MOBILITY, the Right of Exclusion & McCarrons 50-State RTW Mobility Scam

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MOBILITY, the Right of Exclusion & McCarrons 50-State RTW Mobility Scam

Ted
This post was updated on .
Current Count:

28 - Non-Union Right to Work (RTW) States

22 - Union non RTW States

50-28 = 22 re: for all you un-elected, "At Will" Council hacks now selling out the men with this 100% full mobility crap across the country wherein McCarron has usurped the role of Congress to amend, change or alter Federal Law & years of Appellate & United States Supreme Court precedent.

Consolidation of your Locals is for the benefit of the un-elected hacks & stooges kissing McCarron's ring. They line their own pockets all the while and at every opportunity.

Ultimately, Doug McCarron & his Corporate Puppet-Masters (Tutor, Blum, Feinstein & others) will continue the criminal racketeering, theft & embezzlement of your monies/funds via undeclared and very illegal trusteeship's wherein there the Locals thus consolidated/merged had no financial mismanagement and/or improprieties whatsoever; thusly giving Mac & the corporate puppet-masters no legitimate and/or legal means to shut your Local Unions down, nor to seize the assets of said entities & retain 98% at the International UBCJA.

The 'merged Locals' will then receive +-2% back; while Doug & his accountants move the monies around to various accounts & wash it so many times via cheap Accounting tricks, it will then end up being off-shored to Switzerland, the Cayman Islands etc & he & his pals shall collect their booty.

In the end, Doug's plan is to have have two massive Locals; one West of the Mississippi & one East of said river. You will call them Locals while he calls them District Councils & feigns the Harrington v. Chao bullshit relative to the unelected Council stooges; his "AT WILL" NON-UNION shit-bag worshippers who illegally conspire to hold a union book. You know the kind - 'the no tools, no skills, no work ethic maggots', the walk abouts / fuck artists / stewards  / drunks & druggies.

Given every last one of them around the Country are his subjects, all of whom only ultimately answer to King Doug & his make pretend UBCJA Constitution and all of them are "At Will" non-union rat bastards; your all fucked as King Doug can fire any of them or all of them with or without cause at any time for any reason!

Now seriously, given the aforementioned do any of you truly believe that any Council boob, anywhere in the country will stand up for you or any other union brother or sister ?



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F) PROPERTY RIGHTS as applied to NLRA sec. 14(b) & MOBILITY

In, 949 F.2d 199: United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Debs, Defendant-appellant United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. - 949 F.2d 199 at 10 stated:

   Courts have long held that the concept of property under the Hobbs Act is not limited to tangible property, but also includes "any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth." United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 1258, 25 L.Ed.2d 530 (1970). Intangible business rights, including the business rights of unions, are considered property. United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 1221, 59 L.Ed.2d 459 (1979); United States v. Local 560 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 281-282 (3d Cir.1985). Intangible property within the meaning of the Hobbs Act includes LMRDA rights. Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union, Local 95, 627 F.Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y.1985).

In A.L.A. Schecter Poultry,Chief Justice Hughes........At 15 stated:

By contrast, union politics is more like one-party government. The statutory right to participate in union government is not held accountable by anything remotely like a thriving two-party system. Here, the federal legislature and courts have a greater duty to combat labor corruption and electoral vice. The Hobbs Act is an important instrument in service of this democratic objective. For all of these reasons, LMRDA rights are property under the Hobbs Act.

The Geographical Jurisdiction of the NYCDCC defines the primary source or element of wealth for its rank & file members as noted by the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir.1969).

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (NLRA) SECTION 14(b)
APPLICABILITY TO THE NERCC/UBCJA’S MOBILITY CLAUSE

14(b) [Agreements requiring union membership in violation of State law] Nothing in this Act [subchapter] shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law. Currently, there are 28 - Non-Right to Work States & 22 - Right to Work States.

NLRA Section 14(b) operates in two ways:

In all Non-RTW States (Union), Federal Pre-emption is applicable to the entire Act.

In RTW States (Non-Union), Federal Pre-emption is waived under the Tenth Amendment, and the NLRB Board & General Counsel are free to apply the “Mobility” Provision to said Non-Union States, as State law(s) are controlling in the Right to Work (RTW) States.

In Non-RTW States (Union States such as NEW YORK), the 12-31-09 slip Opinion issued in Lebovitz has no application.

The reason is fairly obvious, once people understand the base NLRA 9(a) & (8f) Representation issues as applicable to the Construction Industry. Once a “bargaining representative” has been chosen and subsequently “certified” by the NLRB; and, after the Contractor, Firm, Organization complies with the proviso to Sec. 8(a)(3) regarding the collection of Dues & Initiation Fees and the requisite 30-Day hold for Sec. 9(a) and 7-Day hold for Sec. 8(f), and after Workers or Employees are properly advised of their Beck Rights, to refrain from any & all activities under NLRA Sec. 7 – application of the Lebovitz Ruling is out.

The CBA is a “contract”. Within said contracts for particular Locals, District & Regional Councils of the UBC are well Defined Geographical Jurisdictional areas, comprised of cities, towns, counties or combinations thereof as the case may be in a particular Non-RTW (Union) state. The “Defined Geographical Jurisdiction” of a UBCJA Contract (CBA) is “intangible property”.

In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 US 164 (1979), the United States Supreme Court stated….”one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property – the right to exclude others”.

The exclusion principle thus requires that NYCDCC rank & file members LMRDA Property Rights are enforced by the Federal Court & Jdge Richard Berman. The United States Attorneys Office (U.S.A.O.) and Benjamin Torrance should be taking the lead in this endeavor via enforcing the laws already on the Books, and via utilizing the 2nd Circuit as well as the Supreme Court precedent decisions on the subject.

The right to exclude others thus entails the USAO Torrance & Judge Berman involving themselves squarely in the exisiting standing order of Judge Haight, first and foremost via enforcing the exisiting 67/33% ruling of the Court and second:

Backing it up with hard-core Statistical analysis provided by the Benefit Funds & Mr. Epstein, from 2009 through 2012. Given the millions of dollars spent on Computer Hardware and Proprietary Software used by the Trust Funds, there is no reason or excuse for a Report not to be ordered and issued to Judge Berman for his review and scrutiny.

     How many man-hours were recorded by those living in one of the 5-boroughs from 2009-2012 (current day) vs. how many man-hours were recorded by those who do not live within the Geographical Jurisdiction of the NYCDCC.

The fact is, the UBC International & the DC Attorneys will refuse to produce the report because it will clearly show that they have failed to abide by Judge Haight's 2009 order, thus leading to contempt charges.

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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

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 - CONT. -

In a RTW State wherein Federal Pre-Emption operates as a waiver under the Tenth Amendment, Workers & Employees are free to be employed, or work anywhere they so choose, without exception, thus – the UBCJA signatory General Contractors or Subcontractors conducting their Union operations in any of the 22-Right to Work States, where a Union Security Clause is of no force or effect, in such States, the Mobility Clause would fall under the respective State Law.


In a Non-Right to Work State such as New York and the remaining 27-non RTW States, and as here applicable to NYCDCC Union Carpenters & all other Trade Unions operating Exclusive or Non-Exclusive Hiring Halls (re: Employer Chooses, Worker or Employee Solicits or Union Hiring Hall(s) select candidates for employment), the intangible property right of exclusion, to the defined geographical jurisdiction becomes effective, or operative.

 After all other factors are properly weighed and compliance is had, the Locals are thus free to enforce the right of exclusion limiting this to the defined geographical jurisdiction, to the benefit of their properly indentured workers and employees; and, are free to employ their members first, all members – to the exclusion of all others.

The exclusion principle includes, Non-Union Workers, UBC Union Travelers – whether inter-state or intra-state, 1099 Independent Contractors, Cash Workers and Illegal Aliens/ Undocumented Workers & any others working off the books.

The NLRB Board, the UBCJA or their 36-subordinate Regional or District Councils cannot usurp the Congressional Authority to legislate. The UBC Constitution & Bylaws have been ruled “facially unlawful” as per slip opinion No. 354-122 Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz dated 12-31-09. The union-security clause explicitly requires compliance with the Union’s constitution and bylaws, a requirement which violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). See Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the union-security clause unlawfully required compliance with the union’s constitution and bylaws)

Even when illegal provisions within both documents are properly severed and they are then deemed to be in compliance with all mandates and requirements of law – the UBC Constitution & By-Laws do not supersede or usurp Congressional authority legislate.
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

Ted
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 - CONT. -

UBC Attorneys for NERCC claim that the Mobility provision of the Contract (CBA) is an exception to the general rule, and this is where it runs afoul of the Law and where it must fail as a matter of law. This is also a clear example of the UBC International and its Regional/District Councils shopping NLRB Board Regions for favorable decisions gained in one Region and unilaterally applying the decision and order to all 50-States.

The NLRB Board and its General Counsel and Regional Director have failed to enforce the specific requirements of their original or amended Decision & Order (D & O) or to correct and strike the illegal languages from the NERCC 6-State Contracts (CBA’s). Their participation in this case, as a means to backdoor a legislative amendment to the NLRA, in collusion with the UBCJA warrants an investigation into the Inferior Agency of the Executive Branch…the NLRB & its Region 1 Office by the United States Department of Justice or Office of the Inspector General. The Board Agents and the General Counsel are sworn to uphold the law, not circumvent it for political reasons. Their actions are grossly negligent and warrant at a minimum fines and suspensions from the practice of law.

Douglas J. McCarron, Frank Spencer and John Ballantyne have suspended all NYCDCC Local’s autonomy as a fraudulent means to change the By-Laws, exercise a veto power, and to put forth a Restructuring Plan which incorporates 100% Full Mobility throughout the NYC District Council of Carpenters and one which incorporates the entire State of New York; and which merges and consolidates Local Union rank & file workers/employees. {Restructuring Plan dated 5-26-11 at pg. 131 at 2. and at By-Laws Section 38, pg. 123 of 138, or pg. 28 of bylaws as a separate document}

 Under the law(s), this is fraudulent inducement, as the UBC International, with malice & fore-thought has intentionally deceived the US Attorney, the Independent Review Officer and the Court by with-holding these facts from them. Coupled together with the current 67% - 33% Rule, favoring Contractor Association workers and employees, wherein Contractors can increase the 67% ratio with other added rules under the Consent Decree, the Mobility provision fairly said – eats away an additional 30% in the Contractor Association and Contractor favor and effectively grants exclusive control and license to them of the Union Hiring Halls and the Out of Work List (OOWL). Not only does this disenfranchise workers and employees who rely upon the OOWL & Hiring Hall Rules under the Consent Decree, it is openly discriminatory and provides the  Contractor Associations a monopoly control over all hiring and violates the terms and conditions of the Consent Decree.

In NLRB Mountain Pacific, page 894, the portions not over-ruled, the Board noted:

"The Respondents do not, nor could they, argue that this contract does not make employment conditional upon union approval, for a more complete and outright surrender of the normal management hiring prerogative to a union could hardly be phrased in contract language. The fact that the Agreement limits the unions exclusive control to a 48-hour period after a request for employees is immaterial, for if unqualified exclusive delegation of hiring to a Union is unlawful, the vice is not cured by a reversion back to the employer of the hiring privilege after the union is unable to enjoy the power conferred upon it."2

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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

Ted
This post was updated on .
Mobility & Primary Job Situs:

PRIMARY JOB SITUS – PER THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, NLRA Sec. 14(b)
U.S. Supreme Court Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976) Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp. No. 74-1254 , Argued March 29, 1976  Decided June 14, 1976  426 U.S. 407   

Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act permits union- or agency shop agreements between employers and unions, but § 14(b) authorizes States to exempt themselves from § 8(a)(3) and to enact "right-to-work" laws prohibiting union or agency shops. About two years after petitioner unions and respondent employer had entered into an agency shop agreement covering seamen employed on respondent's oil tankers, respondent brought suit claiming that the agreement was invalid and unenforceable because it violated Texas' right-to-work laws. Since, inter alia, all final decisions for hiring the seamen are made in Texas, the majority of the then employed seamen reside in Texas, and respondent's personnel records are maintained and payroll checks are written there, the District Court held that Texas had an "intimate concern" with the agreement, notwithstanding that the seamen spend the vast majority of their working hours away from Texas on the high seas, and that therefore Texas' right-to-work laws were applicable under § 14(b) and rendered the agreement void and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stressing that Texas was the place of hiring.

Held:
1. lt is the employees' predominant job situs, rather than a generalized weighing of factors or the place of hiring, that triggers operation of § 14(b), and, under § 14(b), right-to-work laws cannot void agreements permitted by § 8(a)(3) when the situs at which all the employees covered by the agreement perform most of their work is located outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 412-419.


(a) Insofar as § 8(a)(3) deals with union and agency shop agreements, it focuses both in effect and purpose on post-hiring conditions, conditions that have a major impact on the job situs. Pp. 426 U. S. 414-416.

Page 426 U. S. 408

(b) Similarly, § 14(b)'s primary concern is with state regulation of the post-hiring employer employee-union relationship, the center of which is the job situs, i.e., the place where the work that is the very raison d'etre of the relationship is performed; and because of this close relationship between § 14(b) and job situs, § 14(b) does not allow enforcement of right-to-work laws with regard to an employment relationship whose principal job situs is outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 416-418.

(c) Under the job situs test, as opposed to a "place of hiring" test, the possibility of patently anomalous extraterritorial applications of any given State's right-to-work laws will be minimized, and parties entering a collective bargaining agreement will easily be able to determine in virtually all situations whether a union or agency shop provision is valid. Pp. 426 U. S. 418-419.

NEW YORK is not a RIGHT to WORK (RTW) State, yet that is what Doug and his Corporate Minions are seeking to push through via full mobility - that is to say, the enforcement of RTW Laws in a Non-Right to Work State such as NEW YORK.

The GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION of the NYCDCC is your source and element of wealth as defined by Tropiano and the 2nd Circuit. It is where you ply your craft, your trade, your skills, sweat and equity. The primary Job Situs is in NYCDCC's turf, not some right to work State. The UBC International's McCarron thinks that buying the services of a former Federal Judge somehow allows him to initiate a defacto reversal of the NLRA Section 14(b) as it directly applies to Federal pre-emtion, state sovereignty and New Yorks non-right to work status. Neither McCarron or Conboy have the power or the authority to usurp the role of the Congress to amend or alter Federal law, yet that is exactly what is going on here, why we have play-skool (pun intended) down at Courtroom 21B at the Federal Courthouse.

Geographical Jurisdiction, under the NLRA, LMRDA is an express Property Right which has directly both tangible and intangible apsects therein, all of which are protected by law and by the U.S. Supreme Court....if only we could get the USAO & the Court to enforce the laws already on the books and without their allowing McCarron, Conboy & the yet vetted and still very corrupt Contractor Associations (Wall & Ceiling etc.) to carve out an exception without submitting any formal motion to the Court or any follow on legal brief's.

The simple fact is, Judge Haight's 67/33% Ruling is in fact still on the Books and has not been over-ruled. 

The SDNY and Judge Berman should not allow a corrupt Contractor Association and a corrupt International Union and it's General President and his hired Gun, the former IRO to directly threaten, coerce and intimidate the men, the USAO, the RO via a 5-page intro letter from a former 2nd Circuit Judge who also ruled upon Criminal RICO matters, and who now stains his own past record and legacy, and directly threaten the Court that should everyone not simply fall in line and acquiesce to the direct threats and demands for full mobility and 100% Contract Association Control over the New York City that no Contract will in fact be signed.



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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

Ted
This post was updated on .
 - CONT. -

The United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America (UBCJA) International union, its General President Douglas J. McCarron and their counsel of record, Latham and Watkins, LLP have put the Lebovitz decision and the Mobility issue square on the table, via their incorporation of the National Restructuring Plan into the May 26, 2011 NYCDCC Restructuring Plan, Exhibit “D”, Page 131, which stated:

Re: UBCJA (undated) 8-page “Memorandum” by Phil Newkirk, Chief of Staff, page 131-138 at 5, “The proposed LU [Local Union] restructuring for the for the above referenced  LU’S [Local Unions] is based on the premise that, while Local Unions play an integral role in the structure of the UBC, there exists an unnecessary number of LU’s that are holdovers from a previous construction era. During that earlier era, LU’s were structured in a way that was consistent with the provincial attitudes of the members residing in many ethnic neighborhoods throughout New York City. Additionally, in that era construction was largely localized and contractors rarely traveled outside of the boroughs they resided in, with many contractors not traveling beyond a limited number of neighborhoods within the borough.”

“However, in today’s construction market, Union contractors are increasingly mobile, chasing work across borough, city and state borders. They employ Union Carpenters who may be members of a LU within a given borough, but are quite possibly residents of an entirely different borough or city. Given the mobility of today’s industry and workforce, it is not necessary to have numerous Carpenter LU’s [Local Unions] scattered throughout New York City. That simply results in unnecessary duplication of administrative resources and costs, resources that could be better directed towards organizing and work growth.”

Movants note that the “holdovers from a previous construction era” and the “provincial attitudes of members residing in many ethnic neighborhoods of New York City” lines are just that. There isn’t any factual basis for these lies, but they must tell a story to avoid the obvious – that being, following the law. NYC is the largest and most racially diverse cities in the nation, and Newkirks statements appear racist and discriminatory, as neither have anything to do with the Mobility issue with the exception of creating a diversion to the Court to cloud the real issue, the UBC’S patent attempt to end run labor laws and avoid motion practice on same.

The fact is, the UBCJA Signatory General Contractors & Subcontractors have always worked across city, borough, county & state borders and have done so since the advent of the automobile, and prior to that as well. The UBCJA signatories noted above, although all are contractually bound to work Union, bound to pay the contracted wage and benefit rates, abide by Davis-Bacon regulations, prevailing wage laws, certified payroll requirements etc., said signatories also like to run afoul of the Union Contract and devise “double breasted and alter-ego corporation” so they can avoid paying the prevailing Union Contract Wage and Benefit scale; and, to substitute it with that of the Non-Union Associated Building and Contractor wage rates.

To get around this, and to end run the labor laws in Union States, large cities such as New York – and to afford themselves with the opportunity to skirt and avoid NRLA Sec. 14(b), the UBCJA devised the “Mobility Scheme” as the primary vehicle to bring in out of state travelers and pay them their lower wage rates when said workers came from an adjoining Union State and Regional or District Council; and to pay the Non-Union wage scale whenever they can get away with it.

The real predicate behind the Mobility Scheme is furthered by the introduction of the Non-Union worker, the 1099 Independent Contractor category and predominately of the illegal alien & undocumented work force, all of whom work for Cash without any Benefits. As NYCDCC and this Court well know, the Mobility clause in Union Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA’s) is the primary magnet leading directly to the fraud in the first instance.

The fraud costs honest UBC Local Union members their jobs and robs them of their livelihood, property and ability to build and sustain wealth and costs taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars throughout the State of New York.

UBCJA Local Unions are sized proportionally to the dollar volume of work which a given Local Union in a defined Geographical Jurisdiction produces on a historical basis. Local union members who live, work, shop, own homes and who pay property taxes are effectively locked out of work when they are replaced with these “travelers”.

When Local Union workers are not on the Projects in their Jurisdictional areas, and where the predominant body of the work force is made up of a core group of travelers and illegal aliens/undocumented workers & employees, working for cash and without benefits, who are without any vested interest in the area where the project is located, and when no one is watching – the fraud & corruption only accelerates. The signatory Contractors encourage it, as was demonstrated within all of the testimony relevant to the August 5, 2009 indictments (Forde, Greaney & others)

The last line of defense, is the District Council assigned Certified Shop Steward, yet, as has just been proven, when he or she is the lone wolf on the job, the same Contractors who are defrauding the Benefit Funds and who fail to pay Workers Compensation, Unemployment Insurance, State & Federal Taxes, Social Security & Medicare/Medicaid etc, defraud the Local Union rank & file member, unduly increase the amount of time said members spend on the so called Out of Work List (OWL) an further induce Unemployment Insurance fraud by forcing the State & Federal Government to pay claims to Local Union members who would otherwise be working, paying all of the aforementioned taxes and insurance and who would therein not be a drain on these critical systems.

Mobility is a power grab by McCarron, which by design enriches and lines the pockets of corrupt Union & Contractor Association employers who maintain their mob connections. The UBCJA does not have clean hands in these matters, as it is their direct policies and violations of the laws which directly caused the fraud.

When you eliminate the Local Unions and consolidate them to the point of creating mega-locals and replace it with Doug McCarron's Right to Work State Mobility Scheme, the specific intent is to increase the power/money grab for those at the top and to create a vacuum of eyes, ears and voices at the bottom; and negate and eviscerate the NLRA & LMRDA which the United States Congress via legislation created. McCarron's fraudulent extension of the LMRDA Trusteeship was designed with one express purpose in mind, handing the project Owners & Developers over $5 Billion dollars in unilaterlally executed PLA's.

The USAO & the Court should be inquiring in to exactly what the finders fee on those amounts of kick-backs are. McCarron & Conboy are making Forde & Greaney look like a couple of girl scouts by comparison.

The primary aim herein is to silence those who oppose the UBCJA International taking on the role of Congress and effectively vetoing the NLRA in its entirety and, by coercion, fraud and intimidation, under the threat & fear of economic reprisal (black-listing).

 The UBCJA Internationals Mobility scheme serves as an effective veto over the legislative branch or Congressional authority to author, write, pass or amend laws. The UBCJA cannot usurp what is clearly Congress’s, nor can it substitute its scheme under the false claim of an economic emergency or crisis, nor can the NLRB.
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

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NATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS:

The UBCJA urges that the national crisis in 1999 demanded a broad and intensive co-operative effort by the Contractor Associations, and that this necessary co-operation was carried out by the adoption and implementation of Mobility Rules on a National level. But the statutory plan is not simply one for voluntary effort. It does not seek merely to endow voluntary trade or industrial associations or groups with privileges or immunities. It involves the UBCJA’s coercive exercise and the exaction of Congressional valid lawmaking and legislative power passed off as a simple “internal rules change” governed by the UBC Constitution and its subordinate Regional & District Council By-Laws.

The UBC International and its subordinate Regional & District Councils seek to abolish the Congressional power to legislate, substitute their internal union by-laws and constitution for that of the United States and the Congress.

The UBCJA International & Regional/District Councils are exercising a veto power over the 22-Right to Work States inherent sovereignty to control & legislate their own Employment laws and in the instance of the 28-Non Right to Work States, the UBC INTERNATIONAL & LATHAM & WATKINS seek to pre-empt Federal laws by application of a Right to Work State law and apply those laws to all 50-States nationwide.

The UBC International simply does not have such powers, nor can they violate the property right of the Geographical Jurisdiction of the NYCDCC, and its inherent source of wealth for its members, the workers & employees which the NLRA, LMRDA, the USAO and the Federal Court and its decisions protect and which the Federal Constitution of the United States and Supreme Court precedents demand.

In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the United States Supreme Court at second wrote:

“Second. The Question of the Delegation of Legislative Power. - We recently had occasion to review the pertinent decisions and the general principles which govern the determination of this question. Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 , 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed . 446. The Constitution provides that 'All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.' Article 1, 1. And the Congress is authorized 'To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' its general powers. Article 1, 8, par. 18.

The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. We have repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting [295 U.S. 495, 530]   legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national Legislature cannot deal directly. We pointed out in the Panama Refining Company Case that the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. But we said that the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained. Id., 293 U.S. 388 , page 421, 55 S.Ct. 241”.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), at 15:

“But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to Trade or Industrial Associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section 1 of title 1? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress…”.

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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

Ted
This post was updated on .
 - CONT. -

 The loss of the property right via mobility rules enacted by the UBCJA and the hiring and employment of illegal aliens are the primary magnet which has led to these direct losses and is the source of the continued fraud, manipulation, malfeasance and longstanding LCN involvement which necessitated the RICO charges in the first instance in 1990.


 It is also a deprivation of the member rights to secure work through his/her own Local Union, for projects in their Local Unions Defined Geographical Jurisdiction within the Geograhpical Jurisdiction of the NYCDCC, above and before all others.

The United States Supreme Court made this point amply clear , stating: “because of this close relationship between § 14(b) and job situs, § 14(b) does not allow enforcement of right-to-work laws with regard to an employment relationship whose principal job-situs is outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 416-418.”

Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz No. 354-122, is one such individual case warranting the Constitutional questions presented by Movants, as noted within the June 1, 2011 letter to the Court. Mobility is the UBC's imposition of a RTW law in the Non-Right to Work State (one of 28 total) of New York.

The Mobility issue at bar here is one of Federal Pre-emption, as New York is not bound by Right to Work State laws which the UBC seeks to impose via fraud & artifice upon the Court.

New York is a Non-Right to Work State, and once the proviso to Section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA is adhered to, the intangible Property Right of Exclusion is thus enacted and operative. Federal pre-emption defeats the UBC International's "position" relative to its Mobility Scheme as does the Federal Constitution and the case law cited herein.

The Benefit Trust Fund reports will confirm that they have in fact violated the 67/33% Ruling by Judge Haight and that the UBCJA should be held in contempt of Court. Moreover, far past showing that the 67/33% Ruling should never have issued - the statistical analysis of the Trust Fund man-hours combined with the express requirements of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) & the Lechmere Doctrine require the Court to rule opposite of the UBCJA International & Contractor Association demands for 100% full control of all hiring and thus control of the Union. Reversion of control of the NYCDCC to contractor associations must fail as a matter of law and right as their position cannot stand upon the rule of fact or law.

In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), Justice Thomas at II A stated “Section 7 of the NLRA provides in relevant part that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations." 29 U.S.C. 157. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, in turn, makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in [502 U.S. 527, 532]   [ 7]." 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). By its plain terms, thus, the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers.”

Given the above and prong 2 of the Consent Decree, the Court in the interest of Restoring Democracy should go in the opposite direction of the UBC International & Contractor Associations and issue a ruling wherein the New York City District Council of Carpenters regains the control of its Hiring Halls and allow the District Council to assign 90% of the workers & employees and in turn - allow the Contractors to assign the remaining 10%.

This ratio more than accounts for the "Company Man", their Foreman and General Foreman and those with UBCJA Books working as Project Superintendents & provides a complement of steady company men for them.

All others (90%) should come directly from the NYCDCC's Local Union Hiring Hall as that is the very minimum of what the Act requires.

The Lechmere Doctrine clearly shows that the Act affords rights to the worker and employee only. Non-Employee Union Orgnaizers are not afforded any rights under Lechmere, accordingly - the District Court for SDNY cannot therefore award or prescribe rights to the Contractor Associations which Federal Law and the U.S. Constitution do not allow.

Ted
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

Ted
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NYCDCC EXCLUSIVE HIRING HALL per NLRB & 2nd Circuit standing decisions & orders in the Gene Clarke cases.

90% - 10% let's go, time to get it done! Where are the Reports requested? Delegates?


In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 US 164 (1979), the United States Supreme Court stated….”one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property – the right to exclude others”.

The exclusion principle thus requires that NYCDCC rank & file members LMRDA Property Rights are enforced by the Federal Court & Judge Richard Berman. The United States Attorneys Office (U.S.A.O.) and Benjamin Torrance should be taking the lead in this endeavor via enforcing the laws already on the Books, and via utilizing the 2nd Circuit as well as the Supreme Court precedent decisions on the subject.

The right to exclude others thus entails the USAO Torrance & Judge Berman involving themselves squarely in the exisiting standing order of Judge Haight, first and foremost via enforcing the exisiting 67/33% ruling of the Court and second:

Backing it up with hard-core Statistical analysis provided by the Benefit Funds & Mr. Epstein, from  May 26, 2009 Judge HAIGHT 67%-33% ruling through January 31, 2012.

Given the millions of dollars spent on Computer Hardware and Proprietary Software used by the Trust Funds, there is no reason or excuse for a Report not to be ordered and issued to Judge Berman for his review and scrutiny.

     How many man-hours were recorded by those living in one of the 5-boroughs from 2009-2012 (current day) vs. how many man-hours were recorded by those who do not live within the Geographical Jurisdiction of the NYCDCC.

The fact is, the UBC International & the DC Attorneys will refuse to produce the report because it will clearly show that they have failed to abide by Judge Haight's 2009 order, thus leading to contempt charges.
________________________________

5,000 + Good men & woman on NYC's OWL demand no less attention to detail...

Point, click & ship (to borrow a phrase from UPS) is the reason we have computers - given Doug's "sophisticated Contractor" argument. Let's go, shake a leg, time to cough it up! The DC spends millions on salaries, computer hardware & software, so it's time for the quick retrieval of information and it is time for an Executive decision.

Ted
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

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VOTE NO ON ALL MOU's & PROPOSED CONTRACTS....see above
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Preserve the Jurisdiction, Wages, Benefits, Property Rights, source of Wealth and secure Retirements for NYCDCC Dock-Builders.

VOTE NO TO AMALGAMATED! Thank you.
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

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from: The One Reason to Vote No on the Proposed Contract August 24, 2012
_________________________________
This post was updated on Dec 30, 2012; 2:13pm.

Full Mobility negates the 67% - 33% Standing Order of Judge Haight dated May 26, 2009 and it cannot be negotiated away via an alleged Contract Negotiation btwn. the D.C. & the Wall & Ceiling Contractor Association - period.

The D.C. Executives and their in house and outside counsel have failed the class on lessons learned ala Forde & Thomassen as directly related to the OWL & Referral List.

The Standing Order of a sitting Federal Judge cannot be negotiated away via a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for a new Contract. Moreover, the D.C., its Attorneys of record & Contractor Associations and their Attorneys of Record and the UBCJA International and their Attorneys of Record cannot do this without filing a formal legal motion & challenge to same and without having the current sitting Judge, Richard M. Berman issue a ruling from the bench and in writing and on the record for all to hear & see. To date, this has not been done.

This mindset, that the District Council & Contractor Associations can end run, negate, alter and amend a Federal Court Standing Order via a Restructuring Plan and/or letter writing campaign or via a CBA negotiation w/o filing the proper Motions before the Court undermines the inherent authority of the Court itself as well as that assumed under the Courts monitoring of the 1994 Consent Decree.

In the interim, there is a deafening silence on this subject matter from the United States Attorney's Office.

Every Delegate has a duty to bring this issue to light and to make the proper Motions at tomorrows meeting to table the Vote until the Wall & Ceiling and the UBCJA International (the two chief proponents) and their respective legal counsel submit this properly before Judge Berman. Without said submission's any & all votes cast are illegal!

This is a classic case of the inmates running the asylum; and, it would be akin to an inmate (Forde) and a Probation Officer negotiating a new sentence for a convicted felon among themselves w/o the direct involvement of the court. It would be like Forde taking a vote at his lunch table to reduce his sentence to time served...all those in favor say aay?

Now how far do you think he would get with a move like that? Time to use the bean....ole Douggie boy & Judge Conboy are using the new exec's to get to try & pass what they could not get over on Judge Berman. This is round 2.

It is not the purview of the U.S.A.O or R.O. to inject themselves directly into contract negotiations for any new CBA and/or insist that terms & conditions which they desire or which the UBCJA International desired but failed to achieve through their Restructuring Plan and which terms & conditions were voted down by the rank & file (Full Mobility, Magic Stewie Wand (scanners) by 2 to 1 margins on 4 of 5 Contracts) be inserted into any new contract and to then deny the members the right to read, review, discuss & debate the "entire contract & all its language" and; to ratify or reject it via a Secret Ballot  up or down vote. The USAO & RO are there to prevent & detect corruption, not to further it or to ignore the law in whole or in part.

When the standing order for the 67% - 33% OWL-Referral procedure dated May 26, 2009 is ignored by the two parties with standing (U.S.A.O. & R.O.) that were installed by the Federal Court to protect rank & file member rights; who are also members of the State Bar, and who fail to file formal submissions & briefs to the Court on this very matter; well, Houston, we got a problem.
_________________________

Where is the Motion before Judge Berman? When was it filed by the DC, or by the Wall & Ceiling Contractor Association?

What are the exact terms and conditions of said proposal?

When did Mike Bilello & the Executive Committee publish it for review? Is it available for all DC members online?

How much time shall be given by Judge Berman to both elected Delegates & Rank & File members given prior to the new vote?

Anyone who comprehends NLRB Sec. 14(b) and property rights in the labor law context as noted above will clearly see that the NYCDCC has the unequivocal right to "exclude" any/all UBC members outside of the NYCDCC, thus allowing the EST, the Executive Committee & Delegates to craft a By-Law revision which can put all of it's members, including those utilizing the Hall and the Out of Work List (OWL) to work before anyone not a member of the DC. It must of necessity be done in concert with the current standing order of Federal Judge Haight's May 26, 2009 67% - 33% ratio.

You have a property right in the entire geographical jurisdiction of the DC, chief of which is the right of exclusion as this jurisdiction which you call home is your source or element of wealth.

The only ratio that counts is the amount of yearly man-hours going to out of council, out of state carpenters and the Bilello administrations refusal to publish it.
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which decision issued February 20, 2007 made it amply clear at 9, pg. 7  “The Consent Decree is clear and unambiguous. King, 65 F. 3d. at 1058. The Consent Decree addresses CBA’s in two places: Paragraph 4(f)(1)(b) and Job Referral Rule 5(B). However, neither empowers the Union to circumvent the Consent Decree through a CBA.”

At 14, pg 8, the Court of Appeals stated “Rule 5(B) does not permit the Union to make unlimited changes to the Job Referral Rules in a CBA. This is particularly true when Job Referral Rule 5(B) is read in conjunction with Consent Decree Paragraph 11, which again, provide that “[t]o the extent that this Consent Decree conflicts with any current or future rights, privileges or rules applicable to the District Council or its membership, the District Council…hereby waives compliance with any such right, privilege or rule an agrees that it and its membership will act in accordance with this Consent Decree.”

At 21, pg. 8, the Court of Appeals stated “Paragraph 11 further requires the Union to make the Job Referral Rules part of the District Council By-Laws.”
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Ted
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Chief Justice Roberts got this one right & did so in direct contravention to Justice Stevens abortive ruling in Kelo v. the City of New London Connecticut, which ironically issued 10-years ago on June 23, 2005.

Now Kelo must be overturned by stare decisis as it ignores the basic tenets of the U.S. Constitution relative to private property rights; albeit, not some of them, but all of them. In Kelo, big-Pharma/Corporate America greased & lined everyone's pockets (as evinced by the intense participation in the case & the many amici-curie or friend of the court briefs submitted) to effect the illegal taking of private property (beach-front homes) & turned it over to privately held corporations via a false claim that private corporations held the same Police Power as the state or the federal government. They do not. Neither does a privately held non-profit corporation such as the UBCJA, greasing politicans, federal attorneys & judges aside.

The UBCJA International cannot claim a Police Power as a sovereign specifically reserved to the state or federal government to effect a regulatory taking of personal property rights via a private contract bewteen the UBCJA International and the United States Attorneys Office via a court imposed Consent Decree and private contract as it, and its ultimate end - elimination of the right of exclusion by the locals & district council as that action effects a per se taking.

_____________________________

Oral Argument Audio & Transcript:

http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2014/14-275



(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
HORNE ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 14–275. Argued April 22, 2015—Decided June 22, 2015


The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate “marketing orders” to help maintain stable markets for particular agricultural products. The marketing order for raisins established a Raisin Administrative Committeethat imposes a reserve requirement—a requirement that growers setaside a certain percentage of their crop for the account of the Government, free of charge. The Government makes use of those raisins by selling them in noncompetitive markets, donating them, or disposing of them by any means consistent with the purposes of the program. If any profits are left over after subtracting the Government’s expenses from administering the program, the net proceeds are distributed back to the raisin growers. In 2002–2003, raisin growerswere required to set aside 47 percent of their raisin crop under the reserve requirement. In 2003–2004, 30 percent. Marvin Horne, Laura Horne, and their family are raisin growers who refused to set aside any raisins for the Government on the ground that the reserverequirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property for public use without just compensation. The Government fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins as well as additional civil penalties for their failure to obey the raisin marketing order. The Hornes sought relief in federal court, arguing that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property underthe Fifth Amendment. On remand from this Court over the issue of jurisdiction, Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 569 U. S. ___, the Ninth Circuit held that the reserve requirement was not a FifthAmendment taking. The court determined that the requirement was not a per se taking because personal property is afforded less protection under the Takings Clause than real property and because the


2 HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Syllabus

Hornes, who retained an interest in any net proceeds, were not completely divested of their property. The Ninth Circuit held that, as in cases allowing the government to set conditions on land use and development, the Government imposed a condition (the reserve requirement) in exchange for a Government benefit (an orderly raisin market). It held that the Hornes could avoid relinquishing large percentages of their crop by “planting different crops.” 730 F. 3d 1128, 1143.

Held: The Fifth Amendment requires that the Government pay justcompensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real property. Any net proceeds the raisin growers receive from thesale of the reserve raisins goes to the amount of compensation theyhave received for that taking—it does not mean the raisins have notbeen appropriated for Government use. Nor can the Government make raisin growers relinquish their property without just compensation as a condition of selling their raisins in interstate commerce.Pp. 4–18.

(a)
The Fifth Amendment applies to personal property as well as real property. The Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes yourhome. Pp. 4–9.

(1)
This principle, dating back as far as Magna Carta, was codified in the Takings Clause in part because of property appropriations by both sides during the Revolutionary War. This Court has noted that an owner of personal property may expect that new regulation of the use of property could “render his property economically worthless.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1027–1028. But there is still a “longstanding distinction” betweenregulations concerning the use of property and government acquisition of property. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 323. When it comes to physical appropriations, people do not expect their property, real or personal, to be actually occupied or taken away. Pp. 4–8.

(2)
The reserve requirement imposed by the Raisin Committee isa clear physical taking. Actual raisins are transferred from the growers to the Government. Title to the raisins passes to the Raisin Committee. The Committee disposes of those raisins as it wishes, topromote the purposes of the raisin marketing order. The Government’s formal demand that the Hornes turn over a percentage oftheir raisin crop without charge, for the Government’s control anduse, is “of such a unique character that it is a taking without regardto other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 432. Pp. 8–9.

(b) The fact that the growers are entitled to the net proceeds of the
Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

Syllabus

raisin sales does not mean that there has been no taking at all.When there has been a physical appropriation, “we do not ask . . . whether it deprives the owner of all economically valuable use” of theitem taken. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U. S., at 323. The fact that the growers retain a contingent interest of indeterminate value does not mean there has been no taking, particularly when that interest depends on the discretion of the taker, and may beworthless, as it was for one of the two years at issue here. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, distinguished. Once there is a taking, as in the case of a physical appropriation, any payment from the Government in connection with that action goes, at most, to the question of just compensation. Pp. 9–12.

(c)
The taking in this case also cannot be characterized as part of avoluntary exchange for a valuable government benefit. In one of the years at issue, the Government insisted that the Hornes part with 47 percent of their crop for the privilege of selling the rest. But the ability to sell produce in interstate commerce, although certainly subjectto reasonable government regulation, is not a “benefit” that the Government may withhold unless growers waive constitutional protections. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, distinguished. Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 279 U. S. 392, distinguished. Pp. 12–14.

(d)
The Hornes are not required to first pay the fine and then seekcompensation under the Tucker Act. See Horne, 569 U. S., at ___. Because they have the full economic interest in the raisins the Government alleges should have been set aside for its account—i.e., theyown the raisins they grew as well as the raisins they handled, havingpaid the growers for all of their raisins, not just their free-tonnageraisins—they may raise a takings-based defense to the fine leviedagainst them. There is no need for the Ninth Circuit to calculate the just compensation due on remand. The clear and administrable rule is that “just compensation normally is to be measured by ‘the market value of the property at the time of the taking.’ ” United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U. S. 24, 29. Here, the Government already calculated that amount when it fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins. Pp. 14–18.
750 F. 3d 1128, reversed.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Ted
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

Ted
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The Docket & Case History & special interest involved in this rape of the U.S. Constitution & private Property Rights.

http://supreme.findlaw.com/supreme_court/docket/2004/february.html

__________________________


SUSETTE KELO, et al., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF
NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT, et al.
 


on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of connecticut
 

[June 23, 2005]
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
 


     In 2000, the city of New London approved a development plan that, in the words of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, was "projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas." 268 Conn. 1, 5, 843 A. 2d 500, 507 (2004). In assembling the land needed for this project, the city's development agent has purchased property from willing sellers and proposes to use the power of eminent domain to acquire the remainder of the property from unwilling owners in exchange for just compensation. The question presented is whether the city's proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a "public use" within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.1
 

I
 
     The city of New London (hereinafter City) sits at the junction of the Thames River and the Long Island Sound in southeastern Connecticut. Decades of economic decline led a state agency in 1990 to designate the City a "distressed municipality." In 1996, the Federal Government closed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had been located in the Fort Trumbull area of the City and had employed over 1,500 people. In 1998, the City's unemployment rate was nearly double that of the State, and its population of just under 24,000 residents was at its lowest since 1920.
 
     These conditions prompted state and local officials to target New London, and particularly its Fort Trumbull area, for economic revitalization. To this end, respondent New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity established some years earlier to assist the City in planning economic development, was reactivated. In January 1998, the State authorized a $5.35 million bond issue to support the NLDC's planning activities and a $10 million bond issue toward the creation of a Fort Trumbull State Park. In February, the pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc. announced that it would build a $300 million research facility on a site immediately adjacent to Fort Trumbull; local planners hoped that Pfizer would draw new business to the area, thereby serving as a catalyst to the area's rejuvenation. After receiving initial approval from the city council, the NLDC continued its planning activities and held a series of neighborhood meetings to educate the public about the process. In May, the city council authorized the NLDC to formally submit its plans to the relevant state agencies for review.2 Upon obtaining state-level approval, the NLDC finalized an integrated development plan focused on 90 acres of the Fort Trumbull area.
 
     The Fort Trumbull area is situated on a peninsula that juts into the Thames River. The area comprises approximately 115 privately owned properties, as well as the 32 acres of land formerly occupied by the naval facility (Trumbull State Park now occupies 18 of those 32 acres). The development plan encompasses seven parcels. Parcel 1 is designated for a waterfront conference hotel at the center of a "small urban village" that will include restaurants and shopping. This parcel will also have marinas for both recreational and commercial uses. A pedestrian "riverwalk" will originate here and continue down the coast, connecting the waterfront areas of the development. Parcel 2 will be the site of approximately 80 new residences organized into an urban neighborhood and linked by public walkway to the remainder of the development, including the state park. This parcel also includes space reserved for a new U. S. Coast Guard Museum. Parcel 3, which is located immediately north of the Pfizer facility, will contain at least 90,000 square feet of research and development office space. Parcel 4A is a 2.4-acre site that will be used either to support the adjacent state park, by providing parking or retail services for visitors, or to support the nearby marina. Parcel 4B will include a renovated marina, as well as the final stretch of the riverwalk. Parcels 5, 6, and 7 will provide land for office and retail space, parking, and water-dependent commercial uses. 1 App. 109-113.
 
     The NLDC intended the development plan to capitalize on the arrival of the Pfizer facility and the new commerce it was expected to attract. In addition to creating jobs, generating tax revenue, and helping to "build momentum for the revitalization of downtown New London," id., at 92, the plan was also designed to make the City more attractive and to create leisure and recreational opportunities on the waterfront and in the park.
 
     The city council approved the plan in January 2000, and designated the NLDC as its development agent in charge of implementation. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-188 (2005). The city council also authorized the NLDC to purchase property or to acquire property by exercising eminent domain in the City's name. §8-193. The NLDC successfully negotiated the purchase of most of the real estate in the 90-acre area, but its negotiations with petitioners failed. As a consequence, in November 2000, the NLDC initiated the condemnation proceedings that gave rise to this case.3
 

II
 
     Petitioner Susette Kelo has lived in the Fort Trumbull area since 1997. She has made extensive improvements to her house, which she prizes for its water view. Petitioner Wilhelmina Dery was born in her Fort Trumbull house in 1918 and has lived there her entire life. Her husband Charles (also a petitioner) has lived in the house since they married some 60 years ago. In all, the nine petitioners own 15 properties in Fort Trumbull--4 in parcel 3 of the development plan and 11 in parcel 4A. Ten of the parcels are occupied by the owner or a family member; the other five are held as investment properties. There is no allegation that any of these properties is blighted or otherwise in poor condition; rather, they were condemned only because they happen to be located in the development area.
 
     In December 2000, petitioners brought this action in the New London Superior Court. They claimed, among other things, that the taking of their properties would violate the "public use" restriction in the Fifth Amendment. After a 7-day bench trial, the Superior Court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of the properties located in parcel 4A (park or marina support). It, however, denied petitioners relief as to the properties located in parcel 3 (office space). 2 App. to Pet. for Cert. 343-350.4
 
     After the Superior Court ruled, both sides took appeals to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. That court held, over a dissent, that all of the City's proposed takings were valid. It began by upholding the lower court's determination that the takings were authorized by chapter 132, the State's municipal development statute. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-186 et seq. (2005). That statute expresses a legislative determination that the taking of land, even developed land, as part of an economic development project is a "public use" and in the "public interest." 268 Conn., at 18-28, 843 A. 2d, at 515-521. Next, relying on cases such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229 (1984), and Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954), the court held that such economic development qualified as a valid public use under both the Federal and State Constitutions. 268 Conn., at 40, 843 A. 2d, at 527.
 
     Finally, adhering to its precedents, the court went on to determine, first, whether the takings of the particular properties at issue were "reasonably necessary" to achieving the City's intended public use, id., at 82, 843 A. 2d, at 552-553, and, second, whether the takings were for "reasonably foreseeable needs," id., at 93, 843 A. 2d, at 558-559. The court upheld the trial court's factual findings as to parcel 3, but reversed the trial court as to parcel 4A, agreeing with the City that the intended use of this land was sufficiently definite and had been given "reasonable attention" during the planning process. Id., at 120-121, 843 A. 2d, at 574.
 
     The three dissenting justices would have imposed a "heightened" standard of judicial review for takings justified by economic development. Although they agreed that the plan was intended to serve a valid public use, they would have found all the takings unconstitutional because the City had failed to adduce "clear and convincing evidence" that the economic benefits of the plan would in fact come to pass. Id., at 144, 146, 843 A. 2d, at 587, 588 (Zarella, J., joined by Sullivan, C. J., and Katz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 
     We granted certiorari to determine whether a city's decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 542 U. S. ___ (2004).
 

III
 
     Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future "use by the public" is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example. Neither of these propositions, however, determines the disposition of this case.
 
     As for the first proposition, the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners' land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party. See Midkiff, 164 U. S. 403 (1896).5 Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit. The takings before us, however, would be executed pursuant to a "carefully considered" development plan. 268 Conn., at 54, 843 A. 2d, at 536. The trial judge and all the members of the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed that there was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose in this case.6 Therefore, as was true of the statute challenged in Midkiff, 467 U. S., at 245, the City's development plan was not adopted "to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals."
 
     On the other hand, this is not a case in which the City is planning to open the condemned land--at least not in its entirety--to use by the general public. Nor will the private lessees of the land in any sense be required to operate like common carriers, making their services available to all comers. But although such a projected use would be sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement, this "Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public." Id., at 244. Indeed, while many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed "use by the public" as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the "use by the public" test difficult to administer (e.g., what proportion of the public need have access to the property? at what price?),7 but it proved to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society.8 Accordingly, when this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as "public purpose." See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 158-164 (1896). Thus, in a case upholding a mining company's use of an aerial bucket line to transport ore over property it did not own, Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court stressed "the inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test." Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 531 (1906).9 We have repeatedly and consistently rejected that narrow test ever since.10
 
     The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City's development plan serves a "public purpose." Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.
 
     In Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954), this Court upheld a redevelopment plan targeting a blighted area of Washington, D. C., in which most of the housing for the area's 5,000 inhabitants was beyond repair. Under the plan, the area would be condemned and part of it utilized for the construction of streets, schools, and other public facilities. The remainder of the land would be leased or sold to private parties for the purpose of redevelopment, including the construction of low-cost housing.
 
     The owner of a department store located in the area challenged the condemnation, pointing out that his store was not itself blighted and arguing that the creation of a "better balanced, more attractive community" was not a valid public use. Id., at 31. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas refused to evaluate this claim in isolation, deferring instead to the legislative and agency judgment that the area "must be planned as a whole" for the plan to be successful. Id., at 34. The Court explained that "community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis--lot by lot, building by building." Id., at 35. The public use underlying the taking was unequivocally affirmed:
 

"We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive... . The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way." Id., at 33.
 
     In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229 (1984), the Court considered a Hawaii statute whereby fee title was taken from lessors and transferred to lessees (for just compensation) in order to reduce the concentration of land ownership. We unanimously upheld the statute and rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that it was "a naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take the property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and benefit." Id., at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). Reaffirming Berman's deferential approach to legislative judgments in this field, we concluded that the State's purpose of eliminating the "social and economic evils of a land oligopoly" qualified as a valid public use. 467 U. S., at 241-242. Our opinion also rejected the contention that the mere fact that the State immediately transferred the properties to private individuals upon condemnation somehow diminished the public character of the taking. "[I]t is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics," we explained, that matters in determining public use. Id., at 244.
 
     In that same Term we decided another public use case that arose in a purely economic context. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984), the Court dealt with provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act under which the Environmental Protection Agency could consider the data (including trade secrets) submitted by a prior pesticide applicant in evaluating a subsequent application, so long as the second applicant paid just compensation for the data. We acknowledged that the "most direct beneficiaries" of these provisions were the subsequent applicants, id., at 1014, but we nevertheless upheld the statute under Berman and Midkiff. We found sufficient Congress' belief that sparing applicants the cost of time-consuming research eliminated a significant barrier to entry in the pesticide market and thereby enhanced competition. 467 U. S., at 1015.
 
     Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized that the needs of society have varied between different parts of the Nation, just as they have evolved over time in response to changed circumstances. Our earliest cases in particular embodied a strong theme of federalism, emphasizing the "great respect" that we owe to state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public needs. See Hairston v. Danville & Western R. Co., 208 U. S. 598, 606-607 (1908) (noting that these needs were likely to vary depending on a State's "resources, the capacity of the soil, the relative importance of industries to the general public welfare, and the long-established methods and habits of the people").11 For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.
 

IV
 
     Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference. The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including--but by no means limited to--new jobs and increased tax revenue. As with other exercises in urban planning and development,12 the City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses of land, with the hope that they will form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. To effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state statute that specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic development. Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
 
     To avoid this result, petitioners urge us to adopt a new bright-line rule that economic development does not qualify as a public use. Putting aside the unpersuasive suggestion that the City's plan will provide only purely economic benefits, neither precedent nor logic supports petitioners' proposal. Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government. There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that we have recognized. In our cases upholding takings that facilitated agriculture and mining, for example, we emphasized the importance of those industries to the welfare of the States in question, see, e.g., Strickley, 200 U. S. 527; in Berman, we endorsed the purpose of transforming a blighted area into a "well-balanced" community through redevelopment, 348 U. S., at 33;13 in Midkiff, we upheld the interest in breaking up a land oligopoly that "created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the State's residential land market," 467 U. S., at 242; and in Monsanto, we accepted Congress' purpose of eliminating a "significant barrier to entry in the pesticide market," 467 U. S., at 1014-1015. It would be incongruous to hold that the City's interest in the economic benefits to be derived from the development of the Fort Trumbull area has less of a public character than any of those other interests. Clearly, there is no basis for exempting economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.
 
     Petitioners contend that using eminent domain for economic development impermissibly blurs the boundary between public and private takings. Again, our cases foreclose this objection. Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties. For example, in Midkiff, the forced transfer of property conferred a direct and significant benefit on those lessees who were previously unable to purchase their homes. In Monsanto, we recognized that the "most direct beneficiaries" of the data-sharing provisions were the subsequent pesticide applicants, but benefiting them in this way was necessary to promoting competition in the pesticide market. 467 U. S., at 1014.14 The owner of the department store in Berman objected to "taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman," 348 U. S., at 33, referring to the fact that under the redevelopment plan land would be leased or sold to private developers for redevelopment.15 Our rejection of that contention has particular relevance to the instant case: "The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government--or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects." Id., at 34.16
 
     It is further argued that without a bright-line rule nothing would stop a city from transferring citizen A's property to citizen B for the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use and thus pay more taxes. Such a one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, is not presented in this case. While such an unusual exercise of government power would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot,17 the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can be confronted if and when they arise.18 They do not warrant the crafting of an artificial restriction on the concept of public use.19
 
     Alternatively, petitioners maintain that for takings of this kind we should require a "reasonable certainty" that the expected public benefits will actually accrue. Such a rule, however, would represent an even greater departure from our precedent. "When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings--no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation--are not to be carried out in the federal courts." Midkiff, 467 U. S., at 242.20 Indeed, earlier this Term we explained why similar practical concerns (among others) undermined the use of the "substantially advances" formula in our regulatory takings doctrine. See Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 14-15) (noting that this formula "would empower--and might often require--courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies"). The disadvantages of a heightened form of review are especially pronounced in this type of case. Orderly implementation of a comprehensive redevelopment plan obviously requires that the legal rights of all interested parties be established before new construction can be commenced. A constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had been assured would unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful consummation of many such plans.
 
     Just as we decline to second-guess the City's considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we also decline to second-guess the City's determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project. "It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch." Berman, 348 U. S., at 35-36.
 
     In affirming the City's authority to take petitioners' properties, we do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of just compensation.21 We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose "public use" requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional law,22 while others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may be exercised.23 As the submissions of the parties and their amici make clear, the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote economic development are certainly matters of legitimate public debate.24 This Court's authority, however, extends only to determining whether the City's proposed condemnations are for a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Because over a century of our case law interpreting that provision dictates an affirmative answer to that question, we may not grant petitioners the relief that they seek.

     The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is affirmed.
 
It is so ordered.
Ted
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

Ted
This post was updated on .
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas.

For those who really wish to take back control of their Union from the corrupt few, you must as a base precept comprehend Property rights as related to United States Constitution; the outline on Mobility above & the Right of Exclusion as well as Kelo (both majority & dissenting opinions) & as relative in HORNE ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 14–275. Argued April 22, 2015—Decided June 22, 2015
 decided last week.

Said cases must then be understood in terms of what McCarron and his puppet masters in California conjured up via forum shopping the UBCJA for a willing EST & a liberal/idiotic Appellate Court to negate your personal property rights & the NLRA, both of which are criminal and actionable in a competent court of law (as opposed to the SDNY).

Given McCarron & his co-conspirators forum shopped the nation to avoid the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in their own back-yard and to wit, to keep a certain Senator out of the equation & press (one put into office by labor), they thus chose the First Circuit Court of Appeals and greased the pockets here to effect another abortive ruling via Harrington v. Chao. Chao must also be undertood via its lone dissenting opinion (the one who could not be bought & paid) and in context with the framework of all of the above precedents by th eU.S. Supreme Court noting that it has only been bought & paid for (decided) in one Circuit Court of Appeals & is thus not yet ripe for adjudication at that level.

__________________

SUSETTE KELO, et al., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF
NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT, et al.
 


on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of connecticut
 

[June 23, 2005]
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Justice Thomas, dissenting.

 
     Long ago, William Blackstone wrote that "the law of the land ... postpone[s] even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable rights of private property." 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 134-135 (1765) (hereinafter Blackstone). The Framers embodied that principle in the Constitution, allowing the government to take property not for "public necessity," but instead for "public use." Amdt. 5. Defying this understanding, the Court replaces the Public Use Clause with a " '[P]ublic [P]urpose' " Clause, ante, at 9-10 (or perhaps the "Diverse and Always Evolving Needs of Society" Clause, ante, at 8 (capitalization added)), a restriction that is satisfied, the Court instructs, so long as the purpose is "legitimate" and the means "not irrational," ante, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). This deferential shift in phraseology enables the Court to hold, against all common sense, that a costly urban-renewal project whose stated purpose is a vague promise of new jobs and increased tax revenue, but which is also suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation, is for a "public use."
 
     I cannot agree. If such "economic development" takings are for a "public use," any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution, as Justice O'Connor powerfully argues in dissent. Ante, at 1-2, 8-13. I do not believe that this Court can eliminate liberties expressly enumerated in the Constitution and therefore join her dissenting opinion. Regrettably, however, the Court's error runs deeper than this. Today's decision is simply the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original meaning. In my view, the Public Use Clause, originally understood, is a meaningful limit on the government's eminent domain power. Our cases have strayed from the Clause's original meaning, and I would reconsider them.
 

I
 
     The Fifth Amendment provides:
 

"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process, of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." (Emphasis added.)
 
It is the last of these liberties, the Takings Clause, that is at issue in this case. In my view, it is "imperative that the Court maintain absolute fidelity to" the Clause's express limit on the power of the government over the individual, no less than with every other liberty expressly enumerated in the Fifth Amendment or the Bill of Rights more generally. Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 2) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 
     Though one component of the protection provided by the Takings Clause is that the government can take private property only if it provides "just compensation" for the taking, the Takings Clause also prohibits the government from taking property except "for public use." Were it otherwise, the Takings Clause would either be meaningless or empty. If the Public Use Clause served no function other than to state that the government may take property through its eminent domain power--for public or private uses--then it would be surplusage. See ante, at 3-4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect"); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 151 (1926). Alternatively, the Clause could distinguish those takings that require compensation from those that do not. That interpretation, however, "would permit private property to be taken or appropriated for private use without any compensation whatever." Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1, 8 (1885) (interpreting same language in the Missouri Public Use Clause). In other words, the Clause would require the government to compensate for takings done "for public use," leaving it free to take property for purely private uses without the payment of compensation. This would contradict a bedrock principle well established by the time of the founding: that all takings required the payment of compensation. 1 Blackstone 135; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 275 (1827) (hereinafter Kent); J. Madison, for the National Property Gazette, (Mar. 27, 1792), in 14 Papers of James Madison 266, 267 (R. Rutland et al. eds. 1983) (arguing that no property "shall be taken directly even for public use without indemnification to the owner").1 The Public Use Clause, like the Just Compensation Clause, is therefore an express limit on the government's power of eminent domain.
 
     The most natural reading of the Clause is that it allows the government to take property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity whatsoever. At the time of the founding, dictionaries primarily defined the noun "use" as "[t]he act of employing any thing to any purpose." 2 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 2194 (4th ed. 1773) (hereinafter Johnson). The term "use," moreover, "is from the Latin utor, which means 'to use, make use of, avail one's self of, employ, apply, enjoy, etc." J. Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain §165, p. 224, n. 4 (1888) (hereinafter Lewis). When the government takes property and gives it to a private individual, and the public has no right to use the property, it strains language to say that the public is "employing" the property, regardless of the incidental benefits that might accrue to the public from the private use. The term "public use," then, means that either the government or its citizens as a whole must actually "employ" the taken property. See id., at 223 (reviewing founding-era dictionaries).
 
     Granted, another sense of the word "use" was broader in meaning, extending to "[c]onvenience" or "help," or "[q]ualities that make a thing proper for any purpose." 2 Johnson 2194. Nevertheless, read in context, the term "public use" possesses the narrower meaning. Elsewhere, the Constitution twice employs the word "use," both times in its narrower sense. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 877, 897 (hereinafter Public Use Limitations). Article 1, §10 provides that "the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States," meaning the Treasury itself will control the taxes, not use it to any beneficial end. And Article I, §8 grants Congress power "[t]o raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." Here again, "use" means "employed to raise and support Armies," not anything directed to achieving any military end. The same word in the Public Use Clause should be interpreted to have the same meaning.
 
     Tellingly, the phrase "public use" contrasts with the very different phrase "general Welfare" used elsewhere in the Constitution. See ibid. ("Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"); preamble (Constitution established "to promote the general Welfare"). The Framers would have used some such broader term if they had meant the Public Use Clause to have a similarly sweeping scope. Other founding-era documents made the contrast between these two usages still more explicit. See Sales, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment's "Public Use" Requirement, 49 Duke L. J. 339, 368 (2000) (hereinafter Sales) (noting contrast between, on the one hand, the term "public use" used by 6 of the first 13 States and, on the other, the terms "public exigencies" employed in the Massachusetts Bill of Rights and the Northwest Ordinance, and the term "public necessity" used in the Vermont Constitution of 1786). The Constitution's text, in short, suggests that the Takings Clause authorizes the taking of property only if the public has a right to employ it, not if the public realizes any conceivable benefit from the taking.
 
     The Constitution's common-law background reinforces this understanding. The common law provided an express method of eliminating uses of land that adversely impacted the public welfare: nuisance law. Blackstone and Kent, for instance, both carefully distinguished the law of nuisance from the power of eminent domain. Compare 1 Blackstone 135 (noting government's power to take private property with compensation), with 3 id., at 216 (noting action to remedy "public ...nuisances, which affect the public and are an annoyance to all the king's subjects"); see also 2 Kent 274-276 (distinguishing the two). Blackstone rejected the idea that private property could be taken solely for purposes of any public benefit. "So great ... is the regard of the law for private property," he explained, "that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community." 1 Blackstone 135. He continued: "If a new road ... were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without the consent of the owner of the land." Ibid. Only "by giving [the landowner] full indemnification" could the government take property, and even then "[t]he public [was] now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange." Ibid. When the public took property, in other words, it took it as an individual buying property from another typically would: for one's own use. The Public Use Clause, in short, embodied the Framers' understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right, prohibiting the government from "tak[ing] property from A. and giv[ing] it to B." Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798); see also Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 658 (1829); Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 311 (CC Pa. 1795).
 
     The public purpose interpretation of the Public Use Clause also unnecessarily duplicates a similar inquiry required by the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Takings Clause is a prohibition, not a grant of power: The Constitution does not expressly grant the Federal Government the power to take property for any public purpose whatsoever. Instead, the Government may take property only when necessary and proper to the exercise of an expressly enumerated power. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 371-372 (1876) (noting Federal Government's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to take property "needed for forts, armories, and arsenals, for navy-yards and light-houses, for custom-houses, post-offices, and court-houses, and for other public uses"). For a law to be within the Necessary and Proper Clause, as I have elsewhere explained, it must bear an "obvious, simple, and direct relation" to an exercise of Congress' enumerated powers, Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600, 613 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment), and it must not "subvert basic principles of" constitutional design, Gonzales v. Raich, ante, at __ (Thomas, J., dissenting). In other words, a taking is permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause only if it serves a valid public purpose. Interpreting the Public Use Clause likewise to limit the government to take property only for sufficiently public purposes replicates this inquiry. If this is all the Clause means, it is, once again, surplusage. See supra, at 3. The Clause is thus most naturally read to concern whether the property is used by the public or the government, not whether the purpose of the taking is legitimately public.
 

II
 
     Early American eminent domain practice largely bears out this understanding of the Public Use Clause. This practice concerns state limits on eminent domain power, not the Fifth Amendment, since it was not until the late 19th century that the Federal Government began to use the power of eminent domain, and since the Takings Clause did not even arguably limit state power until after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 Yale L. J. 599, 599-600, and nn. 3-4 (1949); Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 250-251 (1833) (holding the Takings Clause inapplicable to the States of its own force). Nevertheless, several early state constitutions at the time of the founding likewise limited the power of eminent domain to "public uses." See Sales 367-369, and n. 137 (emphasis deleted). Their practices therefore shed light on the original meaning of the same words contained in the Public Use Clause.
 
     States employed the eminent domain power to provide quintessentially public goods, such as public roads, toll roads, ferries, canals, railroads, and public parks. Lewis §§166, 168-171, 175, at 227-228, 234-241, 243. Though use of the eminent domain power was sparse at the time of the founding, many States did have so-called Mill Acts, which authorized the owners of grist mills operated by water power to flood upstream lands with the payment of compensation to the upstream landowner. See, e.g., id., §178, at 245-246; Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 9, 16-19, and n. (1885). Those early grist mills "were regulated by law and compelled to serve the public for a stipulated toll and in regular order," and therefore were actually used by the public. Lewis §178, at 246, and n. 3; see also Head, supra, at 18-19. They were common carriers--quasi-public entities. These were "public uses" in the fullest sense of the word, because the public could legally use and benefit from them equally. See Public Use Limitations 903 (common-carrier status traditionally afforded to "private beneficiaries of a state franchise or another form of state monopoly, or to companies that operated in conditions of natural monopoly").
 
     To be sure, some early state legislatures tested the limits of their state-law eminent domain power. Some States enacted statutes allowing the taking of property for the purpose of building private roads. See Lewis §167, at 230. These statutes were mixed; some required the private landowner to keep the road open to the public, and others did not. See id., §167, at 230-234. Later in the 19th century, moreover, the Mill Acts were employed to grant rights to private manufacturing plants, in addition to grist mills that had common-carrier duties. See, e.g., M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860, pp. 51-52 (1977).
 
     These early uses of the eminent domain power are often cited as evidence for the broad "public purpose" interpretation of the Public Use Clause, see, e.g., ante, at 8, n. 8 (majority opinion); Brief for Respondents 30; Brief for American Planning Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae at 6-7, but in fact the constitutionality of these exercises of eminent domain power under state public use restrictions was a hotly contested question in state courts throughout the 19th and into the 20th century. Some courts construed those clauses to authorize takings for public purposes, but others adhered to the natural meaning of "public use."2 As noted above, the earliest Mill Acts were applied to entities with duties to remain open to the public, and their later extension is not deeply probative of whether that subsequent practice is consistent with the original meaning of the Public Use Clause. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334, 370 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). At the time of the founding, "[b]usiness corporations were only beginning to upset the old corporate model, in which the raison d'ętre of chartered associations was their service to the public," Horwitz, supra, at 49-50, so it was natural to those who framed the first Public Use Clauses to think of mills as inherently public entities. The disagreement among state courts, and state legislatures' attempts to circumvent public use limits on their eminent domain power, cannot obscure that the Public Use Clause is most naturally read to authorize takings for public use only if the government or the public actually uses the taken property.
 

III
 
     Our current Public Use Clause jurisprudence, as the Court notes, has rejected this natural reading of the Clause. Ante, at 8-10. The Court adopted its modern reading blindly, with little discussion of the Clause's history and original meaning, in two distinct lines of cases: first, in cases adopting the "public purpose" interpretation of the Clause, and second, in cases deferring to legislatures' judgments regarding what constitutes a valid public purpose. Those questionable cases converged in the boundlessly broad and deferential conception of "public use" adopted by this Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954), and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229 (1984), cases that take center stage in the Court's opinion. See ante, 10-12. The weakness of those two lines of cases, and consequently Berman and Midkiff, fatally undermines the doctrinal foundations of the Court's decision. Today's questionable application of these cases is further proof that the "public purpose" standard is not susceptible of principled application. This Court's reliance by rote on this standard is ill advised and should be reconsidered.
 

A
 
     As the Court notes, the "public purpose" interpretation of the Public Use Clause stems from Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 161-162 (1896). Ante, at 11. The issue in Bradley was whether a condemnation for purposes of constructing an irrigation ditch was for a public use. 198 U. S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); but see id., at 58-62 (Peckham, J., for the Court).
 
     This Court's cases followed Bradley's test with little analysis. In Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (1905) (Peckham, J., for the Court), this Court relied on little more than a citation to Bradley in upholding another condemnation for the purpose of laying an irrigation ditch. 200 U. S. 527 (1906), the Court upheld a condemnation establishing an aerial right-of-way for a bucket line operated by a mining company, relying on little more than Clark, see Strickley, supra, at 531. This case, too, could have been disposed of on the narrower ground that "the plaintiff [was] a carrier for itself and others," 262 U. S. 700, 707 (1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155 (1921); Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U. S. 30, 32 (1916); O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U. S. 244, 253 (1915).
 

B
 
     A second line of this Court's cases also deviated from the Public Use Clause's original meaning by allowing legislatures to define the scope of valid "public uses." United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896), involved the question whether Congress' decision to condemn certain private land for the purpose of building battlefield memorials at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, was for a public use. Id., at 679-680. Since the Federal Government was to use the lands in question, id., at 682, there is no doubt that it was a public use under any reasonable standard. Nonetheless, the Court, speaking through Justice Peckham, declared that "when the legislature has declared the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be respected by the courts, unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation." Id., at 680. As it had with the "public purpose" dictum in Bradley, supra, the Court quickly incorporated this dictum into its Public Use Clause cases with little discussion. See, e.g., United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U. S. 546, 552 (1946); Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 55, 66 (1925).
 
     There is no justification, however, for affording almost insurmountable deference to legislative conclusions that a use serves a "public use." To begin with, a court owes no deference to a legislature's judgment concerning the quintessentially legal question of whether the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the taken property. Even under the "public purpose" interpretation, moreover, it is most implausible that the Framers intended to defer to legislatures as to what satisfies the Public Use Clause, uniquely among all the express provisions of the Bill of Rights. We would not defer to a legislature's determination of the various circumstances that establish, for example, when a search of a home would be reasonable, see, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 589-590 (1980), or when a convicted double-murderer may be shackled during a sentencing proceeding without on-the-record findings, see Deck v. Missouri, 544 U. S. ___ (2005), or when state law creates a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, see, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, post, at __; Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 576 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262-263 (1970).
 
     Still worse, it is backwards to adopt a searching standard of constitutional review for nontraditional property interests, such as welfare benefits, see, e.g., Goldberg, supra, while deferring to the legislature's determination as to what constitutes a public use when it exercises the power of eminent domain, and thereby invades individuals' traditional rights in real property. The Court has elsewhere recognized "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic," Payton, supra, at 601, when the issue is only whether the government may search a home. Yet today the Court tells us that we are not to "second-guess the City's considered judgments," ante, at 18, when the issue is, instead, whether the government may take the infinitely more intrusive step of tearing down petitioners' homes. Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are not. Once one accepts, as the Court at least nominally does, ante, at 6, that the Public Use Clause is a limit on the eminent domain power of the Federal Government and the States, there is no justification for the almost complete deference it grants to legislatures as to what satisfies it.
 

C
 
     These two misguided lines of precedent converged in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954), and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229 (1984). Relying on those lines of cases, the Court in Berman and Midkiff upheld condemnations for the purposes of slum clearance and land redistribution, respectively. "Subject to specific constitutional limitations," Berman proclaimed, "when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation." 348 U. S., at 32. That reasoning was question begging, since the question to be decided was whether the "specific constitutional limitation" of the Public Use Clause prevented the taking of the appellant's (concededly "nonblighted") department store. Id., at 31, 34. Berman also appeared to reason that any exercise by Congress of an enumerated power (in this case, its plenary power over the District of Columbia) was per se a "public use" under the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 33. But the very point of the Public Use Clause is to limit that power. See supra, at 3-4.
 
     More fundamentally, Berman and Midkiff erred by equating the eminent domain power with the police power of States. See Midkiff, 123 U. S. 623, 668-669 (1887), in sharp contrast to the takings power, which has always required compensation, see supra, at 3, and n. 1. The question whether the State can take property using the power of eminent domain is therefore distinct from the question whether it can regulate property pursuant to the police power. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1014 (1992); Mugler, supra, at 668-669. In Berman, for example, if the slums at issue were truly "blighted," then state nuisance law, see, e.g., supra, at 5-6; Lucas, supra, at 1029, not the power of eminent domain, would provide the appropriate remedy. To construe the Public Use Clause to overlap with the States' police power conflates these two categories.3
 
     The "public purpose" test applied by Berman and Midkiff also cannot be applied in principled manner. "When we depart from the natural import of the term 'public use,' and substitute for the simple idea of a public possession and occupation, that of public utility, public interest, common benefit, general advantage or convenience ... we are afloat without any certain principle to guide us." Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 60-61 (NY 1837) (opinion of Tracy, Sen.). Once one permits takings for public purposes in addition to public uses, no coherent principle limits what could constitute a valid public use-at least, none beyond Justice O'Connor's (entirely proper) appeal to the text of the Constitution itself. See ante, at 1-2, 8-13 (dissenting opinion). I share the Court's skepticism about a public use standard that requires courts to second-guess the policy wisdom of public works projects. Ante, at 16-19. The "public purpose" standard this Court has adopted, however, demands the use of such judgment, for the Court concedes that the Public Use Clause would forbid a purely private taking. Ante, at 7-8. It is difficult to imagine how a court could find that a taking was purely private except by determining that the taking did not, in fact, rationally advance the public interest. Cf. ante, at 9-10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting the complicated inquiry the Court's test requires). The Court is therefore wrong to criticize the "actual use" test as "difficult to administer." Ante, at 8. It is far easier to analyze whether the government owns or the public has a legal right to use the taken property than to ask whether the taking has a "purely private purpose"-unless the Court means to eliminate public use scrutiny of takings entirely. Ante, at 7-8, 16-17. Obliterating a provision of the Constitution, of course, guarantees that it will not be misapplied.
 
     For all these reasons, I would revisit our Public Use Clause cases and consider returning to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause: that the government may take property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property.
 

IV
 
     The consequences of today's decision are not difficult to predict, and promise to be harmful. So-called "urban renewal" programs provide some compensation for the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful. If ever there were justification for intrusive judicial review of constitutional provisions that protect "discrete and insular minorities," United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938), surely that principle would apply with great force to the powerless groups and individuals the Public Use Clause protects. The deferential standard this Court has adopted for the Public Use Clause is therefore deeply perverse. It encourages "those citizens with dis-
proportionate influence and power in the political pro-
cess, including large corporations and development
firms" to victimize the weak. Ante, at 11 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
 
     Those incentives have made the legacy of this Court's "public purpose" test an unhappy one. In the 1950's, no doubt emboldened in part by the expansive understanding of "public use" this Court adopted in Berman, cities "rushed to draw plans" for downtown development. B. Frieden & L. Sagalayn, Downtown, Inc. How America Rebuilds Cities 17 (1989). "Of all the families displaced by urban renewal from 1949 through 1963, 63 percent of those whose race was known were nonwhite, and of these families, 56 percent of nonwhites and 38 percent of whites had incomes low enough to qualify for public housing, which, however, was seldom available to them." Id., at 28. Public works projects in the 1950's and 1960's destroyed predominantly minority communities in St. Paul, Minnesota, and Baltimore, Maryland. Id., at 28-29. In 1981, urban planners in Detroit, Michigan, uprooted the largely "lower-income and elderly" Poletown neighborhood for the benefit of the General Motors Corporation. J. Wylie, Poletown: Community Betrayed 58 (1989). Urban renewal projects have long been associated with the displacement of blacks; "[i]n cities across the country, urban renewal came to be known as 'Negro removal.' " Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 47 (2003). Over 97 percent of the individuals forcibly removed from their homes by the "slum-clearance" project upheld by this Court in Berman were black. 348 U. S., at 30. Regrettably, the predictable consequence of the Court's decision will be to exacerbate these effects.
 

***
 
     The Court relies almost exclusively on this Court's prior cases to derive today's far-reaching, and dangerous, result. See ante, at 8-12. But the principles this Court should employ to dispose of this case are found in the Public Use Clause itself, not in Justice Peckham's high opinion of reclamation laws, see supra, at 11. When faced with a clash of constitutional principle and a line of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of our founding document, we should not hesitate to resolve the tension in favor of the Constitution's original meaning. For the reasons I have given, and for the reasons given in Justice O'Connor's dissent, the conflict of principle raised by this boundless use of the eminent domain power should be resolved in petitioners' favor. I would reverse the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.
___________________________
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

Ted
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May Gene rest in peace. He was one of a kind!

He left you gentlemen a legacy of standing up, if only you would use it.

Read the two cases below & absorb it; then, keep reading some more. NYC & NY State are not Right to Work (RTW) states as I've stated & written many times over. The moves the former disgraced Judge Conboy, his former junior attorney & the former R.O. Dennis Walsh & Mr. Corruption - the King, Doug McCarron are here for all to see, all of which was illegally rubber stamped by a co-conspiring USAO's office & a sitting Federal District Court Judge, one Richard M. Berman.

Together they make the Teamsters & Hoffa senior look like pansy's or a girl scout troop relative to the criminal RICO racketeering scam, crossing all state lines, as orchestrated against the rank & file through NYC and the NYCDCC under a private contract (Consent Decree) so far outside the realm of legal conduct that the U.S. D.O.J. must get involved. This blog is chock full of criminal violations & the court cases & precedent citations to back it up, if only the D.O.J. would have the spine to go after the aforementioned suspects.

All suspects & those named above are guilty until proven innocent; ahh, crap - innocent until proven guilty in a court of law, or are they?

____________________________________



50-50% Rule, Duty of Fair Representation, Discrimination, Shape Halls
DECISION & ORDER of NLRB dated April 30, 1986

https://www.nlrb.gov/case/02-CB-009767

Carpenters Local 608, 279 NLRB No. 99, Harte, McMurray & Clarke
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

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This post was updated on .
DECISION & ORDER of THE SECOND CIRCUIT

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/811/149/205705/

¶1
The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) petitions for enforcement of an order requiring Carpenters Local 608, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (the union), to permit union members to inspect and duplicate hiring hall records that contain the names, addresses and telephone numbers of persons who had used the hiring hall. The union objects to enforcement, arguing that its refusal to supply those records did not constitute a breach of its duty of fair representation under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(1)(A), and contending that the Board's order conflicts with section 401(c) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 481(c), which permits a union to keep its membership lists confidential. For the reasons that follow, we enforce the Board's order.

¶2
The order under review concerns the efforts of three union members, John Harte, Franklin McMurray and Eugene Clarke (the dissidents), to obtain information concerning the union's hiring hall and referral practices. The union operated its hiring hall through a telephone referral system; members seeking work as well as employers needing workers would call the union, and the union would refer workers to particular jobs. The union maintained daily and monthly "shape-up" and "referral" lists. The former contained names and telephone numbers of persons requesting referrals; the latter contained the names of workers and the employers to whom they were referred. According to the union, workers were referred to jobs in the order in which they called in, taking into account any special qualifications requested by the employer and any worker's preference for certain types of work.

¶3
Harte, McMurray and Clarke were founders of a dissident group within the union called "Carpenters for a Stronger Union," and each had been involved in unsuccessful election campaigns against incumbent union officers. At union meetings and in publications distributed to union members, the dissidents objected to various union policies and criticized the performance of several union officers. Some of their concerns related to the operation of the hiring hall. The dissidents maintained that the referral system was unfair and arbitrary, did not allow members to check whether referrals were being administered fairly, and gave Paschal McGuiness, the union's business manager, and his staff, too much control.

¶4
Beginning in the summer of 1982 and continuing into the first half of 1983, the dissidents made several requests of union officials to inspect hiring hall records. The dissidents were concerned that their activities within the union were adversely affecting their referral opportunities. The dissidents, however, were never permitted to inspect those records. Instead, they were shown their individual work cards, which reflected when each had called the union for work and when each had been referred to a job.

¶5
In February and March 1983, the dissidents filed unfair labor practice charges against the union, claiming that the union violated its duty of fair representation when it refused their requests to inspect the hiring hall records. In March 1985, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that the union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA by arbitrarily refusing the dissidents' requests to inspect the records and by refusing to supply them with information concerning the operation of the hiring hall. In April 1986, the Board affirmed the ALJ's rulings, findings and conclusions, and ordered the union, among other things, to allow its members to "review, inspect, photocopy, or duplicate all hiring hall records." This petition by the Board for enforcement followed.

¶6
A union breaches its duty of fair representation in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA when it arbitrarily denies a member's request for job referral information, when that request is reasonably directed towards ascertaining whether the member has been fairly treated with respect to obtaining job referrals. See NLRB v. Local 139, International Union of Operating Engineers, 796 F.2d 985, 992-94 (7th Cir.1986) (hereinafter Local 139 ). See generally Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 909, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). Unions must "deal fairly" with such requests, Local 139, 796 F.2d at 993, and in resolving disputes over disclosing information the Board must balance the member's need for the information against the union's legitimate interest in keeping the information confidential. See Id. Cf. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314-15, 99 S.Ct. 1123, 1130-31, 59 L.Ed.2d 333 (1979) (union requests for information from employer); NLRB v. Local Union 497, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 795 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.1986) (hereinafter Local 497) (employer request for hiring hall information).

¶7
The union argues that the Board erred in finding that the dissidents had a good faith reason for seeking the hiring hall records, contending that the dissidents' requests should be considered within the context of their efforts to gain elective office within the union. The union claims that the dissidents requested the information in connection with their intra-union political activities and maintains that the union justifiably rejected their demands since the leadership was properly elected. We disagree. Characterizing this dispute solely as part of the dissidents' attempt to wrest control of the union from the incumbents would unnecessarily constrict the rights of members seeking union office and penalize them for exercising activities that are protected under the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(1)(A). Even if the dissidents had political purposes for the information, the union could not deny their requests as long as the dissidents were also motivated by a reasonable belief that they were being treated unfairly by union officials in connection with work assignments. See NLRB v. Leonard B. Hebert, Jr. & Co., 696 F.2d 1120, 1126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817, 104 S.Ct. 76, 78 L.Ed.2d 88 (1983); Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 575, 577 (2d Cir.1956).

¶8
The union's arguments challenging the dissidents' motives do not require extended discussion, and only two arguments warrant any discussion at all. The union claims that McGuiness' determination that the dissidents had received their "fair share" of work was a satisfactory response to their requests for information. McGuiness, however, only reviewed the dissidents' individual work records. That investigation could not have addressed the dissidents' concern that they were being treated unfairly as compared to other workers because McGuiness did not analyze the job referral records of any other persons using the hiring hall. In any event, a union is not permitted to refuse a request for information based on its own determination that the grievance underlying the request is non-meritorious or that the information sought is not essential. Cf. NLRB v. Associated General Contractors, 33 F.2d 766, 771-72 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915, 101 S.Ct. 3049, 69 L.Ed.2d 418 (1981). If the request is made in good faith, members are entitled to receive the information and determine for themselves whether they have a claim that the union has discriminated against them.

¶9
The union also notes that McMurray, who ran against McGuiness in a June 1983 election, attempted to obtain the names and addresses of union members by recording this information without the union's knowledge or consent. The ALJ properly found that this event did not affect McMurray's good faith basis for seeking the hiring hall records because it occurred after he had made almost all of his requests. Moreover, as the Board points out, the hiring hall information "would not have done [the dissidents] much good" in their political activities because the referral lists contain information concerning only 700 to 800 of the union's 3200 to 3500 members.

¶10
The record in this case contains ample evidence that the dissidents' requests for hiring hall records were based on a good faith belief that they were being treated unfairly. For example, almost all of the dissidents' requests were made while they were unemployed and awaiting referral and while union officials were announcing that there was 100% employment among the membership. There was also evidence that the dissidents' work cards contained incorrect information and that the dissidents were offered referrals to jobs outside of their specialties when the union had apparently just referred other workers to jobs in those specialties. We therefore conclude that there is "substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole" to support the Board's finding that the dissidents had a good faith basis for requesting the hiring hall records. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493, 71 S.Ct. 456, 467, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951).

¶11
The union also argues that its denial of the dissidents' requests was not arbitrary and therefore did not constitute a breach of its duty of fair representation. The union notes that it is not required to honor all requests for information, but need only "deal fairly" with such requests, see Local 139, 796 F.2d at 993, and claims that its denial of the dissidents' requests to inspect hiring hall records was reasonably based on its desire to protect confidential information. The ALJ found, however, that the union's claims of confidentiality were only an "afterthought," and that they were "entirely specious and pretextual." He noted that the union did not have a formal or written policy of confidentiality with respect to this information. In fact, union officials admitted that they had "no guidelines or precedents" for responding to requests for information.

¶12
By contrast, there was substantial evidence that the union did not consider this information to be confidential. McGuiness stated at union meetings that job referral lists were available for anyone to examine, and Article VII, section 1, of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect between the union and the employer associations required the union to "establish and maintain an open employment list." It is also significant that union officials never raised their confidentiality concerns with the dissidents as a reason for denying their requests, and that the union did not offer any evidence that its members sought to keep this information confidential.

¶13
On this record, the Board could properly determine that the dissidents' interest in assuring the protection of rights that they reasonably suspected were being violated outweighed any legitimate interest the union had in keeping the hiring hall records confidential. See Local 139, 796 F.2d at 992-94. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's holding that the union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by arbitrarily denying the dissidents' reasonable requests to inspect hiring hall records.

¶14
The union also attacks the scope of the Board's remedy. It claims that the dissidents, through their requests for hiring hall records, should not be allowed to obtain information concerning the membership that they are not otherwise entitled to receive. This argument is based on section 401(c) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 481(c), which requires labor organizations to,

¶15
comply with all reasonable requests of any candidate to distribute by mail or otherwise at the candidate's expense campaign literature in aid of such person's candidacy to all members in good standing of such organization....

¶16
and gives every bona fide candidate for office,

¶17
the right, once within 30 days prior to an election ... to inspect a list containing the names and last known addresses of all members....

¶18
Under the LMRDA, a union may keep its membership lists confidential if it complies with the requirements set out in section 401(c) and if it treats all candidates for union office equally in denying requests for the lists. See Schultz v. Radio Officers' Union, 344 F.Supp. 58, 67-69 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Conley v. Aiello, 276 F.Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y.1967). The union claims that it has never allowed any such requests and argues that the Board failed to construct a remedy that adequately considered the union's right, under the LMRDA, to keep its membership lists confidential.

¶19
The LMRDA, however, only regulates intra-union election campaigns and does not prohibit a union from granting more extensive disclosure than the minimum the statute requires. It would be anomalous to conclude that the LMRDA, a statute designed to protect union members from potential abuse by union officials, see Marshall v. Local Union 478, Laborers' International Union, 461 F.Supp. 185, 188 (S.D.Fla.1978), prohibits a union from disclosing names, addresses and telephone numbers of union members where, as here, such information is necessary to determine whether the union has violated a worker's rights. See Local 139, 796 F.2d at 992-93; Local Union 497, 795 F.2d at 838. See also Conley v. United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 1014, 549 F.2d 1122, 1125 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1977); Local 324, International Union of Operating Engineers, 226 N.L.R.B. 587, 599 n. 34 (1976) (LMRDA does not "delimit[ ] the scope of a union's obligation to furnish information to the employees it represents").

¶20
We also reject the union's contention that the portion of the Board's order permitting the dissidents to copy addresses and telephone numbers of members using the hiring hall was overbroad. The dissidents will need this information to verify the accuracy of the hiring hall records. Although it is conceivable, as the union now suggests, that the Board could have provided the same relief and kept the information confidential by having union employees check the information, considering the animus between the union and the dissidents in this case we cannot say that the Board abused its broad discretion, Lipman Motors, Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir.1971), in ordering a remedy that would enable the dissidents to verify the records. See NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 575, 773 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir.1985).

¶21
The Board's order is enforced.
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

Ted
This post was updated on .
Once you comprehend the above; then, and only then do you have the basics down to attack Harrington v. Chao & every illegal manuever by Douglas J. McCarron, his puppeteers and fellow partners in crime inclusive of those both in & outside the Federal District Court for the Second Circuit in New York City. e.g. the suspects & future indictees previously mentioned many times over.

For additional reference to Harte. McMurray & Clarke as directly related to the Exclusivity of the NYCDCC, its role as your Local Union when decided; and the fact that these cases have never been over-turned and its relationship to private & personal property rights, please see the following topic under Moblized Membership dated 1/14/12.

EXCLUSIVE NYCDCC HIRING HALL the HARTE, McMURRAY & CLARKE legacy vs. 50-50%, 67-33% & 90%-10% vs. the McCarron, Walsh, Berman & Torrance Conversion of the BLUE CARD to the WHITE CARD 8(f) to illegal 9(a) Agreement w/o Proof or the req'd. NLRB Board Election

All of the above must be reviewed in light of every abortive ruling issued by Judge Richard Berman since the August 5, 2009 indictments & perp walks of the former corrupt leadership & the Criminal RICO actions of the UBCJA International and its associated crime bosses as well as the corrupt nature of the private Civil Contract between the government & the NYCDCC and UBCJA International better known as the Consent Decree.

All suspects, UBCJA crime bosses by whatever name and/or title they claim to hold, the U.S. Attorneys Office & their assistants, former Federal District Court Judges, current Federal District Court Judge, court appointed Review Officers and NYCDCC hand selected & corruptly seated officers, their agents and co-conspring politicans, UBCJA & District Council inside & outside legal counsel at every level are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kanagroo Court of Law; ahh, crap, I meant innocent until proven guilty in a competent & uncorrupted court of law; or are they?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FPp4qb-phrA

For those who comprehend the basics, start at the post above, dated June 23 2015 @ 6:04 pm entitled:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
HORNE ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 14–275. Argued April 22, 2015—Decided June 22, 2015

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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion

Ted
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Horne v. Department of Agriculture, Decided June 22, 2015
Oral Argument & Transcripts:


http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2014/14-275


Ever get raisins in a school lunch free of charge? Wondering where all those raisins went that ain't in your Raisin Bran? This case is nothing more than a shakedown by Government bureaucrats, akin to the same exact thing the Mob does - shaking down businesses.

No different here in the UBCJA & the 25-year shakedown of the NYCDCC by Doug McCarron, the USAO & the Federal District Court via an illegally imposed Consent Decree held to be legal wherein members are not even afforded the right to standing in a court of law because the Government Bureaucrats & thieves at the UBCJA International are making way too much money off your dumb asses while running you into the ground with idiotic & unconstitutional rulings.

All suspects (the USAO, RO, NYCDCC & UBCJA International) and their associated legal counsel are guilty until proven innocent in Judge Bermans Kanagaroo Court of (alleged) law, ahh crap - I meant Innocent until Proven Guilty - or did I? 
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Re: MOBILITY & the Right of Exclusion - McCarron's 50-State RTW 100% Mobility Scheme

Ted
Sonny,

FYI bro; here are the stat's on RIGHT TO WORK STATES (RTW). Once again the feckless leaders at your Hall (the under-educated Council boob's) are giving you bad intel at Union Meetings.

Currently it's 28 RTW States to 22 Non RTW States ! (that's 50-28 = 22 for the 'At Will, non Union, un-elected Council phonies/sell outs' posing as your Union brother)

http://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-states/

12