BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
This post was updated on .
Thursday, February 27, 2014
Notice of Billing Changes for Working Dues Assessments
Message from the District Council: Brothers and Sisters,

Please be informed, starting with your (4th) Fourth Quarter 2013 vacation check, the New York City District Council working dues and assessment invoice will no longer be included with the mailing of your vacation check. Due to the new upgraded Benefit Funds System and the use of separate vendors, the New York City District Council will no longer have the ability to combine the working dues invoice with your vacation check. Please be aware that you will receive a separate working dues assessment invoice directly from the New York City District Council, and it is your responsibility to remit payment prior to the due date.

If you have not yet completed a working dues/assessment Deduction Authorization Form, or if you have any questions, please contact the New York City District Council Assessment Department at (212) 366-7375.
______________________________________

As usual, the corrupt NYC District Council is lying to you. They shit-canned this because I exposed the fraud, corruption, coercion and illegal Hobbs Act criminal RICO Racketeering of McCarron, Newman, Conboy, Walsh and the inept U.S. Attorney with an overwhelmong body of evidence. All these scumbags should be in Jail & not Club Fed. Every Attorney should lose their Bar Card to practice Law - as it's been a license to steal, rob & rape you blind.

***********************************************

This post was updated on Apr 29, 2013; 11:40pm.
In reply to this post by Donny Arana
 
A year ago, the contract ratification procedure swayed many to sign this card. Time has shown that the AAA contract Ratification process won't be honored- even as the man-hours steadily improve & eclipse 18+-million worked last year.

Sign the White Card if you will, but know when you sign it or whether you resign, you have made a "legally binding assignment" with the D.C. and it applies even after you cease empoyment or Resign from the UBCJA under Const. Sec. 47. This is a legally binding and enforceable contract from which you will have no escape. Once you make said "assignment" you will have no say on the D.C.'s ability to increase it at will w/o your direct input, vote or signature....so go right ahead, sign away knowing what you know now about what Bilello truly believes as to your respective rights for full mobility & contractor control of your union, your right to ratify a contract you work under etc..

*********************************

This NLRB board case below is settled law, as was the precedent cited in 1997 and applies equally with respect to a Union & Contractor Association attempt to bury the illegal language within any CBA.

The D.C.'s in house counsel Murphy should have caught this during Contract negotiations and followed through by severing it from the contract (CBA) language. The D.C.'s ongoing efforts to induce rank and file members to sign a card obligating them to pay dues to the D.C. is clearly illegal and coercive.

Past the obvious here, is the fact that they are also using this White Card to convert the 8(f) Pre-Hire arrangement to a 9(a) Exclusive Representation requirement w/o submitting the definitive proof to the NLRB that a majority of its members (51%) have signed the White Card and w/o submitting to the NLRA mandated Representation Election which would be conducted by the NLRB via Secret Ballot of all eligible rank & file members.

We all know McCarron won't have any of that, not in New York City, so they concoct yet another scheme wherein they try to circumvent Federal law and backdoor it via insertion of illegal contract language and then falsely stating/claiming to Judge Berman in the Federal District Court that they have achieved the majority; but never having proved it.
________________

358 NLRB No. 73 June 27, 2012 Comeau, Inc and Automated Systems Workers (AWS) Local 1123 affiliated with Carpenters Industrial Council and United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America & Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters (MRCC)

DUES CHECKOFF/AUTHORIZATION FORMS, pg. 4/26


3. We agree with the judge, for the reasons he set forth, that Comau violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees Nizar Akkari and Gasper Calandrino with discipline or discharge if they did not execute dues-check off authorization forms for the CEA.

We further agree with the judge, for the reasons he gave and for the additional reasons set forth below, that Comau and the CEA violated Section 8(a) (1) and Section 8(b)(1)(A), respectively, by making statements and engaging in other conduct that had a reasonable tendency to coerce employee Jeffrey T. Brown to execute a dues check off authorization form.

*An employer may not lead employees to believe that the dues-check off authorization method of fulfilling financial obligations to their union is compulsory. Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260 (1997). The Board has repeatedly held that “the Act guarantees to each employee the right to determine for himself, free from coercion, whether he shall sign a check off authorization or not.” Herman Bros., Inc., 264 NLRB 439, 442 (1982).13

“Any conduct, express or implied, which coerces an employee in his attempt to exercise this right clearly violates [the Act].” Electronic Workers IUE Local 601 (Westinghouse Electric Corp.), 180 NLRB 1062 (1970).

_____________________________________

* Neither may a Union

http://www.nlrb.gov/case/07-CA-052614



PROPOSED ORDER
EXHIBIT 1
90-Civ. #5722
_____________________

The District Council Assessment Department via omisssion and its direct failure to publish known case law and settled Board, Appellate and United States Supreme Court precedent and the corresponding ERISA & EBSA requirements directly related to their illegal collection activities; notwithstanding their continued Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) violations under Section 8(b)(1)(a) amongst others is clearly violative of the conduct noted above:

 “Any conduct, express or implied, which coerces an employee in his attempt to exercise this right clearly violates [the Act].” Electronic Workers IUE Local 601 (Westinghouse Electric Corp.), 180 NLRB 1062 (1970).
_____________________________________

******See pg. 6, bottom of page for the previous 2-posts which relate here.
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Daniel J. Franco
In reply to this post by GUEST

The "mandatory voluntary union participation" program is NOT legal.

TED, WHAT EFFECT DOES THE ENRIGHT CASE AND ERISA HAVE ON THE UBC MEMBER UNION PARTICIPATION (MUP) PROGRAM. THIS IS THE PROGRAM THAT IS IMPLEMENTED ACROSS THE COUNTRY , AND FINES MEMBERS UP TO $500.00 FOR NOT DOING THEIR PICKET DUTY, PER OCCURANCE.


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NAML
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
This post was updated on .
Dan - I have to read the briefs submitted to the Court and ascertain what issues if any they submitted into evidence relevant to this issue. Until I see them I cannot tell you what (if any) issues they may or may not have preserved for the appeals process.

UPP, the alleged "mandatory" UNION PARTICIPATION PROGRAM:
Note: The UBCJA varies the name slightly in different parts of the country.

The entire program instituted nationally by Douglas J. McCarron is a per se violation of the many law(s) as stated throughout the entire history of this thread dating to July 2011. Please see the previous 2-posts on page 6 (bottom of page) as directly related to the NYCDCC under the Consent Decree, Stipulation & Order and the August 5, 2011 By-laws approved by the Court.

Given the ongoing and continuing violations of the many law(s), the Fiduciairy Liability Insurance coverage, the failure of the U.S.A.O. to indict the criminal element responsible or the R.O. to file motion(s) or veto those responsible for the illegal policies or the Court to issue a sua-sponte ruling on the matter or their collective failure to enforce the Consent Decree Prong 1 for continuing racketeering violations consisting of mail & wire fraud involving collection activities crossing state lines, the issue remains ripe for adjudication via action in Enright where preserved for appeal; or under an entirely new law suit as does the requirement to refund members monies previously extorted notwithstanding legal fees, expenses and interest under a make whole remedy.

The Funds and D.C. admittedly retain $58M dollars of monies previously extorted from August 1998 through November 2011 per D.C. employee Paul Tyzner. Monies collected since that time through the current date also fall under the make whole remedy, noting of course that the District Council and UBCJA has failed to keep proper records; and  that they have intentionally destroyed (shredded) record evidence it had in its possession and that they have not stored same for the mandatory 6-year minimum to avoid negative legal and financial consequences of its corrupt actions. The D.C & the Benefit Trust Fund (the Welfare Fund) have exposure in this Hobbs Act racketeering scheme, in NYC and the UBCJA and its subordinate District Councils at the national level as all of it effects both intra-state and inter-state commerce.
Ted
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
This post was updated on .
re-printed; DOUBLE STANDARD by Ethics, March 3, 2014 3:39 pm. Questions are highlighted in Bold text for clarity. Items in italic's by Ted.
____________________________________________________

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING PAYMENT OF WORKING DUES AND WORKING DUES ASSESSMENTS
 
1. Does my June 2012 Vacation Benefit include any deductions for Working Dues and Working Dues Assessments?
 
No. There were no deductions taken for Working Dues and Working Dues Assessments from your June 2012 Vacation Benefit.
 
2. Will there be any deductions for Working Dues and Working Dues Assessments taken from future Vacation Benefit distributions?
 
No.
 
3. I authorized the Welfare Fund through the blue card to deduct my Working Dues and Working Dues Assessments from my Vacation Benefit and I liked the convenience of the deduction. Can I arrange for the Fund Office to make deductions from my Vacation Benefit for the required payments in the future?
 
No. Unfortunately that is not an option at this time. But the District Council is working on putting dues check-off authorizations provisions in all collective bargaining agreements. This would provide for a convenient and more gradual and regular way for members to meet their financial obligations to the District Council.

FALSE - First, the District Council Blue Card Program (Vacation Wage Extortion scheme) expired with the contracts and was ended and discontinued by the R.O. in June of 2012. Any and all authorizations (legally signed and verified) are thus null & void and of no legal force or effect - period. Moreover, any & all coerced, forced or forged Blue Card authorizations are also null & void and of no legal force or effect. Lastly, the D.C. through its H.R. Directors new hire of a Records Retention Coordinator has not preserved properly the actual (alleged) Blue Card Authorizations allegedly signed with or without the coercion and fraud element nor have they presented same to the U.S.A.O., the Review Officer or the Court for a true and accurate verified count of same at any time between the August 1998 inception of this facially unlawful racketeering scheme through its ultimate end in June of 2012 by the court appointed R.O.

Second - The White Card Authorization has similarly never been presented to the U.S.A.O., the R.O. or the Court & Judge Richard M. Berman for an accurate count and verification with or without the coercion & fraud element and the pressure consistently applied to members to "sign the White Card" without adequately informing members of their legal right not to sign it, nor via presentation of basic and long known precedent case law which prohibits this type of blind intimidation, coercion and fraud.

Third - Dues Check-off authorizations (provisions) cannot be made mandatory subjects of bargaining within contracts (CBA's) - period; as such mandatory authorizations violate settled Board (NLRB) law in this area.
*An employer may not lead employees to believe that the dues-check off authorization method of fulfilling financial obligations to their union is compulsory. Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260 (1997). The Board has repeatedly held that “the Act guarantees to each employee the right to determine for himself, free from coercion, whether he shall sign a check off authorization or not.” Herman Bros., Inc., 264 NLRB 439, 442 (1982).13

“Any conduct, express or implied, which coerces an employee in his attempt to exercise this right clearly violates [the Act].” Electronic Workers IUE Local 601 (Westinghouse Electric Corp.), 180 NLRB 1062 (1970).
_____________________________________

* Neither may a Union


http://www.nlrb.gov/case/07-CA-05261

PROPOSED ORDER
EXHIBIT 1
90-Civ. #5722
_____________________

The Welfare Fund assessment department (operating illegally) via omission and its direct failure to publish known case law and settled Board, Appellate and United States Supreme Court precedent and the corresponding ERISA & EBSA requirements directly related to their illegal collection activities; notwithstanding their continued Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) violations under Section 8(b)(1)(a) among others is clearly violative of the conduct noted above:

 “Any conduct, express or implied, which coerces an employee in his attempt to exercise this right clearly violates [the Act].” Electronic Workers IUE Local 601 (Westinghouse Electric Corp.), 180 NLRB 1062 (1970).
_____________________________________

******See pg. 6, bottom of page for the previous 2-posts which relate here.


Past the known illegalities identified above, the prime reason for failing to present the White Card Authorization form to the U.S.A.O., the R.O. and the Court/Judge Berman is the D.C.'s illegal back-door attempt to convert the prior 8(f) agreements to NLRA Section 9(a) agreements because Federal law requires three things occur:

1) Informing members of their legal right to not sign the White Card w/ citation of basic and long known legal precedent(s) stating exactly why they do not have to sign the White Card.

2) Submission of actual proof to the NLRB and to the U.S.A.O., the R.O. and the Court via a verified AAA count of signed White Cards.

3) In lieu of submission of actual proof and a verified count, the D.C. per NLRB requirements must hold an Election to determine that it is the majority representative.
 
The District Council, its Officers, agents and legal counsel in tandem with those at the Benefit Trust Funds and their respective legal counsel as well as the I.G., C.C.O., H.R. Director, its Records Retention officer have never made the requisite showing to the NLRB, the Court/Judge Berman, the United States Attorneys Office or the Review Officer as required by Federal law and thus, collectively, the parties are willfully & wantonly violating both the Consent Decree and the Stipulation and Order requiring the ending of all racketeering and the restoration of democracy under prong 1 & 2 of the decree.

4. Am I still responsible for paying to the District Council the Working Dues and Working Dues Assessments that would have otherwise been deducted from my June 2012 Vacation Benefit distribution?
 
Yes. Although the working dues will no longer be deducted from your vacation check, it is still your obligation to pay all working dues and assessments legally levied as per the U.B.C. constitution section 45 and the District Council’s Bylaws Section 14(A).

FALSE: The "Working Dues" "as per the U.B.C. constitution section 45 and the District Council’s Bylaws Section 14(A)" were not legally levied. The UBCJA Constitution, Section 45 and NYCDCC By-law Section 14(A) do not supersede Federal Labor Law or long settled Decisions and Orders of the NLRB Board, Appellate Court or United States Supreme Court precedents relative to known NLRA Section 7 & 8 rights and known free speech and First Amendment rights.

Bottom line here, the personnel at the D.C. and/or Benefit Trust Funds and their respective legal counsel are intentionally publishing and disseminating false information to continue the Blue Card Vacation Wage (Hobbs Act) Extortion scheme and simply changed the name to the White Card to continue the very same racketeering scheme (although adding the illegal 8(f) to 9(a) conversion w/o the proof/election element) deemed illegal and thus ended by the R.O. without exception by the United States Attorney or the Court.

5. How do I know the amount that I owe the District Council?
 

Enclosed with your Vacation Fund check is a payment invoice listing the amounts you owe the District Council based on the hours you worked in the period from January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2012.

A has nothing to do with B.
e.g., The Vacation Fund which was combined to the Welfare Fund in 2006 has nothing to do with dues or assessment collections. Said function, per the By-laws belongs under the direct control of Local Unions and its Officers, the District Council and EST Joseph Geiger. Furthermore, the Benefit Trust Funds are a separate legal entity on paper (contract) have separate bylaws unto itself and it and its employees are not the authorized representative of the rank & file worker; thus, they have no legal right to interfere or participate in collection activities related to Local Union and/or District Council dues or assessment programs - period.

 
6. By what date do I have to pay?
 

To remain in good standing your payment should be received by August 1, 2012.
 
7. What happens if I don’t pay the working dues to the District Council?
 
Under the District Council’s Bylaws and the UBC’s Constitution, failure to pay your dues in a timely way will lead to adverse actions affecting membership status that can lead to suspension or termination of membership.
 
8. Can my employment be terminated if I do not pay the District Council the working dues I owe?
 
Yes. If you fail to pay the 1% Working Dues and the Additional Working Dues ($0.60 per hour journeyman/$0.30 apprentice), the Union may after 60 days exercise its right under the Union security clauses in the District Council’s various collective bargaining agreements to demand that your employer terminate your employment due to lack of membership.

FALSE - Said statement conflicts directly with the UBCJA Constitution which allow 6-months before members go into arrears and can be terminated from any employment, notwithstanding NLRB Board precedent requiring formal notification procedures in writing from the Local Union and/or District Council as opposed to a non-certified NLRB Board Welfare Fund Plan Administrator, Executive Director or Human Relations Director decree/edict declaring themselves (via default) the statutory Bargaining Representative and/or Collection Agent of Local Union and/or District Council dues or assessment collection activities.

Moreover, the Local Unions and/or District Council must make known and offer re-payment plans for those members falling into arrears to re-pay back dues and assessments prior to acting to terminate a members employment with any employer. Finally, the UBCJA has not met via its 5-year Convention or via Special Convention to change or alter the Constitution requirement of 6-months. Currently, the UBCJA can only legally assess you a charge for late payment after the third month and it must be a nominal fee; e.g. $5.00 late charge etc. and said amount is subject to a direct vote by rank & file members at their Local Union meeting and must be on the record verses the current illegal and unilateral actions of the Welfare Fund and its Fiduciaries/Trustees, Executive Director & its legal counsel.

James Murphy, the current in-house legal counsel of record for the D.C. should be aware of these base requirements of Federal Labor law and long known and settled legal precedent(s) as should Judge Jones - yet both appear to unable or unwilling to act to prevent further abuses; thus, the Executive Committee, the Council Delegate Body and the new EST Joseph Geiger must act under the By-laws to terminate their employment and bring in competent legal counsel which readily adhere to and obey the relatively simple and obvious laws in this arena.

 
9. Can you review how the Working Dues and Working Dues Assessments are determined?

The amounts due to the District Council are determined as follows:
 
a. 1% Working Dues under District Council Bylaws Section 14(A): amount determined by (a) taking 1% of the sum of the hourly wage rate and the hourly fringe benefit rate contributed under the collective bargaining agreement, and (b) multiplying that number by the number of hours you worked in the applicable quarter;
 
b. Additional Working Dues under District Council Bylaws Section 14(A): amount determined by multiplying the number of hours you worked in the applicable quarter by $0.60 (journeyman rate) or $0.30 (apprentice rate); and
 
c. Working Dues Assessment under District Council Bylaws Section 14(A): $500 per year (credited to your account upon completion of your union participation duty).

FALSE:

Item c. above is an Illegal continuation of the prior Blue Card Vacation Wage (Hobbs Act) Extortion scheme which crossed multiple State lines effecting intra-state and inter-state commerce, consisted of mail and wire fraud and collectively qualify as predicate acts of continuing criminal RICO activity, to wit, the Consent Decree and Stipulation & Order were entered into to prevent as agreed to by the parties. To date there has been a deafening silence on the part of the U.S.A.O. to prefer criminal charges and indictments of both past and current racketeers at the D.C & the Benefit Trust Funds.
 
  III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The Board has held that a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in the operation of a nonexclusive hiring hall when it discriminatorily denies referrals to members because those members have engaged in activities protected by Section 7 of the Act. Carpenters Local 370 (Eastern Contractors Assn.), 332 NLRB 174 (2000); Newspaper & Mail Deliverers (City & Suburban Delivery), 332 NLRB 870, 870 fn. 1 (2000); Carpenters Local 626(Strawbridge & Clothier), 310 NLRB 500, 500 fn. 2 (1993), enfd. mem. 16 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 1993); Laborers Local 135 (Bechtel Corp.), 271 NLRB 777, 780 (1984), enfd.

-pg. 1018-
782 F.2d 1030 (3d Cir. 1986) (Table). Such discrimination is unlawfully coercive in the context of nonexclusive hiring halls, despite the fact that the coercion is greater when the discriminating union is party to an exclusive hiring arrangement. Teamsters Local 923 (Yellow Cab Co.), 172 NLRB 2137, 2138 (1968).5

The protections provided by Section 7 extend not only to a member’s decision to participate in union activities, but also to a member’s decision to refrain from union activities, including union-sponsored picketing. Service Employees District 1199 (Staten Island University Hospital), 339 NLRB 1059, 1060–1061 (2003); District 65, Distributive Workers (Blume Associates, Inc.), 214 NLRB 1059 (1974); see also Service Employees Local 87 (Able Building Maintenance Co.), 349 NLRB 408, 412 (2007) (“An essential element of any violation of Section 8(b)(1) is restraint or coercion in the exercise of a Section 7 right; i.e., the right to form, join, or assist a labor organization, or to refrain from such activity.”).
______________

If the legal counsel does not comprehend these simple and plainly worded decisions/orders and the authority cited, then they require immediate discharge as do the Trustees and Fiduciaries for failure to dispense their duties in concert with known law(s) and their continued employment must be vetoed.

10. How can I transmit my payment to the District Council?
 
There are two (2) payment options.
 
a. Mail: Send a check or money order with your required payment made payable to the New York City and Vicinity District Council of Carpenters. A self-addressed postage-paid envelope is enclosed with your Vacation Fund check. Make sure to put your UBC membership number on the check so that your dues payment can be properly credited to you.
 
b. In Person Payment: Pay in person at the District Council on the 9th floor.
 
Ted
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
This post was updated on .
In reply to this post by Daniel J. Franco
THE SEVENTH INTERIM REPORT OF THE REVIEW OFFICER

Dennis M. Walsh Review Officer
The Law Office of Dennis M. Walsh
415 Madison Avenue Floor
New York New York 10017
646.553.1357
dwalsh@dennismwalsh.com

pg. 24

Q. Working Dues and Assessments System and the Dues Check Off Program
 
The District Council still collects the lion's share of working dues and assessments from members through check or credit card payments to the District Council. The ending of the
blue card program necessitated this method.

Statistics regularly reported by the District Councils Chief Accountant show that, on average, approximately 95% of the monies owed by members are received each quarter.

The new collective bargaining agreements between the District Council and the various employer associations provide for a dues check-off system, whereby, with the written consent of a member, an employer withholds a portion of a member's pay for forwarding
to the District Council.

The program is currently scheduled to begin this week.
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
This post was updated on .
4th Interim Report at pg. 69

             CONCLUSION     
     I shall be telling this with a sigh
     Somewhere ages and ages hence;
     Two roads diverged in a wood, and I -
     I took the one less traveled by;
     And that has made all the difference.
                      Robert Frost

          Though the governance and administration of the District Council are sound (with the District Council functioning largely as intended under the Bylaws), it is an inchoate institution still with much room for improvement. It will be at risk for internal and external perils for some time after my tenure ends. Its executives are intelligent, energetic and committed to meeting all of the challenges faced. The Council will benefit as they gain experience and become accustomed to the grave responsibilities of leadership. However, decisions they make, along with the delegates and the executive committee, will ultimately determined the fate of this Union. I firmly believe that no good will come through adherence to tradition and conventional thinking. Such practices have been exploited for decades by racketeers and their minions and must be left behind.

          As they march foward, gaining confidence - - and one hopes wisdom - - to confront the many problems they must solve, the leaders of the District Council must always listen to the membership but be unafraid to tell them why they might disagree with them; they must be teachers, when learning is required, and they must by example of their fortitude and good conduct - - earn the trust they will need in order to succeed.

Dated June 4, 2012
New York, New York

Respectfully Submitted
Dennis M. Walsh
Review Officer

       4th Interim Report at pg. 55/56

J. Blue Card Issue
56

This has been an ongoing issue for the District Council and the Benefit Funds.The Funds have recognized the need to address its historical practice of deducting a member’s District Council dues from his vacation fund check. Under ERISA, the Funds should not be involved in dues collection. The Funds is working towards finalizing a voluntary program. We expect a final resolution shortly.

August 5, 2011 Court approved By-laws
SECTION 14:   WORKING DUES (DUES CHECK-OFF); SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND PER CAPITA TAX  “BLUE CARD”(A) The Council shall receive working dues in the amount of 1% of the members total package rate as reflected in the current collective bargaining agreement covering members for each hour worked. The Council shall also receive working dues from each member of $.60 per hour for each hour worked, subject to review and modification by the Council Delegate Body after review and report by the Audit Committee. This $.60 will be allocated to Organizing in the amount of $.50 an hour, $.05 for Communications and $.05 for Civic Action. The apportionment of working dues amongst Organizing, Communications, and Civic Action shall be maintained in the same proportions as outlined in the prior sentence, subject to review and modification by the Council Delegate Body after review and report by the Audit Committee. The working dues to this Council shall be due on the first day of the month and must be paid not later than the 15th day of the following month. The Council shall also receive working dues of $500 per year from every carpenter who has performed carpentry work for a signatory contractor in our jurisdiction during the calendar year. This $500 working dues to this Council shall be due on the first day of the month following the first day of work performed in our jurisdiction each year and must be paid not later than April 15th of the following year, provided however, that any member who shall have satisfied his or her Union Participation requirement for the applicable year, pursuant to Section 14(F) of the Bylaws, will receive credit for this $500 working dues requirement. The sums stated in this paragraph shall be reviewed periodically to determine if prudence requires that they be reduced or increased.
_________________________________

Note:

You reviewed it as the Junior Attorney under the former I.R.O. & former Federal Judge Kenneth Conboy. I.R.O. Conboy sold this facially unlawful policy to Judge Haight and the District Council forged member names to Blue Cards never signed and thus collected upwards of $81.25 Million dollars over the course of its 14-years illegal history.

In an effort to appease members and to continue the illegal fine & collections policy and continue exacting the $500 Yearly fine, the D.C. purportedly settled, albeit confidentially with Mr. Brennan and the D.C. restored his membership while never rescinding the illegal Blue Card racketeering policy in its entirety. That fact hardly squares with the rhetoric above.

The past practices as well as the current policy under the revised Conboy, Quinn & Walsh authored August 5, 2011 By-Laws, Section 14 remain facially unlawful. The current policy; wherein members are still forced to perform Leaflet, Banner or Picket Duty for one day, or 7-hours, under the directed threat of the facially unlawful $500 Fine (however collected & irrespective of how it is re-named or re-titled) cannot be legally enforced on District Council members or on Out of Council members.
___________________________________________

Exactly what part of the inherent NLRA Section 7 right of any rank & file member, to refrain from any & all duty do the USAO, RO & Judge Jones fail to comprehend? Under Supreme Court precedent/long settled law; members have the right to be good, bad or indifferent members. (citation omitted). Re-naming it "working dues" and offering a "refund" of the $500 Fine in an exchange for the members "Union Participation Requirement" does not save it form the inherent illegality of the policy as it remains an illegal exaction violative of the statutory Section 7 right to refrain from any & all duty whatsover or howsoever imposed. The D.C., its Officers, Agents & legal counsel cannot coerce, intimidate, threaten or fine members for utilizing legal rights afforded to them under Federal Labor law. If no good is to come from adherence to tradition and exploitation by racketeers, the facially unlawful Blue Card Policy and the $500 Fine must be rescinded for all time.

Failing that, all the words above ring hollow.; yeah but I'm King Doug, so the fck with settle law Judge Berman! 
Ted
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
This post was updated on .
Saturday, March 19, 2011
Walsh's Mob Corruption Probe Nets 3 More Carpenter Leaders

 
Informed sources say that Review Officer ("RO") Dennis Walsh investigation pertaining to organized crime influence over the affairs of the District Council has netted 3 more Carpenter leaders.

Local 157 Financial Secretary/Regional Manager Paul Capurso, and Local 926 President/Representative Joseph DiNapoli, have not signed the RO's declaration to disclose any information that they have about such conduct, and are consulting with attorneys and may invoke their privilege against self-incrimination.  

Council employees are required to cooperate with the RO in this undertaking pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation and Order. Failure to comply with the undertaking or invocation of the right against self-incrimination may subject persons to action pursuant to Paragraph 7, which makes failure to cooperate an express violation of the Stipulation and Order, as well as Paragraphs 5.b and 5.f.

It is expected that Capurso who last year reportedly made $116,709 and recently received a huge salary increase since being named regional manager, and DiNapoli, who earned $156,327 will either be fired or will resign an informed source said.

Local 157 Organizer Andre Puerta, did not sign the declaration and resigned last week this source said. Puerta who reportedly made $153,333 last year is rumored to be married to Brian O'Dwyer's niece (O'Dwyer & Bernstein LLP) and has been well taken care of over the years seeing his salary dramatically increase since being hired as an organizer a member commented.

We also reported that Walsh sent Local 157 President/Director of Operations Lawrence D’Errico a letter late Monday vetoing D'Errico's employment as a council representative, Local 157 Vice President/Representative Anthony Pugliese was pushed into retirement because he refused to cooperate and sign the declaration and council employees Ray Brugueras, Richard Tuccillo and Paul Pietropaolo all resigned rather than sign the declaration.

That brings the total to eight council employees netted so far last week, in the RO's investigation pertaining to organized crime influence over the affairs of the District Council.

The RO said his investigation "is broad in scope and many employees (as well as persons affiliated with the Benefit Funds) can expect to be interviewed in the near future."
Posted by John Musumeci at 7:52 PM 2 comments

--------------------------------------------------

So why is Regional Manager Paul Capurso still employed by the NYCDCC?:

Resignations, self incrimination, hiring attorneys ehh? Caperso readily admitted during a live/recorded debate that he & the NYCDCC illegally retained some $58 Million dollars of the Blue Card Vacation Wage Extortion scam monies which was put forth and directly supported by both Dennis Walsh & former Federal Judge Kenneth Conboy in unison with McCarron, the alleged Trust Funds and their corporate counsel
.

And yet, prior to Walsh's departue as the R.O. he failed to prosecute, veto or indict anyone (including himself) from their direct roles and direct participation in the scheme to defraud and extort Vacation Wage monies across multiple state lines for 14-years.

**   Where is the justice in that?

**   Why has the United Sates Attorneys Office failed to indict a single individual or employee or trust fund fiduciary for the Hobbs Act criminal racketeering scheme?

**   Why has the in house legal counsel for the District Council failed to pursue its legal remedies against the Fiduciary Insurance/re-insurance policies?

**   Why has Judge Richard M. Berman stood by silently given his alleged reputation for bening an expert in insurance, banking & SEC matters and failed to take any action directly from the bench (sua-sponte - e.g. on his own accord etc.) to prosecute the participating criminal racketeers noted above?

**   Why have all the loudmouth NYCDCC members who were scammed directly failed to demand that the former or current R.O. or U.S.A.O. enforce their rights & why do they rely on an out of Council member to stand up for them in their absence and with the help of two other members bring the program to an end?

**   Why do they fail to file their own motion Pro-Se or hire their own Attorney directly to prosecute those who stole from them?

**   Why do they cry incessantly on C-Box or Mobilized Membership and do nothing other than offer 4th grade level insults to those who have the balls & brains to stand up for them when they won't do it for themselves?

And you wonder why these people have got away with highway robbery and no one's been indicted or done a day in Club Fed.

It's pretty simple tough guys - your homeowrk; the legwork has been done for you, free gratas and we've handed and spoon fed you clowns a prima-facie case. All you have to do is man up, grow a set and file suit.

Short of that; then here you go, four simple words, "I resign effective immediately". Put it in wiriting, send a copy to your local, the D.C. & your feckless leader Douglas J. McCarron.

-----------------------------------

All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?
LOL
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

LOL
SO !
Ted
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
Thanks for making my point!      Another spineless NYCDCC member.
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@ Ted
Ted what have you done other then posting things that you are  too afraid to act upon  ?
Ted
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
This post was updated on .
In reply to this post by Ted
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/553/639.html


United States Supreme Court

BRIDGE ET AL. v. PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY CO. ET AL., (2008)

No. 07-210

Argued: April 14, 2008    Decided: June 9, 2008


Each year the Cook County Treasurer's Office holds a public auction to sell its tax liens on delinquent taxpayers' property. To prevent any one buyer from obtaining a disproportionate share of the liens, the county adopted the "Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule" (Rule), which requires each buyer to submit bids in its own name, prohibits a buyer from using "apparent agents, employees, or related entities" to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel, and requires a registered bidder to submit a sworn affidavit affirming its compliance with the Rule. Petitioners and respondents regularly participate in the tax sales. Respondents filed suit, alleging that petitioners fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by filing false compliance attestations. As relevant here, they claim that petitioners violated and conspired to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through a pattern of racketeering activity involving mail fraud, which occurred when petitioners sent property owners various notices required by Illinois law. The District Court dismissed the RICO claims for lack of standing, finding that respondents were not protected by the mail fraud statute because they did not receive the alleged misrepresentations. Reversing, the Seventh Circuit based standing on the injury respondents suffered when they lost the chance to obtain more liens, and found that respondents had sufficiently alleged proximate cause because they were immediately injured by petitioners' scheme. The court also rejected petitioners' argument that respondents are not entitled to relief under RICO because they had not received, and therefore had not relied on, any false statements.
 
Held: A plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Pp. 6-21.
 
     (a) In 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation," as pertinent here, of §1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with" a qualifying enterprise "to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity," including "mail fraud," §1961(1)(B). Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mail "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice." §1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any " 'mailing ... incident to an essential part of the scheme' ... satisfies the mailing element," Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705, 712, even if the mailing "contain[s] no false information," id., at 715. Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents' theory of the case is straightforward. Petitioners nonetheless argue that because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity is predicated on mail fraud, respondents must show that they relied on petitioners' fraudulent misrepresentations, which they cannot do because the misrepresentations were made to the county. Nothing on the statute's face imposes such a requirement. Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate racketeering act under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation, see Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 24-25; and one can conduct the affairs of a qualifying enterprise through a pattern of such acts without anyone relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation. Thus, no reliance showing is required to establish that a person has violated §1962(c) by conducting an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity predicated on mail fraud. Nor can a first-party reliance requirement be derived from §1964(c), which, by providing a right of action to "[a]ny person" injured by a violation of §1962, suggests a breadth of coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit first-party reliance requirement. Moreover, a person can be injured "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud even if he has not relied on any misrepresentations. For example, accepting respondents' allegations as true, they were harmed by petitioners' scheme when they lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been awarded. Pp. 6-10.
 
     (b) None of petitioners' arguments--that under the "common-law meaning" rule, Congress should be presumed to have made reliance an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute; that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud must show reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations in order to establish proximate cause; and that RICO should be interpreted to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the "overfederalization" of traditional state-law claims--persuades this Court to read a first-party reliance requirement into a statute that by its terms suggests none. Pp. 10-21.
 
477 F. 3d 928, affirmed.
 
     Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

_______________

Every member concerned about their current status or their future in the NYCDCC should read this case. The above portion is the syllabus only. See the link for the full case.

After absorbing it, please think about who the guilty parties are; and why they are guilty and what evidence you have in the form of written or electronic communications from them; whether the International, the D.C., your Local and/or from Officers or Delegates which would confer standing on you as an individual and/or as a certified class

There is so much damning evidence in this case it's sickening and the 'players' in this extortive game wherein racketeering has not ended but accelerated under their watch know exactly who they are and what I am speaking of.



Mail & wire fraud; re:


The BLUE CARD:

**   The Blue Card Vacation Wage Hobbs Act extortion scheme, approximating $81.25 Million dollars.
 
BY-LAW SECTION 21 MISAPPROPRIATION/CONVERSION:

**   The Bilello, McGinnis & Cavanaugh and Walsh By-law Sec. 21 misappropriation, reallocation and illegal conversion of wages in multiple contracts to the Welfare Fund, approximating $38 Million dollars per year, prending total man-hours recorded under each contract; allegedly verifiable via the new electronic scanners.
 
The CONTINUATION OF PREDICATE RICO ACT VIOLATIONS

**   Continuation of NYCDCC racketeering occurred while allegedly under the watchful eyes of the United States Attorneys Office under Preet Bharara's direct watch; and the court appointed Review Officers (Conboy, Walsh & McGorty), notwithstanding their gross dereliction of duty and negligence as the parties/attorneys of record with the 'standing' to allegedly (cough) represent member interests; while illegally denying all rank & file member Due Process rights for their immediate and very direct property & legal interests in both issues above.

 
The CEMENT LEAGUE & 100% FULL MOBILITY RACKETEERING:

**   Continuation of the racketeering scheme via the intentional ignoring of the NLRA in its entirety, Board precedent and long known Appellate & U.S. Supreme Court precedent as directly related to the 100% Full Mobility scheme and the recent phony/false filing of the Cement League case by the UBCJA International, in concert with the NRCC - which misappropriated the entirety of the NYCDCC's jurisdictional territory and your man-hours for wages and benefits (deferred compensation) to those not entitled to it; and which is your primary source & element for creating wealth as a District Council member.


The NYCDCC's criminal racketeering case has gone on unabated for 25-1/2 years and that fact along with the near 22-year old private contract known as the Consent Decree are both an abortion of justice.

The United States Attorneys Office has openly & hostilely turned a blind eye to all of it, it refuses to press further charges against the UBCJA International for thier direct role in not only continuing the racketeering, but accelerating it.

The U.S. Attorney has allowed the UBCJA International & the former R.O. Dennis Walsh to abuse the NLRA, LMRA, LMRDA, ERISA, SEC & IRS regualations to the point where these public laws are unrecognizeable and they have allowed the former R.O. to pursue a clearly illegal agenda and directly couch participants in the misappropriation of rank & file member pay raises, in direct concert with Union & Employer Trustees and Fiduciaries and the D.C & Benefit Trust Funds legal counsel in an ongoing act of criminal racketeering. The U.S. Attorney has refused to investigate, audit, seat a grand jury or indict any of the long list of those who can & should be so charged.

The U.S. Attorneys malfeasance in their direction & handling of this case is a disgrace. Ben Torrance & Preet Bhararra by their very silence thus condonde this racketeering and Judge Berman and others should act to see to it that they are removed from the case.


**   Your 'standing' in the case can no longer be denied - courtesy of the U.S. Supreme Court.

EXCERPT - FULL TEXT:
 Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
 
     The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§1961-1968, provides a private right of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Act's criminal prohibitions. §1964(c). The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud must plead and prove that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that a showing of first-party reliance is not required, we affirm.


_________________


All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?


Ted
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
In reply to this post by Ted
originally posted pg. 4, Feb 14, 2012

The Thirteenth Amendment reads: 

"Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
 
"Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
 
U.S.C. Title 8, Section 56, reads:
 
"The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or the United States, and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void."
 
U.S.C. Title 18, Section 444:
 
"Whoever holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be held, arrested, or returned, or in any manner aids in the arrest or return of any person to a condition of peonage shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
________________________________

The UBC's Master Plan for a yearly $256M Extortion scheme, which is soon to be a half Billion Dollar per year $512M Extortion scheme from members vacation wages or any form of wages for that matter, does not pass scrutiny.

To force and coerce involuntary servitude via leaflet, banner, picket duty etc. and disguise it as a refund and/or via a name change to "working dues", or "working dues assessment" also does not pass muster, morally, legally or otherwise, notwithstanding the bamboozling of a senile old judge under the Federal RICO Consent Decree.

Massachusetts now requires the Union's form an employment contract with the person performing the leaflet, banner or picket duty, so that proper application of employment laws, liability and recoupment of income taxes etc attach.
   This includes both Union Members and/or bums they find on the street. In the south and southwest, the UBCJA regularly hires non carpenters or bums off the street to perform these duties as Union members refuse to do so. The International which creates these policies and condones their continued use by individual EST's and District or Regional Councils also do not withstand scrutiny.

In the NYCDCC, the fact that Roger Newman, IRO Judge Conboy and the current RO endorsed the policy and the illegal exactions also does not save it from the inherent illegality. Because the USAO & IRO ran to Court under the guise of an internal Union Rule and simple By-law change, it was by design meant to intimidate the rank & file member to believe that it had an air of credibility. It does not. Rather, it was used as part of the coercive scheme to continue the extortion, fraud and involuntary servitude under threat of fine, expulsion or removal from the OWL list; under the so called watchful eye of the United States Attorneys office and the power of the Federal Government who is admittedly engaged in a private contract making it complicit in the scheme to defraud rank & file members to either cough up the tribute money to the DC & the UBC International, or - to submit, become indentured initially for 2-seven (7) hour days and subsequently one (1) seven (7) hour day against their will.

The United States Attorneys Office is charged with enforcing the laws, not willfully or by gross negligence assisting the UBCJA & NYCDCC continue violating the laws (RICO) as are the other attorneys and parties of record in the matter of the Federal RICO Consent Decree.

Regardless of whether a rank & file members submits or pretends not to and thus claims it is voluntary, in either case the indentured servitude remains and it does not remove it from illegal conditions mandated by Federal law or State law(s).

The UBCJA International seems to believe that its venerable UBC Constitution stands supreme above all the laws of the land, including the Federal Constitution and State laws; and, once we start discussing the total take, the extortionate part of said scheme becomes clear and plain for all to see. The BLUE CARD is a Brinks Job of grand proportion;

AND the FORCED/COERCED/INVOLUNTARY SLAVERY & INDENTURED SERVITUDE & CRIMINAL RACKETEERING GOES ON UNABATED & THE MONIES EXTORTED HAVE NEVER BEEN RETURNED; THUS IT IS AN ONGOING CRIMINAL RICO ENTERPRISE - RIGHT DENNIS?, RIGHT MURPHY?, RIGHT MCGORTY
(McFly)?


******************************************************

All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?
Ted
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
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JOHN BRIDGE, et al., PETITIONERS v. PHOENIX
BOND & INDEMNITY CO. et al.
 
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
 
[June 9, 2008]
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.

     
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§1961-1968, provides a private right of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Act's criminal prohibitions. §1964(c). The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud must plead and prove that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that a showing of first-party reliance is not required, we affirm.
 

I
 
     Each year the Cook County, Illinois, Treasurer's Office holds a public auction at which it sells tax liens it has acquired on the property of delinquent taxpayers.1 Prospective buyers bid on the liens, but not in cash amounts. Instead, the bids are stated as percentage penalties the property owner must pay the winning bidder in order to clear the lien. The bidder willing to accept the lowest penalty wins the auction and obtains the right to purchase the lien in exchange for paying the outstanding taxes on the property. The property owner may then redeem the property by paying the lienholder the delinquent taxes, plus the penalty established at the auction and an additional 12% penalty on any taxes subsequently paid by the lienholder. If the property owner does not redeem the property within the statutory redemption period, the lienholder may obtain a tax deed for the property, thereby in effect purchasing the property for the value of the delinquent taxes.
 
     Because property acquired in this manner can often be sold at a significant profit over the amount paid for the lien, the auctions are marked by stiff competition. As a result, most parcels attract multiple bidders willing to accept the lowest penalty permissible--0%, that is to say, no penalty at all. (Perhaps to prevent the perverse incentive taxpayers would have if they could redeem their property from a winning bidder for less than the amount of their unpaid taxes, the county does not accept negative bids.) The lower limit of 0% creates a problem: Who wins when the bidding results in a tie? The county's solution is to allocate parcels "on a rotational basis" in order to ensure that liens are apportioned fairly among 0% bidders. App. 18.
 
     But this creates a perverse incentive of its own: Bidders who, in addition to bidding themselves, send agents to bid on their behalf will obtain a disproportionate share of liens. To prevent this kind of manipulation, the county adopted the "Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule," which requires each "tax buying entity" to submit bids in its own name and prohibits it from using "apparent agents, employees, or related entities" to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel.2 App. 67. Upon registering for an auction, each bidder must submit a sworn affidavit affirming that it complies with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule.
 
     Petitioners and respondents are regular participants in Cook County's tax sales. In July 2005, respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, contending that petitioners had fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by violating the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule at the auctions held from 2002 to 2005. According to respondents, petitioner Sabre Group, LLC, and its principal Barrett Rochman arranged for related firms to bid on Sabre Group's behalf and directed them to file false attestations that they complied with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule. Having thus fraudulently obtained the opportunity to participate in the auction, the related firms collusively bid on the same properties at a 0% rate. As a result, when the county allocated liens on a rotating basis,3 it treated the related firms as independent entities, allowing them collectively to acquire a greater number of liens than would have been granted to a single bidder acting alone. The related firms then purchased the liens and transferred the certificates of purchase to Sabre Group. In this way, respondents allege, petitioners deprived them and other bidders of their fair share of liens and the attendant financial benefits.
 
     Respondents' complaint contains five counts. Counts I-IV allege that petitioners violated and conspired to violate RICO by conducting their affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity involving numerous acts of mail fraud. In support of their allegations of mail fraud, respondents assert that petitioners "mailed or caused to be mailed hundreds of mailings in furtherance of the scheme," App. 49, when they sent property owners various notices required by Illinois law. Count V alleges a state-law claim of tortious interference with prospective business advantage.
 
     On petitioners' motion, the District Court dismissed respondents' RICO claims for lack of standing. It observed that "[o]nly [respondents] and other competing buyers, as opposed to the Treasurer or the property owners, would suffer a financial loss from a scheme to violate the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule." App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. But it concluded that respondents "are not in the class of individuals protected by the mail fraud statute, and therefore are not within the 'zone of interests' that the RICO statute protects," because they "were not recipients of the alleged misrepresentations and, at best were indirect victims of the alleged fraud." Id., at 18a. The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over respondents' tortious-interference claim and dismissed it without prejudice.

*****************************************************

SOUND FAMILIAR? What have the two Lawyers with "STANDING"; one being the Court Appointed Review Officer Dennis W alsh and the Governments lawyers Ben Torrance & Preet Bhararra, for the United States Attorneys Office, S.D.N.Y. and Federal District Court Judge Berman been telling you from day one - "standing denied". Well screw them, the United States Supreme Court says otherwise! You have standing via this precedent and you can sue and recover treble (TRIPLE) damages.

*****************************************************

     The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. It first concluded that "[s]tanding is not a problem in this suit" because plaintiffs suffered a "real injury" when they lost the valuable chance to acquire more liens, and because "that injury can be redressed by damages." 477 F. 3d 928, 930 (2007). The Court of Appeals next concluded that respondents had sufficiently alleged proximate cause under Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258 (1992), and Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451 (2006), because they (along with other losing bidders) were "immediately injured" by petitioners' scheme. 477 F. 3d, at 930-932. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' argument that respondents are not entitled to relief under RICO because they did not receive, and therefore did not rely on, any false statements: "A scheme that injures D by making false statements through the mail to E is mail fraud, and actionable by D through RICO if the injury is not derivative of someone else's." Id., at 932.

     With respect to this last holding, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that courts have taken conflicting views. By its count, "[t]hree other circuits that have considered this question agree ... that the direct victim may recover through RICO whether or not it is the direct recipient of the false statements," ibid. (citing Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Servs., Inc., 18 F. 3d 260, 263-264 (CA4 1994); Systems Management, Inc. v. Loiselle, 303 F. 3d 100, 103-104 (CA1 2002); Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F. 3d 251, 263 (CA2 2004)), whereas two Circuits hold that the plaintiff must show that it in fact relied on the defendant's misrepresentations, 477 F. 3d, at 932 (citing VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210 F. 3d 696, 701 (CA6 2000); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F. 3d 1350, 1360-1361 (CA11 2002)). Compare also Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indemnity Ins. Co., 319 F. 3d 205, 223 (CA5 2003) (recognizing "a narrow exception to the requirement that the plaintiff prove direct reliance on the defendant's fraudulent predicate act ... when the plaintiff can demonstrate injury as a direct and contemporaneous result of a fraud committed against a third party"), with Appletree Square I, L. P. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 29 F. 3d 1283, 1286-1287 (CA8 1994) (requiring the plaintiff to show that it detrimentally relied on the defendant's misrepresentations).
 
     We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. ___ (2008), to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals on "the substantial question," Anza, 547 U. S., at 461, whether first-party reliance is an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud.4


II
 
     We begin by setting forth the applicable statutory provisions. RICO's private right of action is contained in 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), which provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Section 1962 contains RICO's criminal prohibitions. Pertinent here is §1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with" an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." The term "racketeering activity" is defined to include a host of so-called predicate acts, including "any act which is indictable under ... section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)." §1961(1)(B).

*****************************************************

Given this is a June 8, 2008 D & O by the U.S. Sup Ct - every party, (the D.C., The UBCJA International & all of their in-house and hired out legal counsel; the R.O., the USAO-SDNY, & the Federal District Court) were put on notice that this was an available remedy for members obtaining standing; thus - by continually denying "standing"; whether indivdually or as a class to appear in Federal District Court, the practice was both discriminatory on its face and a violation of your Federal Due Process rights under the Constitutional guarantees and provides a seperate cause of action under the ongoing criminal RICO enterprise established by McCrarron, Sppencer and others wherein direct & willing participants appeared to have included the RO & USAO, D.C. & Benefit Trust Fund employees as well as multiple Contractor Associations and private contractors & developers.

*****************************************************


     The upshot is that RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to any person injured in his business or property by reason of the conduct of a qualifying enterprise's affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud. Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mail "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do." §1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any "mailing that is incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element," Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705, 712 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), even if the mailing itself "contain[s] no false information," id., at 715.
 
     Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents' theory of the case is straightforward. They allege that petitioners devised a scheme to defraud when they agreed to submit false attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule to the county. In furtherance of this scheme, petitioners used the mail on numerous occasions to send the requisite notices to property owners. Each of these mailings was an "act which is indictable" as mail fraud, and together they constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity." By conducting the affairs of their enterprise through this pattern of racketeering activity, petitioners violated §1962(c). As a result, respondents lost the opportunity to acquire valuable liens. Accordingly, respondents were injured in their business or property by reason of petitioners' violation of §1962(c), and RICO's plain terms give them a private right of action for treble damages.

*****************************************************

Straightforward - AS IS the case against the aforementioned parties for screwing you on the BLUE CARD and failing to litigate or your behalf against insurers; or to refund any ill gotten (stolen) monies to every member so burned, plus interest; trebled, plus attorneys fees & expenses; AS IS the case against the aforementione dparties fro screwing you on the Hod Hoist, BCA 7 other CBA's Wage Increase which was illegally converted/misappropriated to the Welfare Fund in yet another demonstrable case of ongoing criminal racketeering - wherein the USAO & RO as direct/willing participants; AS IS the current case being financed & run by the UBCJA International & NRCC against the NYCDCC via the CEMENT LEAGUE - to forever force 100% FULL MOBILITY down your throats and albeit, illegally into NLRB Board precedent wherein the NYCDCC legal counsel James Murphy and the court appointed Independent Monitor McGorty and another retired federal Judge, Judge Jones intentionally hid the facts of this case or its filing from the members; right through the 2-12-16 Board Decision & Order (D & O).
      Other than ixnaying Bilello on our written demands, Walsh, Torrance & Bhararra or Walsh's legal counsel did little else other than cover their own ass. To date, not one Audit, not one Refund to any member and no charges filed by anyone. The Court however, upon its own motion/action can intiate the process to move this along; less it too lose any & all apparent authority which it still holds.


*****************************************************
 
     Petitioners argue, however, that because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity consisted of acts of mail fraud, respondents must show that they relied on petitioners' fraudulent misrepresentations. This they cannot do, because the alleged misrepresentations--petitioners' attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule--were made to the county, not respondents. The county may well have relied on petitioners' misrepresentations when it permitted them to participate in the auction, but respondents, never having received the misrepresentations, could not have done so. Indeed, respondents do not even allege that they relied on petitioners' false attestations. Thus, petitioners submit, they fail to state a claim under RICO.

     If petitioners' proposed requirement of first-party reliance seems to come out of nowhere, there is a reason: Nothing on the face of the relevant statutory provisions imposes such a requirement. Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate act of racketeering under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation. See Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1999) ("The common-law requiremen[t] of 'justifiable reliance' ... plainly ha[s] no place in the [mail, wire, or bank] fraud statutes"). And one can conduct the affairs of a qualifying enterprise through a pattern of such acts without anyone relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation.
 
     It thus seems plain--and indeed petitioners do not dispute--that no showing of reliance is required to establish that a person has violated §1962(c) by conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of acts of mail fraud. See Anza, 547 U. S., at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Because an individual can commit an indictable act of mail or wire fraud even if no one relies on his fraud, he can engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of §1962, without proof of reliance").If reliance is required, then, it must be by virtue of §1964(c), which provides the right of action. But it is difficult to derive a first-party reliance requirement from §1964(c), which states simply that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" may sue for treble damages. The statute provides a right of action to "[a]ny person" injured by the violation, suggesting a breadth of coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit requirement that the plaintiff show reliance in addition to injury in his business or property.
 
     Moreover, a person can be injured "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud even if he has not relied on any misrepresentations. This is a case in point. Accepting their allegations as true, respondents clearly were injured by petitioners' scheme: As a result of petitioners' fraud, respondents lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been awarded. And this is true even though they did not rely on petitioners' false attestations of compliance with the county's rules. Or, to take another example, suppose an enterprise that wants to get rid of rival businesses mails misrepresentations about them to their customers and suppliers, but not to the rivals themselves. If the rival businesses lose money as a result of the misrepresentations, it would certainly seem that they were injured in their business "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud, even though they never received, and therefore never relied on, the fraudulent mailings. Yet petitioners concede that, on their reading of §1964(c), the rival businesses would have no cause of action under RICO, Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, even though they were the primary and intended victims of the scheme to defraud.

     Lacking textual support for this counterintuitive position, petitioners rely instead on a combination of common-law rules and policy arguments in an effort to show that Congress should be presumed to have made first-party reliance an element of a civil RICO claim based on mail fraud. None of petitioners' arguments persuades us to read a first-party reliance requirement into a statute that by its terms suggests none. 

III
 

A
 
     Petitioners first argue that RICO should be read to incorporate a first-party reliance requirement in fraud cases "under the rule that Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses." Neder, supra, at 23. It has long been settled, they contend, that only the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may recover for common-law fraud, and that he may do so "if, but only if ... he relies on the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action." Restatement (Second) of Torts §537 (1977). Given this background rule of common law, petitioners maintain, Congress should be presumed to have adopted a first-party reliance requirement when it created a civil cause of action under RICO for victims of mail fraud.
 
     In support of this argument, petitioners point to our decision in Beck v. Prupis, 529 U. S. 494 (2000). There, we considered the scope of RICO's private right of action for violations of §1962(d), which makes it "unlawful for any person to conspire to violate" RICO's criminal prohibitions. The question presented was "whether a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy may assert a civil RICO conspiracy claim under §1964(c) for a violation of §1962(d) even if the overt act does not constitute 'racketeering activity.' " Id., at 500. Answering this question in the negative, we held that "injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under RICO is not sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under §1964(c) for a violation of §1962(d)." Id., at 505 (citation omitted). In so doing, we "turn[ed] to the well-established common law of civil conspiracy." Id., at 500. Because it was "widely accepted" by the time of RICO's enactment "that a plaintiff could bring suit for civil conspiracy only if he had been injured by an act that was itself tortious," id., at 501, we presumed "that when Congress established in RICO a civil cause of action for a person 'injured ... by reason of' a 'conspir[acy],' it meant to adopt these well-established common-law civil conspiracy principles." Id., at 504 (quoting §§1964(c), 1962(d); alterations in original). We specifically declined to rely on the law of criminal conspiracy, relying instead on the law of civil conspiracy:
 

"We have turned to the common law of criminal conspiracy to define what constitutes a violation of §1962(d), see Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52, 63-65 (1997), a mere violation being all that is necessary for criminal liability. This case, however, does not present simply the question of what constitutes a violation of §1962(d), but rather the meaning of a civil cause of action for private injury by reason of such a violation. In other words, our task is to interpret §§1964(c) and 1962(d) in conjunction, rather than §1962(d) standing alone. The obvious source in the common law for the combined meaning of these provisions is the law of civil conspiracy." Id., at 501, n. 6.
 
     Petitioners argue that, as in Beck, we should look to the common-law meaning of civil fraud in order to give content to the civil cause of action §1964(c) provides for private injury by reason of a violation of §1962(c) based on a pattern of mail fraud. The analogy to Beck, however, is misplaced. The critical difference between Beck and this case is that in §1962(d) Congress used a term--"conspir[acy]"--that had a settled common-law meaning, whereas Congress included no such term in §1962(c). Section 1962(c) does not use the term "fraud"; nor does the operative language of §1961(1)(B), which defines "racketeering activity" to include "any act which is indictable under ... section 1341." And the indictable act under §1341 is not the fraudulent misrepresentation, but rather the use of the mails with the purpose of executing or attempting to execute a scheme to defraud. In short, the key term in §1962(c)--"racketeering activity"--is a defined term, and Congress defined the predicate act not as fraud simpliciter, but mail fraud--a statutory offense unknown to the common law. In these circumstances, the presumption that Congress intends to adopt the settled meaning of common-law terms has little pull. Cf. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 11) (rejecting the argument that §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78j(b), incorporates common-law fraud). There is simply no "reason to believe that Congress would have defined 'racketeering activity' to include acts indictable under the mail and wire fraud statutes, if it intended fraud-related acts to be predicate acts under RICO only when those acts would have been actionable under the common law." Anza, 547 U. S., at 477-478 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 
     Nor does it help petitioners' cause that here, as in Beck, the question is not simply "what constitutes a violation of §1962[(c)], but rather the meaning of a civil cause of action for private injury by reason of such a violation." 529 U. S., at 501, n. 6. To be sure, Beck held that a plaintiff cannot state a civil claim for conspiracy under §1964(c) merely by showing a violation of §1962(d) and a resulting injury. But in so doing, Beck relied not only on the fact that the term "conspiracy" had a settled common-law meaning, but also on the well-established common-law understanding of what it means to be injured by a conspiracy for purposes of bringing a civil claim for damages. See id., at 501-504. No comparable understanding exists with respect to injury caused by an enterprise conducting its affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud. And even the common-law understanding of injury caused by fraud does not support petitioners' argument. As discussed infra, at 16-17, the common law has long recognized that plaintiffs can recover in a variety of circumstances where, as here, their injuries result directly from the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations to a third party.

     For these reasons, we reject petitioners' contention that the "common-law meaning" rule dictates that reliance by the plaintiff is an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute. Congress chose to make mail fraud, not common-law fraud, the predicate act for a RICO violation. And "the mere fact that the predicate acts underlying a particular RICO violation happen to be fraud offenses does not mean that reliance, an element of common-law fraud, is also incorporated as an element of a civil RICO claim." Anza, supra, at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 

B
 
     Petitioners next argue that even if Congress did not make first-party reliance an element of a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud, a plaintiff who brings such a claim must show that it relied on the defendant's misrepresentations in order to establish the requisite element of causation. In Holmes, we recognized that §1964(c)'s "language can, of course, be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured 'by reason of' a RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that the defendant violated §1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant's violation was a 'but for' cause of plaintiff's injury." 503 U. S., at 265-266 (footnote omitted). We nonetheless held that not "all factually injured plaintiffs" may recover under §1964(c). Id., at 266. Because Congress modeled §1964(c) on other provisions that had been interpreted to "requir[e] a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a 'but for' cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well," we concluded that §1964(c) likewise requires the plaintiff to establish proximate cause in order to show injury "by reason of" a RICO violation. Id., at 268.
 
     Proximate cause, we explained, is a flexible concept that does not lend itself to " 'a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.' " Id., at 272, n. 20 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 536 (1983)). Instead, we "use[d] 'proximate cause' to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts," Holmes, 503 U. S., at 268, with a particular emphasis on the "demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged," ibid.; see also Anza, supra, at 461 ("When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries"). The direct-relation requirement avoids the difficulties associated with attempting "to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors," Holmes, 503 U. S., at 269; prevents courts from having "to adopt complicated rules of apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries," ibid.; and recognizes the fact that "directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely," id., at 269-270.5
 
     Pointing to our reliance on common-law proximate-causation principles in Holmes and Anza, petitioners argue that "[u]nder well-settled common-law principles, proximate cause is established for fraud claims only where the plaintiff can demonstrate that he relied on the misrepresentation." Brief for Petitioners 28. In support of this argument, petitioners cite Restatement (Second) of Torts §548A, which provides that "[a] fraudulent misrepresentation is a legal cause of a pecuniary loss resulting from action or inaction in reliance upon it if, but only if, the loss might reasonably be expected to result from the reliance." Thus, petitioners conclude, "a plaintiff asserting a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud cannot satisfy the proximate cause requirement unless he can establish that his injuries resulted from his reliance on the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation." Brief for Petitioners 28.
 
     Petitioners' argument is twice flawed. First, as explained above, the predicate act here is not common-law fraud, but mail fraud. Having rejected petitioners' argument that reliance is an element of a civil RICO claim based on mail fraud, we see no reason to let that argument in through the back door by holding that the proximate-cause analysis under RICO must precisely track the proximate-cause analysis of a common-law fraud claim. "Reliance is not a general limitation on civil recovery in tort; it 'is a specialized condition that happens to have grown up with common law fraud.' " Anza, 547 U. S., at 477 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Systems Management, 303 F. 3d, at 104). That "specialized condition," whether characterized as an element of the claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, simply has no place in a remedial scheme keyed to the commission of mail fraud, a statutory offense that is distinct from common-law fraud and that does not require proof of reliance.

     Second, while it may be that first-party reliance is an element of a common-law fraud claim, there is no general common-law principle holding that a fraudulent misrepresentation can cause legal injury only to those who rely on it. The Restatement provision cited by petitioners certainly does not support that proposition. It provides only that the plaintiff's loss must be a foreseeable result of someone's reliance on the misrepresentation.6 It does not say that only those who rely on the misrepresentation can suffer a legally cognizable injury. And any such notion would be contradicted by the long line of cases in which courts have permitted a plaintiff directly injured by a fraudulent misrepresentation to recover even though it was a third party, and not the plaintiff, who relied on the defendant's misrepresentation.7 Indeed, so well established is the defendant's liability in such circumstances that the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth as a "[g]eneral [p]rinciple" that "[o]ne who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances." §870. As an illustration, the Restatement provides the example of a defendant who "seeks to promote his own interests by telling a known falsehood to or about the plaintiff or his product." Id., Comment h (emphasis added). And the Restatement specifically recognizes "a cause of action" in favor of the injured party where the defendant "defrauds another for the purpose of causing pecuniary harm to a third person." Id., §435A, Comment a. Petitioners' contention that proximate cause has traditionally incorporated a first-party reliance requirement for claims based on fraud cannot be reconciled with these authorities.

     Nor is first-party reliance necessary to ensure that there is a sufficiently direct relationship between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's injury to satisfy the proximate-cause principles articulated in Holmes and Anza. Again, this is a case in point. Respondents' alleged injury--the loss of valuable liens--is the direct result of petitioners' fraud. It was a foreseeable and natural consequence of petitioners' scheme to obtain more liens for themselves that other bidders would obtain fewer liens. And here, unlike in Holmes and Anza, there are no independent factors that account for respondents' injury, there is no risk of duplicative recoveries by plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violation, and no more immediate victim is better situated to sue. Indeed, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents and other losing bidders were the only parties injured by petitioners' misrepresentations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a; 477 F. 3d, at 931. Petitioners quibble with that conclusion, asserting that the county would be injured too if the taint of fraud deterred potential bidders from participating in the auction. But that eventuality, in contrast to respondents' direct financial injury, seems speculative and remote.

     Of course, none of this is to say that a RICO plaintiff who alleges injury "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud can prevail without showing that someone relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Cf. Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59, 66 (1995) ("No one, of course, doubts that some degree of reliance is required to satisfy the element of causation inherent in the phrase 'obtained by' " in 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A), which prohibits the discharge of debts for money or property "obtained by" fraud). In most cases, the plaintiff will not be able to establish even but-for causation if no one relied on the misrepresentation. If, for example, the county had not accepted petitioners' false attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule, and as a result had not permitted petitioners to participate in the auction, respondents' injury would never have materialized. In addition, the complete absence of reliance may prevent the plaintiff from establishing proximate cause. Thus, for example, if the county knew petitioners' attestations were false but nonetheless permitted them to participate in the auction, then arguably the county's actions would constitute an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation between petitioners' misrepresentations and respondents' injury.
 
     Accordingly, it may well be that a RICO plaintiff alleging injury by reason of a pattern of mail fraud must establish at least third-party reliance in order to prove causation. "But the fact that proof of reliance is often used to prove an element of the plaintiff's cause of action, such as the element of causation, does not transform reliance itself into an element of the cause of action." Anza, 547 U. S., at 478 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nor does it transform first-party reliance into an indispensable requisite of proximate causation. Proof that the plaintiff relied on the defendant's misrepresentations may in some cases be sufficient to establish proximate cause, but there is no sound reason to conclude that such proof is always necessary. By the same token, the absence of first-party reliance may in some cases tend to show that an injury was not sufficiently direct to satisfy §1964(c)'s proximate-cause requirement, but it is not in and of itself dispositive. A contrary holding would ignore Holmes' instruction that proximate cause is generally not amenable to bright-line rules.
 

C
 
     As a last resort, petitioners contend that we should interpret RICO to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the "over-federalization" of traditional state-law claims. In petitioners' view, respondents' claim is essentially one for tortious interference with prospective business advantage, as evidenced by Count V of their complaint. Such claims have traditionally been handled under state law, and petitioners see no reason why Congress would have wanted to supplement traditional state-law remedies with a federal cause of action, complete with treble damages and attorney's fees, in a statute designed primarily to combat organized crime. See Anza, supra, at 471-475 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Beck, 529 U. S., at 496-497. A first-party reliance requirement, they say, is necessary "to prevent garden-variety disputes between local competitors (such as this case) from being converted into federal racketeering actions." Reply Brief for Petitioners 3.

     Whatever the merits of petitioners' arguments as a policy matter, we are not at liberty to rewrite RICO to reflect their--or our--views of good policy. We have repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe. See, e.g., National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 252 (1994) (rejecting the argument that "RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose"); H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 244 (1989) (rejecting "the argument for reading an organized crime limitation into RICO's pattern concept"); Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 481 (1985) (rejecting the view that RICO provides a private right of action "only against defendants who had been convicted on criminal charges, and only where there had occurred a 'racketeering injury' ").      
 
     We see no reason to change course here. RICO's text provides no basis for imposing a first-party reliance requirement. If the absence of such a requirement leads to the undue proliferation of RICO suits, the "correction must lie with Congress." Id., at 499. "It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it." Id., at 499-500.
 

IV
 
     For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations.
 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
 
It is so ordered.
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
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re: "Standing", Federal Courts, Judge Berman

excerpt at II A, par. 4:

United States Supreme Court

ALLEN v. WRIGHT, (1984)

No. 81-757

Argued: February 29, 1984    Decided: July 3, 1984


Like the prudential component, the constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition. The injury alleged must be, for example, "` distinct and palpable,'" Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 501), and not "abstract" or "conjectural" or "hypothetical," Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 -102 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). The injury must be "fairly" traceable to the challenged action, and relief from the injury must be "likely" to follow from a favorable decision. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 38 , 41. These terms cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise.
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

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JOHN BRIDGE, et al., PETITIONERS v. PHOENIX
BOND & INDEMNITY CO. et al.
 
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
 
[June 9, 2008]
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     Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.

     
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§1961-1968, provides a private right of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Act's criminal prohibitions. §1964(c). The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud must plead and prove that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that a showing of first-party reliance is not required, we affirm.
 

I
 
     Each year the Cook County, Illinois, Treasurer's Office holds a public auction at which it sells tax liens it has acquired on the property of delinquent taxpayers.1 Prospective buyers bid on the liens, but not in cash amounts. Instead, the bids are stated as percentage penalties the property owner must pay the winning bidder in order to clear the lien. The bidder willing to accept the lowest penalty wins the auction and obtains the right to purchase the lien in exchange for paying the outstanding taxes on the property. The property owner may then redeem the property by paying the lienholder the delinquent taxes, plus the penalty established at the auction and an additional 12% penalty on any taxes subsequently paid by the lienholder. If the property owner does not redeem the property within the statutory redemption period, the lienholder may obtain a tax deed for the property, thereby in effect purchasing the property for the value of the delinquent taxes.
 
     Because property acquired in this manner can often be sold at a significant profit over the amount paid for the lien, the auctions are marked by stiff competition. As a result, most parcels attract multiple bidders willing to accept the lowest penalty permissible--0%, that is to say, no penalty at all. (Perhaps to prevent the perverse incentive taxpayers would have if they could redeem their property from a winning bidder for less than the amount of their unpaid taxes, the county does not accept negative bids.) The lower limit of 0% creates a problem: Who wins when the bidding results in a tie? The county's solution is to allocate parcels "on a rotational basis" in order to ensure that liens are apportioned fairly among 0% bidders. App. 18.
 
     But this creates a perverse incentive of its own: Bidders who, in addition to bidding themselves, send agents to bid on their behalf will obtain a disproportionate share of liens. To prevent this kind of manipulation, the county adopted the "Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule," which requires each "tax buying entity" to submit bids in its own name and prohibits it from using "apparent agents, employees, or related entities" to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel.2 App. 67. Upon registering for an auction, each bidder must submit a sworn affidavit affirming that it complies with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule.
 
     Petitioners and respondents are regular participants in Cook County's tax sales. In July 2005, respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, contending that petitioners had fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by violating the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule at the auctions held from 2002 to 2005. According to respondents, petitioner Sabre Group, LLC, and its principal Barrett Rochman arranged for related firms to bid on Sabre Group's behalf and directed them to file false attestations that they complied with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule. Having thus fraudulently obtained the opportunity to participate in the auction, the related firms collusively bid on the same properties at a 0% rate. As a result, when the county allocated liens on a rotating basis,3 it treated the related firms as independent entities, allowing them collectively to acquire a greater number of liens than would have been granted to a single bidder acting alone. The related firms then purchased the liens and transferred the certificates of purchase to Sabre Group. In this way, respondents allege, petitioners deprived them and other bidders of their fair share of liens and the attendant financial benefits.
 
     Respondents' complaint contains five counts. Counts I-IV allege that petitioners violated and conspired to violate RICO by conducting their affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity involving numerous acts of mail fraud. In support of their allegations of mail fraud, respondents assert that petitioners "mailed or caused to be mailed hundreds of mailings in furtherance of the scheme," App. 49, when they sent property owners various notices required by Illinois law. Count V alleges a state-law claim of tortious interference with prospective business advantage.
 
     On petitioners' motion, the District Court dismissed respondents' RICO claims for lack of standing. It observed that "[o]nly [respondents] and other competing buyers, as opposed to the Treasurer or the property owners, would suffer a financial loss from a scheme to violate the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule." App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. But it concluded that respondents "are not in the class of individuals protected by the mail fraud statute, and therefore are not within the 'zone of interests' that the RICO statute protects," because they "were not recipients of the alleged misrepresentations and, at best were indirect victims of the alleged fraud." Id., at 18a. The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over respondents' tortious-interference claim and dismissed it without prejudice.

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SOUND FAMILIAR? What have the two Lawyers with "STANDING"; one being the Court Appointed Review Officer Dennis Walsh and the Governments lawyers Ben Torrance & Preet Bhararra, for the United States Attorneys Office, S.D.N.Y. and Federal District Court Judge Berman been telling you from day one - "standing denied". Well screw them, the United States Supreme Court says otherwise! You have standing via this precedent and you can sue and recover treble (TRIPLE) damages.

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     The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. It first concluded that "[s]tanding is not a problem in this suit" because plaintiffs suffered a "real injury" when they lost the valuable chance to acquire more liens, and because "that injury can be redressed by damages." 477 F. 3d 928, 930 (2007). The Court of Appeals next concluded that respondents had sufficiently alleged proximate cause under Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258 (1992), and Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451 (2006), because they (along with other losing bidders) were "immediately injured" by petitioners' scheme. 477 F. 3d, at 930-932. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' argument that respondents are not entitled to relief under RICO because they did not receive, and therefore did not rely on, any false statements: "A scheme that injures D by making false statements through the mail to E is mail fraud, and actionable by D through RICO if the injury is not derivative of someone else's." Id., at 932.

     With respect to this last holding, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that courts have taken conflicting views. By its count, "[t]hree other circuits that have considered this question agree ... that the direct victim may recover through RICO whether or not it is the direct recipient of the false statements," ibid. (citing Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Servs., Inc., 18 F. 3d 260, 263-264 (CA4 1994); Systems Management, Inc. v. Loiselle, 303 F. 3d 100, 103-104 (CA1 2002); Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F. 3d 251, 263 (CA2 2004)), whereas two Circuits hold that the plaintiff must show that it in fact relied on the defendant's misrepresentations, 477 F. 3d, at 932 (citing VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210 F. 3d 696, 701 (CA6 2000); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F. 3d 1350, 1360-1361 (CA11 2002)). Compare also Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indemnity Ins. Co., 319 F. 3d 205, 223 (CA5 2003) (recognizing "a narrow exception to the requirement that the plaintiff prove direct reliance on the defendant's fraudulent predicate act ... when the plaintiff can demonstrate injury as a direct and contemporaneous result of a fraud committed against a third party"), with Appletree Square I, L. P. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 29 F. 3d 1283, 1286-1287 (CA8 1994) (requiring the plaintiff to show that it detrimentally relied on the defendant's misrepresentations).
 
     We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. ___ (2008), to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals on "the substantial question," Anza, 547 U. S., at 461, whether first-party reliance is an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud.4


II
 
     We begin by setting forth the applicable statutory provisions. RICO's private right of action is contained in 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), which provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Section 1962 contains RICO's criminal prohibitions. Pertinent here is §1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with" an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." The term "racketeering activity" is defined to include a host of so-called predicate acts, including "any act which is indictable under ... section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)." §1961(1)(B).

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Given this is a June 8, 2008 D & O by the U.S. Sup Ct - every party, (the D.C., The UBCJA International & all of their in-house and hired out legal counsel; the R.O., the USAO-SDNY, & the Federal District Court) were put on notice that this was an available remedy for members obtaining standing; thus - by continually denying "standing"; whether indivdually or as a class to appear in Federal District Court, the practice was both discriminatory on its face and a violation of your Federal Due Process rights under the Constitutional guarantees and provides a seperate cause of action under the ongoing criminal RICO enterprise established by McCrarron, Spencer and others wherein direct & willing participants appeared to have included the RO & USAO, D.C. & Benefit Trust Fund employees as well as multiple Contractor Associations and private contractors & developers.

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     The upshot is that RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to any person injured in his business or property by reason of the conduct of a qualifying enterprise's affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud. Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mail "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do." §1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any "mailing that is incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element," Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705, 712 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), even if the mailing itself "contain[s] no false information," id., at 715.
 
     Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents' theory of the case is straightforward. They allege that petitioners devised a scheme to defraud when they agreed to submit false attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule to the county. In furtherance of this scheme, petitioners used the mail on numerous occasions to send the requisite notices to property owners. Each of these mailings was an "act which is indictable" as mail fraud, and together they constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity." By conducting the affairs of their enterprise through this pattern of racketeering activity, petitioners violated §1962(c). As a result, respondents lost the opportunity to acquire valuable liens. Accordingly, respondents were injured in their business or property by reason of petitioners' violation of §1962(c), and RICO's plain terms give them a private right of action for treble damages.

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Straightforward - 

AS IS the case against the aforementioned parties for screwing you on the BLUE CARD and failing to litigate or your behalf against Insurers & re-Insurers; or to refund any ill gotten (stolen) monies to every member so burned, plus interest; trebled, plus attorneys fees & expenses;

AS IS the case against the aforementioned parties for screwing you on the Hod Hoist, BCA & other CBA's Wage Increase which was illegally converted/misappropriated to the Welfare Fund in yet another demonstrable case of ongoing criminal racketeering - wherein the USAO & RO were direct/willing participants in the cover-up for the theft of funds, the failure to prosecute EST Bilello, President McGinnis, Vice President Cavanaugh; every Trustee & Fiduciary, the in house D.C. legal counsel or the Welfare Fund legal counsel for their role in continuing Crimnal RICO Racketeering in the NYCDCC & for violating the very core of the 1994 Consent Decree to which they were all legally bound. The fact is, both the R.O. & the U.S.A.O were both grossly negligent in their core/sworn duties and so to should be prosecuted for conspiring to cover it up & bury it;

AS IS the current  NLRB Board case being financed & run by the UBCJA International, Doug McCarron & his handlers & the NRCC against the NYCDCC via the CEMENT LEAGUE  - to forever force 100% FULL MOBILITY down your throats and albeit, illegally into NLRB Board precedent wherein the NYCDCC legal counsel James Murphy and the court appointed Independent Monitor McGorty and another retired federal Judge, Judge Jones intentionally hid the facts of this case or its filing from the members; right through the 2-12-16 Board Decision & Order (D & O).
     
Other than ixnaying Lebo & Bilello on our written demands, Walsh, Torrance & Bhararra or Walsh's legal counsel did little else other than cover their own ass.

To date, there has not been one Audit conducted by the former RO Walsh or the current I.M. McGorty for the BLUE CARD or for the SECTION 21 BY-LAW illegal  theft of member Vacation Wages or for the illegal misappropriation/conversion of member Pay Raises to the Welfare Trust Fund and there has not been one Motion filed in Judge Bermans Court to force the D.C. to Refund any member and no criminal or civil charges filed by anyone. The Court however, upon its own motion/action can intiate the process to move this along; less it too lose any & all apparent authority or credibility which it might still hold.


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     Petitioners argue, however, that because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity consisted of acts of mail fraud, respondents must show that they relied on petitioners' fraudulent misrepresentations. This they cannot do, because the alleged misrepresentations--petitioners' attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule--were made to the county, not respondents. The county may well have relied on petitioners' misrepresentations when it permitted them to participate in the auction, but respondents, never having received the misrepresentations, could not have done so. Indeed, respondents do not even allege that they relied on petitioners' false attestations. Thus, petitioners submit, they fail to state a claim under RICO.

     If petitioners' proposed requirement of first-party reliance seems to come out of nowhere, there is a reason: Nothing on the face of the relevant statutory provisions imposes such a requirement. Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate act of racketeering under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation. See Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1999) ("The common-law requiremen[t] of 'justifiable reliance' ... plainly ha[s] no place in the [mail, wire, or bank] fraud statutes"). And one can conduct the affairs of a qualifying enterprise through a pattern of such acts without anyone relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation.
 
     It thus seems plain--and indeed petitioners do not dispute--that no showing of reliance is required to establish that a person has violated §1962(c) by conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of acts of mail fraud. See Anza, 547 U. S., at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Because an individual can commit an indictable act of mail or wire fraud even if no one relies on his fraud, he can engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of §1962, without proof of reliance").If reliance is required, then, it must be by virtue of §1964(c), which provides the right of action. But it is difficult to derive a first-party reliance requirement from §1964(c), which states simply that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" may sue for treble damages. The statute provides a right of action to "[a]ny person" injured by the violation, suggesting a breadth of coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit requirement that the plaintiff show reliance in addition to injury in his business or property.
 
     Moreover, a person can be injured "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud even if he has not relied on any misrepresentations. This is a case in point. Accepting their allegations as true, respondents clearly were injured by petitioners' scheme: As a result of petitioners' fraud, respondents lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been awarded. And this is true even though they did not rely on petitioners' false attestations of compliance with the county's rules. Or, to take another example, suppose an enterprise that wants to get rid of rival businesses mails misrepresentations about them to their customers and suppliers, but not to the rivals themselves. If the rival businesses lose money as a result of the misrepresentations, it would certainly seem that they were injured in their business "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud, even though they never received, and therefore never relied on, the fraudulent mailings. Yet petitioners concede that, on their reading of §1964(c), the rival businesses would have no cause of action under RICO, Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, even though they were the primary and intended victims of the scheme to defraud.

     Lacking textual support for this counterintuitive position, petitioners rely instead on a combination of common-law rules and policy arguments in an effort to show that Congress should be presumed to have made first-party reliance an element of a civil RICO claim based on mail fraud. None of petitioners' arguments persuades us to read a first-party reliance requirement into a statute that by its terms suggests none. 

III
 

A
 
     Petitioners first argue that RICO should be read to incorporate a first-party reliance requirement in fraud cases "under the rule that Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses." Neder, supra, at 23. It has long been settled, they contend, that only the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may recover for common-law fraud, and that he may do so "if, but only if ... he relies on the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action." Restatement (Second) of Torts §537 (1977). Given this background rule of common law, petitioners maintain, Congress should be presumed to have adopted a first-party reliance requirement when it created a civil cause of action under RICO for victims of mail fraud.
 
     In support of this argument, petitioners point to our decision in Beck v. Prupis, 529 U. S. 494 (2000). There, we considered the scope of RICO's private right of action for violations of §1962(d), which makes it "unlawful for any person to conspire to violate" RICO's criminal prohibitions. The question presented was "whether a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy may assert a civil RICO conspiracy claim under §1964(c) for a violation of §1962(d) even if the overt act does not constitute 'racketeering activity.' " Id., at 500. Answering this question in the negative, we held that "injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under RICO is not sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under §1964(c) for a violation of §1962(d)." Id., at 505 (citation omitted). In so doing, we "turn[ed] to the well-established common law of civil conspiracy." Id., at 500. Because it was "widely accepted" by the time of RICO's enactment "that a plaintiff could bring suit for civil conspiracy only if he had been injured by an act that was itself tortious," id., at 501, we presumed "that when Congress established in RICO a civil cause of action for a person 'injured ... by reason of' a 'conspir[acy],' it meant to adopt these well-established common-law civil conspiracy principles." Id., at 504 (quoting §§1964(c), 1962(d); alterations in original). We specifically declined to rely on the law of criminal conspiracy, relying instead on the law of civil conspiracy:
 

"We have turned to the common law of criminal conspiracy to define what constitutes a violation of §1962(d), see Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52, 63-65 (1997), a mere violation being all that is necessary for criminal liability. This case, however, does not present simply the question of what constitutes a violation of §1962(d), but rather the meaning of a civil cause of action for private injury by reason of such a violation. In other words, our task is to interpret §§1964(c) and 1962(d) in conjunction, rather than §1962(d) standing alone. The obvious source in the common law for the combined meaning of these provisions is the law of civil conspiracy." Id., at 501, n. 6.
 
     Petitioners argue that, as in Beck, we should look to the common-law meaning of civil fraud in order to give content to the civil cause of action §1964(c) provides for private injury by reason of a violation of §1962(c) based on a pattern of mail fraud. The analogy to Beck, however, is misplaced. The critical difference between Beck and this case is that in §1962(d) Congress used a term--"conspir[acy]"--that had a settled common-law meaning, whereas Congress included no such term in §1962(c). Section 1962(c) does not use the term "fraud"; nor does the operative language of §1961(1)(B), which defines "racketeering activity" to include "any act which is indictable under ... section 1341." And the indictable act under §1341 is not the fraudulent misrepresentation, but rather the use of the mails with the purpose of executing or attempting to execute a scheme to defraud. In short, the key term in §1962(c)--"racketeering activity"--is a defined term, and Congress defined the predicate act not as fraud simpliciter, but mail fraud--a statutory offense unknown to the common law. In these circumstances, the presumption that Congress intends to adopt the settled meaning of common-law terms has little pull. Cf. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 11) (rejecting the argument that §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78j(b), incorporates common-law fraud). There is simply no "reason to believe that Congress would have defined 'racketeering activity' to include acts indictable under the mail and wire fraud statutes, if it intended fraud-related acts to be predicate acts under RICO only when those acts would have been actionable under the common law." Anza, 547 U. S., at 477-478 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 
     Nor does it help petitioners' cause that here, as in Beck, the question is not simply "what constitutes a violation of §1962[(c)], but rather the meaning of a civil cause of action for private injury by reason of such a violation." 529 U. S., at 501, n. 6. To be sure, Beck held that a plaintiff cannot state a civil claim for conspiracy under §1964(c) merely by showing a violation of §1962(d) and a resulting injury. But in so doing, Beck relied not only on the fact that the term "conspiracy" had a settled common-law meaning, but also on the well-established common-law understanding of what it means to be injured by a conspiracy for purposes of bringing a civil claim for damages. See id., at 501-504. No comparable understanding exists with respect to injury caused by an enterprise conducting its affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud. And even the common-law understanding of injury caused by fraud does not support petitioners' argument. As discussed infra, at 16-17, the common law has long recognized that plaintiffs can recover in a variety of circumstances where, as here, their injuries result directly from the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations to a third party.

     For these reasons, we reject petitioners' contention that the "common-law meaning" rule dictates that reliance by the plaintiff is an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute. Congress chose to make mail fraud, not common-law fraud, the predicate act for a RICO violation. And "the mere fact that the predicate acts underlying a particular RICO violation happen to be fraud offenses does not mean that reliance, an element of common-law fraud, is also incorporated as an element of a civil RICO claim." Anza, supra, at 476 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 

B
 
     Petitioners next argue that even if Congress did not make first-party reliance an element of a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud, a plaintiff who brings such a claim must show that it relied on the defendant's misrepresentations in order to establish the requisite element of causation. In Holmes, we recognized that §1964(c)'s "language can, of course, be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured 'by reason of' a RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that the defendant violated §1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant's violation was a 'but for' cause of plaintiff's injury." 503 U. S., at 265-266 (footnote omitted). We nonetheless held that not "all factually injured plaintiffs" may recover under §1964(c). Id., at 266. Because Congress modeled §1964(c) on other provisions that had been interpreted to "requir[e] a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a 'but for' cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well," we concluded that §1964(c) likewise requires the plaintiff to establish proximate cause in order to show injury "by reason of" a RICO violation. Id., at 268.
 
     Proximate cause, we explained, is a flexible concept that does not lend itself to " 'a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.' " Id., at 272, n. 20 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 536 (1983)). Instead, we "use[d] 'proximate cause' to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts," Holmes, 503 U. S., at 268, with a particular emphasis on the "demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged," ibid.; see also Anza, supra, at 461 ("When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries"). The direct-relation requirement avoids the difficulties associated with attempting "to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors," Holmes, 503 U. S., at 269; prevents courts from having "to adopt complicated rules of apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries," ibid.; and recognizes the fact that "directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely," id., at 269-270.5
 
     Pointing to our reliance on common-law proximate-causation principles in Holmes and Anza, petitioners argue that "[u]nder well-settled common-law principles, proximate cause is established for fraud claims only where the plaintiff can demonstrate that he relied on the misrepresentation." Brief for Petitioners 28. In support of this argument, petitioners cite Restatement (Second) of Torts §548A, which provides that "[a] fraudulent misrepresentation is a legal cause of a pecuniary loss resulting from action or inaction in reliance upon it if, but only if, the loss might reasonably be expected to result from the reliance." Thus, petitioners conclude, "a plaintiff asserting a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud cannot satisfy the proximate cause requirement unless he can establish that his injuries resulted from his reliance on the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation." Brief for Petitioners 28.
 
     Petitioners' argument is twice flawed. First, as explained above, the predicate act here is not common-law fraud, but mail fraud. Having rejected petitioners' argument that reliance is an element of a civil RICO claim based on mail fraud, we see no reason to let that argument in through the back door by holding that the proximate-cause analysis under RICO must precisely track the proximate-cause analysis of a common-law fraud claim. "Reliance is not a general limitation on civil recovery in tort; it 'is a specialized condition that happens to have grown up with common law fraud.' " Anza, 547 U. S., at 477 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Systems Management, 303 F. 3d, at 104). That "specialized condition," whether characterized as an element of the claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, simply has no place in a remedial scheme keyed to the commission of mail fraud, a statutory offense that is distinct from common-law fraud and that does not require proof of reliance.

     Second, while it may be that first-party reliance is an element of a common-law fraud claim, there is no general common-law principle holding that a fraudulent misrepresentation can cause legal injury only to those who rely on it. The Restatement provision cited by petitioners certainly does not support that proposition. It provides only that the plaintiff's loss must be a foreseeable result of someone's reliance on the misrepresentation.6 It does not say that only those who rely on the misrepresentation can suffer a legally cognizable injury. And any such notion would be contradicted by the long line of cases in which courts have permitted a plaintiff directly injured by a fraudulent misrepresentation to recover even though it was a third party, and not the plaintiff, who relied on the defendant's misrepresentation.7 Indeed, so well established is the defendant's liability in such circumstances that the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth as a "[g]eneral [p]rinciple" that "[o]ne who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances." §870. As an illustration, the Restatement provides the example of a defendant who "seeks to promote his own interests by telling a known falsehood to or about the plaintiff or his product." Id., Comment h (emphasis added). And the Restatement specifically recognizes "a cause of action" in favor of the injured party where the defendant "defrauds another for the purpose of causing pecuniary harm to a third person." Id., §435A, Comment a. Petitioners' contention that proximate cause has traditionally incorporated a first-party reliance requirement for claims based on fraud cannot be reconciled with these authorities.

     Nor is first-party reliance necessary to ensure that there is a sufficiently direct relationship between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's injury to satisfy the proximate-cause principles articulated in Holmes and Anza. Again, this is a case in point. Respondents' alleged injury--the loss of valuable liens--is the direct result of petitioners' fraud. It was a foreseeable and natural consequence of petitioners' scheme to obtain more liens for themselves that other bidders would obtain fewer liens. And here, unlike in Holmes and Anza, there are no independent factors that account for respondents' injury, there is no risk of duplicative recoveries by plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violation, and no more immediate victim is better situated to sue. Indeed, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents and other losing bidders were the only parties injured by petitioners' misrepresentations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a; 477 F. 3d, at 931. Petitioners quibble with that conclusion, asserting that the county would be injured too if the taint of fraud deterred potential bidders from participating in the auction. But that eventuality, in contrast to respondents' direct financial injury, seems speculative and remote.

     Of course, none of this is to say that a RICO plaintiff who alleges injury "by reason of" a pattern of mail fraud can prevail without showing that someone relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Cf. Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59, 66 (1995) ("No one, of course, doubts that some degree of reliance is required to satisfy the element of causation inherent in the phrase 'obtained by' " in 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A), which prohibits the discharge of debts for money or property "obtained by" fraud). In most cases, the plaintiff will not be able to establish even but-for causation if no one relied on the misrepresentation. If, for example, the county had not accepted petitioners' false attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule, and as a result had not permitted petitioners to participate in the auction, respondents' injury would never have materialized. In addition, the complete absence of reliance may prevent the plaintiff from establishing proximate cause. Thus, for example, if the county knew petitioners' attestations were false but nonetheless permitted them to participate in the auction, then arguably the county's actions would constitute an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation between petitioners' misrepresentations and respondents' injury.
 
     Accordingly, it may well be that a RICO plaintiff alleging injury by reason of a pattern of mail fraud must establish at least third-party reliance in order to prove causation. "But the fact that proof of reliance is often used to prove an element of the plaintiff's cause of action, such as the element of causation, does not transform reliance itself into an element of the cause of action." Anza, 547 U. S., at 478 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nor does it transform first-party reliance into an indispensable requisite of proximate causation. Proof that the plaintiff relied on the defendant's misrepresentations may in some cases be sufficient to establish proximate cause, but there is no sound reason to conclude that such proof is always necessary. By the same token, the absence of first-party reliance may in some cases tend to show that an injury was not sufficiently direct to satisfy §1964(c)'s proximate-cause requirement, but it is not in and of itself dispositive. A contrary holding would ignore Holmes' instruction that proximate cause is generally not amenable to bright-line rules.
 

C
 
     As a last resort, petitioners contend that we should interpret RICO to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the "over-federalization" of traditional state-law claims. In petitioners' view, respondents' claim is essentially one for tortious interference with prospective business advantage, as evidenced by Count V of their complaint. Such claims have traditionally been handled under state law, and petitioners see no reason why Congress would have wanted to supplement traditional state-law remedies with a federal cause of action, complete with treble damages and attorney's fees, in a statute designed primarily to combat organized crime. See Anza, supra, at 471-475 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Beck, 529 U. S., at 496-497. A first-party reliance requirement, they say, is necessary "to prevent garden-variety disputes between local competitors (such as this case) from being converted into federal racketeering actions." Reply Brief for Petitioners 3.

     Whatever the merits of petitioners' arguments as a policy matter, we are not at liberty to rewrite RICO to reflect their--or our--views of good policy. We have repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe. See, e.g., National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 252 (1994) (rejecting the argument that "RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose"); H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 244 (1989) (rejecting "the argument for reading an organized crime limitation into RICO's pattern concept"); Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 481 (1985) (rejecting the view that RICO provides a private right of action "only against defendants who had been convicted on criminal charges, and only where there had occurred a 'racketeering injury' ").      
 
     We see no reason to change course here. RICO's text provides no basis for imposing a first-party reliance requirement. If the absence of such a requirement leads to the undue proliferation of RICO suits, the "correction must lie with Congress." Id., at 499. "It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it." Id., at 499-500.
 

IV
 
     For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations.
 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
 
It is so ordered.

All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?  
Ted
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

Ted
In reply to this post by Ted
This post was updated on Dec 21, 2011; 12:47am.
In reply to this post by Ted
ERISA § 1108(c)(2) excerpt 2nd Cir. 8-20-02

Before: MINER and SACK, Circuit Judges, and BERMAN, District Judge.*
The clear intent of § 1108(c)(2) is to allow a fiduciary, which is otherwise prohibited from engaging in self-dealing transactions by § 1106, to receive reasonable compensation for the administration of a retirement fund. As we stated in Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1216 n. 4 (2d Cir.1987), "the services exempted under ERISA Section [1108(c)(2)] are services rendered to a plan and paid for by a plan for the performance of plan duties." Lobbying, and litigation against plan beneficiaries or their trustees cannot be construed "plan duties."
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Excerpt December 21, 2011:

July 18, 2003 VACATION PLAN FUND
PRUDENT ACTIONS BY PLAN FIDUCIAIRIES


If it should happen that Vacation Plan fiduciaries misuse the Plan’s money, {seriously, they wrote this...had to have been Forde...Guilty Conscience, advance admissions...you can't make this stuff up} or if you are discriminated against for asserting your rights,you may seek assistance from the U.S. Department of Labor, or you may file suit in a federal court. The court will decide who should pay court costs and legal fees.
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re: In response to the original Question posed by Pete Corrigan....your new By-Laws have seen the BLUE CARD VACATION WAGE EXTORTION SCHEME (half billion dollar fraud/extortion/Criminal RICO violations by McCarron) morph right back to the OLD PERMIT SYSTEM as evidenced below. NYCDCC is an EXCLUSIVE HIRING HALL as defined by the NLRB and the SECOND CIRCUIT, via the Gene Clarke cases, which remain "good law".
_________________________________________________

AUGUST 2011 NYCDCC BY-LAWS APPROVED BY JUDGE BERMAN:

SECTION 14:  
WORKING DUES (DUES CHECK-OFF); SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND PER CAPITA TAX  


(A) The Council shall receive working dues in the amount of 1% of the members total package rate as reflected in the current collective bargaining agreement covering members for each hour worked. The Council shall also receive working dues from each member of $.60 per hour for each hour worked, subject to review and modification by the Council Delegate Body after review and report by the Audit Committee. This $.60 will be allocated to Organizing in the amount of $.50 an hour, $.05 for Communications and $.05 for Civic Action. The apportionment of working dues amongst Organizing, Communications, and Civic Action shall be maintained in the same proportions as outlined in the prior sentence, subject to review and modification by the Council Delegate Body after review and report by the Audit Committee. The working dues to this Council shall be due on the first day of the month and must be paid not later than the 15th day of the following month. The Council shall also receive working dues of $500 per year from every carpenter who has performed carpentry work for a signatory contractor in our jurisdiction during the calendar year. This $500 working dues to this Council shall be due on the first day of the month following the first day of work performed in our jurisdiction each year and must be paid not later than April 15th of the following year, provided however, that any member who shall have satisfied his or her Union Participation requirement for the applicable year, pursuant to Section 14(F) of the Bylaws, will receive credit for this $500 working dues requirement. The sums stated in this paragraph shall be reviewed periodically to determine if prudence requires that they be reduced or increased.
__________________________________________

The NYCDCC, USAO, RO and the Court have collectively failed to remove the illegal provisions mandating forced compliance against your Section 7 Federal Right to "refrain from any & all activities", per LMRDA 1959 amendments. Instead of expunging the extortionate exaction in violation of NLRA Section 7 and the LMRDA, they have simply altered the language slightly and re-worded it to something they believe will allow them to continue the Master Plan for McCarron to implement the program nationally, raise it to $1,000 per head, per year and ultimately allow him to extort half a billion plus each and every year.

$512 Million dollars per year based on UBCJA International reports filed with OLMS, thus mooting the false claims of eliminating racketeering and restoring democracy. This scam is better than running drugs it seems, and far more profitable. That kind of money buys a lot of injustice.

The current By-Laws below have additional illegalities built in, which also must be severed & expunged, short of filing additional charges at the NLRB. This is labor law 101, and the coerced/mandated compliance to a facially unlawful rule does not survive scrutiny within Board, Appellate or Supreme Court precedents, notwithstanding application of the All Writs Act yet applied, but doomed to failure as well.

The NYC District Council of Carpenters paid top dollar for the Fiduciary Liability Covergae and policies, each of which has a 6-year statute of limitations. It is time for the newly elected EST, President & Vice President to call in these policies, all of them from 2006-2011 and it is time that the Insurer made the members who were defrauded whole, with punitive damages, attorney fees & expenses and interest and it is time for the Welfare Fund to forego any & all illegal gotten gains now held in their control, to which Paul Tyzner admittedly stated totaled $58 Million dollars during the November 16, 2011 Javit's debate.

No time like the present to act decisively, denial and silence not being options on the table.

_________________________________________

JOHN BRIDGE, et al., PETITIONERS v. PHOENIX
BOND & INDEMNITY CO. et al.
 
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
 
[June 9, 2008]
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     Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.


                                                II
 
     We begin by setting forth the applicable statutory provisions. RICO's private right of action is contained in 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), which provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Section 1962 contains RICO's criminal prohibitions. Pertinent here is §1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with" an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." The term "racketeering activity" is defined to include a host of so-called predicate acts, including "any act which is indictable under ... section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)." §1961(1)(B).

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Given this is a June 8, 2008 D & O by the U.S. Sup Ct - every party, (the D.C., The UBCJA International & all of their in-house and hired out legal counsel; the R.O., the USAO-SDNY, & the Federal District Court) were put on notice that this was an available remedy for members obtaining standing; thus - by continually denying "standing"; whether indivdually or as a class to appear in Federal District Court, the practice was both discriminatory on its face and a violation of your Federal Due Process rights under the Constitutional guarantees and provides a seperate cause of action under the ongoing criminal RICO enterprise established by McCrarron, Spencer and others wherein direct & willing participants appeared to have included the RO & USAO, D.C. & Benefit Trust Fund employees as well as multiple Contractor Associations and private contractors & developers.

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     The upshot is that RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to any person injured in his business or property by reason of the conduct of a qualifying enterprise's affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud. Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mail "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do." §1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any "mailing that is incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element," Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705, 712 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), even if the mailing itself "contain[s] no false information," id., at 715.
 
     Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents' theory of the case is straightforward. They allege that petitioners devised a scheme to defraud when they agreed to submit false attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule to the county. In furtherance of this scheme, petitioners used the mail on numerous occasions to send the requisite notices to property owners. Each of these mailings was an "act which is indictable" as mail fraud, and together they constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity." By conducting the affairs of their enterprise through this pattern of racketeering activity, petitioners violated §1962(c). As a result, respondents lost the opportunity to acquire valuable liens. Accordingly, respondents were injured in their business or property by reason of petitioners' violation of §1962(c), and RICO's plain terms give them a private right of action for treble damages.

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Here's your case - right here. The NYCDCC & the Benefit Trust funds both maintian Fiduciairy liability coverage & excess coverage via re-insurers.

You have direct evidence of the the BLUE CARD VACATION WAGE EXTORTION racketeering scheme, mail & wire fraud, cover-up's by those who were the primary drafters/authors of the scheme (McCarron, Newman, Walsh, Conboy, Forde, Greaney, the Trustees for the Union & the Employers at the Funds) and the cover-up and failure to prosecute by the inept U.S. Attorneys Office.

Given it is an ongoing criminal Rackettering scheme and that the very same players are still collecting the illegal Fines and still are forcing you to perform One Seven (7) Hour Day of mandatory Leaflet, Banner or picket Duty - it's an ongoing  criminal enterprise  so the clock is still ticking and every issue remians live and you statute of limitations have not run out.

You have standing, you have a prima-facie case which is irrefutable; right here, right under your nose and all one of you has to do is copy this thread - hand it to a competent lawyer and get the ball rolling to sue these corrupt bastards. And the best part - you can treble (triple) your damages and obtain Attorneys Fees & Expenses.

So who among the 13,851 members of the NYCDCC wil take this information and file suit?

________________________________________________
 All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?  
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Re: BLUE CARD BOY LIVES

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals
     Sweeney v. Pence
         No.13-1264
     Decided 9-12-14


..."the First Amendment “protects the right to be free from government abridgement of speech,” but it does not “require[ ]” the government “to assist others in funding the expression of particular ideas, including political ones.” Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009). ."
___________________________________

The UBCJA International sponsored/funded Blue Card and its morphed cousin named the White Card as well as every other District Council mandatory Union Participation Program (UPP) mandate coercing & forcing all Union members to perform mandatory Leaflet, Banner or Picket Duty via fine; however disguised or re-worded; OR any other mandated participation requirement whether or not political violates the NLRA Section 7 'right' to refrain from any & all duty which the Union proscribes and forces upon its members and per all past posts remain illegal, facially unlawful under all federal statute, law, Appellate Court & United States Supreme court precedents. And, it also vioates your Free Speech and First Amendment rights as well.

The UBCJA International knows this as fact as does its corporate counsel; as does the former Review Officer & current Independent Monitor Glen McGorty as does the government/United States Attorney for the S.D.N.Y. and Federal District Court Judge Richard M. Berman.

The UBCJA International flaunts the laws & precedent at will and w/o application at any time to the Federal District Court to subvert Federal law via any All Writs Act application and/or approval by the Court; nor could it.; thus, via the fines, penalties collected, whether or not disguised as refunds, work assessments, dues or any other name they conjure up - the clear facts prove that the UBCJA International & its affilated District Councils and Local Unions are running an inter-state Hobbs Act criminal Racketeering operation through all 50-States, the District of Columbia etc.

The UBCJA has raked in hundreds of millions of dollars & are pushing close/exceeding to a billion dollars in illegal collections & racketeering since the illegal programs inception; yet, the hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil or catch no evil and very inept and complicit U.S. Attorneys Office in Manhattan does absolutely nothing to stop the criminal racketeering of the UBCJA International. Instead of preventing it, it willingly participates in the continued raping & extortion of the members in NYC and nationally.

Benjamin Torrance and Preet Bhararra are unfit to practice law in the State of New York and should be removed from the Consent Decree and replaced with competent legal counsel who would pursue this very simple & straight-forward prima-facie racketeering case and one who would seat a grand jury and indict the parties previously named throughout every post in this thread.

_________________________________

All criminal suspects are guilty until proven innocent in a UBCJA Kangaroo Court of law, a court of law; ahh, shit - I meant innocent until proven guilty in a corruption free court of law, or are they?  


Sue me - I double-dog dare you to; any of you!
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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2015 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

OCASIO v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14–361. Argued October 6, 2015—Decided May 2, 2016


Petitioner Samuel Ocasio, a former police officer, participated in a kickback scheme in which he and other officers routed damaged vehicles from accident scenes to an auto repair shop in exchange for payments from the shopowners. Petitioner was charged with obtaining money from the shopowners under color of official right, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. §1951, and of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §371. At trial, the District Court rejected petitioner’s argument that—because the Hobbs Act prohibits the obtaining of property “from another”—a Hobbs Act conspiracy
requires proof that the alleged conspirators agreed to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy. Petitioner was convicted on all counts, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Petitioner now
challenges his conspiracy conviction, contending that he cannot be convicted of conspiring with the shop owners to obtain money from them under color of official right.

Held: A defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he reached an agreement with the owner of the property in question to obtain that property under color of official right. Pp. 5–18.

(a) The general federal conspiracy statute, under which petitioner was convicted, makes it a crime to “conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States.” 18 U. S. C. §371. Section 371’s use
of the term “conspire” incorporates age-old principles of conspiracy law. And under established case law, the fundamental characteristic of a conspiracy is a joint commitment to an “endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of [the underlying substantive] criminal offense.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52, 65. A conspirator need not agree to commit the substantive offense—or

2 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus

even be capable of committing it—in order to be convicted. It is sufficient that the conspirator agreed that the underlying crime be committed by a member of the conspiracy capable of committing it. See
id., at 63–65; United States v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140; Gebardi v. United States, 287 U. S. 112. Pp. 5–10.

(b) These basic principles of conspiracy law resolve this case. To establish the alleged Hobbs Act conspiracy, the Government only needed to prove an agreement that some conspirator commit each element of the substantive offense. Petitioner and the shop owners reached just such an agreement: They shared a common purpose that petitioner and other police officers would obtain property “from another”—that is, from the shop owners—under color of official right. Pp. 10–14.

(c) Contrary to petitioner’s claims, this decision does not dissolve the distinction between extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion. Nor does it transform every bribe of a public official into a conspiracy
to commit extortion. And while petitioner exaggerates the impact of this decision, his argument would create serious practical problems. Under his approach, the validity of a charge of Hobbs Act conspiracy
would often depend on difficult property-law questions having little to do with culpability. Pp. 14–18.
750 F. 3d 399, affirmed.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.

MAJORITY OPINION:

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-361_db8e.pdf

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Although I agree w/ Justice Thomas' dissent; it matters not as the previously identified co-conspirators with Walsh as the lead purveyor of its continuance, followed by McCarron, Roger Newman, ex-judge Conboy, Bilello, Lebo, Cavanaugh - now Geiger, McGinnis & Cavanaugh along with McFly (McGorty) and Judge Jones and James Murphy as well as the Welfare Trust Fund Trustees & Fiduciaires are guilty under either the majority opinion or the dissenting opinion.

The majority opinion & order decided May 2, 2016 makes this prima-facie case of Criminal Racketeering and Hobbs Act Extortion for the ongoing 18-year old Blue Card Vacation Wage Extortion; morphed to the Illegal Working Dues Extortion under Walsh's illegally re-written & corrupt by-laws all the simpler for the simple minded and brain dead attorneys at the U.S. Attorneys Office for the S.D.N.Y.

Disguising the Hobbs Act Extortion as a refund for mandating Leaflet, Banner or Picket duty under a phony and illegal Federal District Court order wherein the Federal District Court and Judge Richard M. Berman ignore the NLRA Wagner Act (1935) with contempt and wherein Judge Berman places himself and the UBCJA General President and their phony agreement with the NYC District Council & the U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y. Consent Decree as voiding all U.S. law & all U.S. precedent wherein the laws text could not be clearer...a member has the right to refrain from any and all duty....; then Hobbs Act Racketeering charges must be filed by the Department of Justice against all the parties, the Consent Decree must be voided in its entirety and every insurer and re-insurer must be sued to the the limits of all their respective coverage limits and the NYCDCC must be placed into receivership.

Every attorney involved must be disbarred from the practice of law and that includes Judge Berman as well. He needs to be removed from the bench as being unfit to judge any case at any level.

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Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1
THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 14–361
SAMUEL OCASIO, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[May 2, 2016]
 JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.


Today the Court holds that an extortionist can conspire to commit extortion with the person whom he is extorting. See ante, at 18. This holding further exposes the flaw in this Court’s understanding of extortion. In my view, the Court started down the wrong path in Evans v. United States, 504 U. S. 255 (1992), which wrongly equated extortion with bribery. In so holding, Evans made it seem
plausible that an extortionist could conspire with his victim. Rather than embrace that view, I would not extend Evans’ errors further. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

I
The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to “obstruc[t], dela[y], or affec[t] commerce . . . by . . . extortion.” 18 U. S. C. §1951(a). The Act defines “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” §1951(b)(2). In Evans, this Court held that, to obtain a conviction for extortion “under color of official right,” the Government need show only “that a public official has obtained a payment
to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.” 504 U. S., at 268. The Court therefore interpreted “extortion” under the Hobbs Act to be “the rough equivalent of . . . ‘taking a


2 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES
THOMAS, J., dissenting

bribe.’” Id., at 260.
 
 I dissented in Evans because the Court’s holding disregarded the “definite and well-established meaning” of the “under color of official right” element of extortion. Id., at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘At common law it was essential that . . . money or property be obtained under color of office, that is, under the pretense that the officer was entitled thereto by virtue of his office. The money or thing received must have been claimed or accepted in right of office, and the person paying must have
yielded to official authority.’ ” Ibid. (quoting 3 R. Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure §1393, pp. 790–791 (1957); emphasis deleted). When Congress enacted the Hobbs Act in 1946, “the offense was [thus] understood to involve not merely a wrongful taking by a public official, but a wrongful taking under a false pretense of official right.” 504 U. S., at 281 (emphasis deleted).

Given the established meaning of under-color-of-official right extortion adopted in the Hobbs Act, the Court in Evans erred in equating common-law extortion with taking a bribe. Id., at 283. Bribery and extortion are different crimes. Ibid. With extortion, “the public official is the sole wrongdoer.” Ibid. Because the official “acts ‘under color of office,’ the law regards the payor as an innocent
victim and not an accomplice.” Ibid. An official who solicits or takes a bribe, by contrast, does not do so “under color of office”—that is, “under [a] pretense of official entitlement.” Ibid. With bribery, “the payor knows the recipient official is not entitled to the payment,” and “he, as well as the official, may be punished for the offense.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted).

II
 Relying on Evans’ definition of Hobbs Act extortion, see ante, at 2–3, 14, the Court holds that an extortionist can

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3
THOMAS, J., dissenting

conspire to commit extortion with the person whom he is extorting. Ante, at 10–11, 18. That holding is irreconcilable with a correct understanding of Hobbs Act extortion and needlessly extends Evans’ error to the conspiracy context. The general federal conspiracy statute makes it a crime for “two or more persons [to] conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States.” 18 U. S. C. §371. To be guilty of conspiracy to commit under-color-of-official right extortion, then, two or more persons must conspire to “obtai[n] . . . property from another, with his consent, induced . . . under color of official right.” §1951(b)(2). Under a correct understanding of Hobbs Act extortion, it is illogical and wrong to say that two people conspired to extort one of themselves. As explained, in a Hobbs Act extortion case, the only perpetrator is the public official; the payor is a victim and not a participant. See Evans, 504 U. S., at 283 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). That understanding is irreconcilable with the view that an extortionist and his payor-victim can be co-conspirators to extortion of the payor. If a payor conspires with a public official for the payor to pay that official, then—whatever the two can
be said to have done—they have not conspired to obtain payments to that official “under . . . pretense of official entitlement.” Ibid. The extortionist and payor both know that the official is not entitled to the payments as a matter of his office. They have not conspired to commit Hobbs Act extortion.

The record confirms that the scheme here did not involve extortion as the common law understood that crime. Far from victimizing repair-shop owners Alexis Moreno and Edwin Mejia, the allegedly extortionate scheme benefited them and their repair shop. Over time, 90% or more of the shop’s business came from paid-for referrals from police officers. Moreno and Mejia worked with Ocasio and other officers to maximize the shop’s profits from the

4 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES
THOMAS, J., dissenting

scheme. Moreno and Mejia both pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act extortion and conspiracy—belying any claim that they were innocent victims. The Government itself does not maintain that the repair-shop owners paid Ocasio based on his assertion of “a false pretense of official right to the payment[s].” Id., at 282 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The Government is instead emphatic that Moreno and Mejia “participated as full partners” in the scheme and that “[t]he record . . . refutes any suggestion that [they] were
the ‘victims’ of th[e] scheme.” Brief for United States 41. Whatever crime Ocasio may have committed, it was not a conspiracy to commit extortion. To be sure, the Court’s conclusion is plausible under Evans’ redefinition of extortion. But that is a reason not to extend Evans’ error. Only by blurring the distinction between bribery and extortion could Evans make it seem plausible that an extortionist and a victim can conspire to extort the victim. The Court today takes another step away from the common-law understanding of extortion that the Hobbs Act adopted.

III

The Court’s decision is unfortunate because it expands federal criminal liability in a way that conflicts with principles of federalism. Even when Evans was decided nearly 25 years ago, the Hobbs Act had already “served as the engine for a stunning expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction into a field traditionally policed by state and local laws—acts of public corruption by state and local officials.”
504 U. S., at 290 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). By disregarding the distinction between extortion and bribery, Evans expanded the Hobbs Act to allow federal prosecutors to reach more conduct by state and local government officials. See id., at 291–294. {so - this makes it far easier to nab Walsh & all his criminal pals noted above} That expansion was unwarranted. Congress had not made its intent to regulate state officials “unmistakably clear in the language of the” Hobbs

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 5
THOMAS, J., dissenting

Act, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), so this Court had no basis for reading the Hobbs Act so expansively. Evans, supra, at 291–292 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see Jones v. United States, 529 U. S. 848, 858 (2000) (“[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance in
the prosecution of crimes” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Today the Court again broadens the Hobbs Act’s reach to enable federal prosecutors to punish for conspiracy all participants in a public-official bribery scheme. The invasion of state sovereign functions is again substantial. The Federal Government can now more expansively charge state and local officials. And it can now more easily obtain pleas or convictions from these officials: Because the Government
can prosecute bribe-payors with sweeping conspiracy charges, it will be easier to induce those payors to
plead out and testify against state and local officials.
 {Great - PLEAD AWAY; provided the USAO or the USDOJ has the balls or brains to charge them! Quick Doug; time for some more hush (bribe) money} The Court thus further wrenches from States the presumptive control that they should have over their own officials’ wrongdoing.
 As in Evans, the Court cites no statutory text “clearly” authorizing this intrusion into matters presumptively left to the States. Jones, supra, at 858. As in Evans, there is no need for the Court’s overreach because state law already punishes the conduct at issue here. See Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §9–201 (2012) (punishing bribery of and bribery by a public official); cf. United States v. Brock, 501
F. 3d 762, 769 (CA6 2007) (“No one doubts that the States have criminal laws prohibiting their citizens from bribing public officials. [We cannot think of] any reason to doubt the States’ willingness to invoke these laws when their citizens engage in [a brazen bribery scheme]”). And, as in Evans, the Court reaches its decision with barely a nod to the sovereignty interests that it tramples. See ante, at

6 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES
THOMAS, J., dissenting

13–14, and n. 9 (summarily dismissing as “unavailing” Ocasio’s “invocation of . . . principles of federalism”). As in Evans, I cannot agree.
* * *
Consistent with the Hobbs Act’s text, I would hold that an extortionist cannot conspire to commit extortion with the person whom he is extorting. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment upholding Ocasio’s conspiracy conviction.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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All Criminal Racketeers & Extortionists are innocent until proven guilty; or are they Dennis?
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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE CO. v. KNOWLES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 11–1450. Argued January 7, 2013—Decided March 19, 2013


The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over class actions in which, among otherthings, the matter in controversy exceeds $5 million in sum or value, 28 U. S. C. §§1332(d)(2), (5), and provides that to determine whether a matter exceeds that amount the “claims of the individual class members must be aggregated,” §1332(d)(6). When respondentKnowles filed a proposed class action in Arkansas state court againstpetitioner Standard Fire Insurance Company, he stipulated that he and the class would seek less than $5 million in damages. Pointingto CAFA, petitioner removed the case to the Federal District Court,but it remanded to the state court, concluding that the amount in controversy fell below the CAFA threshold in light of Knowles’ stipulation, even though it found that the amount would have fallen above the threshold absent the stipulation. The Eighth Circuit declined to hear petitioner’s appeal.

Held: Knowles’ stipulation does not defeat federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Pp. 3−7.

(a)
Here, the precertification stipulation can tie Knowles’ hands because stipulations are binding on the party who makes them, see Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, 561 U. S. ___. However, the stipulation does notspeak for those Knowles purports to represent, for a plaintiff whofiles a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U. S. ___, ___. Because Knowles lacked authority to concede theamount in controversy for absent class members, the District Court wrongly concluded that his stipulation could overcome its finding that the CAFA jurisdictional threshold had been met. Pp. 3−4.

2 STANDARD FIRE INS. CO. v. KNOWLES
Syllabus

(b)
Knowles concedes that federal jurisdiction cannot be based oncontingent future events. Yet, because a stipulation must be binding and a named plaintiff cannot bind precertification class members, theamount he stipulated is in effect contingent. CAFA does not forbid a federal court to consider the possibility that a nonbinding, amountlimiting, stipulation may not survive the class certification process.To hold otherwise would, for CAFA jurisdictional purposes, treat a nonbinding stipulation as if it were binding, exalt form over substance, and run counter to CAFA’s objective: ensuring “Federal courtconsideration of interstate cases of national importance.” §2(b)(2),119 Stat. 5.

It may be simpler for a federal district court to value the amount incontroversy on the basis of a stipulation, but ignoring a nonbinding stipulation merely requires the federal judge to do what she must doin cases with no stipulation: aggregate the individual class members’claims. While individual plaintiffs may avoid removal to federalcourt by stipulating to amounts that fall below the federal jurisdictional threshold, the key characteristic of such stipulations—missinghere—is that they are legally binding on all plaintiffs. Pp. 4−7.
Vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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George - this one is for you. Read the entire post stem to stern & you will be able to file the charges.
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