s protection: A criminal defendant’s untainted assets areprotected from government interference before trial and judgment, but his tainted assets may be seized before trial as contraband or
4 LUIS v. UNITED STATES
through a separate in rem proceeding. ﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭsets avoids case-by-case adjudication and ensures that the original meaning of the right to counsel does real work. Here, the incursion of the pretrial asset freeze into untainted assets, for which there is nohistorical tradition, violates the Sixth Amendment. Pp. 5–9.
(c) ﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭﾭsis. Pp. 9–12.BREYER, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
FULL TEXT of CASE
This post was updated on .
See above case. How many Banking Regulations & Health Care Reg's has McCarron & company violated over the past several years? How many predicate criminal RICO Act violations have the RO & USAO ignored during the same timeframe? re: Blue Card Vacation Wage Extortion (ongoing via imposition of mandatory $500 UPP Fine ala the White Card; the By-Law Section 21 Wage theft illegally converted to the Welfare Fund wherein said Funds, their Fiduciaries / Trustees on both the Labor & Management side are still accruing and earning interest to this day on the ill gotten gains w/o ever having made restitution in full to the Rank & File working stiff (you) from whom they stole said monies, with interest & attorney fees.
For this alone, Walsh, Torrance & Bharrara should be disbarred from the practice of law and McCarron, Geiger, McGinnis & Cavanaugh should be summarily indicted given losses of well over $125 Million dollars.
All criminal suspects are innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law; or are they?
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 17
Appendix to opinion of BREYER, J.
Title 18 U. S. C. §1345 provides:
“(a)(1) If a person is—
“(A) violating or about to violate this chapter or section 287, 371 (insofar as such violation involves a conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof), or 1001 of this title;
“(B) committing or about to commit a banking law violation (as defined in section 3322(d) of this title); or
“(C) committing or about to commit a Federal health care offense; “the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any Federal court to enjoin such violation.
“(2) If a person is alienating or disposing of property, or intends to alienate or dispose of property, obtained as a result of a banking law violation (as defined in section 3322(d) of this title) or a Federal health care offense or property which is traceable to such violation, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any Federal court—
“(A) to enjoin such alienation or disposition of property; or
“(B) for a restraining order to— “(i) prohibit any person from withdrawing, transferring,
removing, dissipating, or disposing of any such property or property of equivalent value; and
“(ii) appoint a temporary receiver to administer such restraining order.
“(3) A permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
“(b) The court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the
Opinion of BREYER, J.
18 LUIS v. UNITED STATES
Appendix to opinion of BREYER, J.
hearing and determination of such an action, and may, at any time before final determination, enter such a restraining order or prohibition, or take such other action, as is warranted to prevent a continuing and substantial injury to the United States or to any person or class of persons
for whose protection the action is brought. A proceeding under this section is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that, if an indictment has been returned against the respondent, discovery is governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”
pg. 7/12 Justice Thomas concurring in judgment; re: Blue Card & By-Law Section 21 Hobbs Act Extortion by the UBCJA International while under the LMRDA Trusteeship and/or extension of said LMRDA Trusteeship wherein the UBCJA International in concert with the Review Officer and United States Attorneys Office continued the predicate criminal RICO Act violations of the Internationals national extortion plan relative to the Blue Card & the current mandatory & very illegal Union Participation (UPP) requirement' and whereby Review Officer Walsh advised the three Amigo's (Billelo, Lebo-McGinnis & Cavanaugh) to continue with the planned contractual Wage Extortion and convert said ill gotten assets with the UBCJA Internationals consent and approval to the Welfare Trust Fund and did so on the record via his Interim Reporting to Judge Berman.
The Welfare Trust Fund fiduciaries/ trustees and their corporate legal counsel and the NYCDCC in house legal counsel all approved the illegal conversion of said assets and to date have made no formal independent financial audit, conducted any investigation whatsoever and continue to profit from the ill gotten gains by failing to account for the total sums taken and invested in the open market across a multitude of state lines and wherein said Welfare Trust Funds and those so named do so knowingly violating the criminal RICO statutes and wherein they have also used the mail and wire services to continue said racketeering scheme.
There is a similarly well-established Fourth Amendment tradition of seizing contraband and stolen goods before trial based only on probable cause. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149–152 (1925) (discussing this history); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 623– 624 (1886) (same). Tainted assets fall within this tradition because they are the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. So the Government may freeze tainted assets before trial based on probable cause to believe that they are forfeitable. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 602–603, 615–616 (1989). Nevertheless, our precedents require “a nexus . . . between the item to be seized and criminal behavior.” Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 307 (1967).
Don't panic Doug - the nexus has long been clearly established & you can always buy off another Judge or court, or government official - right?
All criminal racketeering suspects are innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law wherein McCarron can't forum or judge shop; or are they?
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