THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
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Carpenters Local 608, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (Various Employers) and John Harte and Franklin McMurray and Eugene Clarke. Cases 2-CB-9767, 2-CB-9811, and 2-CB-981230 April 1986

VOL 279 NLRB No. 99; pg's. 747-749 excerpts:
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS DENNIS AND JOHANSEN

On 26 March 1985 Administrative Law Judge Steven B. Fish issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three member panel.

The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.I....

ALJ - Stephen B. Fish
A hearing was held before me with respect to the allegations in the complaint in New York, New York, on December 12, 20, 21, and 22, 1983, and April 10 and 11, 1984. Briefs have been received from Respondent and the General Counsel and have been duly considered. On the entire record,4 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. JURISDICTION
Building Contractors Association Inc. (BCA) and the Cement League (the Associations) are associations of employers engaged in the construction and building trades, and which exist for the purposes of representing their employer-members in collective bargaining and negotiating and administering collective-bargaining agreements
with labor organizations, including the District Council of New York and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (District Council and Respondent).

Annually, the employer-members of each of the Associations, in the course of their business operations, collectively purchase goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from firms located outside the States wherein the employer-members are located. It is admitted and I find that each of the Associations and their respective employer-members are now, and have been at all times material herein, employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
It is also admitted and I so find that Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

II. FACTS
A. Respondent's Hiring Hall Procedures

At all times material herein, Respondent has been a constituent member of the District Council, which includes all Local Carpenter Unions within the city of New York. For a number of years Respondent, as a constituent member of the District Council, was a party to a series of collective-bargaining agreements with the various Associations covering employees falling within the jurisdiction of Respondent. A collective-bargaining agreement running from July 1, 1981, to June 30, 1984, was executed by the parties, and was binding on and enforced and maintained by Respondent during this period of time.

Article VI, section 2, of the agreement provides:

The first Carpenter on the jobsite shall be referred by the Union. The Second Carpenter shall be the Employer's selection. The balance shall be 50% from the Union and 50% from the Employer. The Union will cooperate, in order to meet all legal requirements, and furnish qualified Carpenters when requested. A working Job Steward shall be appointed by the Union.

When an Employer, in compliance with this Section, requests the District Council to send men to a job, the District Council shall cooperate by sending only such as are experienced in the specific type of carpentry work being done on the said job by that Employer. There shall be no discrimination of any kind against any person covered by this agreement, based on race, religion, age, sex, national orgin or Union affiliation with respect to hiring, firing, or any other conditions of employment.

Article VII, entitled "Job Referral System," provides that: In the referral of applicants by the Union for employment as provided for in Article VI, Section 2, by the following provisions shall govern:

Section 1. The Union shall establish and maintain an open employment list for the employment of competent workmen. This list shall be established and maintained on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be based on, or in any way affected by race, creed, color, nationality, age, sex, or Union membership, by-laws, rules, regulations, constitutional provisions of any other aspect or obligation of Union membership, policies or requirements.
________________

And what did the UBCJA International, Judge Conboy, R.O. Dennis Walsh and the U.S. Attorney and Judge Berman do with the last Contracts (CBA's) with the corrupt Contractor Associations; with the 150+ PLA's and $5 Billion dollars in Wage & Benefit consessions (kick-backs to developers & contractor association racketeers) but base the contracts (CBA's) and 100% Full Mobility on "Union Membership, UBCJA International, Dennis Walsh & Contractor Association authored By-Laws, rules, regulations and the UBCJA's facilally unlawful Constitution & Obligation" all of which were, are and remain illegal under NLRB Board precedent, federal law and U.S. Supreme Court precedent; and for the lawyers, their sworn obligation to uphold the laws & statutes as written not as they wished them to be, and to enforce all precedents of the courts. Instead of ending racketeering, they've all willfully or unwillfully furthered it by design or by stupidity and sheer ignorance of the the laws & precedent they were sworn to uphold; or both.
___________

All criminal suspects are innocent until proven guilty in a court of law; or are they?
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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
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 - cont. -
page 754 NLRB Board Decision & Order dated April 30,1986
(remains good law and has never been over-turned)

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Exclusivity of the Hiring Hall

Respondent contends that its hiring hall herein is nonexclusive in nature, because in order for such an arrangement to be considered exclusive, "all" hiring authority must be reserved to the Union. I do not agree. {As the authors above falsely claim with respect to 100% FULL MOBILITY}

It is well settled that a hiring is deemed to be exclusive where the union retains exclusive authority for referrals for some specified period of time, such as 24 or 48 hours, before an employer can hire on its own. Mountain Pacific Chapter AGC, 119 NLRB 883 (1957); Boilermakers Local 587 (Stone & Webster), 233 NLRB 612, 614 (1977); Carpenters Local 78 (Murray Walter), 223 NLRB 733, 734-735 (1976). Thus to the extent that that union retains such exclusive authority during this period, it operates an exclusive hiring hall.

Similarly, an exclusive hiring hall can also exist where an employer has the contractual right to bring in a certain number or percentage of employees onto a job. Bricklayers Local 8 (California Mason Contractors), 235 NLRB 1001, 1003 (1978). Thus the employers herein have given up and delegated to Respondent the right to hire the first employee on the job and 50 percent of the remainder after the employer selects a second employee.

I conclude that to such an extent an exclusive hiring hall is contemplated by the agreement. Heavy Construction Laborers Local 663 (Robert A. Treuner), 205 NLRB 455, 456 (1973).26 Since the record is bereft of any evidence that the terms of the contract have not been adhered to, I conclude that to the extent specified, Respondent operates an exclusive hiring hall, and is subject to the obligations and requirements which flow from such a finding.27

B. The Obligation to Permit Inspection of and Supply
Information Regarding Respondent's Referral Records


It is well settled that a union which operates an exclusive hiring hall breaches its duty of fair representation in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it arbitrarily denies requests of its members for job referral information, where such requests are reasonably directed towards ascertaining whether such members have been properly treated in connection with the operation of the hiring hall. Operating Engineers Local 324 (AGC of Michigan),
226 NLRB 587 (1976); Bartenders Local 165 (Nevada Resort), 261 NLRB 420 (1982); Electrical Workers IBEW Local 575 (Coleman Electric), 270 NLRB 66, 69-70
(1984).
 The Board has found violations with respect to the denials of various types of requests in this connection, such

page 755
as inspecting the hiring hall lists,28 copying the lists,29 or even asking the union to compile and furnish hiring hall information.30

Even where a union operates a nonexclusive hiring hall, the Board has found that the union still owes a duty of fair representation towards those who seek to utilize its services. Bricklayers Local 8, supra at 1005-1008; Plumbers Local 13 (Mechanical Contractors of Rochester), 212 NLRB 477, 479 (1974); Crouse Nuclear Energy Services,
240 NLRB 390 (1979).

This duty has been held to have been violated where the union in a nonexclusive hiring hall discriminatorily refuses its members access to and services of the hiring hall because they have engaged in intraunion political activity. Operating Engineers Local 4 (Carlson Corp.), 189 NLRB 366 (1971); Teamsters Local 923 (Yellow Cab), 172 NLRB 2137 (1968); Crouse Nuclear, supra. The Board has also found the duty of fair representation to have been violated where the operator of a nonexclusive hiring hall refused to permit the utilization of the hiring hall, because of other arbitrary reasons, such as the fact that the applicant was not a union member or because he worked for a nonunion contractor, Plumbers Local 13, supra, or because of his nonunion status and because he refused to pay a fine to a sister local. Bricklayers Local 8, supra.

In the instant case the evidence is more than sufficient to support a finding that the various requests of the Charging Parties were denied because of activities in opposition to the policies of Respondent and its incumbent officials, including their reelection.
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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
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SECTION 38:   HIRING HALL OR JOB REFERRAL SYSTEM
 
The Executive Committee of the Council shall maintain, and all workers shall be governed by, uniform rules and/or procedures consistent with the Consent Decree, and any other Order entered in United States v. District Council, et al., 90 Civ. 5722, for the registration and/or referral to employment of unemployed workers. Workers shall have the right to seek work and be employed throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the Council. The referral of all workers to jobs shall be performed by the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Representatives, organizers and agents of the District Council may not otherwise refer members to jobs or in any way inform an employer that a member is available for employment. The Executive Secretary-Treasurer shall maintain records of all worker registration and referrals, which shall be reviewed regularly by the Executive Committee and which may be reviewed by any member upon reasonable request.

NYCDCC is not a Non-Exclusive Hiring Hall as feigned to the NLRA by D.C. counsel & the I.M. and the UBCJA International & Contractor Associations claiming 100% Full Mobility via their collective & phony declarations to the NLRA's ALJ Green or the NLRB Board.

NYCDCC by the terms and conditions of the contracts (CBA's) and the rules of the Hiring Hall as established by the Executive Committee, the R.O. and as reviewed & approved by the U.S.A.O. and the Court have revealed two things:

1)   The NYCDCC is the Local; therefore requiring Elections for all E-Board positions w/o limitations, and;

2)   The NYCDCC is an Exclusive Hiring Hall by its operative By-Law language as authored by the UBCJA International, its corporate counsel Latham & Watkins & the R.O. Dennis Walsh and consented to by the U.S.A.O. (government) and approved by Federal District Court Judge Richard M. Berman at their behest; and by the law & precedent established through the Board, Appellate & U.S. Sup. Ct. precedent - period.
__________________

Anon - where are you now? This is your baby!
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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
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States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government. The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most detailed organizational chart. The Constitution instead "leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 246 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment.

Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.

________________

Nor may the UBCJA compel Right to Work laws in states which have not approved them as McCarron has done by forcing his 100% Full Mobility Right to Work scam upon the Federal District Court or the NLRB via his fraudulent submission of the phony CEMENT LEAGUE case in NYC or the Board in Washington D.C..

McCarron says its so and the spineless US Attorneys Office & the I.M. Glen McGorty and his predecessor always second the motion due to sheer arrogance, incompetence or both - leaving the Federal court as frustrated with these buffoons as the rank & file.
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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1986). Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, "this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases "correction through legislative action is practically impossible." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved, see Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 405-411 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 458 (1852), the opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving procedural and evidentiary rules.
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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
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FULL TEXT OF CASE BELOW:

http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/553/639.html


United States Supreme Court

BRIDGE ET AL. v. PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY CO. ET AL., (2008)

No. 07-210

Argued: April 14, 2008    Decided: June 9, 2008


Each year the Cook County Treasurer's Office holds a public auction to sell its tax liens on delinquent taxpayers' property. To prevent any one buyer from obtaining a disproportionate share of the liens, the county adopted the "Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule" (Rule), which requires each buyer to submit bids in its own name, prohibits a buyer from using "apparent agents, employees, or related entities" to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel, and requires a registered bidder to submit a sworn affidavit affirming its compliance with the Rule. Petitioners and respondents regularly participate in the tax sales. Respondents filed suit, alleging that petitioners fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by filing false compliance attestations. As relevant here, they claim that petitioners violated and conspired to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through a pattern of racketeering activity involving mail fraud, which occurred when petitioners sent property owners various notices required by Illinois law. The District Court dismissed the RICO claims for lack of standing, finding that respondents were not protected by the mail fraud statute because they did not receive the alleged misrepresentations. Reversing, the Seventh Circuit based standing on the injury respondents suffered when they lost the chance to obtain more liens, and found that respondents had sufficiently alleged proximate cause because they were immediately injured by petitioners' scheme. The court also rejected petitioners' argument that respondents are not entitled to relief under RICO because they had not received, and therefore had not relied on, any false statements.
 
Held: A plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Pp. 6-21.
 
     (a) In 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation," as pertinent here, of §1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with" a qualifying enterprise "to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity," including "mail fraud," §1961(1)(B). Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mail "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice." §1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any " 'mailing ... incident to an essential part of the scheme' ... satisfies the mailing element," Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705, 712, even if the mailing "contain[s] no false information," id., at 715. Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents' theory of the case is straightforward. Petitioners nonetheless argue that because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity is predicated on mail fraud, respondents must show that they relied on petitioners' fraudulent misrepresentations, which they cannot do because the misrepresentations were made to the county. Nothing on the statute's face imposes such a requirement. Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate racketeering act under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation, see Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 24-25; and one can conduct the affairs of a qualifying enterprise through a pattern of such acts without anyone relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation. Thus, no reliance showing is required to establish that a person has violated §1962(c) by conducting an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity predicated on mail fraud. Nor can a first-party reliance requirement be derived from §1964(c), which, by providing a right of action to "[a]ny person" injured by a violation of §1962, suggests a breadth of coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit first-party reliance requirement. Moreover, a person can be injured "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud even if he has not relied on any misrepresentations. For example, accepting respondents' allegations as true, they were harmed by petitioners' scheme when they lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been awarded. Pp. 6-10.
 
     (b) None of petitioners' arguments--that under the "common-law meaning" rule, Congress should be presumed to have made reliance an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute; that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud must show reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations in order to establish proximate cause; and that RICO should be interpreted to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the "overfederalization" of traditional state-law claims--persuades this Court to read a first-party reliance requirement into a statute that by its terms suggests none. Pp. 10-21.
 
477 F. 3d 928, affirmed.
 
     Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

************************************************

Every member concerned about their current status or their future in the NYCDCC should read this case. The above portion is the syllabus only. See the link for the full case.

After absorbing it, please think about who the guilty parties are; and why they are guilty and what evidence you have in the form of written or electronic communications from them; whether the International, the D.C., your Local and/or from Officers or Delegates which would confer standing on you as an individual and/or as a certified class

There is so much damning evidence in this case it's sickening and the 'players' in this extortive game wherein racketeering has not ended but accelerated under their watch know exactly who they are and what I am speaking of.


MAIL and WIRE FRAUD; re:


The BLUE CARD:

**   The Blue Card Vacation Wage Hobbs Act extortion scheme, approximating $81.25 Million dollars.
 
BY-LAW SECTION 21 MISAPPROPRIATION/CONVERSION:

**   The Bilello, McGinnis & Cavanaugh and Walsh By-law Sec. 21 misappropriation, reallocation and illegal conversion of wages in multiple contracts to the Welfare Fund, approximating $38 Million dollars per year, prending total man-hours recorded under each contract; allegedly verifiable via the new electronic scanners.
 
The CONTINUATION OF PREDICATE RICO ACT VIOLATIONS

**   Continuation of NYCDCC racketeering occurred while allegedly under the watchful eyes of the United States Attorneys Office and the court appointed Review Officers notwithstanding their gross dereliction of duty and negligence as the parties with standing to allegedly (cough) represent member interests; while illegally denying rank & file member due process rights for their immediate and very direct interests in both issues above.

 
The CEMENT LEAGUE & 100% FULL MOBILITY RACKETEERING:

**   Continuation of the racketeering scheme via the intentional ignoring of the NLRA in its entirety, Board precedent and long known Appellate & U.S. Supreme Court precedent as directly related to the 100% Full Mobility scheme and the recent phony/false filing of the Cement League case by the UBCJA International, in concert with the NRCC - which misappropriated the entirety of the NYCDCC's jurisdictional territory and your man-hours for wages and benefits (deferred compensation) to those not entitled to it; and which is your primary source & element for creating wealth as a District Council member.


The NYCDCC's criminal racketeering case has gone on unabated for 25-1/2 years and that fact along with the near 22-year old private contract known as the Consent Decree are both an Abortion of Justice.

The United States Attorneys Office has openly & hostilely turned a blind eye to all of it, it refuses to press further charges against the UBCJA International for their direct role in not only continuing the racketeering, but accelerating it.

The U.S. Attorney has allowed the UBCJA International & the former R.O. Dennis Walsh to abuse the NLRA, LMRA, LMRDA, ERISA, SEC & IRS regualations to the point where these public laws are unrecognizeable and the Court and two judges have allowed it and they have allowed the former R.O. to pursue a clearly illegal agenda and directly couch participants in the misappropriation of rank & file member pay raises, in direct concert with Union & Employer Trustees and Fiduciaries and the D.C & Benefit Trust Funds legal counsel in an ongoing act of criminal racketeering and hand the raises over to the Welfare Fund.
     
**   The U.S. Attorney has refused to investigate, audit, seat a grand jury or indict any of the long list of those who can & should be so charged.
     
**   The U.S. Attorney has refused to file charges or to force the Welfare Fund to remiburse members whose wages were stolen one red cent.



The U.S. Attorneys malfeasance in their direction & handling of this case is a disgrace. Ben Torrance & Preet Bhararra by their very silence thus condonde this racketeering and Judge Berman and others should act to see to it that they are removed from the case.

**   Your 'standing' in the case can no longer be denied - courtesy of the U.S. Supreme Court.


Everyone knows the line "Show me the Money", "Show me the Quan" - well, where is it? Why haven't you got yours back? Why are all you boys in NYC allowing these clowns to shit all over your Federal rights?

EXCERPT, FULL ECASE:
 Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
 
     The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§1961-1968, provides a private right of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Act's criminal prohibitions. §1964(c). The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud must plead and prove that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that a showing of first-party reliance is not required, we affirm.

_________________

All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?


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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
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JOHN BRIDGE, et al., PETITIONERS v. PHOENIX
BOND & INDEMNITY CO. et al.
 
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
 
[June 9, 2008]
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.

     
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§1961-1968, provides a private right of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Act's criminal prohibitions. §1964(c). The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud must plead and prove that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that a showing of first-party reliance is not required, we affirm.
 

I
 
     Each year the Cook County, Illinois, Treasurer's Office holds a public auction at which it sells tax liens it has acquired on the property of delinquent taxpayers.1 Prospective buyers bid on the liens, but not in cash amounts. Instead, the bids are stated as percentage penalties the property owner must pay the winning bidder in order to clear the lien. The bidder willing to accept the lowest penalty wins the auction and obtains the right to purchase the lien in exchange for paying the outstanding taxes on the property. The property owner may then redeem the property by paying the lienholder the delinquent taxes, plus the penalty established at the auction and an additional 12% penalty on any taxes subsequently paid by the lienholder. If the property owner does not redeem the property within the statutory redemption period, the lienholder may obtain a tax deed for the property, thereby in effect purchasing the property for the value of the delinquent taxes.
 
     Because property acquired in this manner can often be sold at a significant profit over the amount paid for the lien, the auctions are marked by stiff competition. As a result, most parcels attract multiple bidders willing to accept the lowest penalty permissible--0%, that is to say, no penalty at all. (Perhaps to prevent the perverse incentive taxpayers would have if they could redeem their property from a winning bidder for less than the amount of their unpaid taxes, the county does not accept negative bids.) The lower limit of 0% creates a problem: Who wins when the bidding results in a tie? The county's solution is to allocate parcels "on a rotational basis" in order to ensure that liens are apportioned fairly among 0% bidders. App. 18.
 
     But this creates a perverse incentive of its own: Bidders who, in addition to bidding themselves, send agents to bid on their behalf will obtain a disproportionate share of liens. To prevent this kind of manipulation, the county adopted the "Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule," which requires each "tax buying entity" to submit bids in its own name and prohibits it from using "apparent agents, employees, or related entities" to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel.2 App. 67. Upon registering for an auction, each bidder must submit a sworn affidavit affirming that it complies with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule.
 
     Petitioners and respondents are regular participants in Cook County's tax sales. In July 2005, respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, contending that petitioners had fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by violating the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule at the auctions held from 2002 to 2005. According to respondents, petitioner Sabre Group, LLC, and its principal Barrett Rochman arranged for related firms to bid on Sabre Group's behalf and directed them to file false attestations that they complied with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule. Having thus fraudulently obtained the opportunity to participate in the auction, the related firms collusively bid on the same properties at a 0% rate. As a result, when the county allocated liens on a rotating basis,3 it treated the related firms as independent entities, allowing them collectively to acquire a greater number of liens than would have been granted to a single bidder acting alone. The related firms then purchased the liens and transferred the certificates of purchase to Sabre Group. In this way, respondents allege, petitioners deprived them and other bidders of their fair share of liens and the attendant financial benefits.
 
     Respondents' complaint contains five counts. Counts I-IV allege that petitioners violated and conspired to violate RICO by conducting their affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity involving numerous acts of mail fraud. In support of their allegations of mail fraud, respondents assert that petitioners "mailed or caused to be mailed hundreds of mailings in furtherance of the scheme," App. 49, when they sent property owners various notices required by Illinois law. Count V alleges a state-law claim of tortious interference with prospective business advantage.
 
     On petitioners' motion, the District Court dismissed respondents' RICO claims for lack of standing. It observed that "[o]nly [respondents] and other competing buyers, as opposed to the Treasurer or the property owners, would suffer a financial loss from a scheme to violate the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule." App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. But it concluded that respondents "are not in the class of individuals protected by the mail fraud statute, and therefore are not within the 'zone of interests' that the RICO statute protects," because they "were not recipients of the alleged misrepresentations and, at best were indirect victims of the alleged fraud." Id., at 18a. The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over respondents' tortious-interference claim and dismissed it without prejudice.

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SOUND FAMILIAR? What have the two Lawyers with "STANDING"; one being the Court Appointed Review Officer Dennis Walsh and the Governments lawyers Ben Torrance & Preet Bhararra, for the United States Attorneys Office, S.D.N.Y. and Federal District Court Judge Berman been telling you from day one - "standing denied". Well screw them, the United States Supreme Court says otherwise! You have standing via this precedent and you can sue and recover treble (TRIPLE) damages.

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     The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. It first concluded that "[s]tanding is not a problem in this suit" because plaintiffs suffered a "real injury" when they lost the valuable chance to acquire more liens, and because "that injury can be redressed by damages." 477 F. 3d 928, 930 (2007). The Court of Appeals next concluded that respondents had sufficiently alleged proximate cause under Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258 (1992), and Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451 (2006), because they (along with other losing bidders) were "immediately injured" by petitioners' scheme. 477 F. 3d, at 930-932. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' argument that respondents are not entitled to relief under RICO because they did not receive, and therefore did not rely on, any false statements: "A scheme that injures D by making false statements through the mail to E is mail fraud, and actionable by D through RICO if the injury is not derivative of someone else's." Id., at 932.

     With respect to this last holding, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that courts have taken conflicting views. By its count, "[t]hree other circuits that have considered this question agree ... that the direct victim may recover through RICO whether or not it is the direct recipient of the false statements," ibid. (citing Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Servs., Inc., 18 F. 3d 260, 263-264 (CA4 1994); Systems Management, Inc. v. Loiselle, 303 F. 3d 100, 103-104 (CA1 2002); Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F. 3d 251, 263 (CA2 2004)), whereas two Circuits hold that the plaintiff must show that it in fact relied on the defendant's misrepresentations, 477 F. 3d, at 932 (citing VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210 F. 3d 696, 701 (CA6 2000); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F. 3d 1350, 1360-1361 (CA11 2002)). Compare also Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indemnity Ins. Co., 319 F. 3d 205, 223 (CA5 2003) (recognizing "a narrow exception to the requirement that the plaintiff prove direct reliance on the defendant's fraudulent predicate act ... when the plaintiff can demonstrate injury as a direct and contemporaneous result of a fraud committed against a third party"), with Appletree Square I, L. P. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 29 F. 3d 1283, 1286-1287 (CA8 1994) (requiring the plaintiff to show that it detrimentally relied on the defendant's misrepresentations).
 
     We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. ___ (2008), to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals on "the substantial question," Anza, 547 U. S., at 461, whether first-party reliance is an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud.4


II
 
     We begin by setting forth the applicable statutory provisions. RICO's private right of action is contained in 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), which provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Section 1962 contains RICO's criminal prohibitions. Pertinent here is §1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with" an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." The term "racketeering activity" is defined to include a host of so-called predicate acts, including "any act which is indictable under ... section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)." §1961(1)(B).

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Given this is a June 8, 2008 D & O by the U.S. Sup Ct - every party, (the D.C., The UBCJA International & all of their in-house and hired out legal counsel; the R.O., the USAO-SDNY, & the Federal District Court) were put on notice that this was an available remedy for members obtaining standing; thus - by continually denying "standing"; whether indivdually or as a class to appear in Federal District Court, the practice was both discriminatory on its face and a violation of your Federal Due Process rights under the Constitutional guarantees and provides a seperate cause of action under the ongoing criminal RICO enterprise established by McCrarron, Spencer and others wherein direct & willing participants appeared to have included the RO & USAO, D.C. & Benefit Trust Fund employees as well as multiple Contractor Associations and private contractors & developers.

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     The upshot is that RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to any person injured in his business or property by reason of the conduct of a qualifying enterprise's affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud. Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mail "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do." §1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any "mailing that is incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element," Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705, 712 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), even if the mailing itself "contain[s] no false information," id., at 715.
 
     Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents' theory of the case is straightforward. They allege that petitioners devised a scheme to defraud when they agreed to submit false attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule to the county. In furtherance of this scheme, petitioners used the mail on numerous occasions to send the requisite notices to property owners. Each of these mailings was an "act which is indictable" as mail fraud, and together they constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity." By conducting the affairs of their enterprise through this pattern of racketeering activity, petitioners violated §1962(c). As a result, respondents lost the opportunity to acquire valuable liens. Accordingly, respondents were injured in their business or property by reason of petitioners' violation of §1962(c), and RICO's plain terms give them a private right of action for treble damages.

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Straightforward - 

AS IS the case against the aforementioned parties for screwing you on the BLUE CARD and failing to litigate or your behalf against Insurers & re-Insurers; or to refund any ill gotten (stolen) monies to every member so burned, plus interest; trebled, plus attorneys fees & expenses;

AS IS the case against the aforementioned parties for screwing you on the Hod Hoist, BCA & other CBA's Wage Increase which was illegally converted/misappropriated to the Welfare Fund in yet another demonstrable case of ongoing criminal racketeering - wherein the USAO & RO were direct/willing participants in the cover-up for the theft of funds, the failure to prosecute EST Bilello, President McGinnis, Vice President Cavanaugh; every Trustee & Fiduciary, the in house D.C. legal counsel or the Welfare Fund legal counsel for their role in continuing Crimnal RICO Racketeering in the NYCDCC & for violating the very core of the 1994 Consent Decree to which they were all legally bound. The fact is, both the R.O. & the U.S.A.O were both grossly negligent in their core/sworn duties and so to should be prosecuted for conspiring to cover it up & bury it;

AS IS the current  NLRB Board case being financed & run by the UBCJA International, Doug McCarron & his handlers & the NRCC against the NYCDCC via the CEMENT LEAGUE  - to forever force 100% FULL MOBILITY down your throats and albeit, illegally into NLRB Board precedent wherein the NYCDCC legal counsel James Murphy and the court appointed Independent Monitor McGorty and another retired federal Judge, Judge Jones intentionally hid the facts of this case or its filing from the members; right through the 2-12-16 Board Decision & Order (D & O).
     
Other than ixnaying Lebo & Bilello on our written demands, Walsh, Torrance & Bhararra or Walsh's legal counsel did little else other than cover their own ass.

To date, there has not been one Audit conducted by the former RO Walsh or the current I.M. McGorty for the BLUE CARD or for the SECTION 21 BY-LAW illegal  theft of member Vacation Wages or for the illegal misappropriation/conversion of member Pay Raises to the Welfare Trust Fund and there has not been one Motion filed in Judge Bermans Court to force the D.C. to Refund any member and no criminal or civil charges filed by anyone. The Court however, upon its own motion/action can intiate the process to move this along; less it too lose any & all apparent authority or credibility which it might still hold.


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     Petitioners argue, however, that because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity consisted of acts of mail fraud, respondents must show that they relied on petitioners' fraudulent misrepresentations. This they cannot do, because the alleged misrepresentations--petitioners' attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule--were made to the county, not respondents. The county may well have relied on petitioners' misrepresentations when it permitted them to participate in the auction, but respondents, never having received the misrepresentations, could not have done so. Indeed, respondents do not even allege that they relied on petitioners' false attestations. Thus, petitioners submit, they fail to state a claim under RICO.

     If petitioners' proposed requirement of first-party reliance seems to come out of nowhere, there is a reason: Nothing on the face of the relevant statutory provisions imposes such a requirement. Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate act of racketeering under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation. See Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1999) ("The common-law requiremen[t] of 'justifiable reliance' ... plainly ha[s] no place in the [mail, wire, or bank] fraud statutes"). And one can conduct the affairs of a qualifying enterprise through a pattern of such acts without anyone relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation.
 
     It thus seems plain--and indeed petitioners do not dispute--that no showing of reliance is required to establish that a person has violated §1962(c) by conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of acts of mail fraud. See Anza, 547 U. S., at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Because an individual can commit an indictable act of mail or wire fraud even if no one relies on his fraud, he can engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of §1962, without proof of reliance").If reliance is required, then, it must be by virtue of §1964(c), which provides the right of action. But it is difficult to derive a first-party reliance requirement from §1964(c), which states simply that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" may sue for treble damages. The statute provides a right of action to "[a]ny person" injured by the violation, suggesting a breadth of coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit requirement that the plaintiff show reliance in addition to injury in his business or property.
 
     Moreover, a person can be injured "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud even if he has not relied on any misrepresentations. This is a case in point. Accepting their allegations as true, respondents clearly were injured by petitioners' scheme: As a result of petitioners' fraud, respondents lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been awarded. And this is true even though they did not rely on petitioners' false attestations of compliance with the county's rules. Or, to take another example, suppose an enterprise that wants to get rid of rival businesses mails misrepresentations about them to their customers and suppliers, but not to the rivals themselves. If the rival businesses lose money as a result of the misrepresentations, it would certainly seem that they were injured in their business "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud, even though they never received, and therefore never relied on, the fraudulent mailings. Yet petitioners concede that, on their reading of §1964(c), the rival businesses would have no cause of action under RICO, Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, even though they were the primary and intended victims of the scheme to defraud.

     Lacking textual support for this counterintuitive position, petitioners rely instead on a combination of common-law rules and policy arguments in an effort to show that Congress should be presumed to have made first-party reliance an element of a civil RICO claim based on mail fraud. None of petitioners' arguments persuades us to read a first-party reliance requirement into a statute that by its terms suggests none. 

III
 

A
 
     Petitioners first argue that RICO should be read to incorporate a first-party reliance requirement in fraud cases "under the rule that Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses." Neder, supra, at 23. It has long been settled, they contend, that only the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may recover for common-law fraud, and that he may do so "if, but only if ... he relies on the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action." Restatement (Second) of Torts §537 (1977). Given this background rule of common law, petitioners maintain, Congress should be presumed to have adopted a first-party reliance requirement when it created a civil cause of action under RICO for victims of mail fraud.
 
     In support of this argument, petitioners point to our decision in Beck v. Prupis, 529 U. S. 494 (2000). There, we considered the scope of RICO's private right of action for violations of §1962(d), which makes it "unlawful for any person to conspire to violate" RICO's criminal prohibitions. The question presented was "whether a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy may assert a civil RICO conspiracy claim under §1964(c) for a violation of §1962(d) even if the overt act does not constitute 'racketeering activity.' " Id., at 500. Answering this question in the negative, we held that "injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under RICO is not sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under §1964(c) for a violation of §1962(d)." Id., at 505 (citation omitted). In so doing, we "turn[ed] to the well-established common law of civil conspiracy." Id., at 500. Because it was "widely accepted" by the time of RICO's enactment "that a plaintiff could bring suit for civil conspiracy only if he had been injured by an act that was itself tortious," id., at 501, we presumed "that when Congress established in RICO a civil cause of action for a person 'injured ... by reason of' a 'conspir[acy],' it meant to adopt these well-established common-law civil conspiracy principles." Id., at 504 (quoting §§1964(c), 1962(d); alterations in original). We specifically declined to rely on the law of criminal conspiracy, relying instead on the law of civil conspiracy:
 

"We have turned to the common law of criminal conspiracy to define what constitutes a violation of §1962(d), see Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52, 63-65 (1997), a mere violation being all that is necessary for criminal liability. This case, however, does not present simply the question of what constitutes a violation of §1962(d), but rather the meaning of a civil cause of action for private injury by reason of such a violation. In other words, our task is to interpret §§1964(c) and 1962(d) in conjunction, rather than §1962(d) standing alone. The obvious source in the common law for the combined meaning of these provisions is the law of civil conspiracy." Id., at 501, n. 6.
 
     Petitioners argue that, as in Beck, we should look to the common-law meaning of civil fraud in order to give content to the civil cause of action §1964(c) provides for private injury by reason of a violation of §1962(c) based on a pattern of mail fraud. The analogy to Beck, however, is misplaced. The critical difference between Beck and this case is that in §1962(d) Congress used a term--"conspir[acy]"--that had a settled common-law meaning, whereas Congress included no such term in §1962(c). Section 1962(c) does not use the term "fraud"; nor does the operative language of §1961(1)(B), which defines "racketeering activity" to include "any act which is indictable under ... section 1341." And the indictable act under §1341 is not the fraudulent misrepresentation, but rather the use of the mails with the purpose of executing or attempting to execute a scheme to defraud. In short, the key term in §1962(c)--"racketeering activity"--is a defined term, and Congress defined the predicate act not as fraud simpliciter, but mail fraud--a statutory offense unknown to the common law. In these circumstances, the presumption that Congress intends to adopt the settled meaning of common-law terms has little pull. Cf. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 11) (rejecting the argument that §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78j(b), incorporates common-law fraud). There is simply no "reason to believe that Congress would have defined 'racketeering activity' to include acts indictable under the mail and wire fraud statutes, if it intended fraud-related acts to be predicate acts under RICO only when those acts would have been actionable under the common law." Anza, 547 U. S., at 477-478 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 
     Nor does it help petitioners' cause that here, as in Beck, the question is not simply "what constitutes a violation of §1962[(c)], but rather the meaning of a civil cause of action for private injury by reason of such a violation." 529 U. S., at 501, n. 6. To be sure, Beck held that a plaintiff cannot state a civil claim for conspiracy under §1964(c) merely by showing a violation of §1962(d) and a resulting injury. But in so doing, Beck relied not only on the fact that the term "conspiracy" had a settled common-law meaning, but also on the well-established common-law understanding of what it means to be injured by a conspiracy for purposes of bringing a civil claim for damages. See id., at 501-504. No comparable understanding exists with respect to injury caused by an enterprise conducting its affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud. And even the common-law understanding of injury caused by fraud does not support petitioners' argument. As discussed infra, at 16-17, the common law has long recognized that plaintiffs can recover in a variety of circumstances where, as here, their injuries result directly from the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations to a third party.

     For these reasons, we reject petitioners' contention that the "common-law meaning" rule dictates that reliance by the plaintiff is an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute. Congress chose to make mail fraud, not common-law fraud, the predicate act for a RICO violation. And "the mere fact that the predicate acts underlying a particular RICO violation happen to be fraud offenses does not mean that reliance, an element of common-law fraud, is also incorporated as an element of a civil RICO claim." Anza, supra, at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 

B
 
     Petitioners next argue that even if Congress did not make first-party reliance an element of a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud, a plaintiff who brings such a claim must show that it relied on the defendant's misrepresentations in order to establish the requisite element of causation. In Holmes, we recognized that §1964(c)'s "language can, of course, be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured 'by reason of' a RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that the defendant violated §1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant's violation was a 'but for' cause of plaintiff's injury." 503 U. S., at 265-266 (footnote omitted). We nonetheless held that not "all factually injured plaintiffs" may recover under §1964(c). Id., at 266. Because Congress modeled §1964(c) on other provisions that had been interpreted to "requir[e] a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a 'but for' cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well," we concluded that §1964(c) likewise requires the plaintiff to establish proximate cause in order to show injury "by reason of" a RICO violation. Id., at 268.
 
     Proximate cause, we explained, is a flexible concept that does not lend itself to " 'a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.' " Id., at 272, n. 20 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 536 (1983)). Instead, we "use[d] 'proximate cause' to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts," Holmes, 503 U. S., at 268, with a particular emphasis on the "demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged," ibid.; see also Anza, supra, at 461 ("When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries"). The direct-relation requirement avoids the difficulties associated with attempting "to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors," Holmes, 503 U. S., at 269; prevents courts from having "to adopt complicated rules of apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries," ibid.; and recognizes the fact that "directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely," id., at 269-270.5
 
     Pointing to our reliance on common-law proximate-causation principles in Holmes and Anza, petitioners argue that "[u]nder well-settled common-law principles, proximate cause is established for fraud claims only where the plaintiff can demonstrate that he relied on the misrepresentation." Brief for Petitioners 28. In support of this argument, petitioners cite Restatement (Second) of Torts §548A, which provides that "[a] fraudulent misrepresentation is a legal cause of a pecuniary loss resulting from action or inaction in reliance upon it if, but only if, the loss might reasonably be expected to result from the reliance." Thus, petitioners conclude, "a plaintiff asserting a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud cannot satisfy the proximate cause requirement unless he can establish that his injuries resulted from his reliance on the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation." Brief for Petitioners 28.
 
     Petitioners' argument is twice flawed. First, as explained above, the predicate act here is not common-law fraud, but mail fraud. Having rejected petitioners' argument that reliance is an element of a civil RICO claim based on mail fraud, we see no reason to let that argument in through the back door by holding that the proximate-cause analysis under RICO must precisely track the proximate-cause analysis of a common-law fraud claim. "Reliance is not a general limitation on civil recovery in tort; it 'is a specialized condition that happens to have grown up with common law fraud.' " Anza, 547 U. S., at 477 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Systems Management, 303 F. 3d, at 104). That "specialized condition," whether characterized as an element of the claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, simply has no place in a remedial scheme keyed to the commission of mail fraud, a statutory offense that is distinct from common-law fraud and that does not require proof of reliance.

     Second, while it may be that first-party reliance is an element of a common-law fraud claim, there is no general common-law principle holding that a fraudulent misrepresentation can cause legal injury only to those who rely on it. The Restatement provision cited by petitioners certainly does not support that proposition. It provides only that the plaintiff's loss must be a foreseeable result of someone's reliance on the misrepresentation.6 It does not say that only those who rely on the misrepresentation can suffer a legally cognizable injury. And any such notion would be contradicted by the long line of cases in which courts have permitted a plaintiff directly injured by a fraudulent misrepresentation to recover even though it was a third party, and not the plaintiff, who relied on the defendant's misrepresentation.7 Indeed, so well established is the defendant's liability in such circumstances that the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth as a "[g]eneral [p]rinciple" that "[o]ne who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances." §870. As an illustration, the Restatement provides the example of a defendant who "seeks to promote his own interests by telling a known falsehood to or about the plaintiff or his product." Id., Comment h (emphasis added). And the Restatement specifically recognizes "a cause of action" in favor of the injured party where the defendant "defrauds another for the purpose of causing pecuniary harm to a third person." Id., §435A, Comment a. Petitioners' contention that proximate cause has traditionally incorporated a first-party reliance requirement for claims based on fraud cannot be reconciled with these authorities.

     Nor is first-party reliance necessary to ensure that there is a sufficiently direct relationship between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's injury to satisfy the proximate-cause principles articulated in Holmes and Anza. Again, this is a case in point. Respondents' alleged injury--the loss of valuable liens--is the direct result of petitioners' fraud. It was a foreseeable and natural consequence of petitioners' scheme to obtain more liens for themselves that other bidders would obtain fewer liens. And here, unlike in Holmes and Anza, there are no independent factors that account for respondents' injury, there is no risk of duplicative recoveries by plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violation, and no more immediate victim is better situated to sue. Indeed, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents and other losing bidders were the only parties injured by petitioners' misrepresentations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a; 477 F. 3d, at 931. Petitioners quibble with that conclusion, asserting that the county would be injured too if the taint of fraud deterred potential bidders from participating in the auction. But that eventuality, in contrast to respondents' direct financial injury, seems speculative and remote.

     Of course, none of this is to say that a RICO plaintiff who alleges injury "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud can prevail without showing that someone relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Cf. Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59, 66 (1995) ("No one, of course, doubts that some degree of reliance is required to satisfy the element of causation inherent in the phrase 'obtained by' " in 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A), which prohibits the discharge of debts for money or property "obtained by" fraud). In most cases, the plaintiff will not be able to establish even but-for causation if no one relied on the misrepresentation. If, for example, the county had not accepted petitioners' false attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule, and as a result had not permitted petitioners to participate in the auction, respondents' injury would never have materialized. In addition, the complete absence of reliance may prevent the plaintiff from establishing proximate cause. Thus, for example, if the county knew petitioners' attestations were false but nonetheless permitted them to participate in the auction, then arguably the county's actions would constitute an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation between petitioners' misrepresentations and respondents' injury.
 
     Accordingly, it may well be that a RICO plaintiff alleging injury by reason of a pattern of mail fraud must establish at least third-party reliance in order to prove causation. "But the fact that proof of reliance is often used to prove an element of the plaintiff's cause of action, such as the element of causation, does not transform reliance itself into an element of the cause of action." Anza, 547 U. S., at 478 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nor does it transform first-party reliance into an indispensable requisite of proximate causation. Proof that the plaintiff relied on the defendant's misrepresentations may in some cases be sufficient to establish proximate cause, but there is no sound reason to conclude that such proof is always necessary. By the same token, the absence of first-party reliance may in some cases tend to show that an injury was not sufficiently direct to satisfy §1964(c)'s proximate-cause requirement, but it is not in and of itself dispositive. A contrary holding would ignore Holmes' instruction that proximate cause is generally not amenable to bright-line rules.
 

C
 
     As a last resort, petitioners contend that we should interpret RICO to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the "over-federalization" of traditional state-law claims. In petitioners' view, respondents' claim is essentially one for tortious interference with prospective business advantage, as evidenced by Count V of their complaint. Such claims have traditionally been handled under state law, and petitioners see no reason why Congress would have wanted to supplement traditional state-law remedies with a federal cause of action, complete with treble damages and attorney's fees, in a statute designed primarily to combat organized crime. See Anza, supra, at 471-475 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Beck, 529 U. S., at 496-497. A first-party reliance requirement, they say, is necessary "to prevent garden-variety disputes between local competitors (such as this case) from being converted into federal racketeering actions." Reply Brief for Petitioners 3.

     Whatever the merits of petitioners' arguments as a policy matter, we are not at liberty to rewrite RICO to reflect their--or our--views of good policy. We have repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe. See, e.g., National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 252 (1994) (rejecting the argument that "RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose"); H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 244 (1989) (rejecting "the argument for reading an organized crime limitation into RICO's pattern concept"); Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 481 (1985) (rejecting the view that RICO provides a private right of action "only against defendants who had been convicted on criminal charges, and only where there had occurred a 'racketeering injury' ").      
 
     We see no reason to change course here. RICO's text provides no basis for imposing a first-party reliance requirement. If the absence of such a requirement leads to the undue proliferation of RICO suits, the "correction must lie with Congress." Id., at 499. "It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it." Id., at 499-500.
 

IV
 
     For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations.
 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
 
It is so ordered.

All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?


Ted
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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
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re: "Standing", Federal Courts, Judge Berman

excerpt at II A, par. 4:

United States Supreme Court

ALLEN v. WRIGHT, (1984)

No. 81-757

Argued: February 29, 1984    Decided: July 3, 1984


Like the prudential component, the constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition. The injury alleged must be, for example, "` distinct and palpable,'" Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 501), and not "abstract" or "conjectural" or "hypothetical," Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 -102 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). The injury must be "fairly" traceable to the challenged action, and relief from the injury must be "likely" to follow from a favorable decision. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 38 , 41. These terms cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise.
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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
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THE CEMENT LEAGUE

and

NORTHEAST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS

and

NEW YORK CITY AND VICINITY
DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS,
PARTY IN INTEREST

Case 03-CA-126938

Administrative Law Judges decision 5-21-15

_________________________________________

Docket Activity page 4

Date,                Document,                       Issued/Filed By

02/10/2015, RD Order*,                               NLRB - GC

02/02/2015, Answer to Complaint*, Charged Party / Respondent

01/13/2015, RD Order*,                               NLRB - GC

12/31/2014, Complaint and Notice of Hearing*, NLRB - GC

04/21/2014, Initial Letter to Charging Party*, NLRB - GC

04/21/2014, Initial Letter to Charging Party*, NLRB - GC

04/21/2014, Initial Letter to Charged Party*, NLRB - GC

04/21/2014, Signed Charge Against Employer*, Charging Party

02/24/2014, Signed Charge Against Employer*, Charging Party

The Docket Activity list does not reflect all actions in this case.

* This document may require redactions before it can be viewed. To obtain a copy, please file a request through our FOIA Branch. 

Allegations


8(a)(1) Coercive Rules


8(a)(3) Union Security Related Actions

https://www.nlrb.gov/case/03-CA-12693

_______________________________________

The UBCJA International has again fabricated a test case which does not comport with Federal law. What it is seeking here is for the Government to approve the UBCJA & their Corporate handlers back-door Amending/Altering of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); a power reserved wholly to the U.S. Congress, via the Legislative branch - and one which the corrupt UBCJA International & their Corporate handlers (the true plaintiffs in the case) do not possess.

Quite obviously they are redacting documents in order to bury the true identities of the parties controlling the case. The CEMENT LEAGUE is agnositic (ALJ Greens quote) as they never had a direct interest in pursuing any charges in the first instance - as there were none to pursue predicated upon the charges as proffered by the the NLRB. The current charges were made up to fit the facts as the UBCJA International, their Corporate handlers and their attorneys wanted them to read; and all of them controlled the outcome of this case through to the bogus Board D & O issuing February 12, 2016. The real facts would have produced an entirely different set of charges - criminal racketeering under multiple causes of action.

Anyone who has read ALJ Greens many, many D & O's over the years can see right through this particular Decision & Order and realize immediately that he was told what to write and how to write it and what the outcome was to be in advance and over/above his objections to his superiors. I have read a ton of his work product and this case is certainly not in his own words.
________________________________________

******************************************************
Decision - Statement of the Case
RAYMOND P. GREEN, Administrative Law Judge.


I heard this case on March 25, 2015, in New York City. The charge in this proceeding was filed on April 21, 2014, and the complaint was issued on December 31, 2014. It essentially alleges that a collective-bargaining agreement between The Cement League, an employer association, and the New York City and Vicinity District Council of Carpenters contained provisions granting preference in hiring based on union membership.

On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed, 1 I make the following -
Findings of Fact
________________________________________

This case as ALJ was forced to write it can be broken down to 4 basic components, as follows, the rest being superfulous:


1)   pg. 1, Line 42
   
"In the past, the contract between the NYC Council and The Cement League has permitted employers to select up to one half of their work force for any given project, but required them, after the hiring of a foreman and (line 45) a shop steward, to obtain the other half from the NYC Council out-of-work list; this being a nonexclusive referral system which was not limited to members of the affiliated local unions of the NYC
Council."

2)   pg. 3, Line 45

"Among other things, Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right to join a labor organization and the right to refrain from doing so. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Similarly, Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act prohibits a union from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7."

3)   pg. 4, Line 45-51; pg. 5 Lines 1-4

"Strictly speaking, the contract provisions in the present case do not require any employer to hire all or a part of its work force for any project in New York City because such individuals are already members of the NYC Council. {FALSE}

What they do require is that if an employer chooses to hire persons who are nonmembers, then the employer would be required 50 to hire 50 percent of its work force from the NYC Council’s job referral list that is also called, “the out of work list.” And although it may be fairly assumed that there is strong probability that the people on that list would be members of the NYC Council, there is no showing that the Union prevents or precludes nonmembers from registering for the list. (The record doesn’t disclose the mechanics of how the list is created, maintained or utilized.) In this sense, the use by a union of a job referral list is the equivalent of a hiring hall, whether exclusive or nonexclusive."

4)   pg. 7, Line 10 -18

In light of the above, I am inclined to agree with the theory proposed by the General Counsel and the Charging Party and to conclude that the provisions of The Cement League’s collective-bargaining agreement unduly encourage membership in local unions affiliated with the NYC Council and tend to unduly discourage membership in the locals affiliated with the Northeast Council. (Line 15) I am also going to reject the defense that the Board should defer to the fact that a contract, in the context of the RICO settlement, was approved by Judge Berman. I am doing so despite the fact that that lawsuit was not between private parties and involved a branch of the government other than the NLRB.
_________________________________________

All legal commentary shall be reserved for formal submissions, leaving McCarron and his minions guessing. Good morning Doug!.


Judge Greens decision is not based on any direct evidence, fact or most importantly, NLRB, Appellate Court or U.S. Supreme Court precedent. In short, its garbage and w/o a doubt not ALJ Greens choice.
Ted
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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
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www.nlrb.gov/case/12–CB–109654 ORDER

The Union, United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, Local 1192, AFL–CIO, CLC and United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Energy, Manufacturing, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC


III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards

Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act prohibits an exclusive bargaining representative from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, which includes the right to refrain from joining a union. The Board has long held that a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it makes union membership a condition to processing a grievance. See, e.g., Auto Workers Local 1303 (Jervis Corp. Bolivar), 192 NLRB 966
(1971). In Machinists Local 697 (H.O. Canfield Rubber Co.), 223 NLRB 832 (1976), the Board extended that holding to a case in which the union had made payment of fees by nonmembers a condition of grievance processing. The Board held doing so discriminated against nonmembers and that to “discriminate against nonmembers by charging them for what is due them by right restrains them in the exercise of their statutory rights.” Id. at 835, relying on Hughs Tool Co., 104 NLRB 318 (1953) (in which the Board held that demanding nonmembers pay a fee for grievance and arbitration processing violated the union’s obligations under Section 9(a) of the Act warranting revocation of the union’s certification). Thereafter, the Board has consistently held, absent a valid union-security clause, or in a “right to work” state, a union may not charge nonmembers for processing of grievances or other related services because doing so coerces employees in the exercise of their Section 7 right to refrain from joining a union. Furniture Workers Local 282 (Davis Co.), 291 NLRB 182 (1988); and American Postal Workers (Postal Service), 277 NLRB 541 (1985)
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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
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 NLRB RULES & REGULATIONS §101.14 Judicial review of Board decision and order.

If the respondent does not comply with the Board’s order, or the Board deems it desirable to implement the order with a court judgment, the Board may petition the appropriate Federal court for enforcement. Or, the respondent or any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board may petition the circuit court of appeals to review and set aside the Board’s order. If a petition for review is filed, the respondent or aggrieved person must ensure that the Board receives, by service upon its deputy associate general counsel of the Appellate Court Branch, a court-stamped copy of the petition with the date of filing. Upon such review or enforcement proceedings, the court reviews the record and the Board’s findings and order and sustains them if they are in accordance with the requirements of law. The court may enforce, modify, or set aside in whole or in part the Board’s findings and order, or it may remand the case to the Board for further proceedings as directed by the court. Following the court’s judgment, either the Government or the private party may petition the [United States] sic, Supreme Court for review upon writ of certiorari. Such applications for review to the [United States] Supreme Court are handled by the Board through the Solicitor General of the United States.

________________________________________

ALJ Greens Decision & Order were predicated upon the "theory" proposed by the UBCJA International via their chosen 'party in interest'; the corrupt Jersey Mobsters running the NRCC.

Further, ALJ Greens D & O was not based on the preponderance of the evidence (the civil std.) or any direct evidence or fact. The only fact is that the UBCJA, NRCC & the Cement League never had a prima-facie case at the outset & thus it should have been summarily dismissed by ALJ Green; notwithstanding multiple violations of law and precedent at every turn which they and the USAO and Independent Monitor failed to raise or argue due to their being complicit in the fraud and/or their public incompetence.

ALJ Green has been around the NLRB for 20+ years, thus his failure to follow base NLRB Board Rules & Regulations, prior  Board, Appellate & U.S. Supreme Court precedent and basic requirements of civil law are readily apparent and clear for all to see.  

The UBCJA International & it's affiliated District Councils std. modus operandi is to proffer a phony 'test case(s)' which they jointly intend to forge into National Policy and precedent nationwide w/o adequate and proper service to all parties so impacted - either at the ALJ level or prior to the Board decision and order. Their joint conspiracy to do so illegally alters and amends a Federal law without Congressional notification, input or authority thus usurping the Congressional perogative to initiate, pass, alter and amend Federal Labor law. 

____________________

Aggrieved Parties must appeal this to the Board in Washington D.C. and to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

This is a Property Rights Case and due to the aggrandizement and usurption of power by the UBCJA International, NRCC, NYCDCC, Cement League the ALJ & the Board; it is also one of Constitutional significance.

_________________________________________

Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1986). Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, "this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases "correction through legislative action is practically impossible." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved, see Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 405-411 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 458 (1852), the opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving procedural and evidentiary rules.

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Ethics
Chattel Slavery vs. Wage Slavery (Orestes A. Brownson), Boston Quarterly Review 3 (1840): 368-370.

Orestes A. Brownson, a self-taught Vermonter, made his mark as a preacher, magazine editor, lecturer, reformer, socialist, Transcendentalist, and writer (20 volumes).  Fearless and uncompromising, he began as a Presbyterian minister and wound up as convert to Catholicism.  While preaching to groups of workers, he had become deeply interested in labor reform, and his blast, given here, was music to the ears of Southern slaveowners.  What are his most obvious exaggerations?  Was the slaveowner or the mill owner the greater hypocrite?

In regard to labor, two systems obtain: one that of slave labor, the other that of free labor. Of the two, the first is, in our judgment, except so far as the feelings are concerned, decidedly the least oppressive. If the slave has never been a free man, we think, as a general rule, his sufferings are less than those of the free laborer at wages. As to actual freedom, one has just about as much as the other. The laborer at wages has all the disadvantages of freedom and none of its blessings, while the slave, if denied the blessings, is freed from the disadvantages.

We are no advocates of slavery. We are as heartily opposed to it as any modern abolitionist can be. But we say frankly that, if there must always be a laboring population distinct from proprietors and employers, we regard the slave system as decidedly preferable to the system at wages.

It is no pleasant thing to go days without food; to lie idle for weeks, seeking work and finding none; to rise in the morning with a wife and children you love, and know not where to procure them a breakfast; and to see constantly before you no brighter prospect than the almshouse.

Yet these are no infrequent incidents in the lives of our laboring population. Even in seasons of general prosperity… we have seen hundreds of people in a not very populous village, in a wealthy portion of our common country, suffering for the want of the necessaries of life, willing to work and yet finding no work to do. Many and many is the application of a poor man for work, merely for his food, we have seen rejected. These things are little thought of, for the applicants are poor; they fill no conspicuous place in society, and they have no biographers. But their wrongs are chronicled in heaven.

It is said there is no want in this country. There may be less than in some other countries. But death by actual starvation in this country is, we apprehend, no uncommon occurrence. The sufferings of a quiet, unassuming… class of females in our cities… too proud to beg or to apply to the almshouse, are not easily told. They are industrious; they do all that they can find to do. But yet the little there is for them to do, and the miserable pittance they receive for it, is hardly sufficient to keep soul and body together.

And yet there is a man who employs them to make shirts, trousers, etc., and grows rich on their labors. He is one of our respectable citizens, perhaps is praised in the newspapers for his liberal donations to some charitable institution. He passes among us as a pattern of morality and is honored as a worthy Christian. And why should he not be, since our Christian community is made up of such as he, and since our clergy would not dare question his piety lest they should incur the reproach of infidelity and lose their standing and their salaries? . . .

The average life--working life, we mean--of the girls that come to Lowell, for instance, from Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, we have been assured, is only about three years. What becomes of them then? Few of them ever marry; fewer still ever return to their native places with reputations unimpaired. "She has worked in a factory" is almost enough to damn to infamy the most worthy and virtuous girl...

Where go the proceeds of their labors? The man who employs them, and for whom they are toiling as so many slaves, is one of our city nabobs, reveling in luxury; or he is a member of our legislature, enacting laws to put money in his own pocket; or he is a member of Congress, contending for a high tariff to tax the poor for the benefit of the rich; or in these times he is shedding crocodile tears over the deplorable condition of the poor laborer, while he docks his wages 25 percent. . . . And this man too would fain pass for a Christian and a republican. He shouts for liberty, stickles for equality, and is horrified at a Southern planter who keeps slaves.

One thing is certain: that, of the amount actually produced by the operative, he retains a less proportion than it costs the master to feed, clothe, and lodge his slave. Wages is a cunning device of the devil, for the benefit of tender consciences who would retain all the advantages of the slave system without the expense, trouble, and odium of being slaveholders.
Ted
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Ted
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page 2 - CERTIFIED LIST OF RECORD


https://www.nlrb.gov/case/03-CA-126938


Allegations

8(a)(1) Coercive Rules
8(a)(3) Union Security Related Actions


Participants

Participant Address Phone

Involved Party
Legal Representative
James Murphy

Spivak Lipton LLP
1700 BROADWAY
21ST FLOOR
NEW YORK, NY
10019-5905
(212)765-2100

Charging Party
Legal Representative
RAY HEINEMAN
KROLL, HEINEMAN AND CARTON
Metro Corporate Campus I
99 Wood Avenue South, Suite 307
Iselin, NJ
08830-2715
(732)491-2104

Charging Party
Union
Northeast Regional Council of Carpenters

91 FIELDCREST AVE
SUITE A18
EDISON, NJ
08837

Charged Party / Respondent
Employer
The Cement League

49 West 45th Street
New York, NY
10036
(212)575-0950

Involved Party
Union
NEW YORK CITY DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTER

395 Hudson Street
9th Floor
New York, NY
10014
(212)366-7500

Controlling Parties
UBCJA International & its Corporate Sponsors/Puppetmasters


re: How to End Run the Consent Decree & the useless USAO, Court appointed R.O./I.M. & the Federal District Court......
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Ted
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YJ.AJ'.ACSIM!U!: & FIE.ST CJ..ASS MA!J-.
Honorable .foe! p, Biblr>witz
Associ at<: Chief Admin i.struti:ve Law Jtll:lge
.120 West 45•Ji Slrpet, 11 'h Floor
Now Yo1·k, NY 10036

Re: Northeast Regional Council of Carpenters "The Cement League
t)LRBJ;;_~se No. 03-CA-12.§23a_. __ _ -----------


Dear Judge Blblowitz:

1l1is Firm is counsel to Ille NC>rtheast Regional Counci,I of Carpenters, the Charging Party
in the~ above"captioned matter. I am in receipt 0f c0rrespo.udcnce dat0d March 20, 20 J 5, from
the Cou11sel to the New York City District Council of Carpenters sc~king a postponement of the
March 25, 2015 hearing. The request iB premised on. the Oi-de1· of the Honorable Riobard Bennan
scheduling, oral argument 011 March 30, 201 S, in l\ew Yol'k Ptv and Yici.9.iJy Distric\ Cg:µJ!cil J_
Th..s.8_~~9ciJ!tion oCYi.9'11-Ceiilng_'lf!Q.J;;illJi~:ntry_Lll.9.Jb~.!lis.eJU.l!ew Y_q,tl<,, Case No. J 4 CV609).
Please be advised that the Charging Part;• opposes the postpo11erne11l request.
11ie issue before Judge .Berman, which has bccn pending since· Augu~t 5, '.!.014, is
whether an arbitration award i3sued by A(bitrator H<iward Edehnan should be confinned. The
issue before Arbitrator Edelman was wbeth"l' the hiring provision of the collective bargaining
agreement between t))e Association of Wall-Ceiling and Carpe11l1·y lndusll'ies of New York and
t·hc United .Brotherhood of Carpenters superseded the Joc"I collcct.ivo ba.rgaining agr~emcnl
between the Wall ond Ceiling AssociatiOll and the New Yo1·k City Dislrict Council of
Carpenters. nic arbitration aw~rd pending enfbrc~mont before .hidg~ Bennan does not raise
any issues concerning tl)e cliscrimiµatory nature of the hi.ring provi11io11 .in the agreement at issue
in the instant ca.-i::.
In support nf its rr'quest, the District Council argues that the Charging Party is not
prejudiced because it is not currently seeking a monetary remedy against the Cement League.
However, the Northo:ast'Rcgional .Co1mcil of Carpen tern is continuing lo reccive transfer rcqucsrs
from its members wh<' m·e uansfcning ~heir memborshi.p to the New York City District Council
to prevent the lo~'I of work oppo11unitie~ under the Cement League agreement. Tl:tus, tho
discriminator)' impao\' eofthe hiri>Jg provision in the Cement League ag;1·ccrncnt ;, ongoing.
General Counsel's Exhibit 1 ( Y"'
\
' }
JA 161
Case 16-495, Document 80, 06/30/2016, 1806555, Page11 of 283
03/20/2015 11:12 732491212f) l<H PAGE 03/0J
Accord.ingly, lhc Charging Party regue$lj that the I rial continue lo be scheduled for Marcb 25, 2015.
RGH:sm
cc: William Banfteld (via facsimile)
Rhonda Levy (via facsimile)
James M ..Murphy, E$q. (via facsimile)
Michael Salgo, Esq. (via facsimile)
Jolm Grunert (via facsimile)
Michael Cape.I.Ii (via facsimile)

_______________________

<b>Incompatible systems; nevertheless, the 2015 ltr. by KROLL, HEINEMAN & CARTON, A.A.L. above is the cruxt of their position (the UBCJA International, the NRCC & the Cement League).

Murphy's latest legal brief is lame and clearly depicts he has zero knowledge on NLRB, Appellate or U.S. Sup. Ct. precedent in that he had to come here; to 157 blogspot and to this thread to steal his base idea's & strategy in his attempt to defend the UBCJA International, the mob infested NRCC, the Cement League and the NYCDCC's side of the case.
   However, his brief is not even close to a high school level, let alone a first year law student. Hey Jim, who did the stand in for you for the bar exam? How much did you pay them?

NYC rank & file members have until September 29, 2016 to submit their briefs in opposition as amici curie or ex-parte letter to the court - or, forever hold your peace & welcome to McCarron's 50-State RIGHT TO WORK UBCJA.

The irony of this case is simply this:

The UBCJA International, the NRCC, the Cement League and the NYCDCC; to defend their 'position' and that of former R.O. Walsh & USAO Bhararra/Torrances illegal grip & ongoing racketeering over NYCDCC members via the abortion known as the RICO Consent Decree, wherein rank & file members have no legal rights or standing in Federal Court - the aforementioned parties now fully support the Non-Union RIGHT TO WORK state mantra, the very position we as UBCJA members fight at every turn in every new state proffering such change to their law(s), whereas here, to defend the continued & un-prosecuted criminal racketeering being driven chiefly by the UBCJA International and it's corporate puppet-masters; to have any defense at all, the International, NRCC & the Cement League are now all for RTW state law(s).

The 50-STATE RIGHT TO WORK UBCJA, God Bless America & to hell with Douglas J. McCarron!
Ted
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Ted
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Timing is everything Ladies: Anyone not yet receive the UBCJA's latest 6" x 11-1/2" Postcard comparing the Trump v. Clinton Presidential race?

excerpt:

"This Labor Day, the choice is clear for out members...DO NOT ALLOW WHAT WE HAVE BUILT TO BE TORN DOWN!

UBC founder Peter McGuire started Labaor Day back in 1882. This Labor Day we need to focus on the election.

Our powerful enemies continue to work hard to cut wages and end union protections.

 - National Right to Work

 - The National Labor Relations Board

 - The Supreme Court

While some in his party vote with us, Trump is 100% against us and every other union too:

 - Trump is in favor of Right to Work laws that weaken collective bargaining and union strength.

 - Trump would eliminate prevailing wages by ending federal Davis Bacon, which gives union bidders a fair chance to win work on publicly funded projects.

 - Trump would nominate judges to the Supreme Court who will vote to ban Project Labor Agreements, vote in favor of Right to Work and vote to lower safety & training standards."

_______________________

Wow - what a crock of shit from the word go Doug!

Fact:


The UBCJA via its corporate Puppet-Masters whom you are directly beholden too for your livlihood have engineered and orchestrated a multitude of phony test cases which you've collectively rammed through the NLRB for 21-years; wherein said test cases won in one Board Region or Appellate Court are then used by you & your Corporate handlers as precedent in every other region of the UBCJA; without ever having established precedent through multiple cases.

This model has also been used by the UBCJA & your corporate Puppet-Masters throughout every Appellate Court and the U.S. Supreme Court. Failing that, it's buy a decision & order; bribe someone or pay-off a judge, ALJ, U.S. Attorney or Court appointed Officer along the way (so we hear, wink-wink).

Cases in point; re: THE UBC's 50-STATE RIGHT TO WORK LAW (better known as 'MOBILITY')

A)   Lebovitz (McDowell Bldg & Foundation) (2009)

B)   The Cement League (2016)

Funny thing here - you are not yet through the Circuit Court briefs & Ronald N. Tutor actually allowed you to speak & send this garbage through the mail. Seriously, talk about throwing your friends under the bus Doug? The NLRB & Appellate Courts and Haight & Bermans Federal District Court in NYC have been your best friends.

FACT - Lebovitz/McDowell and the Cement League were, are & remain phony Test Cases which your handlers have conjured up to negate & end run NLRA protections afforded via Sec. 7 amongst others relative to the RIGHT TO WORK LAWS.

Both cases by design were put forth so you and your Corporate handlers could end run the Congress and amend/author a new law without Congressoinal authority which allows you to run the RIGHT TO WORK UBC which you falsely accuse Trump of championing.

The UBC's RTW Program via MOBILITY negates the worker & employee rights afforded under the NLRA to organize, to have one-man, one vote for their elected & Exclusive Bargaining Representatives which the UBCJA INTERNATIONAL has stripped away via Harrington v. Herman & Harrington v. Chao.

The NLRA is unrecognizeable since you took power (sorry, I meant Tutor, you big dummy). Union members have no rights and have no standing in Federal Court before Judge Berman.

The PLA's you so suddenly abhore were afforded to our Union and every other Union via the Boston Harbor case by the U.S. Supreme Court; and suddenly, they are now your enemy?

Who the hell allowed you to speak? Hey Ron - did you approve this message? 

Quite obviously the big dummy Doug doesn't know when to shut it. Timing is everything so how can you let him speak on this or any other subject w/o proper vetting of the topics?

Correct me if I am wrong Mr. Tutor but did the NYCDCC not execute a record number of PROJECT LABOR AGREEMENTS (PLA's), some 160+ which negate the CBA, the contract wages & benefits of workers in the Contractors favor whereby workers/employees alleged to be afforded NLRA rights as individuals have exactly zero say in any Negotiation at any level given the post Chao appointments of UBC Yes Men (alleged 300-Hitters).

Not for nothing, but the UBCJA International and the Corporate Developers associated with the UBC have done more damage to UBC Families in regard to their Wages and Benefits than you charge Trump with having done - even were he to have twenty terms in office.

TRUMP ain't the problem bub - you and your Corporate Handlers are the problem and the true scourge to Labor on this Labor Day.



________________

Douglas J. (Satan) McCarron - given your 66th is around the corner on Friday September 23rd; can you do us all a favor & apply for your SS Benefits and step down? If you got any questions on applying you can call:

AARP
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RACKETEERING PROFESSIONALS

Given the damage you've done to the working man over your career and all the families/homes you've destroyed or had followed by P.I.'s over the years notwithstanding using mumsy to hide certain scams or throwing your brother Mikey under the bus to cover for your crimes, perhaps you should donate your Social Security to the General Fund for some poor bastard who has nothing to live on in his/her golden years. God knows you've got more than enough dough offshored for your own needs or your Wicken pals.
Ted
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Re: THE CEMENT (CONCRETE) LEAGUE & ALJ Greens 5-21-15 Decision & the NLRB Boards 2-16-16 Decision & Order; EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC Hiring Hall, the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

Ted
5-days Ross; Norman & the rest of the wannabe's & posers in the NYCDCC. September 29th is the deadline at the Court of Appeals ladies:

Will any of you man up & defend your own interests/rights or will you all roll over & play dead?
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